



SKILLS DEVELOPMENT, THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT AND 















































This thesis is dedicated to  
 




















This thesis has been composed by myself from results of my own work, except where stated 














































Unemployment and underemployment, particularly among the youth, are serious concerns to 
governments across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Fifteen years on from the World Conference on 
Education For All (EFA) in Jomtien, EFA policies have started to result in some of the largest 
cohorts of primary school leavers ever witnessed in many parts of SSA. This is occurring at a 
time when SSA’s formal sector is unable to generate sufficient formal employment and income 
opportunities. The great majority of all school leavers, therefore, are obliged to enter the informal, 
micro-enterprise economy, urban and rural, and receive informal training in traditional 
apprenticeships and/or through other on-the-job means.  
 
However the links between education, training and enterprise are still poorly understood. This 
study presents an investigation into how young people construct and are able to navigate these 
pathways to informal self-employment in rural Ghana by acquiring skills and schooling from 
multiple sources, and through seeking assistance from informal networks. It makes a contribution 
not only to understanding the transition from training to self-employment, but also to the nature 
of the rural informal sector in Ghana.  
 
This study examines three types of skills training provision; on-the-job apprenticeship training, 
short-term modular training and longer-term pre-employment training, examining both the 
delivery context of these different training modalities, as well as the graduates’ labour market 
outcomes. The analysis is based on 12 months fieldwork in rural Ghana in 2004 and 2005 during 
which time multiple approaches were used to uncover these skill-to-work pathways; tracer studies 
with 162 vocational training graduates, semi-structured interviews with 160 apprentices and a 
household survey capturing data on 147 youth. Furthermore, retrospective interviews with 114 
enterprise owners were conducted to better understand pathways to informal self-employment 
and the multiple occupational realities, or occupational pluralism, of many of those in this rural 
African economy. This data suggests that the school-skill-enterprise relationship is highly 
dependent on the delivery context of training as well as the type of enabling or disabling 
environments within which the training is translated into employment outcomes.  
 
This study also includes an analysis of the long history of Ghana’s skills development policies 
and practice - up to 2006. This is integrated with a discussion on the wider environment within 
which skills are delivered, particularly the labour market, and how this impacts on the 
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Chapter 1: Research Context and Approach 
 
1.0. Introduction  
 
Africa’s young majority (King, McGrath, Nugent and Trudell, 2002) means that youth 
employment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a critical issue for governments, civil society and 
development partners alike (Guarcello, Manacorda, Rosati, Fares, Lyon and Valdivia, 2005; 
World Bank, 2006b). Failure to address this issue will have far-reaching ramifications for the 
economy and society (Guarcello et al., 2005). 
 
Fifteen years on from the World Conference on Education for All (EFA) in Jomtien, EFA policies 
have started to result in some of the largest cohorts of primary school leavers ever witnessed in a 
substantial numbers of countries. This is occurring at a time when the formal sector in SSA is 
unable to generate employment and income opportunities (indeed the formal economy in Africa 
is stagnating), in part a result of structural adjustment1 and the loss of what Ronald Dore once 
termed real jobs (Dore, 1976). The dilemma that most countries in SSA have following EFA is 
that there is “no possibility of offering employment for all” (King, 1997: 1). Therefore, the great 
majority of all school leavers are obliged to enter the informal, micro-enterprise economy, urban 
and rural. Furthermore the growth of the informal economy has been quickened by the increased 
rate of rural-urban migration and enlarging labour force (Blunch, Canagarajah and Raju, 2001). 
Governments, increasingly concerned with spiralling youth unemployment and the lack of post-
school opportunities, are looking to expand their technical and vocational education and training 
(TVET) sector (in school, in vocational training institutions (VTIs) and on-the-job) as a means to 
facilitate the transition to work. Indeed, a senior advisor of a large development partner (DP)2 
commented that of 
 
the initial drafts of the 10 year plans produced by 15 partner countries in SSA...  [a]ll of 
them included expansion of TVET primarily at the post-primary level. If this becomes a 
reality we might be seeing the biggest expansion of TVET since the 60s. (personal 
communication to King, 19.09.06) 
 
                                                 
1 The Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), implemented throughout Africa in the 1980s (starting in 
Ghana in 1983), led to government spending cut backs resulting in a stagnation of formal sector 
employment opportunities and the concomitant explosion of informal activities (chap.4).     
2 DP is the new name for a donor agency. 
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Therefore, one of the most critical issues facing both African youth and policy makers across the 
continent is the school-skill-enterprise relationship. But it is likely this relationship is highly 
dependent on context, or rather, on the factors that impact on how skills development is translated 
into skills utilisation and hence employment creation. Analytically this can be divided into two 
types of context:3 
 
• The delivery environment for skill acquisition - refers to factors that will ensure or inhibit 
the sustainable provision of a quality education and training system itself (e.g. the 
financing of education; availability of teachers and equipment); 
• The transformative environment for skills utilisation - refers to the enabling environment, 
outside of the education and training system, that is required to transform education and 
skills training into developmental outcomes (e.g. growth in the economy and availability 
of employment opportunities). 
 
Ghana represents an excellent case study of this trend: about 40% of the population was under 15 
years in 2003 (UNDP, 2005); the primary-level cohorts are increasing in size (table 1.1) and each 
year about 300,000 youth exit lower secondary school, with about a third of these progressing to 
further education;4 Ghana lacks formal employment prospects, with nine-tenths of the population 
working in the informal enterprise (farm and nonfarm);5 the government is increasingly seeing 
skills training (in school, in VTIs, in short-duration programmes and on-the-job) and the need to 
create an enabling environment for private sector development as critical areas. 
 
                                                 
3 The origin of this framework can be traced to discussions between the author, Kenneth King and Ruth 
Wedgwood about critical systems and the enabling environment for a research application to DFID in 
November 2003.  
4 Education specialist, World Bank Ghana, personal communication 27.07.06. 
5 It was research in Ghana by Keith Hart that first used the term ‘the informal sector’ (chap.2.1). 
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Table 1.1. Primary school enrolment figures in Ghana, 1986-2005


















2005 3,239,462  
* A World Bank (2004c: 145-147) report suggests the drop in enrolment in 2000 is due to the non-inclusion
that year of private school enrolments.  








During the 1960s and early 1970s, TVET was a high priority for many bilateral and multilateral 
agencies (King, 1991; Jones, 1992). From the very first World Bank education loan in 1963 up 
until the mid-1980s, funding diversified secondary education with prevocational streams became 
a high priority for the Bank - as a result of their view about the need to promote TVET in order to 
train people for jobs. Indeed during this period it “became the norm of education operations” 
(Psacharopoulos, 2006: 330). 
 
However, the mid-1980s marked a turning point in Bank policy regarding the usefulness of 
diversified education. Firstly the new rate-of-return studies claimed to show that primary 
education provided the highest returns (e.g. Psacharopoulos, 1980). And secondly, a study on 
World Bank-supported attempts to diversify secondary education in Columbia and Tanzania 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed history of World Bank and ILO support to skills training, see King and Palmer 
(2006b). 
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found that the higher costs of such education were not reflected in higher private or social returns 
(cf. Psacharopoulos and Loxley, 1985). The evidence suggested that diversified schooling was 
“no more effective than academic secondary education in enabling graduates to enter wage or 
self-employment” (World Bank, 1991: 9).7 
 
While Bank policy remained critical of vocationalised secondary education, it remained popular 
for many national governments during the late eighties and nineties – e.g. Kenya, Ghana and 
South East Asia (King and Palmer, 2006b). 
 
In the 1980s, the ILO began to emphasise the importance of training for the informal sector (cf. 
Fluitman, 1989; ILO, 1985; 1988; 1990). However, since 1990 and the World Conference on EFA 
the attention of international development agencies has become increasingly focused on primary 
education, a focus that has become set in the time-bound targets of the MDGs. The focus on basic, 
and especially primary, education has contributed to the neglect of post-basic education and 
training (King and Palmer, 2006c; Palmer, 2005b; c; World Bank, 2004a). Interest in skills 
development has suffered as a result of the focus on other development goals (Fluitman, 2005). 
Indeed, the international neglect of skills development in developing countries is underlined by its 
absence in the MDGs. Similarly, the neglect of skills development is seen in many poverty 
reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) where, as far as education and training are concerned, UPE is 
prioritised (Bennell, 1999; Caillods, 2003; ILO, 2003a).  
 
In spite of this focus on basic education during the 1990s, the World Bank did produce an 
influential policy paper on TVET in 1991 (World Bank, 1991) and a related book in 1993 
(Middleton, Ziderman, and Adams, 1993). But between 1993 and 2004, when the World Bank 
published its Skills Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (2004a), there was a relative absence of 
research in this area. 
 
In the last few years, however, there is growing concern among DPs that the MDGs are being 
interpreted in a more restrictive way than what was agreed at Dakar and Jomtien (e.g. UNESCO-
                                                 
7 There have been serious reservations about both Psacharopoulos and Loxley’s original research and their 
subsequent generalisations. Jain (1991) argued that Psacharopoulos’s methodology and data can support a 
significantly different conclusion. McGrath, King, Leach and Carr-Hill (1995) point out that 
Psacharopoulos and Loxley’s research applies only to the weak version (King, 1987) of school-based 
vocational education. This weak version of vocationalisation involves an orientation to vocational trades as 
part of general education, as compared to the strong version which involves heavy specialization in 
vocational subjects in separate schools or streams (McGrath et al., 1995). 
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IIEP, 2004). The Dakar, and especially the Jomtien, agreements made skills development a much 
more explicit priority. The six Dakar goals included the goal of “ensuring that the learning needs 
of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-
skills programmes” (UNESCO, 2000). At Jomtien, the World Declaration included “skills 
training, apprenticeships, and formal and non-formal education programmes” (WCEFA, 1990: 
article 5).8  
 
Indeed, “[c]urrent international policy debates demonstrate the need for an expanded vision of 
EFA, closer to the spirit of Jomtien” (UNESCO-IIEP, 2004: 78). For example, the World Summit 
(September 2005) sees a widening of the MDGs to include TVET, secondary, and higher 
education (UN, 2005: 11). Moreover, a whole series of international documents (e.g. Commission 
for Africa, 2005; UN Millennium Project, 2005; World Bank, 2002, 2004a, 2005a) point towards 
the importance of a holistic, inter-sectoral approach to the whole of the education and training 
domain if countries are to reach the MDGs (Beveridge, King, Palmer and Wedgwood, 2005). 
 
Even agencies that have long been associated with supporting primary education are increasingly 
of the view that “there is also a growing need to invest in secondary and higher education and 
vocational skills training” (DFID, 2006b: 76; cf. DFID, 2006a). 
 
1.1.2. Education for all, formal jobs for some and informal micro-enterprise for most 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Post-independence history indicates that parental commitment to primary school attendance for 
all their children will depend on some clear evidence of improved opportunities for skills 
development and/or formal post-basic access on the one hand, and equally evidence of a 
relationship between basic education and decent work through increased income generation in 
micro- and small-enterprises (MSEs) on the other. The sustainability of the current unparalleled 
investments in basic education will be determined by such evidence. The next few years’ 
experience of the quality  and outcomes of EFA will determine whether the massive numbers of 
poor, first generation school-attenders and their families will continue their new commitment to 
schooling. 
 
                                                 
8 None of the EFA Global Monitoring Reports have focused on skills training to date.  
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While basic education discourse in SSA has focused on quantity and quality of service provision, 
there has not been sufficient discussion of labour market outcomes. But the issue of what happens 
next to these school graduates is crucial. Politically the massive costs of universal primary 
education (UPE) and EFA need to be able to answer the question: EFA for what? That is not to 
say that the EFA-for-what question is new (King and McGrath, 1999b), but simply that the 
urgency of the question is becoming more of a concern for governments and development 
partners alike. Indeed, the inescapable interconnectedness of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) on Poverty (Target 1), Education (Target 3) and Decent and Productive Work (Target 
16), point both to the urgent need to examine possible synergies between these areas, and to the 
immediate post-school outcomes of EFA cohorts. However, the MDGs offer only a narrow 
agenda for combating these critical employment issues – over-emphasising primary education 
and making no mention of the crucially important informal employment activities or skills 
training initiatives. 
 
In SSA it is estimated that the informal micro-enterprise (IME) sector is responsible for over 90% 
of all new jobs (Chen, 2001; Commission for Africa, 2005), or as much as 85% of total 
employment, according to the World Bank (2004a; 2005a).  
 
In the past these MSEs were often seen as largely characterised by low productivity and poverty 
(Kilby, 1969; Ninsin, 1991) and there were doubts about their ability to continue to create 
employment (House, 1984; Simon, 1984; ILO/JASPA, 1985; Preston-Whyte, 1991).9 
 
In the last two decades there has been a rapid growth in IME sector, especially in rural areas 
(Jeans, 1999; Kilby, 1986 in Livingstone, 1997; King and McGrath, 1999a; Liedholm and Mead, 
1999), and since the 1990s a concomitant heightened interest in its potential to assist in poverty 
reduction. The dominant contemporary view of governments, planners, donors and academics is 
that IMEs are “the backbone of many developing economies” (Haan, 2001: 167).10 Indeed 
empirical evidence suggests that the informal sector in SSA is important for economic growth 
(ILO, 2002; Livingstone, 1997; Xaba, Horn and Motala, 2002) and it is now directly linked to the 
main objectives of development; increased production, employment and wealth creation, and as a 
key ingredient in poverty reduction (Afrisat, 1997; Akpalu and Bhasin, 2001; Bagachwa, 1997; 
                                                 
9 See Palmer (2004b: 29-31) for a discussion on the origins of this negative perception of the informal 
economy. 
10 See Palmer (2004b: 31-33) for a discussion on the positive perception of the informal economy. 
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Commission for Africa, 2005; Daniels, 1999; DFID, 2000; Dijk, 1997; ILO, 1972; King and 
McGrath, 1999a; Livingstone, 1991; 1997; Mamman, 2003; Webster and Fidler, 1996; World 
Bank, 2004a). The importance of informal MSEs to the economic and social development of 
Africa is “almost undisputed” (Rogerson, 2001: 115). 
 
1.1.3. Informal micro-enterprise (IME) 
 
Micro-enterprises in developing countries, including Ghana, are usually defined as comprising 
less than 10 workers (Aryeetey, Baah-Nuakoh, Duggleby, Hettige and Steel, 1994; Aryeetey, 
1996; Boapeah, 1996; Liedholm, 1991; Liedholm and Mead, 1999; Livingstone, 1991; Rhyne and 
Otero, 1994). 
 
The working definition of IME for this research is that they are any farm or nonfarm income-
generating activity (full-time or part-time), operated from the home (cf. Chen, Sebstad, and 
O’Connell, 1999) or outside (from a stall, on the street or on the farm), constituting 1-9 workers 
(inclusive of the owner-worker and apprentices), who are either paid or non-paid (cf. Livingstone, 
1991). The micro-enterprise spectrum is defined as a continuum between the more survivalist 
trading (bogyuwa-bogyuwa),11 manufacturing and farming activities at one end and the more 
dynamic enterprises at the other (cf. McGrath, et al., 1995).        
 
The IME sector can be further subdivided into micro-manufacturing, trading, repair, transport, 
financial, ICT and agricultural enterprises (chap.2.2.2). 
 
The emphasis of this study will be on micro-manufacturing enterprises, though occupational 
pluralism (chap.2.3.1) is also investigated.    
 
1.2. Research rationale and research questions 
 
1.2.1. Contribution to theory and gaps in the literature 
 
This research will contribute to the informal sector literature. Firstly, it contributes to the 
knowledge about (training for, and pathways to) IME in rural areas (work on this still suffers from 
                                                 
11 In Ghana, trading micro-enterprises are sometimes referred to as bogyuwa-bogyuwa (petty trading). 
 28 
urban bias, e.g. Haan, 2006). Secondly, since the informal sector is often conceptualised as a 
decontextualised phenomenon – without reference to “the context of the specific historical, 
political and social aspects of the country or region in question”  (Blunch et al., 2001: 8) - this 
study will contribute to the contextualisation of the informal sector in Ghana. Thirdly it will 
emphasise the importance of occupational pluralism as an element of the informal sector, a 
concept which challenges the traditional proliferation of dualisms, or oppositional categories: e.g. 
employed/unemployed; farm/nonfarm; formal/informal. 
 
There is a large amount of the literature on rural nonfarm activities (Bagachwa, 1997; 
Canagarajaha, Newman, and Bhattamishra, 2001; Ellis, 1998; FAO, 1998; Haggblade and 
Liedholm, 1991; Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001; Newman, and Sudharshan, 2000; Reardon, 1997; 
Reardon, Berdegue and Escobar, 2001; Start, 2001) and their role in rural employment and 
deagrarianisation (Bryceson, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 2002a, 2004). This rural nonfarm literature is 
usually taken as synonymous with the literature on the rural informal economy (Bagachwa, 
1997). While there is a literature on farm activities and farm-nonfarm relationships (Kilby, 
Liedholm and Meyer, 1984; Livingstone, 1991), the importance of occupational pluralism (pluri-
activity) and its relationship with the farm-nonfarm divide has not been sufficiently stressed 
despite it not being a new concept (see Mureithi, 1973). This research contributes to the 
understanding of occupational pluralism.  
 
There is a long running (and heavily contested, e.g. Bennell, 1996a) literature examining 
quantitatively the relationship between education and incomes in wage-employment in 
developing countries (e.g. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). Similarly, quantitative studies 
regarding the effects of schooling on farm outcomes are common (e.g. Lockheed, Jamison and 
Lau, 1980). However, such studies regarding the effects of schooling on nonfarm outcomes are 
less so (but see Moock, Musgrove and Stelcner, 1990; Vijverberg, 1995; 1999) and even fewer 
quantitatively-orientated authors look simultaneously at effects of schooling on both farm and 
nonfarm activities (but see Jolliffe, 1996; 2002; 2004).12 It is not within the scope of this thesis to 
review these kinds of studies for Ghana. In fact, this has been done earlier (Palmer, 2006a). On 
the qualitative side, there is quite a well developed literature examining the impact of education 
on nonfarm informal employment (e.g. Afenyadu, King, McGrath, Oketch, Rogerson and Visser, 
1999; Aryee, 1976; King, 1977, 1980, 1996; McGrath et al., 1995; Muskin, 1997). However, the 
                                                 
12 This is, in part, due to the methodological difficulties associated with calculating income for those self-
employed in nonfarm enterprise (see Glewwe, 2002). 
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issue of formal schooling followed by (multiple forms of) vocational skills acquisition and the 
subsequent link from skills training to enterprise has hardly been developed in the literature. This 
study aims to fill this gap. 
 
Moreover, in much of the quantitative literature, the standard years of schooling measure says 
nothing about the quality of the delivery context of education and training. And yet this is a 
crucial issue (UNESCO, 2004). This research will examine in detail the delivery context of 
training programmes and, in so doing, disaggregate this environment and emphasise the 
importance of knowing more than simply how many years of training an individual received.      
 
The research also contributes to the understanding of the transition from training to self-
employment which, at present “remains unclear” (Haan, 2006: 3).   
 
1.2.2. Contribution to policy 
 
For development partners, researching the outcomes beyond EFA is becoming more of a priority 
area as 2015 approaches. USAID is increasingly talking more about school-to-career transitions 
and DFID, in late 2005, set up three Education Research Programme Consortia (RPCs) one of 
which is examining educational outcomes.13 DFID is now actively thinking about the link 
between education, training and work and is keen for more information in this area (Desmond 
Birmingham, Head of Profession, DFID, personal communication 14.09.05).14  
 
In most of SSA, poverty is most prevalent in rural areas and hence there is an ongoing need to 
better understand how to meet the needs of the rural poor (IFAD, 2004; World Bank, 2003). The 
focus of this thesis on training and IME in rural areas will contribute to this understanding.  
 
The GoG has stated its desire to create an enabling environment for private sector development 
(GoG, 2003a; GoG, 2005a) and has been increasingly involved in financing skills training and 
youth employment programmes (chap.5). Moreover in 2005 the President announced the 
intention to formalise the informal sector and an informal sector survey is underway during 2006-
                                                 
13 See http://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/RECOUP/index.html 
14 As a contributor to the RPC on Outcomes (see below) I am in a good position to feed my thesis findings 
into the RPC, and through that to DFID.   
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07. My thesis, therefore, is timely and will further the understanding of these highly topical 
issues. 
 
1.2.3 Research questions, objectives and structure of thesis 
 
This thesis examines the interaction amongst school, skill and enterprise in rural Ghana; though 
focus is on the relationship between skills training and informal micro-enterprise. With the 
research rationale in mind (chap.1.2.1&1.2.2), the main research questions, therefore, are: 
 
1. What has been the history of the interaction amongst school, skills development and 
informal micro-enterprise policy and practice in Ghana? 
2. How do Ghanaian youth, especially those in rural areas, acquire vocational skills and 
create pathways to informal micro-enterprise?  
3. How does the delivery environment for skill acquisition and the transformative 
environment for skills utilisation relate to 1. and 2. above? 
4. How can an examination of these questions add to the theoretical understanding of these 
matters? 
 
In order to answer these questions, this study pursues the following objectives: 
• To revisit a conceptualisation of the informal economy, and to rethink this debate that has 
hitherto been focused on an urban perspective; 
• To analyse the dynamic relationship between schooling, skills training and work in historical 
context in Ghana; 
• To analyse the delivery environment of three kinds of skills development programmes – all 
aimed at informal micro-enterprise (especially in rural areas):  informal enterprise-based 
training in apprenticeship, short-term modular training and longer-term pre-employment 
training; 
• To analyse the pathways to work in informal micro-enterprise from these three kinds of skills 
development programmes; 
• To assess the extent to which skills acquired by graduates of these training programmes are 
utilised in the labour market and the types of enabling and disabling environments that impact 
on these labour market outcomes. 
 
This chapter sets the context for the thesis and explores the methodological approach used. 
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Chapter two focuses on the enterprise component of the school-skill-enterprise link and rethinks 
some traditional conceptualisations in light of the occupational pluralism, or pluri-activity, of 
large segments of Africa’s population, for example with regard to the farm-nonfarm divide. It 
also examines the urban bias that has characterised the literature on the informal sector. 
 
Chapter three examines some of the assumptions and challenges of the school-skill-enterprise 
link arising from current thinking in the areas of skills development, enabling environments and 
pathways to self-employment. 
 
Chapter four explores the history of policy and practice vis-à-vis skills development, work and 
enterprise in the Gold Coast/Ghana from the early nineteenth century to 2000. It examines the 
remarkable consistency in the way TVET has been revived as the solution to un/under-
employment over the decades from the early colonial period to the present. 
 
Chapter five explores skills development and informal micro-enterprise policy and practice 
within the new political context, 2001-2006. 
 
Chapter six, using a case study of an institution-based pre-employment skills training programme 
(the Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills, ICCES), analyses both the delivery 
context of training and graduates’ pathway to work. 
 
Chapter seven examines two other types of skills acquisition modalities and presents new 
evidence on these programmes: traditional apprenticeship training in rural areas and a short-
duration modular skills programme. 
 
Chapter eight analyses retrospective interviews with MSE owners, looking at their education and 
training pathways and their entry into self-employment.   
 
Chapter nine concludes the thesis by covering three major issues: first, it re-examines the 
assumptions of Ghanaian skills development agenda (chapters 4 and 5) and positions this both in 
relation to access and equity issues, but also to the larger macro-economic dynamics; second, it 
comments on the skills development programmes and pathways to rural informal micro-
enterprise identified in chapters 6, 7 and 8; lastly, it outlines some theoretical concerns arising 
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from the study (particularly in relation to chapters 2 and 3) and the new research challenges that 
this study’s findings suggest. 
 
1.3. Methodology  
 
I first went to Ghana in 2001 as a volunteer, having requested to the volunteer agency that I be 
placed ‘with a tree-planting NGO, somewhere rural, with no electricity or running water’. On 
arrival I found myself in a vocational training centre (ICCES) in rural Ashanti but, having had 
three out of my four requests granted I saw no reason to move. And so my interest in rural 
vocational training began.  
 
It was by chance that my first arrival in Ghana, in January 2001, coincided with a change of 
government (chap.5) and the taking up of office of the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Trotro 
(minibus) passengers were alive with the expected ‘positive change’ that many believed would be 
seen quickly.15     
 
In early 2002, just after returning from my first 11-month visit to Ghana, I visited the Centre of 
African Studies (CAS) in Edinburgh to discuss my application for the MSc/PhD. Having been 
working closely with ICCES I was keen to understand more about what the youth that had 
received this type of skills training were doing after they left. While aware of the problems faced 
by ICCES, at that time I had never heard of Philip Foster and was largely uncritical of the idea 
that pre-employment training might not be the best way for youth to acquire ‘employable’ skills. I 
later returned to Ghana in 2002 (for 3 months work with ICCES) and 2003 (for 2 months MSc 
fieldwork on IME financing – see Palmer, 2004a). Prior to starting the PhD, therefore, I had some 
sixteen months of experience in rural Ashanti. The focus area for my PhD developed both from 
my work experience in ICCES and from my MSc research. 
 
For research of this type, that involved a year of fieldwork with multiple questionnaires, 
interviews, impromptu discussions and secondary analysis, it is impossible to briefly discuss the 
methodology used since much essential information would be lost. Due to the desire that the 
thesis would flow clearly, it was considered necessary to include a methodology overview in the 
main text, and allow for a more detailed discussion of some aspects of the research in Appendices 
A-D.  
                                                 
15 ‘Positive change’ is the slogan of the NPP. 
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The research was based on twelve months fieldwork in rural Ashanti (2004-05), during which 
time multiple approaches were used to uncover skill-to-work pathways: i) retrospective 
interviews with 114 masters in rural manufacturing enterprises (chap.8); ii) interviews with 160 
traditional apprentices (chap.7); iii) questionnaires, interviews and focus groups with 162 
graduates from 7 vocational training centres (chap.6); iv) a basic household survey (81 
households) in one rural community (involving a wealth-ranking and mapping exercise) that 
captured data on 147 youth in the labour market (Appendix C); v) interviews with other key 
informants (e.g. village, district and national officials, as well as DP officials); and, vi) informal 
(participant) observation of education, skills and enterprises in rural communities. 
 
The research design adopted a multi-disciplinary approach and was intentionally as reflexive as 
possible. This allowed the design to evolve as both ideas and thoughts changed and as unforeseen 
constraints arose.   
 
Despite the difficulty of collecting quantitative data regarding the informal sector and the 
unreliability of official data, the research design chose to combine both quantitative and 
qualitative methods (questionnaires, interviews and discussions), an approach that proved highly 
successful during previous MSc fieldwork in Ghana (Palmer, 2004a). This triangulation of data 
has a number of well-known strengths and weaknesses that should be noted (Appendix D.2.3). 
 
1.3.1. Literature reviews and balancing consultancy and academic research 
 
A comprehensive review was undertaken of two sets of relevant literature concerned with: i) 
education and skills development; ii) informal sector, livelihoods and MSE development. This 
allowed for initial choices to be made that had to satisfy audiences the research was robust and 
valid.  
 
This resulted in an early paper (pp.105) on the informal economy (Palmer, 2004b) which, 
together with the author’s revised Masters’ dissertation on rural IME financing (Palmer, 2004a) 
provided a solid foundation for this thesis.  
 
Between 2004-2006, I was involved in some consultancy research directly related to the topic of 
this thesis. The largest of these was a DFID-funded project examining the contribution of post-
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basic education and training to poverty reduction (Palmer, Wedgwood, Hayman, King and Thin, 
2007).16 As a result of this project I (co-)wrote a number of papers related to skills and education 
(King and Palmer, 2006a, b, c; King, Palmer and Hayman, 2005; Palmer, 2005a, b, c – see 
bibliography). In 2006, I become involved in a DFID-funded RPC examining the outcomes of 
education and have produced some papers connected to this (see Ayamdoo, Casely-Hayford, 
Palmer and Thompson (2006) and Palmer (2006a, b)).17 
  
It has been difficult at times to maintain an appropriate balance between consultancy research and 
the demands of academic doctoral research, but the opportunity to be part of these research 
exercises on highly relevant topics – and the opportunity to publish and co-author both policy-
orientated and academic papers, in addition to the access to key policy and academic personnel 
that these research exercises have offered - has undoubtedly enriched my own thesis. Whilst the 
consultancy research has been on similar topics, I have consistently been careful not to include in 
these papers fieldwork from my PhD. While the depth of my knowledge has increased 
significantly as a result of doing these extra pieces of research, my thesis is, of course, an entirely 
new piece of work. Moreover I have been careful to ensure that this consultancy research 
complements my academic focus (McGrath, 1995).  
 
1.3.2. Choice and description of location 
 
As noted above, before starting my Masters or PhD, I worked for fourteen months for a rural 
skills training programme in Ghana (ICCES), based primarily at village level in Atwima 
District.18 Given the difficulty of researching the informal sector, as well as the financial 
constraints PhD fieldwork operates within, I considered it far better to return to an area where I 
had excellent access, excellent contacts and over 14 months of prior experience. These contacts 
and my ability to demonstrate previous insider status allowed me to gain greater access to 
individuals, situations, events, places and documents (Agar 1996). This prior knowledge also 
improved the efficiency with which I was able to undertake the fieldwork, and it gave me the 
advantage of knowing about the socio-cultural framework of the communities – even before I 
commenced my fieldwork. With this background, the study sites were chosen as I knew that the 
                                                 
16 See http://www.cas.ed.ac.uk/research/projects.html 
17 Palmer (2006a) is essentially a review and critique of the economic literature that links education, skills 
and labour market outcomes. 
18 During this time I worked mainly in one rural ICCES centre, but also did work at the regional level in 
Ashanti. In 2004 Atwima District split into two and became Atwima Mponua and Atwima Nwabiagya 
Districts. 
 35 
different skill modalities I intended to investigate in this research (informal enterprise-based 
training in apprenticeship, short-term modular training and longer-term pre-employment 
training), as well as numerous MSEs, could all be found in these locations.    
 
The bulk of the research was conducted in Atwima Mponua District (fig.1.1) in Otaakrom village 
and the district capital, Nyinahin. A third site was the (neighbouring) district capital of Bibiani - 
just 10km from Otaakrom (fig.1.2). The interviews with masters and apprentices took place in all 
three locations, while the household survey was only in Otaakrom. Much of the detailed 
understanding of ICCES came from Otaakrom, though this was supplemented with data from six 
other centres.    
 
Fig.1.1. Ashanti Region, showing Atwima Mponua District  
 


























Nyinahin is the capital of the newly created (August 2004) Atwina Mponua District and has a 
population of about 8000. The main occupation is agriculture; both cash crops (cocoa, oil palm) 
and Chop(food)-crops (yam, coco-yam, plantain, cassava, maize). Wage-employment 
opportunities exist in the district assembly, the hospital, post-office and schools. Nyinahin has 
large bauxite deposits and a mine is expected to open before 2010 which will offer youth with 
National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) certificates (or higher) increased wage-
employment opportunities. Nyinahin has both electricity (since 1999) and pipe-borne-water (a 
new water pumping station was installed in the late 1990s), though sanitation remains a problem. 
Electricity allowed new types of enterprises to start-up (e.g. in telecommunications, welding etc.). 
Nyinahin’s health centre was upgraded to a hospital in the late 1990s and it is served by a rural 
bank and post-office. There is a senior secondary school (SSS) (though it suffers from a lack of 
teachers) as well as numerous junior secondary (JSS) and primary schools and kindergartens 
                                                 
19 The data in the following three paragraphs draws both on personal experience (2001-2004), fieldwork 
(2005/6) and UNDP/NDPC (2004). 
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(KG). Apprenticeship training in informal enterprises is also common. The roads within Nyinahin 
have been rehabilitated and the main road to Kumasi has been resurfaced with asphalt (completed 
2006). About 25% of households in Nyinahin are classified as poor.  
 
Otaakrom 
The population of Otaakrom is approximately 2000. It is located about 75km west of Kumasi. 
The village is predominantly reliant on agricultural produce; both cash crops (principally cocoa) 
and chop-crops (see above). The only waged-employment in Otaakrom consists of the teachers, 
an agricultural officer, the nurse and a few logging-company employees. It is not a well-off area: 
the author’s household survey conducted in 2005 suggested that over 40% of households can be 
regarded as poor/very-poor (chap.2.3.3).20 Educational facilities include: two public JSS, two 
public primary schools, two private KGs, and a public VTI (ICCES). The nearest SSSs are in 
Nyinahin and Bibiani. There are also a number of local artisans that train youths within a 
traditional apprenticeship framework. There is no pipe-borne-water, bank or post-office. 
However, Otaakrom has good transport links (located on a new (2006) asphalt road between 
Kumasi and Bibiani and is served by a public bus service and private trotro minibuses) and in 
2003 got mains electricity. In addition, it has a small clinic and public communication centre (and 
mobile space-to-space telephone).21 As a result of the electricity new enterprises are opening up 
in the village (e.g. a radio repairer) and existing enterprises are able to use new types of 
equipment (e.g. hairdressers using an electric dryer). 
 
Bibiani 
Bibiani is the capital of Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai (BAB) District. It has a population of about 
22,000 and is located 88km west of Kumasi. Agriculture is the main occupation (principally 
cassava, yam, plantain, cocoyam) though petty-trading and artisanal enterprises are widespread in 
Bibiani. Wage-employment exists in the gold mine (Ashanti Goldfields Bibiani Ltd.), various 
logging companies, as well as in the district assembly, hospital and schools. Educational facilities 
include a public Secondary Technical School, JSSs, primary schools, KGs and apprenticeship 
training in informal enterprises. Bibiani has had both electricity and pipe-borne-water for the last 
decade and has a government hospital, post-office and telecommunications facilities. Road links 
                                                 
20 This is similar to the rural average of 38% for this district (UNDP/NDPC, 2004). See Appendix C for a 
description of what poor means in Otaakrom and more information on the household survey. 
21 See chap.2.2.2. 
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around Bibiani are good (due to the presence of the gold mine), but in BAB District as a whole 
most roads are unpaved.  
 
The three sites 
This area has, over the last thirty years, seen a considerable decline in the percentage of the 
population working in agriculture. While it continues to be the main source of livelihood for the 
majority, for many of the youth it is no longer their primary activity. Nonfarm activities are 
increasing among the youth, and migration to larger settlements in search of employment or 
education/training is also a common strategy. Poverty indicators suggest that this area lags behind 
the national situation (UNDP/NDPC, 2004). 
 
Bibiani is the most dynamic enterprise setting out of the three. This can be seen, for example, in 
the average number of apprentices per enterprise: while Bibiani has, on average, 4.2 apprentices 
per enterprise, Nyinahin only has 2.3 and Otaakrom 1.5. While one-person enterprises make up 
62% of all enterprises in Otaakrom, in Nyinahin and Bibiani 33% and 4% respectively are one-
person ventures. The presence of electricity for the last decade in Bibiani has meant that, 
compared to Nyinahin, more enterprises requiring electricity can be found here compared to 
Nyinahin or Otaakrom (Appendix A). 
 
1.3.3. Timing of research and research strategy 
 
The research took place for twelve months between 2005/06. To avoid development tourism 
(Chambers, 1983: 11), the phenomenon of a brief rural visit, I lived in Otaakrom village for the 
duration of the fieldwork. This was convenient since it was between Nyinahin and Bibiani 
(fig.1.2). This meant finding somewhere to live in town, taking time to talk to people, going to 
funerals with friends and, as Dingwall (1997) puts it, “hanging out” (p.53). The impromptu 
discussions that resulted allowed a more holistic understanding of rural livelihoods. This was 
invaluable since it is not possible to study anything in isolation (Tripp, 1997). Moreover, I was 
able to continue to work in the village ICCES centre and hence participated in, and observed, day 






1.3.4. Main approaches used (see Appendix D for supplementary approaches used) 
 
The enterprise data (see also chap.7 and 8) 
i) Retrospective interviews with 114 masters in different rural manufacturing enterprises. 
Retrospective interviews were chosen as they allowed me to trace the life-history of the owner 
backwards and to find out about the type of education and skills acquired and how they made the 
transition into self-employment. In the three localities, enterprises were mapped with the 
assistance of local VTI instructors. These local actors were able to point out the majority of store, 
street and home-based enterprises. Since I wanted to look at training enterprises and trade areas 
that were also taught in the ICCES, the focus was on dressmaking and carpentry enterprises, 
though other enterprises were also included. For example, it soon became apparent that large 
numbers of hairdressing enterprises were operating in these localities, training large numbers of 
apprentices. Basic semi-structured questionnaires (Appendix A.2) were used to guide the 
interviews, and space was given for additional probing questions. Each interview lasted about 30 
minutes.  
  
ii) Interviews with 160 traditional apprentices. Traditional apprenticeship training was chosen for 
examination since it represents the most widespread skills training modality in Ghana. In each 
enterprise a maximum of 2 apprentices were interviewed (again using a semi-structured 
questionnaire, Appendix A.3). While some enterprises had no apprentices, overall the 114 
enterprises had a total of 347 apprentices making the sample of 160 almost 50% of the total 
number of apprentices.  
 
The data on skills training providers 
iii) Questionnaires, interviews and focus groups with 162 graduates from 7 vocational training 
centres. Two types of questionnaires were used (Appendix B) to collect data: one was answered 
directly by ICCES graduates, while in the other centre managers and instructors were asked about 
the current activity of graduates. This approach is discussed elsewhere (chap.6). ICCES was 
selected as a case study as it has, as a central concept, the idea of training youth for self-
employment using pre-employment training in formal VTIs. This is unusual. Moreover, it has not 
been studied by other researchers before and the author’s strong contact with ICCES since 




The household survey data 
iv) A basic household survey (81 households) in one rural community (involving a wealth-
ranking and mapping exercise) that captured data on 147 youth in the labour market. This survey 
sought to get information on: youth in Otaakrom (aged 14-25) regarding their education/skills 
background, their current activities and migration patterns; the occupational pluralism of 
households; and, the poverty/wealth categories of households in order to look for trends. This 
household survey involved multiple stages (Appendix C): i) interviews in 21 households to 
establish poverty/wealth categories; ii) household mapping of the entire village by agreed 
poverty/wealth categories; iii) random sampling of 81 households and basic questionnaire 
(Appendix C.5) administered in each household.  
 
1.4. Conclusion   
 
This chapter has set the context and questions for the thesis. The following two chapters examine 
the international literature and interrogate some of the concepts and theoretical concerns related 
to the school-skill-enterprise link. The next chapter (2) focuses on the enterprise component of 



















Chapter 2: Micro-Enterprise and Occupational Pluralism: Rethinking Urban Bias 




This chapter focuses on the enterprise component of the school-skill-enterprise link and rethinks 
the farm-nonfarm conceptualisation in light of the occupational pluralism, or pluri-activity, of 
large segments of the Africa’s population. Furthermore it examines the rural dimension to the 
informal sector.  
 
The first section examines the informal sector in historical perspective, examining how the 
concept became shaped by key actors and events and noting briefly the way it is currently 
defined. The second section focuses on the rural informal sector, examining the farm-nonfarm 
divide and how the composition of the rural informal sector is changing as a result of de-
agrarianisation. The final section explores a re-conceptualisation of work in SSA; it argues that, 
as a result of occupational pluralism, the dichotomous occupational categorisation so common in 
labour market statistics is misleading. It concludes with implications for the skill-to-enterprise 
link beyond the farm-nonfarm divide. 
 
2.1. The history of the informal sector concept 
 
Given that the concept of the informal sector is over thirty years old, it is not surprising that it has 
been used to mean different things by different analysts (Mead and Morrisson, 1996). This is 
evidenced in the large number of terms that have been used to describe the informal economy (cf. 
Palmer, 2004b): e.g. the unregulated or unenumerated sector; the Jua Kali sector (King, 1996); or 
the micro-enterprise sector (Bagachwa, 1997; Livingstone, 1991; Webster and Fidler, 1996).  
 
It has been claimed (e.g. Bromley, 1978) that the informal/formal economy dualism was simply a 
spin-off of the dual economy literature of the 1950s (cf. Lewis, 1954). But the idea also has 
origins in research work done in numerous countries: for example Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana. 
 
                                                 
22 For more detail on the history and conceptualisation of the informal economy see the occasional paper 
(pp.105) that was written as part of this doctoral research (Palmer, 2004b). 
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In Kenya the East African Royal Commission (EARC) of 1953-55 recognised the clusters of small 
enterprise activities on the outskirts of Nairobi - that would later fall under the informal sector 
concept - as “important as centres of African trade” (EARC, 1955, cited in King, 1996: 4). The 
African businessmen (Marris and Somerset, 1971), based on fieldwork 1966-1967, also 
highlighted the importance of small enterprises in Kenya.23 Later the 1966 Report to the Kericho 
Conference in Kenya described what would later be termed that informal sector as a sector where 
the unemployed “eke out an existence as casual labourers, stall-holders, beggars and petty thieves” 
(Harbison, 1967, cited in King, 1996: 5) with activities also including “petty barter trade and 
traditional crafts” (ibid.). This negative view contrasts with the positive view of the ILO (1972) a 
few years later.  
 
In 1972, just before the publication of the ILO Kenya report, Steele presented his idea of an 
intermediate sector (Steele, 1972) in Kenya at a conference at the University of Edinburgh. Steele 
noted that 
 
an unknown portion of… service [sic] and manufacturing [African business] is not 
registered in the big towns or the rural areas for factory, social insurance, minimum wage, 
or statistics collecting legislation. Yet there are indications… that it is a significant zone 
for entrepreneurial activity. Policy does very little to assist and the sector as a whole fits 
only piecemeal into development theory. (ibid.: 206) 
 
Steele’s colleagues at the university of Sussex included the two main authors of the ILO Kenya 
report: Hans Singer and Richard Jolly. Since the ILO Kenya report was not submitted in draft 
form until early July 1972 and published until November 1972, it is likely that some of Steele’s 
ideas filtered into the thinking of the ILO Kenya report write-up.        
 
Meanwhile, about the same time that the ILO Mission started in Kenya, Kenneth King – without 
knowing about the ILO Mission - started research work in July 1972 interviewing informal 
machine makers (published as King, 1977) (cf. McGrath, Jedrej, King and Thompson, 1997). 
 
In Nigeria in the early 1960s, Callaway’s research (Callaway, 1963; 1964) highlighted a number 
of key elements that would later be described as characteristic of the informal sector. For 
example, Callaway (1963) highlights the case of a typical school leaver who goes to search for 
work in Ibadan and might end up becoming an apprentice after exhausting the limited options for 
                                                 
23 Somerset was also a member of the 1972 ILO Mission to Kenya (see below). 
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entry into the modern sector.24 He then goes on to discuss the “whole array of indigenous 
enterprises [that] represents the only really competitive element in these economies” (p.359). 
 
In Ghana apprenticeship training had long been recognised as an important means of skills 
acquisition (Foster, 1965a; Hart, 1973; Peil, 1970; Quartey-Papafio, 1914). For example, Foster’s 
research in the mid-1960s (1965a), like Callaway’s in Nigeria just mentioned, brings up the issue 
of informal apprenticeship.25 Foster, moreover, throughout his classic Education and Social 
Change in Ghana frequently uses the distinction between exchange and subsistence economies 
(Foster, 1965a).  
 
It was Keith Hart’s work in Ghana, of course, that is acknowledged as discovering the informal 
sector. Hart conducted doctoral fieldwork between 1965-68 exploring the informal economic 
activities of the northern Frafra migrants in a poor area of Accra, Nima.26 In September 1971 Hart 
first discussed his preliminary findings on informal economic activities, later published as his 
1973 article (Hart, 1973), at a conference on Urban unemployment in Africa at the university of 
Sussex. Present at this conference were ten members of the later ILO Employment Mission to 
Kenya including the two leaders of the mission, Singer and Jolly. This early interaction with the 
concept of informal economic activities discussed by Hart, will have undoubtedly shaped some of 
the later ILO findings in Kenya the following year (cf. Bromley, 1978; Cruise O’Brien, 1972).27 
Tony Somerset, a member of the informal sector working party for the ILO Kenya Mission, 
confirmed this – while also noting the urban bias of the Kenyan Mission – and commented that:  
 
it’s something of a puzzle that the ILO Mission considered the informal sector to be 
mainly an urban phenomenon… As I recall it, we were strongly influenced by Keith 
Hart’s paper… and also by the preoccupation at the time with rural-urban migration as a 
precursor to jobseeking (in Mike Todaro’s work, for instance). (Somerset to Kenneth 
King, by email 11.04.05) 
 
Hart’s presentation at this conference is likely to have been an important factor securing his name 
as the discoverer of the informal sector idea. However, as noted above, Hart’s work was preceded 
by a wealth of research that was effectively looking at the same phenomenon, in all but name. 
                                                 
24 See also his 1964 article on Nigeria’s apprenticeship system (Callaway, 1964). 
25 Quartey-Papafio (1914) provides an earlier account of apprenticeship training in the Gold Coast. 
26 In his doctoral thesis, Hart also examines the economic activities of the Frafra in rural areas in northern 
Ghana, see Palmer (2004b). 
27 A later member of the Kenya ILO team, John Weeks, also presented at this conference a paper on the 
unenumerated sector, a cousin idea to the informal sector. 
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Hart would have had access to much of the literature noted above that explored many of the main 
aspects of the informal sector-to-be such as: low-cost informal apprenticeship (Callaway, 1963; 
Foster, 1965a); enterprise activities (Callaway, 1963; Harbison, 1967); labour intensive activities 
(Callaway, 1963); diversification of enterprises (Bauer, 1954); not to mention the dual economy 
literature of the 1950s. Thus Hart being attributed the role of discoverer of the informal sector 
seems an exaggeration and it is most likely that he was in the right place at the right time.28  
 
Nonetheless, Hart’s two early articles (Hart, 1970; 1973) were important pieces: e.g. Hart’s view 
was that the informal sector served a productive role in the economy and he also discussed the 
issue of multiple occupations.29  
 
2.1.1. The primary school leaver problem and the internationalisation of the informal 
sector concept by the ILO/UNDP employment mission to Kenya 
 
Associated with the three UNESCO meetings – Addis, Santiago and Karachi - the early push for 
UPE in the 1960s resulted, by the end of that decade, in a growing concern for unemployed 
school leavers and the search for employment opportunities for these youth. The unemployed 
school leaver problem was made more pressing for some as a result of warnings about 
forthcoming political instability that were believed to be the result of large numbers of 
unemployed educated youth (Gutkind, 1969).   
 
This concern for unemployed school leavers at the time also laid the foundations for the 
internationalisation of the informal sector concept in the 1970s and potentially its link to 
schooling. 
 
The 1961 conference in Addis Ababa on the development of education in Africa (noted above) 
set a target to achieve UPE by 1980. A few years after this conference Callaway (1963) noted that 
the advance towards UPE “reveals itself as an opportunity – but also a dilemma” (p.354). He goes 
on to say that “only a few parents – most of whom are farmers – want their school children to 
become farmers” (ibid.). By the mid-1960s the dilemma was apparent as it became clear that an 
                                                 
28 The fact is that Hart’s earliest published use of the term informal sector is after the ILO Mission had used 
it. He used it in his unpublished paper in 1971 which may even have been an oral presentation. 
29 See Palmer (2004b) for a detailed discussion on Hart’s early papers and his PhD. 
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insufficient number of modern jobs were being created that were needed to absorb the people 
wanting to fill them (Bangasser, 2000). It was becoming clear that: 
 
increasingly large numbers of people were obviously economically active; but what they 
were doing did not appear in the [national development] plan and so, de facto, neither did 
they. (ibid.: 4) 
 
As a response to this problem the ILO launched the World Employment Programme (WEP) in 
1969 in an attempt to bring the issue of employment creation to the forefront of developmental 
efforts. The first employment missions, to Colombia (1970) and Sri Lanka (1971), both 
recommended a full employment strategy involving major structural and institutional reforms, for 
example with land and fiscal reforms and the development of labour intensive employment 
schemes. In Colombia the report noted the necessity to create five million new jobs between 
1970-1985 but was soon criticised for being far too unrealistic and only likely to be adopted 
through a revolutionary process (Urrutia, in Moser, 1978). 
 
The ILO mission to Kenya, the first comprehensive employment mission to Africa, differed from 
earlier missions in identifying the key problem not as unemployment per se, but employment of 
the working poor (ILO, 1972). The report positively described a sector apart from the 
modern/formal sector, an informal sector that was “economically efficient and profit-making” 
(ibid.: 5) characterised by ease of entry, labour intensive activities and providing skills training 
outside of the formal system. This interpretation of the informal sector would have fitted well 
with those concerned with the primary school leaver or youth employment problems of this 
time.30 Moreover, it would have fitted well with those thinking about the outcomes of UPE: since 
it was clear there were insufficient jobs created in formal employment, this informal sector 
seemed a viable alternative with regard to job creation and employment opportunities for the 
products of UPE. Indeed the Kenya report explicitly noted this in commenting that the 
“[informal] sector can be a source of future growth as an integral part of an employment strategy” 
(ibid.: 229). 
 
However, the ILO Kenya report was criticised for laying too much emphasis on the 
employment/unemployment problem and not enough emphasis on economic growth, while at the 
same time making rapid economic growth a necessity for solving the problem (Moser, 1978). 
Indeed, Leys (1973) described “the recommendations… as utopian” (p.421). 
                                                 
30 See King (1991) for a history of the thinking about education and employment. 
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The informal sector is now widely viewed as heterogeneous and as consisting of three segments, 
each having their own specific set of constraints and requiring their own particular support 
strategies (Haan, 2001: 169; cf. World Bank, 2004a: 51): 
 
• Pre-entrepreneurial subsistence types of self-employment characterized by part-time 
(seasonal) operations, traditional technologies, local materials, and local markets, a 
particularly important source of income for poor rural women. 
• Micro-enterprises of up to 10 workers, mostly family members or apprentices using a mix 
of technologies, serving rural markets, and often operating in rural centers. 
• Small-scale enterprises with 10 to 50 workers, using some modern technologies, 
semiformalized, and with some growth potential. 
 
A thread running through this thesis is the acknowledgement that the informal sector is 
heterogeneous but that, for analytical purposes it is useful to examine specific segments of it. 
Since, the focus of this thesis is on self-employment in micro-enterprises, the discussion will 
largely relate to the first two of the segments outlined above and,  following King (1980) and 
McGrath et al. (1995), will largely adopt a two-fold distinction between subsistence orientated 
self-employment, on the one hand, and entrepreneurship self-employment one the other.32 
 
While some have traditionally viewed the informal sector as comprised of subsistence-orientated 
activities, the dominant view now is that due to its heterogeneous nature the informal sector is 
both survivalist and dynamic (Mead, 1999). The informal sector encompasses both micro-
enterprises struggling to survive at one end and much better off enterprises (often moving into 
high-tech business such as internet cafes), showing innovative and expansive tendencies, at the 
other. Interestingly Hart (1969), in his doctoral thesis, analysed the need: 
  
to distinguish between those [in trading and self-employment] who look on these 
activities as a source of subsistence income equivalent or additional to a wage or farming 
(i.e. full-time and part-time petty traders and small artisans) and those to whom these are 
small beginnings to a cumulative process (i.e. “entrepreneurs proper”). (p.273) 
                                                 
31 See also Palmer (2004b). 
32 But see chap.3.3.2 that introduces a third category: micro-entrepreneurial self-employment (MESE). 
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King (1980) also made a distinction between types of employment within the informal sector: in 
his case between subsistence self-employment and entrepreneurial self-employment. In a later co-
authored paper, it was made clear that the informal sector should not be used as a catch all phrase. 
Instead there is the need to be specific about which group is being discussed at any given time (cf. 
McGrath et al., 1995). Further, there is the need to be clear, when using the distinction between 
subsistence self-employment and entrepreneurial self-employment, that this does not imply that 
“there is something static about the situation” (ibid.: 15). Informal enterprise activities can and do 
move between these different types over the course of an enterprise’s life-cycle.33  
 
However, a word of caution should be added when viewing the informal sector as a continuum 
between subsistence and entrepreneurial enterprise activities, at the same time as recognising the 
need to discuss different types of enterprise within this continuum. The use of a conceptual 
continuum that will highlight the transition of enterprises along it, as Bromley (1978) noted, 
implies that informal operators can graduate to the formal sector (Liedholm, 1991; Meghir, 1991). 
However, evidence suggests that this graduation is uncommon since numerous constraints exist to 
keep informal operators at the same level (cf. Blunch et al., 2001: 8; Buckley, 1997: 1091; King 
and McGrath, 1999a: 6; chap.5.3, this thesis). The existence of certain barriers to growth has been 
highlighted by others (e.g. Palmer, 2004a: 47-50).34 
 
Many of the characteristics of urban informal micro-enterprise (IME) are shared by their rural 
counterparts, though there are some distinct differences. Some shared characteristics include 
(Palmer, 2004b: 39-59): 
• Smallness of size; 
• Often alegal status and lack of regulations;35 
• Members are mostly law-abiding and often pay some form of license or tax; 
• Informal finance predominates;  
• Few formal business records are kept; 
• There is a general low-level of education, but this is rising following EFA policies; 
• Skills training occurs on-the-job; 
                                                 
33 See chap.3.3.3. 
34 See chap.3.3.3. 
35 Alegal activities refer to activities that are legitimate in nature (i.e. differentiated from illegal activities 
like corruption, theft, coercion or bribery) but which are not officially sanctioned by law and therefore not 
legal in the strictest sense.    
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• Low level of technology; 
• Low price of informal sector products and services; 
• Ease of entry to activities at the lower end of the MSE continuum; 
• Occupational pluralism is widespread; 
• Enterprises operate within geographically-constrained markets and often in saturated and 
income-constrained markets;  
• There is a high birth and death rate of enterprises. 
 
The January 1993 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) definition of the 
informal sector was that it consisted of economic units (enterprises) engaged in the production of 
goods or services. Since 2002 it has become common to also use the term informal economy as a 
broader concept that incorporates “the whole of informality” (ILO, 2002: 11). In the expanded 
conceptual framework the informal economy is seen as comprised of informal employment 
(without secure contracts, worker benefits, or social protection) both inside and outside informal 
enterprises (based on ILO, 2002: 12): 
 
• Informal Employment in Informal Enterprises (small unregistered or unincorporated 
enterprises), including: employers, employees, own account operators, and unpaid family 
workers in informal enterprises; 
• Informal Employment outside Informal Enterprises (for formal enterprises, for 
households, or with no fixed employer), including: domestic workers, casual or day 
labourers, temporary or part-time workers, industrial outworkers (including 
homeworkers), and unregistered or undeclared workers. 
 
In 2003 the 17th ICLS (ILO, 2003 cited in Charmes, 2005: 218) defined informal employment as 
comprising all jobs carried out in informal enterprises as well as those carried out in formal 
enterprises by employees “whose employment relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to 
national labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain 
employment benefits (advance notice of dismissal, severance pay, paid annual or sick leave…) 
because of non declaration of the jobs or the employees, casual or short duration jobs, jobs with 
hours or wages below a specified threshold, (…), place of work outside premises of employer’s 
enterprise (outworkers), jobs for which labour regulations are not applied, not enforced, or not 
complied with for any other reason”. The 17th ICLS considered that employment in the informal 
sector (based on the enterprise as the unit of observation) and informal employment (based on 
jobs as units of observation) were two concepts which refer to different aspects of the 
informalisation of employment and to different targets for policy-making (ILO, 2004). 
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The distinction between informal sector employment and informal employment can be made 
clearer: Ralf Hussmanns (2001, in Charmes, 2005: 219-220) proposed a framework to understand 
the coverage and meaning of the two concepts (fig.2.1).  















The two cells in grey cover the informal sector while the two cells in double line cover informal 
employment. Cell (2) means that in the informal sector some individuals may have a formal job 
(it may happen where the criteria of non-registration of the unit or of the employees is not used in 
the definition). Such a category is assumed to be small. Cell (3) represents informal jobs outside 
the informal sector and in the formal sector. This category is assumed to be huge and growing up. 
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that multiple employment and straddling between these 
categories is also increasing (e.g. formal sector teachers also having part-time IMEs) which 
complicates any neat distinction (chap.2.3).  
 
Recognising the long-standing urban bias in informal sector research and analysis, the 15th ICLS 
definition specifically mentioned that the informal sector should be measured in both urban and 
rural areas (ICLS, 1993: sect.15).  
 
2.1.3. Summary  
 
The informal sector might have been popularised by the ILO’s Mission to Kenya in the early 
1970s, but it is somewhat of an exaggeration to attribute to Hart the discovery of it: while his 
work influenced the ILO Mission it undoubtedly drew upon earlier research from Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria and elsewhere. 
 
The current view of the informal sector sees it as made up of enterprises of different sizes: a 
common distinction made is between lower-end subsistence enterprises and more dynamic, 
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entrepreneurial ventures. The term informal employment is also used and refers to informal-type 
work either in informal enterprises or in the formal sector.   
 
While the informal sector concept has traditionally been urban-focused, there is growing 
acknowledgement that the concept can also include rural areas. This is the focus of the following 
section.  
 
2.2. The informal sector in rural areas 
 
This section will start where the last left off: by noting the long-standing urban bias in the 
informal sector literature, despite the fact that the two main early studies by Hart and the ILO did 
acknowledge a rural informal sector (2.2.1.). The next section (2.2.2.) looks at the farm-nonfarm 
divide and characteristics that define the rural informal sector. The last section (2.2.3.) looks at 
the changing composition of the rural informal sector as a result of de-agrarianisation. 
 
2.2.1. The initial urban bias 
 
It is surely not possible to deny the existence of similar enterprises (artisans, petty traders, 
peasant farmers etc.)… in rural areas. The ‘rural informal sector’ should logically receive 
at least as much attention as the ‘urban informal sector’. (Bromley, 1978: 1034) 
 
As noted in the previous section, since Hart’s concentration on “the urban sub-proletariat” in 
Accra (Hart, 1973: 61),36 and the ILO Kenya Mission and later urban informal sector studies 
conducted by the ILO, the informal sector has for the most part been considered part of the 
dualistic nature of urban economies (Aboagye and Gozo, 1986).  
 
The ILO Kenya mission, whose report internationalised the informal sector concept, described 
“two urban sectors” as the formal and informal sectors (ILO, 1972: 503), directly placing the 
informal sector idea into an urban framework, largely excluding discussion of an informal sector 
in rural areas.37 This urban bias in informal sector studies was noticed six years later (e.g. 
Bromley, 1978: see the quotation above). 
                                                 
36 Not only did the informal sector become seen largely as an urban phenomenon, but Hart’s research in 
Nima, a poor area of Accra, cast the concept into the slums as well. 
37 However, the ILO Kenya report did state that the informal sector idea was applicable to rural areas, 
mentioning a dichotomy between official, large-scale plantation agriculture and unofficial, subsistence 
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However the initial urban bias was compounded by divisions within the World Employment 
Programme (WEP): informal sector work in the WEP was largely confined to the Urbanisation 
and employment programme, while a parallel division – the Rural poverty, employment and 
development division – “had virtually no informal sector concerns” (King, 1991: 120). Hence 
research by the Urbanisation and employment programme subsequently “cast the notion of 
informality into an exclusively urban context” (Bangasser, 2000: 11). Consequently there was 
much written on the urban informal sector in the 1970s/1980s and very little discussion of how 
relevant the concept was to rural areas. 
 
Both Hart (1973) and the ILO (1972) study mentioned agriculture as part of the informal sector,38 
but both their final products definitely cast the informal sector into an urban framework. Both 
Hart and the ILO also made mention of rural non-agricultural enterprises.  
 
For example Hart’s doctoral thesis contained a chapter mentioning rural nonfarm enterprise 
activity and the issue of multiple occupations: 
 
blacksmiths, potters, tailors of smocks, drummers and barbers earn sizeable cash incomes 
from occupations which are usually only secondary to the main business of farming. 
(Hart, 1969: 144) 
 
He also mentioned that some activities were taken up during the agricultural off-season and notes, 
for example, that as the 
 
farming season has always been short – a matter of some six months from late April to 
early October… [farmers]… have traditionally supplemented their income by specializing 
in certain crafts and skilled occupations. (ibid.: 143) 
 
However, this discussion of rural informal economic activities never found its way either into his 
presentation at the University of Sussex in 1971 or his two early pieces (Hart, 1970, 1973).   
 
Similarly, the ILO (1972) Kenya report noted, in its famous chapter 13, that although the chapter 
would 
                                                                                                                                                 
agriculture (ILO, 1972). This distinction failed to fully discuss other nonfarm enterprises in rural areas, but 
see ILO (1972: 223). 
38 See Palmer (2004b, chap.10.38). 
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concentrate on the urban informal sector… it should be noted that in 1969, in what was 
certainly an under-count, there were found to be almost 190,000 men, women and 
children working in non-agricultural activities in rural areas. (p.223)   
 
However, despite this acknowledgement of rural enterprise, the ILO’s decision to “concentrate on 
the urban” (ILO, 1972: 223), Hart’s research in urban Ghana (1970, 1973) and divisions within 
the WEP set the stage for urban bias in informal sector work. Consequent research focused on 
larger cities, with little information on small or intermediate cities (Trager, 1987) or rural areas. 
Indeed, this urban bias still prevails (Xaba et al., 2002). 
 
2.2.2. The farm-nonfarm divide and defining the rural informal sector 
 
What, then, is the rural informal sector? This section examines this question, noting that 
traditionally it has been associated with nonfarm enterprise and has excluded agriculture. Since 
the late 1990s, however, agriculture has increasingly been considered part of the rural informal 
sector. In research and policy literature there has often been a tendency to discuss the impact of 
schooling or skills on farm activities without mention of nonfarm activities, or vice-versa.39 This 
section discusses this farm-nonfarm divide and argues that this artificial divide is not only 
fallacious, but that it disguises an essential characteristic of African livelihoods, especially in 
rural areas: occupational pluralism. In doing this the enterprise component of the school-skill-
enterprise link is highly simplified.  
 
Livingstone (1991) notes that “defining the rural informal sector is even more problematic than in 
the urban case” (p.652). He comments that “it is often taken as synonymous with the non-farm 
activities” (ibid.). For example, Bagachwa (1997) identifies the rural informal sector as 
comprising 
 
non-farm or non-agricultural small-scale activities, including manufacturing, 
construction, mining, fishing, transport, commerce and other services… irrespective of 
whether they are carried out as main or secondary activities. (p.141) 
 
King (2005a) goes on to note that when the term informal sector was 
 
                                                 
39 Though there is obviously a literature that examines farm-nonfarm links. 
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finally used of Africa’s rural areas, there was a very strong tendency to consider that the 
informal small enterprise economy was ‘off-farm’… Only relatively recently has the term 
been broadened to accept that ‘small farms are also small businesses’” (p.440). 
 
By conceptualising the informal sector in rural areas as nonfarm or off-farm, “the informal sector 
was set aside from the regular urban (formal) sector and the regular ‘enterprise’ of running a 
small farm” (King, 1996: 194; Tribe, 1995). 
 
King points out, for example, that the Kenyan sessional paper on the development of micro and 
small enterprises for employment creation and poverty reduction argues strongly that “small 
farms are also small businesses” (Kenya Government 2003, cited in King, 2005a: 440). King 
adds that the latest draft of this same paper “boldly redefines the sector finally to cut across the 
farm/non-farm divide” (ibid.). 
 
Nonetheless the distinction between farm and nonfarm is still commonly made.40 For example 
neither the UN Millennium Project (2005), the UK’s Commission for Africa (2005) nor the 
Bank’s Skills Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2004a) completely abandons the 
farm-nonfarm divide. This said, the Commission for Africa Report does acknowledge that: “[t]he 
primary source of jobs in Africa is small enterprises, the most important of which is the family 
farm” (Commission for Africa, 2005: 51). While the Bank did include smallholder agriculture as 
part of the informal economy (World Bank, 2004a: 3), the study specifically excluded skills for 
agriculture from their remit - as it was thought that this issue was so large and complex as to 
merit a separate study (World Bank, 2004a: 33). Indeed a separate Bank study on skills for 
agriculture is forthcoming.41 However the World Bank, by proposing separate studies on skills 
development for agricultural and for nonfarm employment, has helped to maintain the traditional 
farm-nonfarm divide. This is unhelpful since it perpetuates the artificial construction of neat 
employment realities of the (rural) poor. Nonetheless, the Bank’s inclusion of agriculture as part 
of the informal economy and the recognition of a “rural informal sector” (World Bank, 2004a: 
48) are positive steps forward. 
 
The rural informal sector, therefore, is made up of both non-agricultural and agricultural 
activities. It has been accepted that, conceptually, the informal economy can include agricultural 
                                                 
40 Carter and Rosa (1998) argue that small business analysts overlook the UK farm sector. 
41 The initial intention was for the World Bank to produce a counterpart study on agricultural education and 
training. Johanson (2005) has written a draft study outline which was further discussed by Saint (2005) at 
the Rome Meeting of the WGICSD. 
 54 
activities (Afrisat, 1997). The 15th and 17th ICLS definitions of the informal sector and informal 
employment respectively do not exclude farm activities and “a strict application of the definitions 
would include agriculture (and more generally primary activities: agriculture, animal husbandry, 
forestry, fishery)” (Charmes, 2005: 218). However for “practical reasons” (ICLS, 1993: sect.16), 
which are not mentioned but presumably pertain to the collection of information, when it comes 
to measurement the 15th ICLS definition of the informal sector excludes agricultural activities 
(ibid.: sect.20), being limited to “household enterprises engaged in non-agricultural activities” 
(ibid.: sect.16). Instead of including agriculture as part of the informal economy the 15th ICLS 
notes that “agricultural activities… may be identified as separate categories outside the distinction 
between the informal and formal sectors” (ibid.: sect.20). This, as Charmes (2005) notes, is not 
only due to methodological and measurement issues, but also so that the proportion of farm and 
nonfarm activities would not be hidden if the concept mixed both farm and nonfarm components.  
 
Indeed there is now an increasingly widespread view that the informal sector includes agriculture 
(e.g. Commission for Africa, 2005; World Bank, 2004a) and that farms should be regarded as 
enterprises too. 
 
When agriculture is included as part of the informal sector, the informal sector becomes a very 
rural phenomenon, since farm activities predominate in rural areas of developing countries.42 In 
SSA, rural informal sector employment (farm/nonfarm) accounts for about two-thirds of all 
employment (fig.2.2).   
 










Source: World Bank, 2004a: 48  
                                                 
42 In fact the majority of studies note the predominance of nonfarm enterprises in rural areas (Mead, 1999). 
But see Adams and Pischke (1992). 
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In Ghana (Ashanti) the rural informal sector comprises myriad IME activities: 
 
• Agricultural enterprises (both pastoral and arable)43 - predominantly small-scale farming 
units (okuani) and small-scale rearing of animals (e.g. goats, chickens); 
• Fishing and fish-processing enterprises - found mostly along Ghana’s coastline; 
• Rural agro-based processing enterprises – e.g. corn-milling; processing cassava into gari; 
palm, palm kernel, groundnut and copra oils; alcohol production (palm wine, pito, 
akpeteshie);44 and traditional soap-making; 
• Trading enterprises - food traders and processors (e.g. food sellers in the market, itinerant 
wholesalers and retailers, bakers, caterers and cooked-food sellers), building suppliers, 
pharmacy/cosmetic stores, spots (local bars), and charcoal, mineral (soft drink) and wood 
sellers etc.; 
• Manufacturing/construction enterprises – e.g. masonry (odansifuo), blacksmithing, 
carpentry (adua dwumayefuo), tailoring (adepamni barimaa), dressmaking, weaving and 
small-scale gold mining (galamsay); 
• Repair enterprises – e.g. refrigerator, bicycle, mechanic (afidiesiesiefuo); 
• Information and communication technology (ICT)-based enterprises, e.g. Space-to-Space 
wireless telephone enterprises,45 mobile phone repair/unlocking enterprises, internet 
cafés;  
• Service enterprises – e.g. barbering, hair-dressing and shoe-shining; 
• Transport enterprises - e.g. minibuses (trotro); 
• Finance-providing enterprises - e.g. door-to-door money collectors (susu). 
 
More so than in urban areas, the rural informal sector in SSA contains a large hidden element. In 
rural Ashanti, for example, charcoal makers, water carriers, traditional healers and fetish/juju  
men and women46 are difficult for surveys to identify.47 Many rural informal economic activities 
                                                 
43 See Palmer (2004b, chap.11.4). 
44 See Bryceson (2002b; 2004) and Hart (1969). Pito is distilled guinea corn. Akpeteshie is a strong spirit 
made from distilled palm wine. 
45 Areeba (formally Spacefon) is a large mobile phone provider in Ghana who built a wireless, battery 
powered, telephone handset that can be used wherever there is a mobile signal. The space-to-space 
machines are purchased from the Areeba company and are then operated by private owners and are now 
commonplace in rural Ghana. The owners sell airtime by the minute to customers wanting to make a phone 
call. These machines have undoubtedly dramatically changed access to telecommunications in rural Ghana.   
46 Juju (wo)men are believed to be able to harness the power of good and evil spirits (including the 
mmoatia, dwarfs believed by many to live in the forests of Ashanti). Sometimes people visit them to ensure 
their new enterprise start-up will be successful, or go if their enterprise is going badly (cf. Buckley, 1996). 
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are conducted by women, in the home or as mobile enterprises, often from a head-pan 
(arpanpamu), or from a tray (panpanmu) or moveable cart. Moreover occupational pluralism, or 
pluri-activity, is more widespread in rural areas.48 These factors make the rural informal sector 
even more difficult to measure than its urban counterpart.49    
 
Like the composition of the informal economy more generally,50 trade represents the most 
common type of nonfarm activity in the rural informal sector (Bagachwa, 1997; ILO, 1972; 
Livingstone, 1991). For example, Palmer’s (2004a) research in Nkawie-Kuma, a rural town in 
Ghana, noted that only 21% of the sample of 109 rural MSEs were manufacturing enterprises, 
with 53% retail enterprises. The Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 4 (1998/99) revealed 
that over 56% (1.3 million) of all nonfarm enterprises were trading ventures, 24% (550,000) were 
manufacturing, and the remaining 20% in other activities. Many of these would have forward and 
backward linkages to agriculture (ILO, 2003b).  
 
This illustration of the different kinds of rural informal sector activities shows that what is often 
subsumed under the amorphous heading of informal sector activities, is highly diverse. 
 
2.2.3. The changing composition of the rural informal sector: de-agrarianisation 
 
It could be argued that the concept of a rural informal sector has been strengthened over the last 
twenty years, since the introduction of SAPs and neo-liberal policies (Bryceson, 2002a; 2004), by 
the increasing recognition given to the process of de-agrarianisation in SSA (Bryceson, 1996).51 
 
De-agrarianisation is defined by Bryceson (1996) as a long term process of: i) economic activity 
reorientation (livelihood); ii) occupational adjustment (work activity) and; iii) spatial realignment 
of human settlement (residence) away from strictly agricultural patterns. She comments that, 
while in the 1950s to 1970s the idea of a move away from agriculture was understood as a move 
                                                                                                                                                 
In addition to taking items like baby chickens, lizards, leaves, string, akpeteshie (local gin) there is usually 
a financial payment required for this type of informal service (¢30-40,000 in 2005, c.US$3-4). 
47 Though obviously note that these activities may well be present in urban areas, even if they have 
previously not been mentioned in the literature or research documents.  
48 See chap.2.3.1 on occupational pluralism. 
49 See Palmer (2004b, section 10) on measurement.  
50 See Palmer (2004b, section 7.2). 
51 This refers to research conducted as part of the de-agrarianisation and rural employment (DARE) project, 
co-ordinated by Deborah Bryceson of the Centre of African Studies, Leiden. The countries in the DARE 
project were Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
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from rural to urban areas, the process of de-agrarianisation conceptualises a move away from 
agriculture to happen in situ, in the rural areas themselves (Bryceson, 2004).  
 
Bryceson (1996) points to research since 1980 that illustrates the increasing importance of non-
agricultural rural employment (NARE) in SSA. She notes that the increased significance of 
NARE relates to the growing role it plays in rural livelihood strategies. This is shown by the 
increase in total labour time spent on NARE activities and the increasing part it plays in 
contributing to overall household income. 
 
In terms of contribution to overall rural household income, rural nonfarm activities have 
previously been estimated to make-up about 40% of the overall income in SSA (Bagachwa, 1997; 
Ellis, 1998; Haggblade, Hazel, and Brown, 1989; Reardon, 1997). However, research by 
Bryceson suggested rural nonfarm activities make a higher contribution to overall income, 
between 60-80% (Bryceson, 2002a: 730). It is clear, therefore, that with respect to household 
income, nonfarm activities are increasingly becoming the most important part of the rural 
informal sector. This being said, there are obviously differences across countries. For example, 
Livingstone (1991: 654) revealed that in Kenya (1981-2), on average, nonfarm activities 
accounted for just over 50% of total income: of this only 17% of income came from nonfarm 
enterprise activity (Kenyan Central Bureau of Statistics, in Livingstone, 1991).52 
 
Bryceson (1996) notes that although NARE has received a centre-stage position in development 
project work, it has traditionally been seen as largely supplementary to, rather than operating 
independently of, farming activities. She notes that, increasingly, NARE is being seen as an 
“alternative to farming for certain categories of people in a number of places” (ibid.: 97, original 
emphasis).  However, Bryceson (2004) comments that de-agrarianisation does not suggest that 
the rural poor are turning their backs on agriculture altogether, since subsistence agriculture is 
frequently retained as a fall-back option.  
 
Bryceson (1996; 2002a; 2004) points to causal factors responsible for an increase in NARE: i) 
increasing population densities in many rural areas, causing people to increasingly turn to 
nonfarm activities due to lack of land (e.g. parts of Nigeria and Ethiopia); ii) a contraction of 
urban employment opportunities for potential migrants as a result of SAPs; iii) an increased need 
to acquire cash on a daily basis as a result of SAPs (and removal of government subsidies on 
                                                 
52 The rest was made up of salary and wages (21%) and other sources (remittances, gifts etc) (14%).  
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education and health); iv) the reduction of farm incomes in many cases due to the government 
cessation of paying subsidies on agriculture under SAPs; v) the decrease in public sector wages 
(due to SAPs) that forced greater livelihood diversification and increased participation in informal 
economic activities; vi) the increased investment in primary education resulting in a generation of 
rural inhabitants becoming more dissatisfied with a strictly agrarian way of life; vii) the increase 
in rural people charging for traditional services that were previously given for free (e.g. village 
midwifery).53 
 
With reference to point vi) above, it might be interesting to consider what affect the current EFA 
policy will have on speeding up de-agrarianisation. Will the expansion of formal (basic) 
education mean that more and more rural youth enter into primarily non-agricultural livelihood 
strategies? If this is the case, there will need to be more policy focus than there is now on 
promoting and assisting MSE development, including the creation of enabling environments and 
business development services (BDS) that can assist enterprise start-ups.54     
 
As noted above (and explained below), one overriding characteristic of rural livelihoods is 




The urban focus of early informal sector research by Hart and the ILO during the 1970s set the 
stage for an urban bias in the informal sector literature. This is in spite of the fact that both Hart 
and the ILO Kenya Mission discussed rural informal enterprise. 
 
Where the informal sector has been discussed in relation to rural areas, it is usually taken as 
synonymous with nonfarm enterprise. There is a growing view, however, that farms should also 
be treated as enterprises, and that agriculture should be included as part of the rural informal 
sector. In fact the farm-nonfarm distinction, so frequently used in the literature, fails to 
                                                 
53 This has been mentioned before. Hart (1969), for example, mentions that many traditional roles, such as 
roofing expert, hut-builder and ritual diviners “now [1969] have an open market value and some Frafra 
have turned to these roles as a major supplementary source of cash income, where before they were part of 
the nexus of kinship obligations which linked the inhabitants of a particular settlement” (p.144). 
54 The attention paid to enabling environments in many of the PRSPs, for example, is a step forward. But in 
many cases enabling environments for IMEs are not improving. BDS includes market information, 
management and business advice as well as vocational skills training. See Sievers and Vandenberg (2004). 
55 Occupational pluralism is also a common feature of the informal economic activities in urban and peri-
urban settings (Palmer, 2004b).        
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adequately capture the notion of occupational pluralism; that individuals/households frequently 
operate across the farm-nonfarm divide in multiple enterprise ventures. 
 
The process of de-agrarianisation in SSA means that rural enterprise is increasing in importance. 
The next section re-examines the notion of work in SSA by discussing more about occupational 
pluralism. 
 
2.3. Re-conceptualising work in SSA as a result of occupational pluralism 
 
This section re-examines concepts of work in SSA, arguing that occupational pluralism 
contributes to the blurring of the usual categories: e.g. farm/nonfarm, wage-/self-employment. 
 
Employment classification in developing countries is beset with problems (cf. Harbison, 1967). 
Since “many censuses rely on the informants’ own identification of their employment status” 
(Scott, 1979: 107), with many informants receiving no guidance as to what criteria they should 
use in answering (ibid.: 108), the definition of employment is subjective and open to myriad 
interpretation.  
 
Imagine an announcement of a forthcoming unemployment census in the media of a country in 
SSA that had just elected a new government whose election campaign had highlighted job 
creation as a key area. This might lead those in informal employment (including farmers) to 
register as unemployed in the hope of gaining a job. This was exactly what happened in Ghana. 
The present ruling political party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), came to power in January 2001 
with, among other election promises, the pledge to create employment for the youth. As a result 
when the employment census was announced, telling the unemployed to register there were many 
incidences of “unemployed” people registering who were in most senses of the word, employed. 
“There are yet some who do not recognise farming as a job and came to register as unemployed 
persons” (GNA, 2001c). Many were registering specifically with the idea that by doing so they 
would benefit with a job or at least some kind of training.56 
 
The problems associated with measuring unemployment in Ghana, and other developing 
countries with large informal economies, mean that it is hard to take official unemployment 
figures seriously. And yet many do. For example, Teal (2001) reports the unemployment rates for 
                                                 
56 See chap.7.2. 
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Ghana were around 2-3.5% (1989-1999) which he comments are “very low” and “stand in 
marked contrast to those observed in other African countries” (p.5).57  
 
2.3.1. Tinker, tailor, farmer, trader: occupational pluralism and the fallacy of 
dichotomous occupational categorisation 
 
It has long been regarded as misleading to talk of ‘unemployment’ in the SSA situation (Hart, 
1973, 1976; Weeks, 1973). Indeed a joint ILO/UNICEF/World Bank funded paper comments that 
“the traditional labour market concepts such as jobs, employment, unemployment, participation, 
wages, and earnings are difficult to apply to Africa” (Guarcello et al., 2005: 2).  
 
However, occupational statistics from developing countries frequently make these kinds of 
categorisation that grossly over-simplify reality: individuals and sometimes households are 
classified as either farm or nonfarm, or as being self- or wage-employed, as working in the formal 
or informal sector, or even as being rural or urban.58  
 
Such pigeon-holing and use of these neat dichotomies are misleading and disguise complex 
realities regarding the nature of work in SSA, especially in rural areas. For example Teal’s 
presentation of the GLSS data (table 4.3, chap.4) and the ILO diagram below (fig.2.3.) disguise a 










Source: ILO, 2003c  
 
Teal’s diagram, with the categories wage employee, farmer, non-agricultural self-employment 
and unemployed, does not reveal whether some of those that are recorded as working outside of 
agriculture actually work part-time in agriculture and part time in nonfarm activities (ILO, 
                                                 
57 See table 4.3, chap.4. 
58 The rural-urban dimension is complicated where households are located in rural areas but get a 
proportion of their income from family members’ enterprise or jobs in urban areas (Livingstone, 1991). 
Ghana employment by sector
14%
31%55%
Formal economy Informal economy Agriculture
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2003b). The ILO diagram (fig.2.3.) makes a neat, but very crude, division between formal, 
informal and agricultural sectors – a division that does not exist in peoples’ everyday livelihoods.  
 
Classifications such as employed or unemployed disguise the great problem of underemployment 
(Heintz, 2004). Categorising an individual or household as working in either farm or nonfarm 
activities fails to capture the possibility of multiple occupations and hence farm-nonfarm 
relationships.  
 
Occupational pluralism, pluri-activity or enterprise diversification - involving working across 
sectors and between activities is increasingly the norm in SSA, especially in rural areas, but is not 
a new issue (cf. Barrett, Reardon and Webb, 2001; Bryceson, 2002a, c; Buckley, 1997; Ellis, 
2000, 1998; Hart, 1973; Kilby et al., 1984; King, 1996; Long and Richardson, 1978; Mureithi, 
1973; Palmer, 2004a, b). For example in Kenya in the 1970s, Mureithi (1973) commented that: “a 
characteristic of rural dwellers is occupational pluralism… [in other words] many have more than 
one job” (p.130). Hart (1973), commenting on Ghana in the late 1960s/early 1970s, noted the 
“widespread incidence of multiple income sources” (p.83). 
 
Income diversification through occupational pluralism is becoming more widespread in SSA 
(Barrett et al., 2001) and is determined by multiple factors (Ellis, 2000). For example, enterprise 
owners near the level of subsistence are more likely to follow strategies which reduce risk, even if 
these strategies result in less overall profit for those involved (Scott, 1976). In this context, one 
strategy that is followed is livelihood and income diversification, which has its roots in the 
traditional risk aversion strategy utilised by peasants living in situations of extreme uncertainty 
(Long and Richardson, 1978: 200; cf. Hugon, 1990: 75). In this context Scott (1976) notes that 
some traders pursue “several minor occupations to minimize the danger of ever being entirely out 
of work” (p.24). In other words, enterprises might expand not by increasing investment in their 
successful enterprise, but by investing in the start-up of another enterprise or in farming activities 
(Long and Richardson, 1978). Alternatively, those owners engaged in entrepreneurial self-
employment who are looking to expand might be more willing to accept the risk of investing in a 
new, higher end, enterprise.  
 
Moreover the issue of occupational pluralism complicating occupational quantification has been 
noted before. For example Canagarajah and Mazumdar (1997) note that: 
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The quantification of the different segments of the labour market in an economy like that 
of Ghana is complicated because of the prevalence of multiple occupations. The same 
household would be involved in more than one sector, or as different working members 
are involved in activities in different sectors, or the same individual earner divides his 
time between different activities. (p.2) 
 
In fact, over 50 years ago Bauer (1954) commented on the deficiency in occupational 
categorisation in Gold Coast statistics: 
 
In the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast many farmers spend a substantial part of 
their time in non-agricultural activities… [in] the colony area of the Gold Coast, the great 
bulk of the population has other occupations, generally some form of trading, in addition 
to their main activity. (p.11) 
 
This imperfect specialization and the importance of secondary activities carried on by 
members of the household greatly diminish the value and relevance of the conventional 
occupational classifications of statistical compilations. This fact has not been sufficiently 
recognized. (p.12) 
 
As noted, however, the notion of occupational pluralism, at both the individual and household 
level, is frequently sidestepped in research and policy documents – and, fifty years after Bauer’s 
warning, is still not sufficiently recognised. Bauer also noted the issue of what is now termed 
occupational straddling – long before the term was used – and that it was not only so-called 
farmers that had other occupations, but “Government employees are also frequently part-time 
traders” (ibid.). 
 
Indeed many of those working in SSA, particularly those in rural areas, can be said to not simply 
have one occupational or income-generating activity, rather their employment portfolio is 
complex, and likely to be made up of two, three or more income-generating activities pursued 
simultaneously, the composition of which changes at different times of the year. Many activities 
are highly opportunistic, “involving quick responses to market demand and supply” (Bryceson, 
2002a: 732). Further, those in the formal sector may have informal employment activities as an 
increasingly necessary side-line. Thus while some have multiple activities in the informal sector, 
some have multiple activities in the formal sector, others straddle the formal-informal divide 
taking up employment in both. For example, it is increasingly recognised that informal income 
opportunities play a large role in the income portfolio of many teachers (Kerr, 2006; King, 2001). 
The traditional view of the informal sector being synonymous with self-employment or non-wage 
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employment no longer prevails.59 Indeed it was recognised early that self- and wage-employment 
can exist in both informal and formal sectors (cf. Bromley, 1978; Davies, 1979). 
 
2.3.2. Occupational pluralism and farm-nonfarm links 
 
Farm-nonfarm links are an important element of occupational pluralism, and have been well 
documented in the literature (e.g. Haggblade et al., 1989; Reardon, Crawford and Kelly, 1994; 
Reardon et al., 2001). For example, Reardon et al. (1994) discuss the important relationship 
between farm productivity and nonfarm income of rural households. Forward linkages are evident 
from agriculture to MSEs, especially with regard to agro-processing and trade in both the rural 
and urban areas, for both large and micro-enterprises. Farming inputs such as farm tools or simple 
machinery are often sold, manufactured, repaired or sharpened in rural nonfarm enterprise. Other 
agricultural inputs, like fertilisers, insecticides or weed-killer are traded in rural nonfarm 
enterprises.  
 
Agriculture stimulates the demand for transportation in rural areas especially at harvest time 
when goods need to be transported to market. More transportation in rural areas increases the 
demand for repair workshops, vulcanisers, fitters and mechanics in rural localities. Moreover, the 
demand for the rural production of consumer goods and services is related to (seasonal) 
agricultural earnings (Livingstone, 1991). 
 
Another important aspect of occupational pluralism is cross-financing. This refers to the use of 
profits from one (farm or nonfarm) enterprise as an input for another (farm or nonfarm) 
enterprise. The relationship is two-way, with farm activities cross-financing nonfarm activities 
and vice-versa. Cross-financing occurs between household and enterprise, enterprise and 
enterprise and vice-versa. It is also noted that, particularly in rural areas, households and 
enterprises are one and the same (Meghir, 1991; Rhyne and Otero, 1994). Thus in the same 
household someone might be a carpenter, while at the same time raising poultry or grass-cutters,60 
meanwhile the wife and children tend to the farm, with the wife also having a part-time activity 
brewing and/or selling alcohol to the neighbours at night. Many such cases like this exist and it 
should be clear that micro-enterprises do not operate as autonomous units. For example, evidence 
from research in a rural town in Ghana (Palmer, 2004a) indicates that a significant percentage of 
                                                 
59 But some, like Blunch et al. (2001: 3) still make this distinction to “provide some semblance of order”. 
60 Grass-cutters are large rodents that are bred for meat in Ghana. 
 64 
enterprises (farm/nonfarm) cross-finance each other - particularly at the start-up phase, but also 
with respect to working capital needs. This concurs with other research (Rhyne and Otero, 1994). 
Indeed, the ILO (1972) Kenya report also noted the cross-financing of farming and nonfarm 
activities.  
 
2.3.3. Occupational pluralism: an illustration from rural Ashanti (Ghana) 
 
In order to explore the farm-nonfarm issues in more depth, a household survey conducted as part 
of this doctoral research examined the extent of occupational pluralism in one rural community, 
Otaakrom (Ashanti) (table 2.1). It also examined whether the dimensions of occupational 
pluralism varied according to the wealth status of the household to investigate whether enterprise 



























                                                 
61 For a description of the methodology of this household survey and of the detailed wealth ranking and 
household mapping exercises that preceded it, see Appendix C. 
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Table 2.1. Occupational pluralism among 80 households in Otaakrom by wealth 
category   
Very Poor Average Above Well- Total
poor average off
None 0 0 3 0 0 3
Farming only (1) 0 0 1 0 0 1
Farming only (2) 1 5 4 0 0 10
Farming only (3) 0 16 12 0 0 28
Farming (1) + ISE (1) 0 1 1 0 1 3
Farming (2) + ISE (1) 1 2 6 0 0 9
Farming (3 or more) + ISE (1) 1 2 4 0 0 7
Farming (2) + ISE (2) 0 0 1 0 0 1
Farming (2) + WE 0 1 2 0 0 3
Farming (3 or more) + WE 0 0 2 0 0 2
Farming (2) + ISE (1) + WE 0 1 0 0 0 1
Farming (3 or more) + ISE (1) + WE 0 0 1 0 0 1
ISE only (1) 0 1 4 1 0 6
ISE only (2) 0 2 0 0 0 2
WE only 0 1 2 0 0 3
Totals 3 32 43 1 1 80
   Farming only 1 21 17 0 0 39
   ISE only 0 3 4 1 0 8
   WE only 0 1 2 0 0 3
   Farming and nonfarm 2 7 17 0 1 27
   Farming total 3 28 34 0 1 66  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005
Legend: 
ISE – Informal (nonfarm) self-employment
WE – Formal (nonfarm) wage employment
(1)(2)(3) refers to number of farming or non-farm activities  
Otaakrom (Ashanti Region) is one of the field sites for this doctoral research. For background information on
Otaakrom, see chap.1.3.2. The total number of households in the sample was 81, but data on income generating
activities was missing for one household.  
 
Respondents were asked to name all income generating occupational activities that their 
household engaged in at any time in the year.62 The main findings can be summarised as follows: 
                                                 
62 Since respondents were asked to name income generating activities, the degree to which subsistence 
farming (or chop-cropping) was also practiced was not captured by this survey. However, the distinction 
between chop-crops and crops grown for sale is often blurred. In this part of Ghana, yams, cassava and corn 
are the three main staple crops grown and, depending on daily household demand for cash, these crops can 
either be consumed by the household or sold in the market for a few thousand cedis. In practice most 
households tend to sell some and eat the majority of so-called chop-crops (fieldwork, 2001-2006). Despite 
the respondents being asked about income generating activities during the whole year, the amount of 
nonfarm activity is likely to be under-reported in this household survey: since the data collection period 
(October 2005 to January 2006) covered the main cocoa harvesting time, it is possible that many 
households were concentrating on farming at this time. It would be interesting to conduct this same 
exercise around March/April time which is regarded as the low-point in the year when cocoa money has 
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• Of all households in the sample: 
o 83% (66/80) engaged in farming enterprises; 
o 38% (30/80) engaged in informal sector nonfarm self-employment (of these 80% 
(24/30) were involved in one or more additional income-generating ventures, 
farm or nonfarm); 
o 13% (10/80) engaged in wage-employment.  
 
• 84% (67/80) of all households were engaged in multiple income generating ventures 
(either multiple farm, multiple nonfarm or farm and nonfarm). A further 13% (10/80) of 
households were engaged in only one income generating activity,63 while 4% (3/80) of 
households had no-one earning an income.64 
 
• 34% (27/80) of all households engaged in both farm and nonfarm activities. This figure is 
similar to other estimates from rural Africa. Haggblade et al. (1989), for example, 
estimate that in rural Africa between 20-40% of the labour force works in both farm and 
nonfarm activities. 26% of poor/very poor households (9/35), compared to 40% (17/43) 
of average households were engaged in both farm and nonfarm activities. 
 
• 49% (39/80) of all households engaged only in farming activities: of these only 3% (1/39) 
of solely farming households practiced just one farming venture. The rest of these 
farming households undertook at least two different kinds of farming ventures. 
Diversification in farming enterprises, therefore, appears to be the norm.  
 
• 14% (11/80) of all households engaged only in nonfarm activities: of these 10% (8/80) 
were in informal self-employment, and 4% (3/80) were in wage-employment. 
 
• Poorer households appeared to be less likely to be undertaking nonfarm activities and, 
those that did, appeared less likely to be engaged simultaneously in both farm and 
nonfarm ventures: 37% (13/35) of poor/very poor households in the sample were engaged 
in nonfarm activities (of these 26% (9/35) were engaged in both farm and nonfarm 
                                                                                                                                                 
been spent and the next harvest is not due for some time. Hence there might be more nonfarm activity at 
this point. 
63 Of these only 1% (1/80) of households undertook only one farm activity. 11% (9/80) of households had 
only one informal self-employment activity (6/80) or one wage-employment activity (3/80).   
64 These three households were all female headed. 
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activities); 60% (26/43) of average households were engaged in nonfarm activities (of 
these 40% (17/43) were engaged in both farm and nonfarm activities).  
 
Earlier research (Palmer, 2004a) on informal MSE owners conducted in another rural town in 
Ashanti  (Nkawie-Kuma) in 2003 had similar findings and the results can be compared to the 
findings above (for those households engaged in informal enterprise, n=30).65 The Nkawie-Kuma 
survey found that 86% of all enterprise owners (n=109) indicated that their household was 
involved in one or more additional income-generating activities (table 2.2). This compares well to 
the survey results above which found that 80% of all those engaged in IME were also involved in 
one or more additional income-generating ventures, farm or nonfarm. 
 
In the survey above, 73% (22/30) of those engaged in IME indicated that farming was one of their 
additional activities. Similarly, Palmer (2004a) found that 67% of enterprise owners indicated that 
farming was one of their additional activities.66  
 
Table 2.2. Enterprises in Nkawie-Kuma: households engaging in income-
generating activities in addition to their main enterprise activity  
MSE %
respondents
No income-generating activities in addition to main enterprise 15 14
Farming activities in addition to main enterprise 30 28
Farming activities and other activity* in addition to main enterprise 43 39




* ‘other activity’ included; 1] Waged-employment: security work, teacher, nurse, prison office, 
mining, logging, police, agricultural officer, clerk, accountant, cooperative agent, government 
driver, forestry; 2] Self-employment: any other informal sector enterprise, such as carpentry or retail.  
 
Put together these two surveys highlight the extent of occupational pluralism in rural Ashanti. 
Only a few households rely on only one enterprise activity, farm or nonfarm, and about one third 
of all households are engaged in both farm and nonfarm activities. Most IME activity in rural 
                                                 
65 For details on the methodology of this survey see Palmer (2004a). 
66 This figure of 67% is likely to be an under-estimate since, although the questionnaire specifically stated 
that farming should be included as an enterprise activity, some respondents may have not considered that 
their farming was significant enough to mention.  
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Ashanti appears to form part of a wider household enterprise strategy: more than 80% of IME 
owners also receive income from other sources. Better-off households in Otaakrom appear to be 
both more likely to be engaged in nonfarm enterprises and more likely to be involved in both 




Despite the fact that the issue of multiple employment has been raised before, standard 
occupational categorisation usually characterises individuals and activities into distinct and 
exclusive categories (e.g. farm/nonfarm, wage-/self-employed) which disguises occupational 
pluralism. There are signs though that this might be changing. For example, Heintz (2004) 
outlines a set of possible indicators for tracking employment outcomes in Ghana, based on 
questions that have been asked in the GLSS 4: one of these was ‘percentage of the employed who 
work in two jobs or more’.  
 
The concept of occupational pluralism, however, cuts across the farm-nonfarm divide, across the 
wage-/self-employment distinction, acknowledges cross-financing and the complex linkages 
between farm and nonfarm work. 
 
As a concluding word to this section, Hart (1973) makes this point: 
 
Spurious attempts at quantification [of unemployment] obscure the truth of the matter, 
which is that very few of those peddling such information have any idea of how the 
majority of Africans make a living. Moreover, government policies are framed in the 
light of analysis using information of this kind! (p.493) 
 
2.4. Conclusion: implications for the school-skill-enterprise link beyond the farm-
nonfarm divide 
 
Discussion in this chapter has resulted in a number of implications for rethinking the school-skill-
enterprise interaction. 
 
Recognising occupational pluralism in SSA means that an individual’s employment is often not 
in one activity, or one enterprise, but in multiple activities, or multiple enterprises: multiple farm, 
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multiple nonfarm or farm and nonfarm. Moreover, the issue of straddling formal and informal 
occupations further complicates employment realities.  
 
While the issue of occupational pluralism, or enterprise diversification, is discussed in the 
literature, the straightforward occupational classifications continue to be used. The implications 
such an acknowledgement of occupational pluralism has for the school-skill-enterprise 
relationship have not been acted upon.    
 
It is too simplistic to examine the effects of schooling and/or skills training on enterprise 
outcomes, where enterprise outcomes are measured from only one activity – either farm or 
nonfarm. Studies regarding the effects of schooling on farm outcomes are common (e.g. 
Lockheed et al., 1980), but those regarding effects of schooling on nonfarm outcomes are less so 
(but see Vijverberg, 1995; 1999). Very few authors look at effects of schooling on both farm and 
nonfarm activities (Jolliffe, 1996; 2002; 2004), and the issue of schooling, skills and occupational 
pluralism needs to be more developed in the literature. Given the widespread, and growing, 
nature of occupational pluralism in SSA, studies that only look at the effects of schooling or skills 
on individuals’ farm or nonfarm activities are missing a lot.  
 
Similarly, it is too crude to categorise an individual as only self- or wage-employed. Secondary 
and tertiary enterprise activities or occupations need to be considered.   
 
The implications of occupational pluralism and straddling are that skills needs are diverse and 
changing, and that skills development has to be flexible enough to contribute to diverse 
livelihood strategies. Training should enhance individual capability to move from one type of 
work to another. 
 
The occupational pluralism of households or individuals, that results in an often simultaneous 
combination of formal and informal employment, in addition to the importance of cross-financing 
between these activities, suggests that any sharp distinction between the formal and informal 
sectors is a fallacy (cf. King, 1977; Rimmer, 1992).  
 
Given the large number of links between formal/informal economies and that they both exhibit 
characteristics of each other, the relationship between the formal and informal becomes blurred; 
for example wage duplication takes place, where formal sector employees have informal sector 
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sidelines, or informal sector participants have multiple informal employment; some waged jobs 
are unrecorded (Rimmer, 1992); others make rational decisions to move from the formal to 
informal areas of the economy and, by doing so, bring a formal background, up-to-date 
information and access to formal support mechanisms (i.e. training, modern banking, extension 
services) to the informal economy; others use informal activities to finance a period of formal 
sector unemployment; in addition many informal activities act as service/material providers for 
both the informal/formal economy. Further, since the activities exhibit both modern and 
traditional features, this clear-cut dualistic categorization is inappropriate (Aboagye and Gozo, 
1986).  
 
Once it is recognised that the informal sector is both urban and rural, is often characterised by 
occupational pluralism (individuals/households with multiple occupations and strong farm-
nonfarm links) and accounts for some 90% of all employment in some developing countries, 
surely the time has come to stop seeing it as a sector at all, or as something special in an 
economy. King (1990a; 1996; 2005a) argues that it is not an informal economy, it is the ordinary 




















Chapter 3: Skills Development, the Enabling Environment and Pathways to 




The education-enterprise link is not well understood (King and McGrath, 1999a), though 
UNESCO and the ILO have been “making the connection between education and the acquisition 
of skills for a productive working life” (ILO, 2003a: 8). 
 
The previous chapter focused on the enterprise component of the school-skill-enterprise 
interaction and re-visited some traditional conceptualisations in light of the occupational 
pluralism of large segments of the Africa’s population. This chapter will mainly focus on the 
skill-enterprise link. 
 
As noted in chapter 1, since the EFA initiative in 1990 the school leaver crisis, emerging due to 
the massive increase in numbers completing basic education, has led to questions concerning the 
scale of post-basic education and skills training, and ultimately, to questions about EFA for what 
type of employment outcome. Politicians and policy makers in many countries in SSA are 
concerned on the one hand about these large numbers of youth exiting the school system and, on 
the other hand, about the knowledge that there are insufficient formal jobs for these youth. The 
bulk of school graduates enter the informal micro-enterprise (IME) economy, both rural and 
urban, in farm and nonfarm enterprises. In a number of countries across SSA attention has turned 
to delivering skills training as a means to make these school graduates employable and hence 
facilitate their entry into enterprise. Hence knowing more about the education-enterprise link, and 
especially the skill-enterprise pathway is important both from a political and a policy-making 
position. Moreover, to maintain commitment to primary school enrolment there is need for 
parents to see further training or employment opportunities for their children after school. 
 
Skills training is said to be beneficial to labour market outcomes. The standard approach, popular 
among economists, has been to link years of schooling with outcomes: increases in productivity, 
incomes or higher returns. Much of this literature, however, has not looked at the returns to 
TVET (but see Bennell, 1996b).67  
                                                 
67 See also King and Palmer (2006b). 
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Skills learnt though TVET are often linked with positive developmental outcomes including the 
alleged positive impact skills have on the nature of employment outcomes in an economy. In a 
general analysis the ILO (1998) saw training as being important for workers in the informal 
economy. The ILO (2003a: 8) stresses that “skills are essential to improve productivity, incomes 
and access to employment opportunities”. Skills training is often said to be beneficial to IME 
operatives in a number of ways. 
 
Firstly, it is widely assumed that skills training increases productivity, quality, diversity and 
occupational safety and improves health, thereby increasing incomes and hence leading to 
reductions in poverty levels for these workers and their families (Fluitman and Haan, 2002; 
World Bank, 1991; 2000a; 2004a; 2005a).  
 
Secondly, it has been argued that on-the-job skills training helps to develop social capital and 
enterprise networks (Assad, 1993).  
 
Thirdly, skills training can help develop business skills and experience, crucial to apprentices’ 
future survival as independent entrepreneurs (Fluitman, 1994). 
  
Fourthly, given that increasing numbers of people in SSA are engaging in occupational pluralism, 
any increase in productivity resulting from nonfarm skills training has positive knock-on effects 
to agricultural enterprises, principally through cross-financing (Palmer, 2004b).   
 
Fifthly, traditional apprenticeship training represents the most accessible source of training for 
the poor and an important source of technical skills for those who cannot access formal training.68 
 
These claims about the beneficial results of skills acquired through TVET or so many years of 
schooling perpetuate the assumption that this training leads to economic growth and poverty 
reduction.69 But there is no automatic relationship between acquiring skills and obtaining these 
outcomes above. Skills development outcomes, at all levels, are obviously determined many 
other things such as the quality of the education and training and the state of the enabling 
environment surrounding skills development (King and Palmer, 2006c). The years of schooling 
                                                 
68 However, the poor can still have trouble financing apprenticeship (see chap.7.9.1).  
69 See chap.9. 
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measure fails to say anything about the quality of the learning or about the type of environment in 
which graduates find themselves.70   
 
This is something that is perhaps very obvious but which had been missing in much of the long-
running debate about the developmental outcomes of education and skills training - that education 
and training needs to be embedded in a series of particular contexts or environments if it is to 
have the powerful effects that are so often claimed for it. Hence, skills training on its own may be 
a key variable, but it is not a determinant of poverty reduction, growth or of job creation. 
 
The first section of this chapter examines two types of environment which are crucial in the skill-
to-work link: i) the delivery environment for skill acquisition; ii) the transformative environment 
for skills utilisation.71 The second section examines one aspect of this transformative 
environment: the micro-enterprise environment in developing countries. Lastly, this chapter 
examines some of the pathways to IME. 
 
3.1. Translating skills development into employment outcomes 
 
The quantity and quality of human resources produced depend on both the delivery capacity of 
the formal and informal education and skills system, and on the demand for these resources in a 
given country. It is not simply a case of increasing the supply of educated and skilled workers 
through investing heavily in expanding the provision of education and training. Education and 
training, alone, do not result in increased productive capacity in the form of employment. Nor, by 
the same token, do they, alone, result in poverty reduction/growth. If skills cannot be put to use, 
potential capacity may be increased, but productive capacity will not be (King and Palmer, 
2006a). There is a difference between skills development (the capacities acquired) and skills 
utilisation. Not only do the skills acquired need to be of good quality, but they need to be 





                                                 
70 For a critique of the economics of education literature for Ghana, see Palmer (2006a). See also Bennell 
(1996a) who has been a vocal critic of rate-of-return to education estimates. 
71 The framework for the delivery and transformative context were also discussed in King and Palmer 
(2006c) and Palmer et al. (2007), but in both cases it was the author who wrote that part of the papers. 
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3.1.1. The delivery environment for skill acquisition  
 
This refers to the context in which skills are acquired and is made up of three distinct 
environments: the formal education environment (skills delivered through schools or formal 
VTIs); the informal enterprise-based training environment (e.g. traditional apprenticeship 
training); and, the formal enterprise-based training environment. 
 
In the formal education environment the delivery of skills is affected by factors such as: the 
availability and quality of, and incentives for, teachers; text books and other learning materials 
(e.g. tools, equipment); management/governance; curriculum; instruction time; language of 
instruction; school infrastructure (including workshops) (World Bank, 2005a). These quality 
aspects of school- or institution-based training are absolutely critical (UNESCO, 2004). 
 
Informal enterprise-based training is intimately linked to the nature of informal enterprise itself – 
and to the associated challenges that most of these enterprises face. Training in this environment 
is well known to have a number of advantages and disadvantages (Palmer, 2005a; World Bank, 
2004a).72 This type of training is also affected both by policies related to the informal private 
sector, but also by government skills strategies that might include apprenticeship training in their 
remit.  
 
Meanwhile formal enterprise-based training is affected by the policies and environment related to 
formal private sector development (and in some countries which have skills levies, by 
government skills strategies).73  
 
This delivery environment exerts a major influence on the degree to which quality skills are 
developed. But the delivery environment is, itself, affected by other factors. For example: user 
fees/other direct costs; indirect and opportunity costs; household income; distance to school; 





                                                 
72 See chap.7.9. 
73 See World Bank (2004a) on training in formal enterprises. 
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3.1.2. The transformative environment for skills utilisation 
 
For skills to translate into productive employment outcomes there needs to be the development of 
other factors, external to the education and training system. The extent to which the traditional 
skills learnt through basic education and traditional forms of TVET can contribute to the 
development of a county’s productive capacity are influenced both by the development and 
utilisation of a country’s higher-level skills, and by the development of a supportive enabling 
environment that allows skills to be utilised productively (fig.3.1) (King and Palmer, 2006a; 
Palmer et al., 2007).  
 
In 2005 three documents highlighted the crucial importance of seeing the expected outcomes and 
quality of education and training within such wider enabling contexts: the UN Millennium Project 
Report (UN Millennium Project, 2005), the Commission for Africa (Commission for Africa, 
2005), and the World Bank’s policy paper on education (World Bank, 2005a).74 Likewise 
UNESCO (2004) highlights the importance of external contextual factors that impact on the 
quality of an education system. These include: the economic and labour market conditions; socio-
cultural and religious factors; aid strategies; educational knowledge and support infrastructure; 
public resources available for education; parental support; labour demands.  
 
Similarly the World Bank (2004a) sees no automatic connection between skills development and 
employment: “[t]raining, by itself, will not create jobs and will achieve its objectives only where 
the conditions are right for economic growth” (p.188). The Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) further adds that there is no tangible evidence that training alone creates jobs (IDB, 2000: 
17, italics in original) and notes that   
 
Training requires an enabling environment… [T]raining by itself will not be effective 
unless the conditions for the deployment of learned skills are favorable. This includes the 
political and economic climate… The first and foremost precondition is the creation of 
jobs. Unless jobs are being created, training runs a high risk of being ineffective. (p.7, 
italics in original) 
 
Among the most critical factors in such a transformative environment, therefore, are the macro-
economy, work and employment. 
 
                                                 
74 For a full discussion of each of these, see King and Palmer, 2006c and Palmer et al., 2007. 
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The essential first step with regard to skills development remains getting the macroeconomic 
context right (World Bank, 2004a: xv). The World Bank made a similar point ten years earlier - 
that for skills training to result in increased productivity and earnings, the economic and labour 
market environment had to first be reformed so that it was supportive of skills utilisation: 
 
Progress along this road [improvement in productivity and earnings of the poor] initially 
requires not training, but reform of policies that discourage economic and employment 
growth. (Middleton et al., 1993: 217) 
 
The 1991 Bank TVET paper further acknowledged that training alone was a necessary, but 
insufficient factor in improving informal sector productivity: 
 
Training in the rural and urban informal sectors can improve the productivity of the poor 
if it is used to complement broader strategies to generate income, but training alone has 
not been very effective. (World Bank, 1991: 58) 
 
In the field of agriculture, skills development is recognised as “a vital part of the package needed 
to advance farm productivity, raise incomes, reduce poverty and make the transition to a more 
productive non-farm sector” (Johanson, 2005: 17). However, as with our discussion above 
concerning skills learnt though traditional TVET, “support for the educational needs of rural 
populations… is unlikely to foster the improvements in rural incomes and living standards… 
without the support of other reinforcing initiatives” (Saint, 2005: 1, emphasis added). These 
reinforcing initiatives include, for example: a proper macro-economic and regulatory framework; 
innovative private firms and NGOs; and adequate communication and transport infrastructure 
(ibid.). Similarly, Kodithuwakku and Rosa (2002) argue that knowledge utilisation is dependent 
on resource availability:  
 
[A]ny increase in knowledge must be matched with equivalent and relevant resource 
mobilisation. Learning about fertilizers and farm machinery, for example, can only be 
useful if fertilizer and machinery for spreading is affordable, can be obtained, and 
maintained. (p.435) 
 
The widely used claim in policy documents about how education increases agricultural very 
seldom notes the central caveat to the original research this claim is based on – that the impact of 
skills on agricultural productivity acquired through education is dependent on the state of the 
enabling environment for farming. Lockheed et al. (1980) showed that four years of education for 
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farmers makes a difference to agricultural productivity of about 10% in a modernising 
environment. This modernising environment referred to a context where there were  
 
new crop varieties, innovative planting methods, erosion control, and the availability of 
capital inputs such as insecticides, fertilisers, and tractors or machines. Some other 
indicators of [a modern] environment were market-orientated production and exposure to 
extension services. (ibid.: 129) 
 
Education makes virtually no difference, the research argued, if the environment is nonmodern 
(ibid.).75   
 
The labour market environment includes, for example: the growth in the economy and availability 
of more and better employment opportunities; the advancement, accessibility and adoption of 
technological capabilities; the development of an equitable infrastructure for formal and informal 
enterprises; the presence of meritocratic access to both the formal and informal labour markets; 
and the availability of financial capital.  
 
The macro-economic environment includes, for example: civil service reform; good governance 
(with policy predictability, transparency and accountability) and action on corruption; poverty 
reduction and inclusion; social cohesion; decentralisation; political economy of reform; 
knowledge economy goals; resource mobilisation and utilisation (Commission for Africa, 2005; 
UNDP, 2004; World Bank, 2005a). 
 
The interaction between education and economic development has been the subject of long 
debate. In fact, it was in Ghana in the late 1950s, that one of the most influential pieces of 
research was done concerning the role of the school in the economic development of a country: 
Philip Foster’s Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning (Foster, 1965b). Briefly put, 
Foster argued that it was a fallacy to think that it was possible to change the aspirations of (rural 
and urban) youth in favour of farming (and staying in the rural areas) by changing the curriculum 
to include vocational education. This was because, he continued, youths’ aspirations are 
determined largely by what happens outside the education and training system – in the labour 
market.76 Foster argued that in general, pupils and parents value academic education much more 
than vocational education and training because it promises to offer better employment 
                                                 
75 For an extended analysis of this see King and Palmer (2006c) and King et al. (2005). 
76 Foster’s research was not, of course, in VTIs, but in middle and secondary schools. 
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opportunities in the future. Foster argued therefore that, in many respects, academic education is 
more vocational than vocational education proper.   
 
Even though Foster (1965b) was able persuasively to show that “the idea that children’s 
vocational aspirations can be altered by massive changes in curriculum is no more than a piece of 
folklore with little empirical justification” (p.149), the belief that a vocationalised curriculum can 
largely alter pupils’ occupational aspirations held sway in the Bank until the mid 1980s and 
continues amongst national policy-makers up to the present (chap.1.2.1). 
 
While Foster (1965b) argued that the curriculum made no difference to the aspirations of students 
with regard to occupation, a later study in Ghana by King and Martin (2002) suggests “that there 
could, very possibly, be an identifiable school influence or school effect on attitudes towards 
employment and self-employment” (p.6).77 Nonetheless, King and Martin agree with Foster that 
“clearly pupils are directly affected by their perceptions of the opportunity structure outside the 
schools” (p.23) and that one should be aware of the limitations of any attempt “to use schools to 
deliver massive changes in attitude and aspiration in the absence of any parallel initiatives in the 
larger economic environment” (p.24). 
 
The view in the 1960s - concerning the role of school in development - which Foster was so 
concerned with was this: in largely agricultural societies, where formal employment is small and 
cannot absorb the vast majority of school leavers, it is “essential… [that] large scale technical and 
agricultural programmes [are developed] within the schools” (Foster, 1965b: 142)78 that would 
prepare school leavers with vocational, agricultural and technical skills needed to transform their 
society. The British economist, Thomas Balogh, commented that:79  
 
Present educational facilities constitute an obstacle to rural progress because people are 
not trained for agriculture, and academic systems of formal education are the chief 
determinant of attitudes hostile to the practice of rural agriculture. Schools are regarded 
as primarily responsible for the flight from rural areas to the towns. (Balogh in Foster, 
1965b: 142)  
 
However, in the Vocational School Fallacy, Foster (1965b) argued that such views are “generally 
fallacious and ignore a series of crucial variables” (p.143).  Foster’s concerns, which are still of 
                                                 
77 See also Foster (2002).  
78 Here, Foster is paraphrasing the views of Balogh (see fn. 79). 
79 Balogh made a series of observations on the conclusions of the 1961Conference of African Ministers of 
Education (Addis Ababa).  
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critical relevance to today’s Ghana - e.g. vis-à-vis the proposed education reform (chap.5.1) – 
relate to the need to understand the limitations of what education alone can do for economic 
development. He argued that the solution to the problem of unemployment is not the school, or 
the school curriculum, since it is relatively easy to expand student enrolments, but if the economy 
is not growing sufficiently to absorb the increased influx of school graduates then the 
unemployment situation will worsen.   
 
Educating and training large numbers of people “does not… create employment opportunities for 
them” (Foster, 1965b: 153). Foster argued that the solution to the problem of unemployment lies 
outwith the school, and children’s aspirations - and the occupations that they end up in - “are 
almost exclusively determined by factors which lie outside of the schools” (p.152). He notes that 
it is the institutional environment outside the school which is critical:  
 
the crucial variables lie… in the structure of incentives within the economic system and 
in the degree to which the institutional milieu is supportive of entrepreneurial activity. 
Without such a milieu no amount of vocational instruction can be effective since the 
skills acquired will not be utilized. (ibid.: 153, emphasis added)80 
 
In a later paper, Foster (1975) continues to make the point that providing formal education, 
without concomitant developments in the rural economy (e.g. in markets, infrastructure etc.) will 
not lead to economic development and the expected outcomes of education. 
 
[F]ormal education alone must not be regarded as the primary engine of rural 
transformation, for literacy and schooling become effective only when they operate in 
conjunction with other changes in the rural economy…  
 
the priorities for rural improvement are the provision of incentives for peasant farmers; 
the development of markets; the extension of transport facilities; and increase in input 
supplies; and basic research on agriculture. Without these, the rural economy will not 
grow and educational efforts will be partly wasted. (p.385, italics in original) 
 
It is clear, therefore, that Foster’s concerns related to the outcomes of education and the need for 
other enabling factors to be in place – job opportunities, infrastructure etc. – are directly related to 
the concerns regarding the importance of the transformative environment.  
 
                                                 
80 For an analysis of the institutional environment for enterprise activity in Ghana, see chap.5.3. 
 80 
In fact, Foster was not alone in his scepticism of the role that education, alone, could play in the 
economic development and transformation of a country. Both Callaway’s Nigerian research and 
Peil’s Ghanaian research in the 1960s/70s led them to similar conclusions.   
 
Callaway noted that it was not schools that affected student perceptions, but, rather the wider 
external social and economic environment:  
 
The fact is that school leavers’ views of their vocation in life are determined largely by 
what happens outside the school, in the society and economy. (Callaway, 1963: 362, 
emphasis added) 
 
Peil was also of this view. During the discussion at the conference on urban unemployment in 
Africa in 1971, she commented that: 
 
… it is the influences from the wider social environment and not just education which are 
crucial in shaping attitudes towards the labour market. (Cruise O'Brien, 1972: 111-112, 
emphasis added)  
 
In 2002 Foster commented again on the limitations that should be placed on expectations of what 
education can do for economic development:  
 
…education is only one of the factors associated with economic development. Over the 
last thirty years a formidable body of evidence has been generated to emphasize that it 
plays a major role. But I would contend that education is not the “prime mover” in 
economic change but it is a powerful accelerator given an appropriate structural and 
institutional environment. This caveat is absent from much of the current policy-
orientated literature… (Foster, 2002: 28, emphasis in original) 
 
In addition to the macro-economic and labour market environment there are a number of other 
environments which all serve to enable or disable the translation of skills acquisition to skills 
utilisation (fig.3.1): cross-sectoral linkages; the historical, social and cultural environment; and 
the international environment. 
 
The cross-sectoral linkages (physical and social infrastructure) include, for example: water and 
sanitation; transport; health; energy; social protection; youth; agriculture; education; private 
sector development (labour market environment) (Commission for Africa, 2005; UNDP, 2004; 
World Bank, 2005a). Investment in infrastructure is increasingly regarded as being absolutely 
critical for development (DFID, 2006b: 61). For example, Hettige (2006) finds that the poor and 
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very poor benefit substantially from rural roads through access to state services in areas such as 
health, education, agricultural extension, and provision of information. Lack of access to basic 
infrastructure and services, for example electrical, telephonic and transport infrastructures can 
inhibit successful production, trade and networking among MSEs (King and McGrath, 2002b). 
 
The historical, socio-cultural and political environment includes, for example: the development of 
social capital; cultural values and attitudes; societal values and norms. 
 
The international environment impacts on the different kinds of national enabling environments: 
the cross-sectoral linkages; macro-economic linkages; historical, social and cultural environment; 
the labour market environment; and, as noted above, the national delivery environment of 
education and training. This international environment includes, for example, open markets and 
international trade regulations; international aid policy and framework; global geo-politics; and, 
debt (UNDP, 2004). 
 
Fig.3.1 tries to show visually that which has been discussed above. The key point to note here is 
the distinction between skills development and skills utilisation. Developing skills in a labour 
force is one thing, but if people cannot utilise these skills because other supportive measures are 
absent, then skills development cannot lead to productive employment outcomes.  
 
The relationship between the development of the transformative environment and the different 
levels of skills development (fig.3.1) is, of course, two-way: particularly at the post-basic level 
skills development assists in the creation of the transformative environment (see King and 
Palmer, 2006c). 
 
Many of the environments that have been discussed above come close to what the World Bank 
refers to as the investment climate – defined as the “opportunities and incentives for firms to 
invest productively, create jobs and expand” (World Bank, 2004b: 19). The Bank also makes the 
useful point that many aspects of a good investment climate – courts, finance markets and 
infrastructure – improve the lives of the population whether they are working in private sector 
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This section questioned the straightforward linking of skills training with outcomes and 
highlighted the importance of both the context in which skills are delivered - the delivery 
environment for skill acquisition – and the context in which trainees find themselves upon 
graduating - the transformative environment for skills utilisation. The labour market environment 
is among the most critical elements of this transformative environment, and this is examined in 
the following section in relation to the informal sector. 
 
3.2. The informal micro-enterprise (IME) environment  
 
African IMEs face a host of challenges and there is a wide literature discussing the kinds of 
enabling factors which influence the success of these ventures (Commission for Africa, 2005; 
Grierson, 1997; King and McGrath, 1999a; 2002b; McGrath, 2005b; McGrath et al., 1995; 
Trager, 1987; UNDP, 2004; World Bank, 1991; 2004a).  
 
Both the 2004 and 1993 World Bank publications on TVET (Middleton et al., 1993; World Bank, 
2004a) underlined the need to support skills training with other interventions if self-employment 
outcomes were to occur. The 1991 Bank paper also made this point: 
 
Successful entry into self-employment and the establishment of small businesses require 
much more than vocational skills; access to capital and markets and business 
management competence are also needed. (World Bank, 1991: 27) 
 
Grierson (1997) also highlighted the importance of an enabling environment for enterprise 
development:  
 
The clearest lesson learned about enterprise development in recent years is that all types 
of business are easier to establish and ultimately more successful if framework conditions 
are positive – that is, if there is an “enabling environment” (p.43) 
 
In addition to the more general aspects of the transformative context, noted above, it is worth 
briefly outlining components of the micro-enterprise environment that serves both to enable and 
disable skill-to-enterprise outcomes. These include the:  
• economic environment;  
• legal and regulatory environment;  
 84 
• policy and institutional environment; 
• social environment (networks, associations and gender); 
• post training environment. 
 
3.2.1. The economic environment 
 
The key macro-economic linkages that impact on the overall informal sector labour market 
environment were noted above. But it is worth taking this discussion a little further at this point. 
 
Firstly, in most of SSA the informal sector represents the dominant source of employment. 
Countries in SSA that have experienced economic growth appear to have largely done so without 
concomitant job growth; GDP growth, in other words, is often jobless (Altman, 2003). It is 
therefore important that the growth in economies is complemented by the availability of more and 
better employment opportunities. In the absence of formal job creation and supportive policies for 
informal MSE development, it is difficult for skills learnt to be used.  
 
Secondly, the nature of informal economies in SSA suppresses demand for skills training or 
upgrading. Informal economies effectively operate as income-constrained markets - meaning that 
people’s buying power is weak overall.81 This restricts not only overall demand for products and 
services, but reduces the demand for training to improve quality since the market could not 
purchase better quality, more expensive, goods and services anyway (Palmer, 2005a; World 
Bank, 2004a: 135).82 
 
3.2.2. The legal and regulatory environment 
 
The legal and regulatory environment can also serve both to enable and disable enterprise 
outcomes. The UNDP (2004) notes that “[p]erhaps most important in allowing entrepreneurship 
and the private sector to blossom is a level playing field… with fair rules, fairly enforced” (p.17). 
These rules are laid down in a sound legal framework, consisting of written rules and laws 
followed by every citizen, and are enforced by a professional bureaucracy in a fair and 
                                                 
81 Markets may also be saturated or dispersed which further constrains entrepreneurial activity. 
82 Hence, skills development interventions need to improve quality and efficiency without resulting in too 
great a price rise for the final product/service. 
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transparent manner (UNDP, 2004). In the private sector the rule of law manifests itself in, among 
others, commercial laws, custom laws and contract laws (ibid.).  
 
However “[r]ules, if excessively complex and incorrectly applied, can turn into significant 
barriers for enterprises… [t]his applies to rules for entry, operating, market and exit” (UNDP, 
2004: 17). Too many complex or inaccessible procedures associated with formally registering 
and running a business will serve to disable enterprise outcomes. 
 
In developing countries a key constraint to the informal economy remains the lack of rights over 
land and commercial assets (Commission for Africa, 2005). The need for enforceable contracts in 
relation to property rights is crucial (Commission for Africa, 2005; UNDP, 2004). Many in the 
informal economy find it hard to utilise their assets, which largely remain “dead capital” (De 
Soto, 2001). Dead capital is capital in the form of informal assets that lack value as collateral for 
securing the interests of creditors. To become live capital, these assets must be formalised so that 
ownership can be traced and validated and exchanges can be governed by a legally recognisable 
set of rules (ibid.).  
 
Other regulations and standards (e.g. health and safety issues) and social protection (e.g. labour 
protection) that exist in developing countries largely ignore the informal economy, especially in 
rural areas (Commission for Africa, 2005). 
 
Nonetheless, since the vast majority of MSEs in the informal economy are alegal (Blunch et al., 
2001; Hugon, 1990: 73), “it does not appear that the legal and regulatory framework has been a 
serious hindrance to the establishment of most enterprises” (Liedholm and Mead, 1999: 85; cf. 
Mead, 1999). 
 
In spite of the fact that the IME economy contains the largest proportion of workers in many 
developing countries, preferential treatment for their formal sector colleagues still occurs 
(McGrath et al., 1995). While governments are now becoming generally less openly hostile 
towards informal economic activities, constraints still arise in many countries from often 
contradictory policies of local, state and central government policy, in relation to tax collection, 




3.2.3. The policy and institutional environment 
 
IMEs can be constrained by: weak, contradictory or absent government policy vis-à-vis IME; lack 
of coordination between, and lack of capacity of ministries and agencies concerned with 
education, skills and private sector development. These are obviously interrelated: a lack of an 
overall strategic policy framework contributes to weak institutional linkages and hence a 
disabling policy environment for IMEs.  
 
3.2.4. The social environment; networks, associations and gender 
 
Grierson (1997) notes that social barriers to entry present a “formidable challenge to the 
prospective self-employed” (p.57). For example, despite the fact that “women play a pivotal role 
in the informal economy… women entrepreneurs in Africa face huge discrimination with regard 
to economic and social assets, including land rights” (Commission for Africa, 2005: 239), credit 
and other aspects. The difficulty of female access to such basic assets constrains their ability to 
enter dynamic self-employment activities when compared to their male counterparts. The 
traditional roles of women in many developing countries often restrict and discourage female 
involvement in activities outside of what women traditionally do: dressmaking, hairdressing, 
trading etc. 
 
Social networks, enterprise networks and other informal sector associations (ISAs) are vital for 
self-employment promotion (cf. Kodithuwakku and Rosa, 2002) and the extent to which aspiring 
self-employed youths can access these social networks may affect their start-up success. Some 
groups, especially women, the young, poor or disadvantaged find it difficult to obtain access to 
these networks needed to start and sustain enterprises (Chigunta, Schnurr, James-Wilson and 
Torres, 2005; Grierson, 1997). Grierson (1997) comments that:  
 
ease of entry to self-employment is related to the ability to access or create the social 
networks needed to provide information about self-employment opportunities and access 
to the resources and skills needed to take advantage of these skills. (p.57) 
 
As noted below, the majority of those entering self-employment in SSA get financial assistance 
from family or other social networks. This takes the form of social relationships between people – 
assisting relatives/friends financially or helping them find employment - or might be more 
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structured in the form of informal savings, funeral or social welfare groups.83 However, the role 
that family plays in enterprise start-up can both be a help and a hindrance (Buckley, 1996; 
Palmer, 2004a). 
 
In addition to the importance of family and social networks, those entering self-employment 
activities need to develop good enterprise networks made up of trainees’ own enterprises, their 
competitors, their suppliers, their creditors and their customers. Enterprise networks don’t only 
provide advice to new starts, but can also assist financially (e.g. some enterprises might offer 
supplier credit to new starts). There is often quite a degree of overlap between social and 
enterprise networks; since other owners might also be in an individual’s social network the 
boundary between social and enterprise networks can often be blurred. Moreover, social contacts 
can act as intermediaries to bring enterprise owners together.   
 
Grierson (1997) argues that two distinct types of network84 need to be stimulated for self-
employment promotion: i) enterprise networks; and ii) institutional networks - comprised of 
training programmes, complementary support institutions, banks and other financial and non-
financial support institutions that have the aim of supporting self-employment. These institutional 
networks relate directly to the point made below about the need for strong collaboration between 
those agencies concerned with education and skills training, and those concerned with self-
employment creation. 
 
A study by Gibb and Manu (1990, cited in Grierson, 1997) of 57 projects in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and Europe concluded that effective small enterprise development institutions linked 
training with other support services not as part of a bureaucratic service, but through stimulating 
network and linkage creation. Coordination between institutions is therefore vital as is the 
strengthening of networks and associations that can facilitate this coordination process. 
 
Furthermore, informal sector associations (ISAs) can be an important means not only to link 
owners of similar enterprises together so that they might support each other informally, but also 
to act as a single voice to get the views of thier members felt in policy dialogue, and as a means to 
strengthen these institutional networks. The Commission for Africa Report (2005) noted that, in 
                                                 
83 These types of informal savings and insurance associations have been well documented (see Ardener and 
Burman, 1996). 
84 Given what has been said above about the importance of family and ethnic connections, it is noted that a 
third type of network could be added to these two: the family and ethnic network (see chap.8.1). 
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order to develop a private sector strategy for the informal economy, small enterprises have to be 
given a voice in the policy process.  
 
3.2.5. The post-training environment: finance, follow-up and technology  
 
Finance 
It is widely acknowledged that lack of, or difficulty in obtaining, credit is a major problem to 
enterprise development in Africa, especially for MSEs (ApT, 1993; Aryeetey, 1996; Commission 
for Africa, 2005; ILO, 2003a; UNDP, 2004).  
 
Youth wishing to start-up a small enterprise find it especially difficult to access formal credit, 
and informal credit markets are usually insufficient to meet their needs at this stage (Palmer, 
2004a: 12-28).85 Participation in informal credit markets often relies on social capital (informal 
networks and trust), an asset that newly trained young people generally have not yet had time to 
develop. Furthermore, young people find it difficult to participate fully in the informal credit 
market since suppliers and customers often exploit their need for credit to get a cheaper price 
(customer) or a bigger profit (supplier) for themselves. Consequently, new start-ups have to rely 
heavily on their own savings (ibid.).86  
 
In general, informal economic activities have long been characterised by their ease of entry (ILO, 
1972). Webster and Fidler (1996) note that “low entry barriers facilitate relatively easy enterprise 
start-up” (p.13). Others note that the “capital intensity in this sector is low” (Barwa, 1995: 9), 
meaning that those wishing to establish informal economic activities do not require much capital. 
 
However, once the construct of the informal economic self-employment is broken down into the 
distinction between subsistence and entrepreneurial self-employment, noted earlier (chap.2.1.2), 
then pathways to enterprise appear to be different: it seems that the more subsistence-orientated 
enterprises are generally charcterised by ease of entry, whereas more dynamic enterprises, like 
micro-communications enterprises, are harder to enter.  
 
This distinction between entry into different types of enterprise was recognised early by Hart 
(1969, 1973) who noted that while there was a general ease of entry, this was less true for the 
                                                 
85 For a detailed discussion of MSE financing in Africa (using Ghana as a case study) see Palmer (2004a). 
86 See chap.8.2. 
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more dynamic, profit-making enterprises. More dynamic informal activities require more 
financing and, where start-up capital is difficult to come by, entry is harder. Hart (1973) noted 
that an essential prerequisite for entry into more profitable activities was that savings had been 
accumulated. A later ILO/JASPA (1985) report noted that:  
 
the ease of entry argument about the informal sector has to be qualified substantively: 
entry [can be]… quite selective. (p.43) 
 
Bryceson (2002a) points to a number of studies from SSA that suggest entry into more lucrative 
non-agricultural activities requires high levels of starting capital, that results in the exclusion of 
“farmers from more modest means” (p.734).  
 
Thus, while it may be true to describe pathways to the more subsistence-orientated enterprises as 
an “erratic, iterative process” (Grierson, 1997: 45), or as rapid, incremental and unplanned 
(Aldrich, Rosen and Woodward, 1987, in Grierson, 1997), it would be less true to say the same 
of pathways to more dynamic, entrepreneurial, enterprises. 
 
In addition to problems associated with formal credit, formal savings and insurance programmes 
are difficult to access by young, often poor, individuals, especially those in rural areas. 
 
Some researchers (e.g. Adams and von Pischke, 1992; Buckley, 1997; Dawson, 1997; Gockel and 
Akoena, 2002) have come to the conclusion that micro-enterprises may face more important 
constraints than lack of working or fixed capital. Buckley (1997) adds that the real problems 
facing micro-entrepreneurs “cannot be tackled solely by capital injections but require 
fundamental structural changes of the socioeconomic conditions that define the informal sector 
activity” (p.1081, emphasis added). The importance of market demand (low purchasing power), 
market access, lack of diversification, inadequate infrastructure, and poor access to raw materials 
are seen as critical points for MSE intervention, moving non-financial support services back on 
the policy agenda (Rogerson, 2001). 
 
Indeed evidence suggests that once artisans obtain credit they soon start to demand training as 
well (Oketch, 1993). This is particularly the case for expanding MSEs where the managerial 
competence of the owner is often out-stripped by the speed the enterprise is expanding (post-
credit), leading to default on repayments (Harper, 1984). This suggests that the relative 
importance of credit (e.g. compared to training) is higher for enterprises at the lower end of the 
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MSE spectrum than it is for expanding MSEs that are in need of more entrepreneurial-
management skills training to accompany credit (McGrath et al., 1995; Palmer, 2004a).  
 
Business skills, entrepreneurship development, follow-up and extension 
The Commission for Africa Report (2005) notes that “[s]mall enterprises [in SSA] are also 
constrained by a lack of access to business services, including training and planning” (p.240). A 
number of programmes exist in developing countries aimed at providing enterprises with 
business training. These are usually aimed at the more dynamic enterprises, and less so at the 
more subsistence-orientated enterprises (McGrath et al., 1995).  
 
Non-financial BDS are infrequently received by informal MSEs, especially in rural areas though 
there exist innovative possibilities to extend BDS to these clients.87 Agricultural education, 
extension and training services are weak in many developing countries (Johanson, 2005). This 
contributes to a general lack of access to technology, especially in rural areas, which further 
disables education and skill outcomes. 
 
Technology  
It is widely acknowledged that a technically dynamic environment enhances the benefits to 
education and general skills as more educated individuals are better able to make decisions and 
evaluate information in changing economic conditions (see King and Palmer, 2006a; King et al., 
2005 for a discussion). 
 
Reliance on out-dated or traditional technological practices is seen as a constraint to enterprise 
development in the informal economy (McGrath et al., 1995). The apprenticeship literature, in 
particular, frequently cites perpetuation of traditional technology as a major disadvantage of this 
type of training (World Bank, 2004a). NGOs and other agencies have attempted, in various 
countries, to improve productivity, diversity or product quality by improving technology among 
MSEs (Jeans, 1999; Smillie, 1986). Of course the technology environment is not uniform in the 
informal economies of SSA: many of the more dynamic MSEs are able to access modern 
technologies or their enterprise itself might be based on modern technology such as micro-
communications enterprises (cf. Molony, 2006). 
 
                                                 
87 See chap.5.3.6. 
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Another point of view is that one of the strengths of the informal sector is its ability to use and 




This section has briefly examined some of the key components of the labour market environment 
for IME: factors that enable or disable the utilisation of education and skills in the labour market.  
 
While the difficulty of accessing financial resources is commonly cited as the main constraint to 
IME, the non-financial environment – infrastructure, market demand, the legal environment and 
access to social networks are also critical factors in determining ease of entry into IME. 
 
3.3. Pathways to self-employment in micro-enterprise  
 
3.3.1. Education and opportunities  
 
The absolutely critical nature of the enabling environment in the translation of skills acquisition 
to skills utilisation and employment outcomes has involved discussion both of the specific micro-
enterprise environment (itself part of the transformative environment), and also the delivery 
environment. But what does the literature say about pathways to enterprise self-employment in 
developing countries, especially in SSA? What typical pathways through education and skills to 
self-employment can be inferred from the literature? 
 
There is a strong consensus that the acquisition of education and skills is “an important building 
block for new entrepreneurs in the informal sector” (World Bank, 2004a: 54). Caillods (1993) 
stresses the diversity of pathways towards employment through a variety of different skill training 
modalities: 
 
Such surveys carried out in developed and in developing countries consistently show that 
there is not one single way of acceding to skilled occupations: workers and employees 
acquire their skills in a variety of ways, through on-the-job training and experience, 




McGrath et al. (1995) also stress the multiple pathways to self-employment through these 
different providers. This thesis concurs with this position but would add that the multiple skills 
routes to self-employment are complicated when youth combine multiple types of skills 
acquisition. It is not uncommon, for example, for youth to undertake traditional apprenticeship 
training either before or after receiving training in a VTI. Indeed Haan (2001) notes that “[t]here 
are… ample examples of persons who engage in apprenticeship training after a first period of 
formal VTI training” (p.24). 
 
Research in West Africa (Birks, Fluitman, Oudin and Sinclair, 1994; Fluitman, 2001) points to 
education as a critical factor facilitating entry into self-employment, especially in a range of more 
dynamic, attractive, economic activities (including: radio and TV repair, car mechanics, 
secretarial services, cybercafés, tailoring and women’s hairdressing).  
 
Entrepreneurs in the informal sector with a higher level of education were found more likely to 
obtain pre-employment training, to benefit more from apprenticeship training and to need less 
time to enter into self-employment (Birks et al., 1994; Haan, 2001). Birks et al. (1994: 64) 
distinguish two career paths: one to more subsistence-orientated self-employment and the other to 
more-entrepreneurial self-employment:  
(i) Entry to the more attractive, higher technology activities typically involves 7 years at 
school, followed by some technical vocational training (or period at technical 
school), and nearly 4.5 years of apprenticeship, followed by a limited period (less 
than 3 years) of wage-employment before embarking on self-employment; the 
median age for these entrepreneurs is 25 years at the start of self-employment;  
(ii) Entrepreneurs in less attractive activities have only 3.4 years of schooling, less 
propensity to undertake technical or vocational training and, if any (only 55% of 
them), a shorter period of apprenticeship (3.2 years). 
 
Increasingly, entry into informal self-employment is becoming the preferred option for some and 
not only the fall-back option for those who could not make it into formal employment (World 
Bank, 2004a). New opportunities at the more dynamic end of the MSE spectrum are opening up 
in developing countries, not least as a result of the spread of ICT. It is now common place in 
many urban, and increasingly rural parts of West Africa to have micro-communications 
enterprises, either selling air time from a mobile handset or from a specially designed machine 
(chap.2.2.2) – sold to private owners and used in the informal economy (fieldwork, 2001-2005).  
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Pathways to entrepreneurial self-employment, more so than to subsistence self-employment, are 
constrained or hindered by the existence of entry barriers. The whole series of factors that make 
up the micro-enterprise environment are all relevant here (chap.3.2). 
 
The following section looks at a series of typical pathways to self-employment.  
 
3.3.2. Typical pathways to micro-enterprise self-employment 
 
A study by McGrath et al. (1995) outlines a number of typical pathways to self-employment. In 
analysing these pathways below, it is necessary to expand the range of possible other pathways 
not covered by these authors. The intention is that the following diagrams show possible 
transitions to first employment or training and hence do not reflect occupational pluralism, which 
tends to occur later. 
 
Foster’s critique of the provision of skills training in schools in the mid-1960s (Foster, 1965a; b) 
and the acknowledgement in the mid-1980s that providing vocational training as part of a 
diversified school curriculum was no more effective than providing academic education in terms 
of preparing youth for self-employment, led to the World Bank viewing a good general education 
followed by enterprise-based training as the most likely path to self-employment. The World 
Bank (1991; 2004a) has made it clear, as was pointed out above, that it considers a general basic 
education as an essential building block for self-employment:  
 
A solid basic education is the best preparation for a wide range of jobs and often will 
shorten the length of training required. (World Bank, 2004a: 27) 
 
Hence the pathway to self-employment implied here is one where a youth completes general 
education, then enters into some form of formal or, more likely, informal training in an enterprise, 
and subsequently establishes their own enterprise (Model A).  
 
Nonetheless, Model A “is less explicit about what happens after training. It appears to be 
assumed that many graduates of both formal and informal sector enterprise based training will 
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become self-employed” (McGrath et al., 1995: 109, emphasis added). This assumption, as noted 




Model B, based on Grierson (1997) who takes up this issue at the post-school point, examines 
further the link between post-school enterprise-based training and self-employment. In this 
model, the youth, after completing a period of (mostly) informal enterprise-based training pursues 
wage-employment. The importance of time is stressed in this model: in order to ultimately 
become self-employed a period of wage-employment will allow an individual, over time, to 
accumulate savings, develop social networks and gain experience all of which are crucial in order 
to enter self-employment. Indeed, “work experience is a known asset and useful predictor of self-
employment potential” (Mead, Mukwenha and Reed, 1993). Earlier, Hart (1973) noted that 
acquiring capital alone was not sufficient, but that experience was required to establish informal 
activities: 
 
Artisans need not only small capital sums in order to set up their own sewing machine, 
bench and tools... but also a considerable amount of learned expertise. (p.70) 
 
                                                 











Of course, what Model B does not make clear is the type of wage-employment that youth might 
pursue after their period of enterprise-based training. Indeed if the enterprise-based training was 
an informal apprenticeship it is more likely that the period of wage-employment would be in the 
informal economy, perhaps working for their previous master or doing other ad hoc wage work – 
than it is that a newly qualified apprentice would get a job in the formal sector.  
 
Haan (2001) adds that, as a mechanism to accumulate start-up capital, the importance of wage-
employment would diminish if there was an accessible credit scheme that could provide this 
capital. Indeed, as shown later, as a mechanism to accumulate personal savings, wage-
employment, particularly of the informal kind, is but one of many strategies used in rural 
Ghana.89  
 
Palmer (2004a) shows that rural enterprises in Ghana utilise multiple sources of start-up capital. 
One of these sources involves, what might be termed, micro-entrepreneurial self-employment 
(MESE); that is working on very micro, often ad hoc, income generating activities as a means to 
save money to start up a more permanent self-employment venture – e.g. micro-scale cash 
cropping; a graduate tailor doing ad hoc clothing repair work door-to-door; a graduate carpenter 
doing ad hoc furniture work.  
 
                                                 







Source: McGrath et al., 1995: 109 
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The analytical distinction used so far has been between subsistence and entrepreneurial self-
employment, or between what has also been termed: subsistence activities and lucrative segments 
(Blunch et al., 2001) or survivalist and dynamic activities (Mead, 1999). But it may be that it is 
useful to make a distinction between two kinds of entrepreneurial self-employment: on the one 
hand there is what has just been termed MESE, and on the other entrepreneurial self-employment 
proper. MESE, as noted above, might refer to micro-scale entrepreneurial activities that do 
succeed in making a small profit – and so are distinct from subsistence self-employment (which is 
defined by its inability to move beyond the mere replication of current activities)90 – but could not 
yet be termed dynamic or lucrative. 
 
Thus the seemingly paradoxical conclusion is that another typical pathway to self-employment is 




                                                 
90 Subsistence enterprise activities provide only enough profit to satisfy some of the basic needs of the 
owner, and enough to reinvest in the enterprise to maintain its current position. No profit is left over for the 
















Model D represents a common pathway to self-employment in developing countries, illustrating 
both the common phenomenon of youth not completing education and the general lack of post-




Indeed, ‘limited general education’ (Model D) might well be replaced by ‘no formal education’ 
since many youth move into the labour market in developing countries with no formal schooling. 
Ghana, for example, despite 15 years of attention to EFA has more than one million primary 
school-age children not enrolled at the primary level (UNESCO, 2004) and 3.3 million (aged 15 
and above in 1998/99) people in the population with no education (GSS, 2000).  
 
A further model (Model E), therefore, starts with the premise that in many developing countries 
children start their education and training not in school, but in the home, in the market and on the 
farm (Palmer, 2005a).91 
  
                                                 







Source: McGrath et al., 1995: 111 
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From a very early age children in rural areas are taken to the farm, usually by their mother. 
Starting with basic weeding, children acquire farming skills informally from their parents, 
engaging in progressively more complex tasks. Similarly many children, from an early age, assist 
their parents in selling farm produce or trading in local markets (Clark, 1994). This highly 
informalised training that children receive usually continues as the child attends school. Rural 
youth, therefore, regardless of whether they finish, drop out of, or even attend formal schooling in 
the first place usually already possess a basic knowledge of, and experience in, farming and/or 
trading (Palmer, 2005a). 
 
Model F represents typical pathways to entrepreneurial self-employment through three different 
kinds of training. This model fits with the view that “general education… provides [youth with] 
the foundation for later acquisition of vocational skills” (World Bank, 2006b: 111). It assumes 
that a good basic education “is the foundation of most individuals’ success in achieving access to 
enterprise self-employment, although it does not make assumptions about the form and content of 
the basic cycle” (McGrath et al., 1995: 112). It also acknowledges that, in light of the stagnation 
of many formal economies in developing countries, the traditional skills pathways to formal 
sector employment – such as VTIs and formal enterprise-based training – are “increasingly 
becoming pathways to enterprise self-employment” (ibid.: 113). After the training period, Model 
F follows Model B, emphasising the importance of wage-employment for entry into 













informal kind. This model seems to fit with the typical pathway to self-employment outlined in a 
World Bank (2004a) study: 
 
A typical sequence in becoming an entrepreneur is to acquire a basic education, then 
develop skills through a variety of means (formal training, informal training, on-the-job 




McGrath et al. (1995) emphasise the issue of the enabling environment: that “education-and-
training pathways are situated within a particular legal and macroeconomic framework which 
very often constrains or supports them” (p.117). They illustrate this with a further model (Model 
G) intended, on the one hand, to illustrate the enabling environment and, on the other, to illustrate 
the kinds of interventions that have been considered as important for facilitating access to 
entrepreneurial self-employment. However, McGrath et al. (1995) note that these kinds of 
interventions are more effective if delivered after someone has started in self-employment. They 
also note that the support services in Model G are rarely seen by the many millions who engage in 


























A summary model (H) attempts to incorporate all previous models, or pathways to 
entrepreneurial self-employment. It illustrates the multiple skills pathways that might be 
followed: from no, limited or complete formal education; through three types of skills training (or 
none) – including the possibility of movement between training and acquisition of skills from 
multiple sources; from the acquisition of skills to informal/formal wage-employment or MESE; 
and from here to entrepreneurial self-employment. As noted earlier, access to formal wage-
employment is more likely for those who have completed formal enterprise-based training or 
formal VTI training – as opposed to informal apprenticeship training. Moreover, the MESE route 
incorporates those who, after finishing skills training are able to get support from family to 
establish an enterprise – without having to go through informal/formal wage-employment as a 
precursor to self-employment. Those that follow this route have little or no experience and are 
likely to learn through their own mistakes, from copying or observing others, or from getting 
advice from a family member or friend. A further aspect that Model H does not clearly illustrate 
is the route from no, incomplete or complete education to MESE, often with the support of 
family, described above. This route, that bypasses enterprise or VTI training altogether, is likely 


















Source: McGrath et al., 1995: 118 
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enterprises. Model H also suggests that there is movement, or pathways, from subsistence self-
employment to entrepreneurial self-employment. While very many entrepreneurs become 
entrenched in, what might be termed, a subsistence-entrepreneurship equilibrium, others – given 
the right support, advice and time – are able to access entrepreneurial self-employment. There 
are, in fact, very many examples of highly successful self-employed entrepreneurs in developing 





Model H, however, does not show all the possible movements that can take place between 
different kinds of employment activity. For example, two-way movement can occur between 
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The, now, threefold distinction between self-employment activities (subsistence, MESE and 
entrepreneurial) should not, as has been emphasised, lead to the assumption that these types of 
activity should be seen as static (chap.3.3.3). These three types of self-employment coexist and 
movement clearly takes places - in both directions; successful entrepreneurs may find the market 
turns against them and they end up in more MESE activities, or their enterprise might head 
towards collapse via a subsistence-type existence; similarly, movement may occur in the other 
direction. Movement from subsistence to entrepreneurial self-employment is constrained by the 
types of economic and social barriers noted above. Changes in both the entrepreneur (e.g. skill 
level) and the environment affect the entrepreneurial process (Gibb and Ritchie, 1982).    
 
King (1996), in a longitudinal study of informal sector operators in Kenya covering a twenty-year 
period, observes the co-existence of survival/subsistence and entrepreneurial activities at different 
stages of the lives of entrepreneurs. The life histories of King’s sample revealed that many of 
those who had now established themselves as entrepreneurs would have looked very much more 
like subsistence self-employed in the 1970s when they often engaged in casual (kibarua) work. 
This has led King to conclude that subsistence activities should sometimes be seen as a stage 
towards a more enterprise-oriented modality. Furthermore, according to Hoppers (1994), short-
term or casual income-generating activities often function as stepping-stones for young people to 
a more substantive business effort. This view – that, for some, MESE activities can be seen as a 
step towards a more entrepreneurial, dynamic, stage of self-employment, is confirmed by data 
and interviews from this doctoral research in Ghana: many current micro-enterprise owners 
interviewed who were all engaging in some form of artisanal or service enterprise, revealed that a 
common strategy used to obtain start-up capital for their more dynamic enterprise was through 
starting off in MESE activities (chap.8.2). 
 
The coexistence of subsistence and entrepreneurial self-employment activities in the informal 
economy, and of the mobility between these types, brings us onto a discussion of the life-cycle of 
enterprises and issues of graduation. 
 
3.3.3. Enterprise and entrepreneur lifecycles 
 
To understand micro-enterprise development it is necessary to adopt a dynamic perspective 
(Liedholm, 1991; Meghir, 1991). Enterprise dynamics refer to the inception of enterprise start-
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ups, through growth and/or survival eventually to enterprise disappearance/closure. Liedholm and 
Mead (1999) found it useful to examine MSE dynamics through four main categories:92 
1. New starts. These enterprises are just getting underway. The needs of this group for 
support are significantly different from those of enterprises that have been in existence 
for some time and that have managed to overcome many of their start-up problems. 
2. Non-growing enterprises. These are enterprises that have survived the perils of start-up 
but have not added to their employment since they were first established. 
3. Small growers. These are enterprises that have been in existence for some time and have 
added to their work force since starting, but have grown only in small amounts. 
4. Graduates. These are enterprises that started from a very small base and have made a 
transition to reach at least the middle ranges of the small enterprise spectrum. 
 
It is often suggested that informal MSEs will eventually graduate to the formal sector, gaining 
access to formalised credit during the life-cycle of their enterprise (Liedholm 1991; Meghir 
1991). Liedholm (1991) outlines a typical picture:  
 
The firm originates as a tiny enterprise… [then has] three years of struggle, a high 
probability of failure, and little growth. If it survives… it is likely to experience a sudden 
spurt of growth that will typically project it into one of the larger size categories of 
micro-enterprises. (p.3) 
 
In this view the lifecycle of an enterprise is characterised by a relatively static existence, 
punctuated by sudden growth spurts as “they… jump to a larger-size category” (Meghir, 1991: 
103). While Meghir (1991) seems more optimistic that this type of graduation to the formal sector 
will happen given time, Leidholm (1991) cautions that “relatively few… micro-enterprises… 
ultimately graduate or transform themselves into more complex modern small and medium 
enterprises” (p.3). Indeed he later noted that “only about 1 percent of all MSEs starting out very 
small succeed in “graduating” to an enterprise with ten or more workers” (Liedholm and Mead, 
1999: 94). Mead (1999) notes that the “number of enterprises that graduate from the survivalist 
end is not as many as we would like, but it is not insignificant” (p.69). Liedholm (1991) adds that 
“an important issue is to what extent inadequate access to finance, informal or formal, may have 
impeded this graduation process” (p.3). While it may be true that relatively few micro-enterprises 
are able to graduate into modern small and medium enterprises in the formal sector, it seems 
                                                 
92 A fifth category not covered in Liedholm and Mead’s typology might obviously be the examination of 
dead enterprises – those that have closed. See, for example, Tellegen (1997) who includes in her study of 
rural enterprises in Malawi ex-entrepreneurs, or those that have stopped running an enterprise. 
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more likely that those engaged in MESE will be able to graduate into entrepreneurial self-
employment proper (fig.3.2).  
 
This being said, very large numbers of micro-enterprises at the more subsistence end of the 
enterprise continuum will remain unable to overcome the barriers that inhibit graduation to a 
more successful, dynamic, IME activity. 
 
Palmer (2004a) outlined a theoretical lifecycle of an enterprise and how graduation is impeded by 
two main growth ceilings (fig.3.2.) which serve to keep very large numbers of owners as what 
Liedholm and Mead (1999: 84) call “non-growing enterprises”.  
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In developing countries the vast majority of new-starts enter enterprise self-employment towards 
the lower end of the MSE continuum in the informal economy. However, depending on 
personal/family background, access to financial and social capital, some new-starts may be more 
able than others to overcome start-up barriers, and hence start self-employment activities from a 
higher level (fig.3.2.).93 Indeed the age of a potential enterprise owner often determines their 
ability to overcome start-up barriers and to participate in entrepreneurship (Chigunta et al., 2005; 
Hoppers, 1994). Hoppers (1994) comments that age has implications for the professional 
maturity, outlook on life and general experience of male and female youth in the urban informal 
sector. Chigunta et al. (2005: 29) add that “younger youth are less likely to have the resources, 
social networks, business contacts, and work experience needed to engage in enterprise 
activities.” The two (financial) growth ceilings identified by Palmer (2004a: 49-50) include: 
 
Graduating past subsistence type self-employment - 1
st
 Growth ceiling 
 
Growth past subsistence level is constrained by saturated, low-income or dispersed markets, by 
the lack of access to social and enterprise networks, and the (partly related) difficulty of getting 
fixed or working capital (Palmer, 2004a; b). Typically owners might underestimate the amount of 
working capital that the enterprise will require or overestimate the amount of profit it will 
generate. Often new enterprise owners might give up small-scale commercial farming for their 
new activity and not invest wisely the higher than normal profits they are likely to receive during 
the first year or so of the enterprises existence.94 Since enterprise owners of this sort permanently 
have financial problems, suppliers are likely to be less keen to advance credit to them. In order to 
attract business to their enterprises new owners often extend credit to customers and, in so doing, 
tie up substantial parts of their dwindling working capital. Moreover, customers often take 
advantage of owners’ needs to make a sale by forcing down the price. Thus not only do these 
owners have very little working capital, but the profits they make are too small to reinvest in 
enterprise expansion/diversification.  
 
                                                 
93 Fig.3.2. concerns start-up, non-growth and graduation. However, enterprises and owners can obviously 
move in the opposite direction; enterprises can shrink, can move from the formal to informal sectors, or 
more from more dynamic to subsistence types, or close down altogether! 
94 Enterprise owners in rural Ghana talk of an enterprise honeymoon period (Palmer, 2004a). “This is 
approximately a year-long period following the inception of the enterprise in the rural community when 
people are more interested in the new enterprise and hence profits for this period are atypically high when 
compared to future years” (ibid.: 45). 
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There are two main reasons why many enterprises experience a ceiling to grow beyond the 
subsistence stage, including: 
 
• Their inability to participate fully in the informal credit market since suppliers and 
customers often exploit the owners need for credit to get a cheaper price (customer) or a 
bigger profit (supplier) for themselves. Often the owners have exhausted their own initial 
savings through mis-management or short-sighted planning;  
• Subsistence-type enterprises are usually unwilling to take the risk of trying something 
new (such as expanding) that might cause their enterprise to fail. From their perspective it 
is better to be sure of a little profit, than try to get more profit but risk losing all. Buckley 
(1997) suggests that the closer an enterprise owner is to “the margin of basic survival the 
harder it is to be entrepreneurial because risk of failure increases” (p.1091).  
    





The second ceiling to further growth is typically experienced by those at the higher end of the 
IME spectrum, those enterprises that have expanded as much as they can using mostly informal 
financial means. At this stage they reach a credit ceiling. 
 
As enterprises grow, informal lending bodies become less able to satisfy their financial demands: 
larger loans over longer periods (Duggleby, Aryeetey and Steel, 1992; Liedholm 1991; Meghir 
1991). Aryeetey (1996) notes that the type of credit that many small borrowers desire in growing 
economies (a loan of about $1000, with interest rates much less that 30% pa and a maturity of 
about 18 months) cannot be met by informal intermediaries and hence this leads to “an obvious 
gap in the credit market… [as this group of potential borrowers] become too big for informal 
finance and yet too small for formal lenders” (p.12). Palmer (2004a) adds that in Ghana more 
dynamic MSE owners are not too small for formal lenders since they can access rural bank loans 
for example. Rather the rules that surround formal lending inhibit MSEs from getting access to 








This section discussed IME start-up and growth in relation to the various types of enabling and 
disabling environments which were discussed earlier in this chapter. A series of models 
representing typical pathways to self-employment were described.  
 
3.4. Conclusion: assumptions and challenges of the school-skill-enterprise link 
 
As a result of discussion in this chapter, implications arise for the way that the school-skill-
enterprise link in SSA should be conceptualised. These include that: 
 
Multiple pathways, differentiated by gender and poverty status, through education and skills 
training to enterprise exist and youth often combine both a period of formal schooling with 
(multiple forms of) skills training and experience. These multiple skill pathways are likely to be 
different for the rich and poor alike. This implies that the usual years of schooling measure used 
in econometric studies of education fails on two main counts:95 firstly it fails to pick up the effect 
of how formal schooling combines with other (multiple) skills acquisition strategies; and, 
secondly, from a poverty reduction perspective, the usual studies do not differentiate between 
youth wealth categories which means that there is a dearth of information related to how the poor 
and nonpoor access and utilise multiple skills acquisition strategies. The outcomes resulting from 
an education and training pathway of formal education followed by formal or informal skills 
training needs to be examined in more depth.  
 
The recognition that the development of skills depends to a large degree on the delivery context 
of the training means that the quality variable needs to be given high priority. Moreover, the 
quality of education and training can vary significantly during any of the multiple stages a youth 
pursues, and is certainly not uniform for the rich and poor. The standard years of education 
measure, therefore, further fails to take account of the quality of education and training received 
prior to enterprise. 
 
                                                 
95 For a review and critique of these approaches (e.g. the rate of returns to education estimates) see King 
and Palmer (2006b), Palmer et al. (2007) and for a review and critique of this quantitative material 
specifically related to Ghana see Palmer (2006a). 
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The recognition that the utilisation of skills is enabled or disabled by other factors, external to the 
education and training system, implies that studies have to take much more account of contextual 
issues. Again, the standard years of schooling measure says nothing about the wider context in 
which the education or training was delivered. Some earlier studies of education and farm 
productivity made the distinction between modern and nonmodern environments (e.g. Lockheed 
et al., 1980), but it is not routine practice to discuss the possible impact that different socio-
cultural, historical, economic and political environments may have on skills utilisation (or skills 
development for that matter). It is likely that school-skill-enterprise interaction is highly 
dependent on context, or rather, on the type of internal and external enabling environments within 
which the training occurs and through which it is translated into employment outcomes. 
 
Recognising the informal economy as a heterogeneous entity, that can, analytically, be divided 
into subsistence-orientated enterprises and entrepreneurial-enterprises,96 implies that skill needs 
are different for different parts of the informal economy. The types of work that the poor have are 
more likely to be of the subsistence type, rather than of a more dynamic kind. Ease of entry into 
informal economic activities is only true at the more subsistence-orientated end of the informal 
economy spectrum. It is likely, therefore, that the poor construct a portfolio of multiple low-profit 
informal activities. There remain considerable barriers to entering the more profitable informal 
activities. Understanding the social and economic barriers to enterprise start-up is therefore 
crucial. The nature of employment – for the majority - in developing countries further 
complicates a neat school-skill-enterprise link. Informal economy employment has traditionally 
been seen as an urban phenomenon, and has usually been examined in the context of individuals 
engaging in distinct types of work (in farm or nonfarm work), or in distinct types of activities 
(e.g. carpenters, dressmakers etc). However the nature of enterprise in developing countries 
means that the assumption of one man, one job/enterprise does not hold true for many, especially 
the poor.  
 
The first three chapters have covered the international literature, especially on Africa. The 
following chapters examine the interaction amongst school, skill and enterprise in the context of 




                                                 
96 Self-employment in more entrepreneurial enterprises might be further sub-divided - as noted above - into 
MESE activities and entrepreneurial self-employment proper. 
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Chapter 4: Ghana’s Policies on Skills Development, Work and Enterprise in 
relation to the Economic, Social, Historical and Political Environments, early 
Nineteenth Century to 2000  
 
4.0. Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the history of policy and practice vis-à-vis skills development, work and 
enterprise in the Gold Coast97/Ghana from the early nineteenth century to 2000. It is divided into 
three sections; the nineteenth century; early twentieth century to 1950s; and post-independence to 
2000. Each section examines policy and practice of skills development in relation to the 
economic (especially the labour market), political and social environments at the time. It explores 
the remarkable consistency in the way TVET has been reworked as the solution to un/under-
employment over the decades from the early colonial period to the present. 
 
4.1. Gold Coast Policies on skills development in relation to the economic and social 
environments in the nineteenth century 
 
4.1.1. Early skills and schooling: artisans, castles, merchants and missionaries 
 
Early formal schooling in the Gold Coast became, for a time, a subsidiary function of the large 
merchant companies who operated schools usually attached to castle chaplaincies which preceded 
the main mission activity in the Gold Coast by nearly a hundred years.98  In 1821 provision was 
made from Crown funds to set up a series of government schools, though these were later 
absorbed by missions.  
 
It was not until the late-nineteenth century, with the rise of European missionary societies, that 
the development of educational facilities really took off.99 Two of the most important missions 
were the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society and the Basel Mission Society.  
                                                 
97 The term ‘Gold Coast’ subsumes the Ashanti Region and the Northern Territories (which were both 
administered separately until 1936), Togoland (after 1922) and the Gold Coast Colony (established 1874). 
98 It was the Portuguese who established the first school at Elmina Castle (mid-sixteenth century). Other 
castle schools were opened by the Dutch (Elmina 1644), Danes (Christianborg 1722) and British (Cape 
Coast 1751). 
99 In fact, at the turn of the twentieth century most schools were still Mission-run “to such an extent that 
Christians were commonly called sukul-fo, ‘people of the school’” (Kimble, 1963: 74). 
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The arrival of the first Wesleyan missionaries in 1835 led to a number of educational institutes 
being established,100 with a largely academic focused curriculum (Kimble, 1963).  
 
The Basel Mission Society, a Swiss missionary group (Gannon, 1983), arrived in Accra in 1828 - 
seven years before the first Wesleyans.101 The Basel Mission took a different approach to 
schooling than the Wesleyans, focusing on agricultural and industrial training (Ayandele, 1971 in 
Ahadzie, 2003; Kimble, 1963).102 A nineteenth century representative of the mission remarked: 
 
The Basel Mission, recognizing the fact that industrial training is a most important factor 
in the education of a heathen un-civilised nation, tried to exercise an every-day influence 
on the people, making the spade and other instruments go hand-in-hand with the Bible. 
(Rottmann, 1905 cited in Foster, 1965a: 87) 
 
Outside of these early formal schools, skills formation and replication among the early 
occupational specialists – e.g. the goldsmiths, weavers and wood-carvers – took place through 
informal apprenticeship learning. Silver (1981) describes the activities of carvers in Asante and 
notes the growth of this trade in response to the massive commissions of wooden ceremonial 
objects by the Asantehene. Apprenticeship in the pre-colonial period existed largely as a means to 
reproduce skills among kin or communities, though occasionally outsiders came to train in 
communities known for specific trades. Silver (1981) notes that the duration of apprenticeship for 
outsiders took longer than for children from the carving community since “they had had no 
informal exposure” (p.43). Moreover the “fees for training nonvillagers were substantial… [and] 
the entire town council had to vote to accept the recruit before his apprenticeship could begin” 
(ibid.). Communities, therefore, often had an effective monopoly over certain trades, like carving, 
and the associated reproduction of skill through apprenticeship training.  
 
While carvers “certainly received prestige for their work… there was no indication of outright 
payment for services rendered” (ibid.). Carving work during pre-colonial times, therefore, was 
likely to have largely been non-commerical regalia production. But with the defeat of the Asante 
Kingdom at the end of the eighteenth century, combined with the increased monetisation of the 
colonial economy and the emergence of a free labour market, artisanal production was to shift 
from a largely non-commercial to commercial function.  
                                                 
100 By 1858 there were 29 schools, mostly along the coast, with 1,130 pupils (80% boys) (Kimble, 1963). 
101 The high mortality among the Basel missionaries meant that by 1841 they had failed to establish a single 
school. It was not until 1843 that the first school was opened after the mission relocated inland. 
102 By 1858, the Basel Mission had 13 day and 4 boarding schools with about 250 pupils (Kimble, 1963). 
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4.1.2. Government and missionary attempts to provide technical, vocational and 
agricultural education  
 
In the early 1840s “an oversupply of graduates” (Foster, 1965a: 89) from castle and mission 
schools had become visible and, by 1850 there were indications that this “supply of literates was 
already exceeding… demand” (ibid.: 67). As a response to this, the idea of creating agricultural 
and industrial institutions became more popular. From this point on, the view that school-based 
TVET could ease or solve the problem of unemployed school leavers was to remain a recurring 
theme in the minds of Gold Coast, and later Ghanaian, officials and politicians.  
 
The literature of the mid-nineteenth century comments extensively on the bookish character of 
African education and on the need to re-orientate this towards work through the provision of 
technical, vocational and agricultural education. The most systematic expression of this view 
came in the 1847 report by the Education Committee of the Privy Council to the Colonial Office. 
  
The 1847 report outlined the principal objectives of education in colonial areas and included 
specific mention of the need to provide practical training in handicrafts and agriculture. It was 
one of the earliest explicit expressions of the belief that the provision of school-based TVET was 
the key to economic development in the British colonial territories. 
 
As a response to criticism of their bookish curriculum, the Wesleyan missionaries, in the 1850s, 
experimented in agricultural education through the creation of several farm schools in Fanti 
territory. However within ten years every one of these institutions had closed through lack of 
support.  
 
In contrast, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Basel Mission had made great efforts to 
develop a system of technical, vocational and agricultural institutions in the southern interior 
areas.  
 
The mission activity in the Gold Coast, particularly that of the Basel Mission, is likely to have 
been the main source of training for the first carpenters and tailors and may well have contributed 
to the development of such a varied, vibrant and widespread apprenticeship system in Ghana. 
While apprenticeship in more traditional trades (carving, weaving, gold-/black-smithing, bead-
making) had been around for hundreds of years, the TVET provided by the Basel Mission 
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undoubtedly introduced new trades into Ghana (Agbodeka, 1992; Akyeampong, 2002; Peil, 1970; 
Quartey-Papafio, 1914).  
 
In 1882 an Education Ordinance in the Gold Coast tried to establish a series of industrial schools 
in which pupils were meant to spend no less than 10 hours per week in practical classes on 
handicrafts, manufacturing processes and agriculture (Foster, 1965a). Government grants were 
offered to encourage educational establishments to teach technical and agricultural subjects.103 
 
4.1.3. The early development of the colonial exchange
104
 and informal economies  
 
In order to understand the relationship between the early formation of skills and the labour market 
it is necessary to examine the labour market environment at this time. 
 
Fyle (2002) comments that “...pre-colonial business patterns were... similar to informal sector 
systems” (p.30). In much of pre-colonial Ghana, particularly in Asante, the social division of 
labour, petty production, trade and monetisation were advanced (Adebayo, 2002; Dzorgbo, 2001; 
Iliffe, 1983; Kay, 1972; Kimble, 1963).  
 
In Asante the pre-colonial state played an important role in facilitating indigenous enterprise by 
enforcing a single currency (gold dust) and by helping to reduce transportation costs by making 
villages along major routes responsible for their upkeep (Austin, 2005). Indeed the Asante carried 
out significant trade with North Africa across the Sahara (primarily gold) and with the Europeans 
(primarily slaves) through their coastal forts. Following the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 
the British attempted to establish legitimate trade with the Asante and gold became the main 
trading medium (Arhin, 1972; Austin, 1995; Kay, 1972). Pre-colonial nonfarm enterprise activity 
in Asante included artisanal activities (blacksmithing, goldsmithing, weaving/spinning, pottery, 
carving, leather-craft, canoe-making and bead-making, small-scale gold/bauxite mining)105 and 
trading (food-crops, cooked food and forest products) (Austin, 2005). 
 
                                                 
103 This Ordinance cannot have been very successful, since in 1908 and 1909 new education reforms again 
attempted to make the education system more orientated towards work, though again with little success 
(Kimble, 1963). 
104 The colonial exchange economy refers here to the official transactions taking place within the 
recognised part of the colonial economy (and concerned with European trade).   
105 See Shaw (1945) for an early account of small-scale bauxite mining. 
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The labour market in the nineteenth century and the early colonial period was, however, 
restricted. Outside the emerging colonial economy (on the coast), free labour markets were not 
the norm and were characterised by slavery and pawnship. In Asante, for example, craft 
occupations (such as carving, noted above) were often filled by slaves or by free people who were 
nevertheless kept in villages whose function was to perform specific crafts. A free labour market 
emerged later, typically involving freed slaves who were also amongst the first to convert to 
Christianity. Asantes of high birth came late to Christianity and the labour market (see Austin, 
2005 on slavery, pawning and the labour market in Asante). In 1874 the Governor of the Gold 
Coast Colony and Protectorate abolished slavery, slave-trading and pawning, though it largely 
continued until the British formerly annexed Asante (1902) and the advent of a colonial economy 
in this area “made traditional forms of involuntary labour expendable” (McSheffrey, 1983: 368; 
cf. Kimble, 1963).  
 
The colonial exchange economy developed as a result of the activities of the colonial powers and 
came into direct contact with the pre-colonial trading and bartering activities that existed. In 
particular it was the development of early cash crops, initially palm oil and palm kernels and later 
rubber and cocoa,106 combined with extractive enterprises, such as gold mining,107 and other 
commercial ventures that contributed to the development of the colonial exchange economy.  
 
In brief the overriding objective of the British in the Gold Coast was to manipulate the economy 
on the one hand to be suppliers of raw materials for export and on the other to promote 
consumption of British goods (Arhin, 1979; Fyle, 2002). Though formally neutral in business 
matters the British administration in its West African colonies had a distinct bias towards 
expatriate firms (Hopkins 1966 in Olukoju, 2002). Indeed the larger companies exerted a great 
deal of influence over the colonial administration (Meredith, 1988). 
 
As a result of varying durations of European contact, the development of this colonial exchange 
economy was unsurprisingly uneven throughout the Gold Coast. The coastal areas, especially the 
towns, had been subjected to long periods of European contact and had seen a concomitant 
growth in the exchange economy (even at the beginning of the eighteenth century). The 
                                                 
106 Rubber exports only really got underway in the mid/late-1880s (Arhin, 1972) and cocoa production did 
not really take off until the start of the twentieth century. 
107 The first attempts to develop gold mining with European capital were not made until 1877. Prior to this 
gold dust was also traded and was the second largest export in the 1850-74 period (after palm oil) (Kimble, 
1963).  
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development of urban coastal towns saw the concomitant development of an increasingly 
differentiated occupational structure connected with European trade. But,  
 
European expansion was not to lead to any dramatic widening in vocational opportunities 
open to Africans. During the first half of the nineteenth century these had been confined 
to a few clerical posts with commercial companies or government. (Foster, 1965a: 89) 
 
The establishment of the Gold Coast Colony in the south in 1874 and the annexing of Asante in 
1902 would have facilitated the spread of the colonial exchange economy. By contrast the north 
retained largely subsistence economies.  
 
The emergence of this colonial exchange economy is likely to have stimulated the development of 
informal economic activities. With the increasing monetisation of the economy as the colonial 
period progressed, a problem arose for the indigenous population; how to obtain this new 
currency.108 Where previously socio-economic obligations were either paid in kind or by pre-
colonial currencies, money (British silver) became increasingly required (Adebayo, 2002; Arhin, 
1979; Arhin, 1995). This was exacerbated by the increased demand for foreign manufactures. This 
induced many into artisanal activities and petty trading as a means to obtain cash incomes, since 
there were too few official jobs in the colonial economy.109  
 
As the pre-colonial enterprises (noted above) became monetised, a colonial informal economy 
developed – comprised of all those earning money outside of the recognised colonial economy. 
The arrival of missionaries and other Europeans not only brought increasing monetisation to these 
pre-colonial enterprises, but also new trades (e.g. carpentry and masonry)110 and foreign 
manufactures which led to the demise of some pre-colonial enterprises (e.g. spinning).  
 
Small-scale commercial activities (especially female market trading) boomed during the colonial 
period (Clark, 1994; Howard, 1978; Rimmer, 1992). In neighbouring colonial Nigeria, 
“urbanization opened new opportunities to women in the informal sector” (Apena, 1997: 202), 
and despite female marginalisation in the formal colonial economy, “they controlled the informal 
economy especially in the supply of food items” (ibid.). The colonial economy led to the 
                                                 
108 By 1889 British silver predominated as the currency of exchange in British controlled areas. 
109 The introduction, by the British Treasury, c.1903 of small denomination coinage “helped considerably 
to widen the area of internal exchange” (Kimble, 1963: 38). 
110 Colonial documents from the mid-1930s make mention of numerous rural industries (Gold Coast, 1937). 
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empowerment of men in the colonial recognised sector111 and the concomitant empowerment of 
women in the informal sector (as women moved into previously male dominated spheres, like 
trading). These unenumerated, unregulated, women traders, and by inference the informal sector 
more widely, were largely ignored by the colonial government and thought to operate outside of 
the economy (Aryeetey and Bortei-Doku, 1996); they were not recognised. It is precisely the fact 
that these sorts of activities in the Gold Coast could operate outside of colonial regulations that 
they became so widespread (cf. Martin, 1988).  
 
In the Gold Coast, as in other British West African colonies, formal banks were established 
primarily for expatriate firms and the formal colonial economy (Adebayo, 2002). Africans were 
largely excluded from these formal mechanisms (Adebayo, 2002; Falola, 1995; Kimble, 1963; 
Martin, 1988) and the majority of people continued to save and derive the initial capital for their 
business from the informal financial sector (Adebayo, 2002).112 Falola (1995) talks about the 
existence of the dualistic money market comprised of formal and informal institutions in the 
colonial period whose clients were predominantly expatriates and Africans respectively. In short 
most African “entrepreneurs with assets and ideas [had] to fall back on the informal institutions” 
(Falola, 1995: 169).113 The large amount of literature making reference to informal finance 
mechanisms in existence during this time in West Africa highlights their importance (Austin and 
Sugihara, 1993; Bascom, 1952; Falola, 1995; Hopkins, 1988; Kay, 1972; Partridge, 1910). Indeed 
with the monetisation of the economy and the associated increase in income-generating work, the 
pooling of cash resources in the informal sector rapidly expanded (Adebayo, 2002). 
 
Since the discovery of the informal sector in the early 1970s (chap.2), very little literature has 
used the same terminology with reference to the colonial period (but see Apena, 1997; Fyle, 
2002). Most literature on the colonial economy of the Gold Coast tends to concentrate on the 
activities of British firms/individuals and the indigenous African bourgeoisie that dealt with them. 
Frimpong-Ansah (1991) rightly notes that the literature “is rather weak on the economic activities 
of the rest of the population” (p.55). Even though Hart (1970, 1973) discovered the informal 
sector, as Rimmer (1992) puts it, it “doubtless exist[ed] already” (p.36).  
                                                 
111 E.g. mining, cash-cropping, education, soldiering, trading, government work (including clerks) and 
missionary activity. 
112 Pre-colonial enterprises in Asante had recourse to three main sources of finance: supplier’s credit, 
retained profits and equity participation (with conjugal or matrilineal family) (Austin, 2005: 135-138). 
113 Many still relied on getting credit informally through the pledging system; either property (e.g. kente 




Fyle (2002) describes the colonial informal economy in West Africa as “refer[ring] to businesses 
outside what colonial rule came to establish as formal business operations” (p.29). The recognised 
colonial economy was pursued at the expense of the informal micro-enterprise (IME) economy: 
“production and trade not primarily affected by western patterns” (ibid.: 33).  
 
4.1.4. Summary: the difficulty of establishing TVET during the nineteenth century 
 
As noted above, both the Basel missionaries and the colonial educationalists made keen attempts 
during the second half of the nineteenth century to establish TVET in response to the oversupply 
of academic graduates and doubt over the suitability of general education. 
 
However these early attempts at promoting school-based TVET failed largely due to “a series of 
factors operating outside the schools themselves” (Foster, 1965a: 57, emphasis added). 
Prominent among these factors were two aspects of the labour market environment of the period. 
 
Firstly, as early as the mid-nineteenth century it became apparent that wage-employment 
opportunities for skilled artisans were limited in the Gold Coast. So limited, that some of the early 
graduates of the vocational Basel programmes, as well as graduates from traditional 
apprenticeships, migrated across SSA (e.g. to Nigeria, the Cameroons and the Congo) in search of 
employment and the opportunity to utilise their skills (Foster, 1965a; Quartey-Papafio, 1914).114  
 
Secondly, during the nineteenth century the colonial economy’s formal occupational 
opportunities stimulated demand for general academic education. Interest in school-based TVET 
was marginal. Parents and youth had little interest to go to school only to return to working in 
agriculture. For parents and children “[e]ducation meant one thing… the opportunity to enter 
more highly paid posts within the exchange sector of the economy” (Foster, 1965a: 66). Thus the 
most vocational type of education perceived of at the time was an academic education:  
 
The African did not enter clerical employment because he had been to an academic 
secondary school; he went to an academic secondary school because it provided the most 
effective way of entering into such employment. (ibid.: 136) 
 
                                                 
114 As a consequence of apprentices going to find work abroad, new rules concerning apprenticeship fees 
emerged (Quartey-Papafio, 1914). 
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In this sense, Foster argues, academic education was more ‘vocational’ than vocational education 
proper.115 Moreover, a view emerged among those Africans in closest contact with Europeans that 
“came to attribute… material advantages to the mystique of… [academic] education” (Kimble, 
1963: 62). They also saw that only those Africans that had been educated could hope to access 
employment as clerks, teachers or higher positions.116 Education was viewed as a way of 
“avoiding the manual labour which was traditionally allotted to slaves” (ibid.). 
 
In fact these two elements of the nineteenth century labour market - the lack of formal jobs for 
TVET graduates and the preference for academic schooling - persisted throughout the twentieth 
century. The paradox, therefore, is why from the mid-nineteenth century to 2006, there were 
further attempts to promote TVET as the response to a growing unemployed school-leaver 
problem, without also fully addressing other factors in the labour market environment.  
 
4.2. Gold Coast policies on skills development in relation to the economic and social 
environments, early twentieth century to 1950s 
 
After 1901, following the defeat of the Asante Kingdom, the borders of contemporary Ghana 
were largely defined.117 The labour market environment at the beginning of the twentieth century 
still offered few opportunities in the recognised economy and economic development was 
negligible: gold mining (using European capital) had commenced in 1877, but its development 
was very slow; cocoa production did not really take off until the start of the twentieth century, 
though its advent provided farmers with new opportunities to earn cash incomes; the main exports 
were still palm oil and palm kernels. However, the emancipation of slaves and pawns (in Asante 




                                                 
115 King (1971) makes a similar point. 
116 In the 1920s, James Aggrey (Aggrey of Africa) was to become a prime case in point. His return to the 
Gold Coast as the only black member of the 1920s Phelps-Stokes Commission caused a stir among 
Africans. Aggrey was born in the Gold Coast and had been in the USA for 20 years teaching and studying. 
His academic educational background made a large impact on those Africans he spoke to about the need to 
make education more relevant to work. Everyone knew that he had achieved his important position not 
through TVET but through academic schooling. He thus became, in the minds of many Africans, proof of 
the value of academic above vocational schooling (see Smith, 1929).  
117 The Gold Coast Colony had been established in 1874, but it was not until 1902 that Asante was 
annexed. In 1918, following the defeat of Germany, part of German Togoland was ceded to the Gold Coast. 
 119 
4.2.1. Changes in the labour market and economic environment up to World War One 
(WW1)  
 
Between 1898-1919 the colonial government’s main economic activity was to develop a railway 
system in the south (Kay, 1972) to facilitate movement of goods within the colony. 
 
As noted above, the opportunities for employment in the colonial exchange economy at the start 
of the twentieth century were not great in the southern areas of the Gold Coast. By 1912 it had 
become apparent that in the Northern Territories too there were not sufficient recognised jobs in 
the labour market. The acting Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Territories commented at 
that time that since there were not sufficient job opportunities, education and technical training 
should not be expanded too quickly, asking: ‘[w]ill these educated youths go back to work on the 
farms?” (Wheeler, 1912 cited in Thomas, 1974: 434). He went onto note that 
 
As regards the teaching of carpentry and mason’s work; if you teach boys trades you 
must find them well-paid work locally, or send them to look first elsewhere. How many 
masons and carpenters would the Navaro [Navrongo] District support? Not many at 
present. For the time being we can only afford to go very gently with education, both 
book and technical in my opinion. (ibid.) 
 
A few years later this plea received the support of the new governor of the Gold Coast; Sir 
Gordan Guggisberg.118 Following his arrival in the Gold Coast “emphasis was to be placed on 
relating education to the rural economy” (Thomas, 1974: 429) in the Northern Territories. 
Learning from the mistakes of the south (Ashanti and the Colony) “efforts were made to 
guarantee that the supply of literates did not exceed the new job opportunities in education and 
the expanding technical departments” (ibid.).119 
 
As a result of WW1 the labour market became slightly more open to the indigenous population 
seeking work in the colonial economy. Killingray (1978) comments that: 
 
The labour shortage and the withdrawal of white artisans and blue collar workers for war 
service opened up a range of jobs and promotion opportunities for Africans. They became 
engine drivers on the railways, fitters and mechanics in the mines… (p.53) 
 
                                                 
118 In 1919 Guggisberg was appointed Governor of the Gold Coast - a position he was to retain until 1927. 
119 See Bening (1990) on the development of education in northern Ghana. 
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A further consequence of WW1 with regard to skills development was that the Basel Mission 
effectively stopped functioning; since 36/50 foreign Basel missionaries at the time were German 
it was suspected of pro-German sentiment and actions (Gannon, 1983). Consequently in 1918 the 
Gold Coast Government confiscated the Basel Mission properties and its trading company 
(ibid.).120 Guggisberg noted in 1921 that  
 
[t]here can be no doubt that the severest blow dealt by the War to the Gold Coast was the 
withdrawal of the Basel Mission. The education given by that Mission was practical and 
good, and it never seemed to lack funds or recruits. (Guggisberg, 1922: 84) 
 
This comment, that Basel education (with its TVET focus) did not lack recruits suggests that 
there were those Africans that were keen on TVET. This somewhat undermines Foster’s 
prejudice about trade and industrial education – that it was distinctly unpopular.121 
 
As noted earlier, the truly traditional apprenticeship activities (e.g. carving, weaving) had been 
supplemented in the mid-nineteenth century by other trade activities (e.g. carpentry, masonry) as 
a result of the training provided by the Basel mission (and early government industrial schools). 
Since the arrival of the first cars in the Gold Coast, around the 1920s, apprenticeships in 
mechanics became more common, especially in urban areas (Peil, 1970).122 Initially these 
mechanical apprenticeships were undertaken in workshops of the Public Works Department 
(Guggisberg, 1922), but shortly afterwards this type of training would have spread to the colonial 
informal sector.123 Indeed with the introduction of railways, public works, telegraphs, marine 
departments, expatriate motor mechanical workshops “a cadre of Africans was trained in 






                                                 
120 In 1854, in order to provide funds for its missionary activities in the Gold Coast, the Basel Mission had 
established a trading company which gave part of its profits to mission activities. 
121
 However, Guggisberg’s opinion over the popularity of the Basel Mission schools was biased, since he 
was very clearly in favour of school-based TVET (chap.4.2.2).  
122 Motorised trucks were imported into the Gold Coast for carting cocoa some 10-15 years before 1920. 
123 Other types of apprenticeship, such as radio repairing apprenticeships, were not to be found in the 
country until the late 1950s/early 1960s (Peil, 1970). 
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4.2.2. From Guggisberg’s Ten Year Development Plan and renewed push for TVET 
during the 1920s, to the 1930s-40s depression, retrenchment and war 
 
Guggisberg’s Ten Year Development Plan outlined a large number of development activities he 
hoped to accomplish between 1919-1929:124 the focus being on developing transportation 
infrastructure (harbour, railways, roads), but also including development of the water supply, 
drainage, hydro-electric works, public buildings, town improvements, telegraphs/telephones and 
maps (Bourret, 1949; Kay, 1972). Guggisberg’s intention to focus on transportation infrastructure 
was to expand commerce in the Gold Coast and this is indeed what occurred: total trade 1920-
1926 was almost double what it had been 1913-1919 (Bourret, 1949). The improvements in 
transportation infrastructure facilitated the spread of cocoa farms and freed large numbers of 
head-carriers who could then work in the cocoa or mining sectors where demand for labour was 
high (ibid.). Indeed Guggisberg’s focus on developing infrastructure as a means to support private 
sector development anticipated much later priorities (chap.9). 
 
While the development of transportation infrastructure was high on Guggisberg’s agenda, he was 
also deeply concerned by the importance of education for development, regarding it as the 
keystone of progress (Williams, 1964). But it is the type of education that is of particular interest 
to this thesis; throughout Guggisberg’s period as governor the basis of education was repeatedly 
re-orientated towards technical and agricultural subjects – a response to the growing phenomenon 
of semi-educated youths with a disdain of manual labour (Gold Coast, 1925–6). 
 
In 1921 Guggisberg gave an address to Britain’s Royal African Society highlighting what he 
envisaged as the central role education could play in the “progress [of the “Native Races of the 
country”] towards the attainment of those conditions of modern civilization which are best suited 
to the country” (Guggisberg, 1922: 82). Guggisberg bemoaned the focus given to book-work over 
hand-work in the system of primary schools in 1921: 
 
The general result is that we are turning out annually between six and seven thousand 
youths who are fitted for employment as clerks and very little else. We are, in fact, being 
flooded gradually by what can only be described as a semi-educated class of Native. 
(ibid.: 83)125 
                                                 
124 The Ten Year Plan was ended prematurely in 1927 when Guggisberg’s position as governor ended 
(Kay, 1972). 
125 Guggisberg assumed, of course, that academic schooling in some way orientated youths’ minds away 
from manual work and channelled them into wanting jobs like clerks. 
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Guggisberg later repeated this view that the cause of unemployment was the type of person 
developed through a particular type of education: 
 
[O]wing to their [semi-educated youths] disdain of manual labour, there is annually less 
employment… Failing employment in an office, and strongly imbued with an unhealthy 
dislike to manual labour, they fall a natural victim to discontent and… unhappiness. 
(Gold Coast, 1925–6)126 
 
Guggisberg (1922) noted that part of the government efforts being applied to “the defects of our 
present system” (p.85) involved providing more opportunities for TVET. 
 
A year before his 1921 address, Guggisberg created a Committee of Educationalists to articulate a 
comprehensive education policy for the Gold Coast, 127 which:  
 
strongly advocated a plethora of manual activities such as gardening, woodwork, metal 
work, and clay work to overcome the ‘mere bookishness’ of school instruction. (Foster, 
1965a: 149) 
 
The committee also recommended the establishment of trade schools offering practical courses. 
In 1920 four government trade schools128 were opened that served to supplement the work of a 
government technical school established in Accra in 1909 (Kimble, 1963). 
 
The 1920s saw interesting developments regarding TVET in the British colonies which had a 
profound impact on the way Guggisberg was to attempt to shape education in the Gold Coast. In 
1923 the Colonial Office established an Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British 
Tropical African Dependencies which was to provide the first general colonial educational 
policies of the British since the 1847 Education Committee. One factor that led to the creation of 
                                                 
126 Gutkind (1969) comments that unemployment can lead to political instability as the unemployed get 
“agitated and often violent” (p.359). Ghana’s draft TVET policy document (GoG, 2004i) comments that 
without sufficient opportunities the youth will be a threat to peace and stability. Ghana’s National Youth 
Employment Programme (GoG, 2006c) (chap.5), which intends to create over 150,000 jobs 2006/07, states 
that this will help develop character, lead to self-discipline and patriotism and therefore dispel 
discontentment.   
127 By the early 1920s, both the former Swiss Basel missionary schools and the German Bremen Mission 
schools (formerly in German Togoland) had come under the control of the British. At the close of WW1 
60% of all schools were under government control compared to just 8% in 1914. This made educational 
reform easier (Kimble, 1963). 
128 In Yendi, Mampong-Ashanti, Asuantsi and Kibi. 
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the 1923 committee was the first Phelps-Stokes Report (see Jones, 1922).129 This report had the 
general aim of re-orientating education in the African colonies to meet the needs of African 
people, “to provide them with elements of good agriculture… and to give them training in simple 
crafts and home economics” (Brown, 1964: 367). 
 
Guggisberg adopted the Phelps-Stokes Report wholeheartedly and attempted to implement the 
policies in the Gold Coast to a greater degree than any other governor in any of the British 
African colonies (Foster, 1965a; Hamilton and Asiedu, 1987).130 
 
Guggisberg’s Sixteen Principles of Education (Martin, 1976; McWilliam and Kwamena-Poh, 
1975; Williams, 1964) announced (though not for the first time) to the legislative council in 
February 1925, were the product of the Education Committee set up in 1920 and the influence of 
the Phelps-Stokes Report.131 The sixteenth principle was a call on the government to provide 
trade schools with a “technical and literary education that will fit young men to become skilled 
craftsmen and useful citizens” (Gold Coast, 1923: 204–205: italics in original).  
 
In 1925 Guggisberg remarked on the “impossibility of either Government or the European trading 
community giving employment to all those who annually pass through the schools of the Colony” 
(Gold Coast, 1925: 62). He went on to say that: 
 
There was a period when a clerk of any sort was greatly in demand… but those 
conditions no longer exist; I doubt very much whether five hundred clerks per annum are 
required to replace the normal wastage throughout the country. What employment is open 
to the remainder, roughly four thousand able-bodied and intelligent but wrongly educated 
youths[?]… Cocoa-brokers? There is a limit to this field of employment, indeed I am not 
certain that it is not decreasing. Storekeepers? Judging from the number of small stores 
already existing all over the country… there is not room for more than a small increase in 
this field of employment. (ibid.: 60, emphasis added) 
 
[However, in] the field of manual labour… there are ample opportunities for the educated 
product of our primary schools. Mechanics, carpentering, motor driving, engine driving, 
and other skilled trades are all employment in which educated artisans can do superior 
and better paid work than the illiterate. (ibid.) 
                                                 
129 The second Phelps-Stokes Report on East Africa was published in 1925 (Jones, 1925). For a critique of 
the Phelps–Stokes Commissions, see King (1971). 
130 Indeed Martin (1976) noted that Guggisberg was instrumental in getting the grant from the Phelps-
Stokes Fund that financed the later report (cf. Jones, 1922). 
131 Guggisberg would also have been influenced by his Director of Education who, in 1921, visited the 
Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes in the United States which had attempted to adapt education to meet the 
local needs of the economy (Martin, 1976). 
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… the annual surplus in the supply of educated youths can only be absorbed by private 
enterprise either in the form of trade or of manual labour. (ibid.: 62) 
 
These comments by Guggisberg are particularly interesting for a number of reasons; first he notes 
the changing demand for clerks in the formal colonial economy; second he reiterates the view that 
it is the type of education that impacts on occupational outcomes of youth; third, he comments 
that in the mid-1920s, there was already a multitude of small-scale trading activities and that new 
employment opportunities in trading were few; and, fourth, he identified small-scale 
manufacturing enterprise as the most promising destination for educated youth. 
 
How then did Guggisberg’s policies - emphasising school-based TVET as a means to re-orientate 
the youth towards manual work and hence reduce unemployment - materialise in practice? 
 
On the positive side, Guggisberg’s activities in the 1920s certainly provided a “driving force for 
the development of technical education” (Foster, 1965a: 150); by 1930 more than 55% of 
expenditure for all government educational institutions went on trade and technical schools 
(ibid.). Moreover, as a result of the rapid take-up of cocoa production in Ashanti, purchasing 
power in the market expanded (Austin, 2005) which might have stimulated nonfarm economic 
activity, including demand for artisans. Guggisberg’s Ten Year Development Plan provided 
employment opportunities for many artisans in the 1920s, and Guggisberg even complained about 
a lack of artisans to work on the many infrastructure projects (Kay, 1972; Kimble, 1963). 
 
However, due to a number of significant factors, it soon became apparent that this driving force 
and demand for artisans could not be sustained. 
 
Firstly, there was staunch criticism from educated African nationalists regarding what they 
interpreted as an inferior type of education for Africans.132 Indeed the early financial support 
given by Africans133 was for establishing academic, western-type, schools – not technical or 
vocational schools (Foster, 1965a). Guggisberg’s attempts to add technical and agricultural 
subjects into the curriculum of the schools were met with disfavour from leading Africans 
(Williams, 1964).  
 
                                                 
132 This came both from Africans in the diaspora and indigenous Africans from the Gold Coast, e.g. in the 
newspaper The Gold Coast Leader (Kimble, 1963: 114). 
133 E.g. the Fanti Confederation pledged, in 1871, to support schools in their areas. 
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Secondly, as noted above, Africans in the Gold Coast generally had a very keen understanding of 
labour market opportunities and rightly identified work in the official colonial economy as more 
financially lucrative than any other type of work. Since entry to these lucrative opportunities was 
better facilitated through academic education, this type of education was more popular than 
vocational education.  
 
Thirdly, providing school-based TVET was much more expensive than providing academic 
education – a cost that was not rewarded in the labour market and ultimately contributed to the 
demise of school-based TVET in the Gold Coast: 
 
[J]unior trade schools… were very expensive in terms of the cost per student, and were 
abandoned a few years after Guggisberg left the Gold Coast. Their graduates were not 
looked upon with favour by expatriate employees, and there is no evidence that anyone 
else outside the Government looked upon them with particular favour either. (Williams, 
1964: 300) 
 
Fourthly, external shocks contributed to a tightening of occupational opportunities in the Gold 
Coast during the 1920s and 1930s. Martin (1989) notes that there was a broad economic 
downturn in the Gold Coast as a result of WW1 which, lasting through to WW2, led to declining 
terms of trade for cocoa and palm oil and thus hit the cash crop sector badly. The worldwide 
economic slump of the 1930s exacerbated this trend (Bourret, 1949).134 
 
Fifthly, at the same time Guggisberg was promoting TVET “there was evidence that 
unemployment among artisans and technicians was increasing” (Foster, 1965a: 150). Indeed “the 
fact that technical employment possibilities were even more limited [than academic employment 
opportunities] during the colonial period is conveniently forgotten” (ibid.: 138).135 In 1933 the 
Director of Education noted in response to a demand for increased TVET that “there was just no 
demand for technical employees on any scale and that the creation of new technical institutions 
could not create employment”.136 This early acknowledgement that training itself does not create 
employment did not go far enough to counter what had become – and would remain – the 
underlying assumption of the skills development agenda in the Gold Coast/Ghana: that the 
                                                 
134 Government revenue was substantially reduced between 1928-1931 (from £3.7 to £2.2 million), 
resulting in retrenchment and development project cut-backs (Bourret, 1949; Kay, 1972).  
135 This is somewhat of a generalisation and indeed goes counter to what Guggisberg was saying in the 
1920s; that there was a shortage of skilled artisans to work on projects of the Ten Year Development Plan. 
136 Gold Coast Legislative Council Debates, 1933, in Foster (1965a: 151) emphasis in original. A World 
Bank (2004a) study reiterated this view that “training alone does not create jobs” (p.28). 
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provision of skills training leads to employment, economic growth and poverty reduction.137 By 
1935 the employment situation for technical graduates had become so openly bad that the 
governor was forced to observe that the enrolments into technical training might have to be 
limited in order to “avoid underemployment among trained artisans” (ibid.: 151). The government 
drive for school-based TVET had resulted in the unemployment of the graduates of these schools 
“few of whom attempted to found their own business” (ibid.: 134). Many of those trained in 
technical or vocational subjects ended up not using their skills due to lack of opportunities and 
often ended up in different roles altogether.138 
 
Sixthly, at the same time as there were insufficient opportunities in the colonial economy for 
technical graduates, the agricultural labour market environment inhibited the utilisation of skills 
up to the late colonial period. Unlike the lack of formal employment for those with technical and 
vocational education, however, there were opportunities available in the cash-crop sector for the 
products of agricultural schools. But a number of factors meant that these kinds of opportunities 
were not being taken up (Callaway, 1963; Foster, 1965a; Gutkind, 1969; Nugent, personal 
communication 18.07.06):  
• Better incomes could be achieved outside of farming; 
• Undertaking cash-cropping meant residing in rural areas which had inferior amenities 
when compared to urban areas;  
• Since illiterates could also take up cash-cropping, to return to the land was regarded as 
failing;  
• Cocoa production was subject to violent price fluctuations;139  
• Kin/community obligations in rural areas inhibited efforts to save and increase 
production through more modern methods; 
• Parents perceived schooling not as a means to take their children back to agriculture, but 
as a means to move out of agriculture; 
• Agricultural work, however profitable, was not identified with modernity; 
• The lack of security of tenure in the absence of a land register meant that if land could not 
be found in a person’s home village (especially if they were of slave origin) then options 
                                                 
137 See chap.9. 
138 “By the end of the colonial period the products of technical schools were frequently obliged to find 
employment in the police force” (Foster, 1965a: 134). 
139 Between 1908-1914 prices varied between £38-49/ ton. By 1920 prices had risen to £129/ton, but 
plummeted to £41/ton in 1929, £20/ton in 1930 and £19/ton in 1933 (Bourret, 1949). 
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were limited - unless they headed for the cocoa frontier where the risks were offset by the 
financial rewards; 
• Cash-cropping still used very traditional methods. 
 
Perhaps one of the most significant of these points is the last – the agricultural labour market 
environment remained largely traditional and did not allow school graduates who had learnt about 
new farming techniques to use them. As noted earlier (chap.3.1.2), skills cannot be utilised 
effectively without the presence of a supportive environment.140 Foster makes this point about 
skills utilisation: 
 
[M]odern agricultural techniques… may be known to farmers but they may not be 
utilized unless an institutional framework exists which provides real incentives for them 
to improve their methods and utilize the land more effectively.  
 
… agricultural education was not likely to be successful until marked changes had 
already occurred in the agricultural sector. As with technical education the success of 
agricultural studies was largely dependent upon real opportunities being created in the 
economic and social environment of the Gold Coast. (Foster, 1965a: 155, emphasis 
added) 
 
Indeed the real crux of the failure of Guggisberg’s renewed push for school-based TVET was that 
both the economic and social environments at that time were unsupportive to the utilisation of 
these skills. It had been recognised, as noted above, by the Director of Education in 1933 that 
skills training itself does not create employment and yet this seems to have been what was 
expected of it. While Guggisberg’s Ten Year Plan markedly improved infrastructure and led to 
significant increases in trade, apart from creating a short-lived increase in the demand for artisans, 
it does not appear to have gone far enough towards developing a sustainable demand for skilled 
labour. This, combined with the external economic shocks which impacted on country’s labour 
market, meant that skills training was unlikely to be a popular option for the youth.  
 
As a last comment on the outcome of Guggisberg’s efforts, some twenty years later the Watson 
Commission141 outlined the problem in almost identical terms (Kay, 1972), suggesting that the 
efforts made in the 1920s had largely failed to impact on unemployment: 
 
                                                 
140 In the case of farming, these might include, among other things, fertilisers, pesticides, machinery and 
access to credit. 
141 The Watson Commission was set up to examine the disturbances in the Gold Coast in the late 1940s. 
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It is realised that literary education alone is doing great harm in the Gold Coast… It is 
producing a youthful hooligan element in the towns as boys emerge from school to find a 
glut of clerks and to find themselves disinterested in, or not equipped for, other 
occupations. It is creating a false sense of values in which the dignity of labour is lost 
sight of. There must be an immediate expansion of craft, technical and vocational 
training. (Gold Coast, 1948a: para 374) 
 
4.2.3. The demise of TVET, the rise of academic schooling and the re-emergence of the 
unemployed school leaver problem 
 
The unpopularity of school-based TVET led to curricula becoming increasingly more academic 
during the 1930s until the period of self-governance in 1951.  
 
By 1951 there were only 23 technical institutions with some 3,300 pupils – less than 1% of pupils 
in all types of school (Foster, 1965a). This might lead an observer to regard the neglect of 
technical education as a characteristic of British policy. The fact was that during the later colonial 
period the small number of technical and agricultural institutions compared to academic ones was 
not a result of government policy per se, but rather an outcome of both the unpopularity of 
school-based TVET among a population who favoured academic schooling, and the few 
opportunities for TVET graduates in the economy. Indeed during the late colonial period the 
academic secondary school was the fastest growing sub-sector of the educational system. This 
occurred in spite of the repeated government attempts, especially during Guggisberg’s term as 
governor, to re-orientate education away from a primarily academic focus by promoting the 
growth of technical and agricultural schools.  
 
The development of Achimota secondary school during the 1920s is an interesting case. The 
initial intention was to create a secondary school with a strong agricultural core as part of the 
curriculum but, as a result of pressure from youth, parents, educated Africans and the press, by 
1951 Achimota had become a very academically orientated institution. 
 
For the colonial period there are no adequate statistics regarding unemployment as registering as 
unemployed at a labour exchange was voluntary. However, the existence of large numbers of 
unemployed school graduates in the coastal towns of the nineteenth century was, nonetheless, 
suggestive of a wider problem. During the 1930s “it seems safe to conclude that the proportion of 
school leavers who got the jobs they desired decreased” (Kay, 1972: 44).  
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Guggisberg’s view concerning the relationship between academic education and unemployment 
is a view which remained in the minds of educators despite the failure of TVET during the 1920s. 
Indeed this view was still prevalent in the mid-1960s (Foster, 1965a) and persists up to 2006 
(chap.5). 
 
By the late 1940s as the unemployed school leaver problem was becoming more apparent,142 the 
root cause was again attributed to the academic nature of schooling and again school-based TVET 
was seen as the solution. But unemployment is largely an economic, not an educational problem. 
It was the general lack of occupational opportunities in the colonial economy of the Gold Coast, 
together with the unsupportive or non-existent policies for promoting MSE activities that were 
the cause of unemployment. The effectively stagnant economic growth from WW1 to 1951 meant 
that there were insufficient opportunities in any sector of the economy (ibid.) (with the exception 
of emerging opportunities in the cocoa sector). 
 
At the time of self-government in 1951, 82% of the labour force was engaged in 
subsistence/cocoa-farming or petty trading, while 18% were employed on a wage/salary basis. 
Two-fifths of those in wage employment were in the public sector (ibid.). 
 
4.2.4. Traditional apprenticeships and the labour market environment in the first half 
of the twentieth century 
 
The literature makes little mention of traditional apprenticeships during the colonial period and, 
despite the push for school-based TVET during the 1920s, apprenticeship probably remained the 
largest provider of skills training. The traditional pattern was for a father to apprentice his child to 
a known master at an early age (Silver, 1981).143 However as access to formal schooling became 
more widespread it became more common for a parent to send their child to school first and then 
to an apprenticeship afterwards (Quartey-Papafio, 1914). Indeed by the late 1930s apprenticeship 
had become an established institution (Ninsin, 1991). However, the prospects for apprenticeship 
graduates entering into entrepreneurial self-employment were low. Access to start-up capital was 
extremely difficult given the colonial banks’ focus towards larger, European, businesses. Those 
wanting to enter self-employment had to rely on informal finance mechanisms or else try to get 
                                                 
142 This was to a large extent due to the expansion of the educational system during the 1920s and 1930s 
(Kay, 1972). 
143 Silver (1981) suggests eight years of age was the usual time to start an apprenticeship in the nineteenth 
century. 
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some short-term work in the formal colonial economy in order to save money. Ninsin (1991) 
notes that youth in 1940 who lacked seed capital to establish an enterprise tried to engage in 
intermittent formal employment to raise this capital. It is likely that most of the self-employed 





While WW1 increased the opportunities for Africans in the labour market, the expansion of 
primary schooling during this period soon led to concerns about unemployed school leavers. 
TVET as a solution to this problem of rising unemployment remained popular among policy 
makers. Guggisberg vehemently promoted school-based TVET as a means to re-orientate youth 
towards manual work and hence reduce unemployment. While Guggisberg should be credited for 
improving the infrastructural environment (and creating associated employment opportunities 
during the Ten Year Plan), there was no long lasting change vis-à-vis the employment 
opportunities for academic or TVET graduates. For example, while there were ample 
opportunities in the expanding cocoa cash-crop sector, farming – of any kind – remained reliant 
on traditional practices and was not identified with modernity. Moreover pressure from Africans 
for academic schooling meant that TVET was not a popular option for most. The downturn in the 
economy in the 1930s tightened occupational opportunities further. 
 
4.3. Ghana’s policies on skills development in relation to the economic, social, 
historical and political environments, 1951-2000 
 
In 1951 when the Gold Coast became self-governing under the leadership of Nkrumah’s 
Convention People’s Party (CPP), the financial position of the country was sound, with some 
£200 million in reserves. However, Nkrumah’s socialist nation-building policies aimed at mass 
job creation by rapid (import-substitution) industrialisation (Killick, 1978), the mechanisation of 
agriculture, massive educational expansion, and grandiose public sector projects144 meant that 
these initial reserves soon became exhausted. After Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966, Ghana 
experienced repeated coups and political instability until a young Flight Lieutenant, Jerry 
Rawlings, seized power and became president for nearly 20 years, ushering in a more stable 
                                                 
144 E.g. the Akosombo Dam and the building of the headquarters of the new Organisation of African Unity 
– that ended up being located in Addis Ababa and not Accra. 
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political period. During these 50 years since independence, Ghana’s politicians and policy makers 
have been continually troubled by youth unemployment and have made repeated attempts to 
tackle this issue through education reform, though without concomitant support to the primary 
destination of most school leavers: the IME sector. 
 
4.3.1. Education, training and the environment in the new Ghana, 1951-1965  
 
In 1950 the administration of the Gold Coast recorded just 200,000 wage-employees, a fraction of 
the approximately 2.4 million “of working age” (Rimmer, 1992: 36).  
 
The 1951 Accelerated Development Plan for Education (Gold Coast, 1951) aimed to expand 
education in all sub-sectors, but with an emphasis on primary and middle schools (renamed senior 
primary schools).145  
 
The subsequent rapid expansion in primary (Ninsin, 1991) and middle school enrolments (1952-
1960) was “accompanied by progressive ‘dilution’ of the teaching force by untrained teachers” 
(Foster, 1965a: 186), though the emergency training of teachers eased the situation somewhat.146 
Despite this quality dilution, in November 1960 the CPP carried educational reform further by 
making primary schooling compulsory and free starting September 1961.147 Again enrolments 
increased dramatically (Ninsin, 1991; Rimmer, 1992). Nkrumah’s policy of rapid expansion of 
primary education was out of step with the thinking of the colonial administration that had 
previously shaped educational policy. The colonial administration’s ten year education plan 
(1946-1956), later replaced by Nkrumah’s Accelerated Development Plan, had aimed to achieve 
UPE in 20-25 years (from 1946) (Gold Coast, 1948b). Nkrumah, however, aimed to provide a 
six-year primary education “as soon as possible… for all children” (Gold Coast, 1952: 33). 
 
The planned expansion of primary education by the colonial administration had been questioned 
by a report in 1948 from the Watson Commission. It noted that achieving UPE in 20-25 years was 
                                                 
145 At this point, the pre-tertiary school system was comprised of up to seventeen years of education: six 
years primary, four years middle school, five years secondary school and two years sixth-form. In 1952 
primary school fees were abolished.  
146 For a discussion of rapid primary expansion and resulting dilution of quality in Tanzania, see 
Wedgwood (2005). See also Williams (2005). 
147 It was the same year, 1961, that the Addis Ababa conference on education set the ambitious target to 
achieve UPE by 1980. This undoubtedly encouraged Nkrumah to continue with his expansionist policies in 
primary education. 
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not a realistic target, one which, moreover, could have adverse effects of not only the post-basic 
level of education, but on the entire economy (Gold Coast, 1948a). It argued for a “soundly 
balanced system of education” (ibid.: 64), not one that was unbalanced in favour of one particular 
sub-sector. The report commented that: 
  
If the material is limited, the alternatives are to build a narrower ladder that, while 
tapering, reaches the objective, or to build so broad a ladder that it fails to reach 
anywhere. (ibid.)  
 
In spite of this warning Nkrumah opted to continue building a broad ladder.148 Indeed the 
expansion of education, particularly at the primary level, was to a great extent politically 
motivated since the “new government was elected to a large extent upon its promises to extend 
education to a wider proportion of the population” (Foster, 1965a: 184). 
 
The opponents of the plan to expand primary and middle school (due to fears about lowering of 
quality) ignored the “more significant consequences of mass educational expansion” (Foster, 
1965a: 190), namely the unemployment of school leavers from these levels. Increasing numbers 
of youth were graduating from these schools without a concomitant increase in formal 
employment opportunities: between 1957-1963 over 100,000 additional formal employment 
places arose, but over 160,000 left elementary school (Hodge, 1964).149 
 
In the late 1950s/early 1960s some attempts were made by the government to tackle the 
unemployment problem.  
 
Firstly, there was a campaign to encourage school-leavers to return to farming but, without 
concomitant changes in the agricultural labour market environment which remained largely 
traditional, this was generally unsuccessful and existed “mostly at the level of rhetoric rather then 
deliberate policy and action” (Ninsin, 1991: 105). 
 
                                                 
148 In Tanzania, Nyerere followed a broad ladder approach, focusing on primary education. Indeed, in the 
1980s, Tanzania nearly achieved UPE but still remains one of the poorest countries in the world (see 
Wedgwood, 2005). 
149 For skilled workers there were periodic increases in demand for workers; e.g. the building of Tema in 
the late 1950s and the Akosombo dam in the 1960s (Peil, 1969). 
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Secondly, vocational guidance schemes were introduced. However, contrary to popular 
understanding that this would create jobs, the essential function was to develop better techniques 
to select graduates for entry into current employment opportunities.     
 
Thirdly, the government set up Workers’ Brigades in 1957 which involved the large-scale 
recruitment of the unemployed for public works in agriculture and construction (GoG, 2004j; 
Hodge, 1964).150 Those working for the Brigades were paid a small wage and subsistence 
allowance and provided some degree of on-the-job training. However, by the early 1960s the 
Brigades had became a highly politicised and inefficient extension of the state apparatus, and a 
drain on national coffers (GoG, 2004j).151 The numbers employed in the Workers’ Brigades 
represented only a fraction of the total number of those unemployed and did little to solve the 
unemployed school-leaver problem. In 1961, for example, only 25% of the 15,000 recruited into 
the Brigades were middle school leavers, and since the average output of middle school graduates 
at that time was about 40,000 per annum, the Brigades had little impact on the total problem152 
(Foster, 1965a: 205).153 
 
Fourthly, technical training institutes were set up (e.g. in Tema) with support from the USSR in 
some cases. These developed quite good links with industry in the late 1960s/70s, but have been 
poorly maintained and today suffer from acute delivery problems (Palmer, 2006b).154   
 
Nkrumah’s policies, aimed at mass job creation by rapid industrialisation, led him towards 
distinct views concerning employment and informal MSE development in the new Ghana. 
Nkrumah saw subsistence farmers as backward, favouring instead mechanised agriculture on state 
farms. Nkrumah saw any part of the economy that was not geared up towards industrialisation, 
not concerned with the national, state-led, economy as peripheral. The cocoa industry, for 
example, was seen as a national asset that should be socialised in support of wider developmental 
                                                 
150 Hodge (1964) comments that the Workers’ Brigade was the government response to a political crisis of 
the summer of 1957 during which gangs of unemployed youth roamed the streets of Accra “voicing strong 
resentment over the lack of work… and expressing disillusion with the honeymoon of independence” 
(p.114). 
151 Furthermore, in 1961 the Brigades were moved to the Ministry of Defence which led to increased 
militarisation of Brigade activities (GoG, 2004j). 
152 At its height the Brigades were responsible for employing some 25,000 people (GoG, 2004j). 
153 For information on the range of other schemes adopted in SSA to solve the primary school leaver 
unemployment problem (e.g. Botswana Brigades, Kenyan Village Polytechnics and Tanzania’s Education 
for self-reliance) see King (1991).   
154 When Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, Soviet technicians were expelled and USSR-supplied 
equipment and curricula in Ghana’s public TVET sector was not maintained or upgraded.   
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objectives (Dzorgbo, 2001).155 Those parts of the national economy that could be taxed to support 
other social projects fell within the formal part of the country’s economy. Those that remained 
separate and un-taxable became part of the informal MSE economy. McLaughlin (1979) notes 
that after independence MSEs were “written off in official parlance as ‘cottage industries’ and 
their workers were lumped together as ‘unenumerated’ to underscore their unimportance” (p.21). 
 
In 1960 Nkrumah announced that his government would “place far greater emphasis on the 
development of cooperatives rather than encourage Ghanaians to start private business 
enterprises” (Legislative Assembly Debates, September 1960, cited in Killick, 1978: 37). Private 
enterprise had to “stand on their own feet” (ibid.). While Nkrumah saw that encouraging Ghanaian 
private capitalism would hamper the country’s advance to socialism, he could not prohibit private 
enterprise altogether since much of his support through the 1950s had come from small-scale 
enterprise owners (Killick, 1978). Nkrumah’s solution was to allow the development of small-
scale businesses, provided that they had no foreign links and operated within the socialist 
framework he wished to create (ibid.). Nkrumah planned to increase the opportunities available to 
Ghanaians to enter the small-scale business sector by excluding foreigners from this activity, 
though this policy was not implemented until 1969 (by Busia) (Killick, 1978).156 In March 1962 
Nkrumah announced that, “[i]n future the private small-scale personal enterprise sector will be 
exclusively reserved for Ghanaians. Foreign concerns already established in this sector will be 
allowed to continue operation, on condition that they do not expand their present establishment 
and scale of operations”.157 Despite limited efforts to assist Ghanaian entrepreneurs in the late 
1950s, Nkrumah came to the view that there was little realistic hope of fostering an indigenous 
entrepreneurial class who could industrialise the country at the speed he was after (Killick, 1978). 
Nkrumah turned to foreign direct investment as the means to finance industrialisation.  
 
Despite Nkrumah’s doubts that rapid industrialisation could not come about through the MSE 
sector, it was clear that this sector represented by far the most widespread form of occupational 
opportunities for Ghanaians before and after independence. For example, Hart’s study in Nima, a 
poor urban area of Accra, in the 1960s noted that it was “clear that a very large part of the urban 
labour force... [was] not touched by wage employment” (Hart, 1973: 62). Furthermore, the 1960 
Population Census showed that:  
                                                 
155 In fact the cocoa industry was so heavily taxed by government that this partly led to the demise of the 
industry. 
156 See chap.4.3.2. 
157 Friedland and Rosberg, 1964, cited in Killick, 1978: 37. 
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only 16 per cent of the adult population of Accra was employed in what might loosely be 
described as white-collar jobs, while almost one-third of the adult population were small-
scale traders and shopkeepers. (Foster, 1965a: 130).  
 
Despite the rapidly expanding formal education system under Nkrumah, skill acquisition for the 
majority continued to be in the form of on-the-job apprenticeship training. With the expansion of 
the primary education system since 1951 and the lack of post-primary formal education and 
training opportunities, it is likely that from the late 1950s it was no longer just uneducated youth 
who were going into apprenticeship training, but also the graduates of the primary schools who 
could not find employment.158  
 
CPP policy towards this type of informal training was likely to be neglectful since Nkrumah 
viewed IMEs as peripheral to the economy. In spite of this neglect, in the mid-1960s informal 
apprenticeship was very much a “burgeoning system” (Foster, 1965b: 156). 
 
4.3.2. Education and training policies and practice, 1960s – 1970s: coups, political 
unrest and education policy repetitiveness in the face of old problems 
 
On February 24th 1966 Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup by the National Liberation 
Council (NLC). That same year, the NLC appointed the Kwapong Educational Review 
Committee which brought about the introduction into the middle schools of two-year pre-
vocational continuation classes (continuation schools) which were based on the perceived 
industrial and farming needs of the country (Martin, 1976). The continuation schools were 
created to address the fact that most middle school leavers (80% at the time) could not further 
their education at formal secondary schools, and hence middle school was terminal for most 
people.159 It was hoped that the vocational classes in continuation schools would better prepare 
school leavers for the world of work (industry and farming).160 However the continuation schools 
programme suffered serious set-backs which eventually led to its demise.161 One major 
                                                 
158 In fact even pre-WW1 it was becoming more common for parents to send their children to formal 
schooling before an apprenticeship (Quartey-Papafio, 1914). 
159 The majority of youth did not even get as far as middle schools, with primary education being terminal 
for them. 
160 Subjects included animal rearing, crop and vegetable production, kente weaving, production of sandals, 
baking and cooking, and needlework. 
161 The education reforms in 1987 saw UNICEF financially supporting the revival of the defunct 
continuation schools under a new name: ICCES (chap.6).  
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contributing factor was that many pupils in the continuation schools were keen to enter SSS and 
therefore paid little attention to the vocational and technical subjects of the curriculum. This dual 
function - as both a continuing and terminal institution - of the continuation schools was a large 
factor in its demise.   
 
The NLC re-oriented itself to the West for support (Rimmer, 1992) and in May 1966 received 
support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The NLC adopted laissez-faire policies and 
launched a stabilisation programme with IMF support (Rimmer, 1992). Between 1966-1968 this 
adjustment programme led to; reduction in overall government expenditure; large scale 
retrenchment in the public and private sectors;162 removal of price-control and subsidies; and 
devaluation of the cedi by 30% against the dollar. Following the 1966 coup “total expenditure in 
education declined, participation rate[s] of school aged children dropped, [and] so did the 
proportion of trained teachers… [with] this degeneration [continuing] well into the 1980s” 
(Ahadzie, 2000: 20). 
 
In 1969 the elected Busia government continued relations with the IMF/World Bank, though an 
agreement was not reached until December 1971 due mainly to Busia’s expansionist policies 
which implied greater pubic spending - that ran counter to the former IMF/World Bank 
agreement with the NLC. 
 
One of Busia’s first actions was to effect a policy that realised Nkrumah’s objective of increasing 
the opportunities available to Ghanaians to enter MSEs; Busia issued an Alien Compliance Order 
on 18th November 1969 that “gave all aliens [non Ghanaians] without residence permits two 
weeks to obtain them or else leave” (Peil, 1974: 367; cf. Peil, 1971). As a result more than 
200,000 aliens, many of whom were traders, left Ghana within six months (Peil, 1974).163 Hart 
(1970) described this as “the culmination of Ghanaian commercial nationalism” (p.118). 
However, this did not stem rising unemployment (GoG, 2004j). 
 
Following another coup in 1972, this time led by Colonel Acheampong of the National 
Redemption Council (NRC), a new government faced with the long-standing youth 
                                                 
162 The NLC expected that the private sector would be able to provide opportunities for those retrenched 
from the public sector (Ninsin, 1991), and yet opportunities in formal private sector employment also 
declined. 
163 These included Lebanese, Indians and others from countries surrounding Ghana – principally Nigerians 
and Togolese (Peil, 1974). 
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unemployment problem again saw education reform as the panacea. The NRC’s Dzobo 
Educational Reform Committee (GoG, 1972) noted that the graduates of the current middle and 
secondary school system:  
 
have been found to lack the proper attitude and skills necessary to equip them to work 
with their hands, and to be willing to take up the type of practical work that is available 
in our society at the moment. As a result there is a high rate of unemployment and 
under-employment among middle and secondary school leavers. (ibid.: 3) 
 
Hence the Dzobo Reform suggested the introduction of a Junior Comprehensive Secondary164 
containing pre-vocational subjects which, it was assumed, would “predispose them [pupils] to 
working with their hands as well as their minds” (ibid.: 9).165  
 
The resulting 1974 education reform introduced the JSS concept on an experimental basis. 
However, due to economic constraints facing the country from the late 1970s and the lack of 
interest of those administering it, the JSS programme never survived this experimental stage.  
 
The refocusing by the NRC on creating an educational system that would be of relevance to youth 
(un)employment issues should be read against the background of the NRC’s relationship with 
external donors. The NRC had, in fact, repudiated all external debts that arose through fraudulent 
contracts. This antagonised donors and foreclosed any possibility of his regime receiving 
concessional and long-term bilateral aid. Hence Acheampong adopted a policy of self-reliance, 
launching ‘Operation Feed Yourself’ and ‘Operation Feed Your Industries’. This also may have 
encouraged the experimentation with the JSS system that arose from the 1972 Dzobo Reform.  
 
In 1978 General Akuffo took power through another coup. Akuffo reintroduced the structural 
adjustment policies espoused by the donors – which meant a cut back in public expenditure, 
including education. 
 
By 1979 school enrolment for 6-14 year olds had fallen to 69.9% (from a high of 75% in 1965), 
and the percentage of trained teachers in schools had dropped from 90.8% in 1965 to 72% in 
                                                 
164 Later JSS. 
165 Subjects included: woodwork, masonry, metalwork, pottery, commercial subjects, marine science 
(fishing), automobile practice, craft (basket weaving), home science, beauty culture (including hair 
dressing), tailoring, dressmaking and catering (GoG, 1972). 
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1979 (Ahadzie, 2000). On June 4th 1979 Akuffo was deposed in coup led by Jerry Rawlings of 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 
 
One of the AFRC’s first acts was to conduct, between June-October 1979, its housecleaning 
exercise targeted at government officials, formal sector enterprises and informal market traders 
(Clark, 1988; Robertson, 1983). Rawlings claimed this would eradicate corruption in Ghana’s 
commercial system.166 Actions were fast and hard; Accra’s Makola #1 market, well known for 
wholesaling imported and manufactured items, was raided on the day of the coup, closed down 
and ultimately dynamited (ibid.).167 In Kumasi soldiers took over many of the formal micro- and 
small-stores and sold off all the provisions at very low prices. Many traders stayed away from the 
Kumasi market for fear of having their stock confiscated or due to the general violence and 
thievery (ibid.). Although the first targets were the illegal distribution of imports, the exercise was 
quickly extended to include local foodstuffs. As a result rural producers kept away from markets 
for fear of their goods being forcibly sold (ibid.). Rural household incomes plummeted, with 
many moving back towards subsistence farming and nonfarm enterprises suffered due to decrease 
in consumer demand (ibid.). 
 
The housecleaning exercise caused huge disruption among informal MSEs and was felt most 
harshly by those with little or no cash reserves, like market porters and poor traders (ibid.). While 
some traders were able to switch to artisanal or other informal production work, like sewing or 
baking, even this came “to a standstill, due to lack of supplies and customers” (Clark, 1988: 67). 
Furthermore informal finance networks between friends and other traders became “useless… 
since they faced similar problems” (ibid.). 
 
Haan and Serrière (2002) note that until about 1985, the GoG’s policies strongly favoured larger 
industries - being generally very unsupportive of informal MSEs: “Police harassment of 
enterprise that had not succeeded to get all of the large number of licenses and permits was 
common. Financial and other support services were unavailable” (ibid.: 27). However as noted 
later (chap.4.33&5.3) many of the government initiatives since the mid-1980s to 2006 have still 
largely failed to reach the bulk of informal MSEs, especially those in rural areas. 
                                                 
166 Traders (especially female market traders) were blamed for food shortages and were accused by 
Rawlings of hoarding goods and inflating prices. In reality, Rawlings was merely using them as scapegoats 
to blame for the economic crisis of the late 1970s (Robertson, 1983). 
167 Sekondi, Kumasi and Koforidua and Makola #2 markets were also destroyed when Rawlings took 
power again in 1981 (Robertson, 1983). 
 139 
 
On September 24th 1979 Rawlings handed over power to an elected president, Hilla Limann 
(People’s National Party), but later, on 31st December 1981 made a second coming, launching a 
second coup and taking power as head of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). 
 
4.3.3. Schooling, skills and the environment: from crisis to reform, 1980s to 2000 
 
By the time the IMF/World Bank SAPs were adopted by Ghana in 1983 the country was in crisis 
(Canagarajah and Mazumdar, 1997; Petchenkine, 1993). Not only had the education system been 
so run down due to repeated political instability and budget cuts, but the economy was in crisis, 
low-end informal sector activities burgeoned and the infrastructural environment had become run 
down.168 
 
Between 1970-1983 per capita income decreased by 30% and the cocoa sector, the foundation of 
export earnings, was devastated:  production in 1983 was just 28% of its level of 1965 
(Canagarajah and Mazumdar, 1997).169 In spite of falling revenues government spending 
increased - unconstrained by budgetary considerations. Inflation soured, averaging 58% (1972-
1982) which depressed real wages in the formal public and private sectors (ibid.). While the 
public sector protected employment, at the end of 1982 real wages of public employees was no 
more than 25% of their 1970 level (ibid.). Canagarajah and Mazumdar (1997: 6) comment that 
“[i]t is not hard to imagine the dive in efficiency of government services which this must have 
caused”. Many in the civil service, including teachers, were forced to engage in backyard 
gardening and other income-generating ventures which would undoubtedly have led to a 
reduction in the quality of education.  
 
Employment prospects in IMEs were equally thin. Honny (1999) comments that most NVTI 
graduates were finding it hard to enter self-employment at this time. 
 
                                                 
168 Between 1967 and 1984, real transportation costs increased by as much as 50% (World Bank, 1985). 
This increase was due both to the deterioration of Ghana’s infrastructure over the previous decade and to 
decreased government subsidies on petroleum products. In 1983 c.70% of Ghana’s 92,000 heavy-duty 
vehicles were off the road (Smillie, 1986). The early 1980s also saw frequent power cuts – for as much as 
half the day in Suame (ibid.). 
169 Both the overtaxing of cocoa farmers and the massive overvaluation of the exchange rate led to the 
demise of the cocoa sector (Canagarajah and Mazumdar, 1997). 
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The capacity of the trainees to enter into self-employment, even in the most traditional 
trades, has been constrained by excessive supplies of artisans into those trades (for 
example, masonry, carpentry), and the lack of linkages… from market and industry. 
(p.194) 
 
Periods of severe drought (1975-77, 1981-83) (Derrick, 1984), plummeting cocoa prices and 
increasing oil prices exacerbated poverty and caused an increase in nonfarm informal activities. 
Moreover, black market activities (kalabule) became widespread during the 1970s and early 
1980s (Smillie, 1986). 
 
To make matters worse by the end of January 1983 about one million migrants returned to Ghana 
after being forcibly repatriated from Nigeria. The large numbers of new entrants into an already 
saturated economy led to soaring unemployment. Despite these external or natural shocks, some 
argue that the root cause of Ghana’s economic decline can be traced to gross governmental 
mismanagement, including excessive public spending and over-involvement in economic affairs 
(Canagarajah and Mazumdar, 1997; Vijverberg, 1995). 
 
The economic crisis of the early 1980s was paralleled by a crisis in education and training. 
Government financing for education declined sharply 1976-1983, from 6.4% to 1.4% of GDP, 
resulting in the decline of the education system (World Bank, 1996). By the early 1980s, the 
education system in Ghana was facing huge problems (Ahadzie, 2000; Sawyerr, 1997): lack of 
trained teachers, lack of materials, books and teaching aids, inadequate infrastructure, low and 
late pay for teachers, high drop-out rates and low enrolment rates, poor educational management 
and administration and a general lack of financing for education. By 1983 approximately 50% of 
trained primary teachers had left the country (Ahadzie, 2000) due to the deteriorating economic 
climate and working conditions.170 Untrained teachers were employed to avoid disintegration of 
the education system and the quality of teaching deteriorated. By 1983 the quality of education 
had reached crisis levels and it became necessary for a serious attempt to be made to salvage it. 
 
In 1987, with World Bank support,171 an Educational Reform was started with the objective of 
improving educational quality and, just as previous reforms had attempted, to make education 
more orientated to work - a reaction to the massive unemployment problems and economic crisis 
                                                 
170 The Commission for Africa report (2005) discusses the impact brain drain is having on development in 
Africa today. 
171 For a discussion on World Bank support to the 1987 reforms and after, see Palmer (2005c). For a 
discussion on aid to education in Ghana since then see Ayamdoo et al. (2006). 
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facing Ghana in the mid-1980s. The education reform changed the educational system from the 6-
4-5-2-3/4 version, to: six years of primary, three years of JSS, three years of SSS and 3-4 years of 
tertiary (6-3-3-3/4). This shortened the pre-tertiary education from 17172 to 12 years (World Bank, 
2004c). Basic education consisted of the 6-3 element: six years primary and three JSS (the JSS 
replaced middle schools). 
 
The 1987 reforms led to comprehensive curriculum reform: while the middle schools were 
largely academic schools, the JSS curriculum included pre-technical and pre-vocational education 
(Donge, 2002). Back in 1972 the Dzobo Educational Reform Committee had emphasised that the 
curriculum should be re-oriented so that graduates were predisposed to work with their “hands as 
well as their minds” (GoG, 1972: 9). This exact same rationale, manifest in the JSS concept, was 
taken up and implemented in the 1987 reforms.  
 
In addition to the general subjects, the Junior Secondary School curriculum has been 
designed to provide opportunities for pupils to acquire basic pre-technical, pre-
vocational, and basic life skills which will enable pupils to… appreciate the use of the 
hands as well as the mind and make them creative and self-employable. (Republic of 
Ghana, 1992, cited in McGrath et al., 1995: 22) 
 
Moreover further evidence that the government was keen to manipulate the education and 
training system so that it better prepared youth for work can be seen in the 1986 revival of the 
defunct continuation schools programme, albeit under a different name: ICCES (chap.6). 
 
The political environment at the time of the education reform contributed both to its design and to 
the underlying assumptions of how the reform would impact on the economy. At the time of the 
reform Rawlings’ PNDC, a military government driven by socialist ideology, had made it their 
objective to make the education system more equitable and responsive to current critical issues, 
principally unemployment. The argument put forward by the PNDC, which reiterated over a 
hundred years of previous TVET policy in the Gold Coast/Ghana, was that the education system 
should: 
 
prepare the youth for work and that providing vocational education at the secondary 
school level would equip students with the skills for paid and self-employment… [hence] 
vocationalization [became] widely accepted as one of the key solutions to socio-
economic decline. (Akyeampong, 2002: v) 
                                                 




In addition, the increased attention in the 1987 reform to basic education also had a political 
basis. At that time Rawlings was seeking political support from rural areas – not from the 
minority, mainly urban, elite - and a policy of spreading the benefits of education there was 
dominant (Donge, 2002). The establishment of rural ICCES training centres at this time was 
likely part of Rawlings’ renewed focus on rural areas and rural votes.173 
 
Ultimately, however, the 1987 education reform was seen largely as failing to achieve its 
objectives and resulted in unexpected outcomes. 
 
Firstly, the 1987 education reform failed to inculcate “any meaningful vocational and technical 
oriented skills into the students” (Aryeetey, Laryea, Antwi-Asare, Baah-Boateng, Turkson, 
Codjoe and Ahortor, 2005: 133).174 The 2004 White Paper on Educational Reforms (chap.5.1) 
concluded that the 1987 reform “failed to comprehensively equip[…] the youth… with directly 
employable skills for the world of work” (GoG, 2004a: 4). Indeed the objective of the JSS system 
to prepare graduates for work has “for years been known to be totally unreal” (ibid.: 7). 
Akyeampong (2002) suggests that the vocationalisation policy proved to be too ambitious and 
implementation was hurriedly carried out. The 1987 education reform was initiated without 
serious consideration given to the associated capital or recurrent costs. It proved difficult, for 
example, to find sufficient numbers of suitably trained vocational/technical teachers, to finance 
the construction of JSS workshops or the purchase of essential tools and equipment 
(Akyeampong, 2002, GoG, 2004i).175 
 
A second, related, point is that the expected effect a vocationalised JSS system would have on the 
labour market – that it would prepare students for (self-)employment and reduce unemployment – 
largely failed to materialise. Almost twenty years after the 1987 education reform youth 
unemployment is still a critical issue. Van Dijk (1997) argues that “… the strong link between 
education and employment prospects, a central premise of the post-independence development 
                                                 
173 Indeed new ICCES centres in rural areas were sometimes put in the hands of stalwart PNDC supporters 
and used as a mechanism to boost support for the party – especially in areas that were traditionally 
supporters of the opposition (ICCES official, personal communication 10.09.05).  
174 It might be argued that a light-form of vocationalisation took place in the JSS; but lacking equipment 
and workshops most JSS students will have had very little hands-on practice, with teacher demonstration 
and pre-vocational/technical theory more predominant.  
175 A further issue which reduced the supply of JSS teachers was that many did not end up teaching at this 
level, or in fact teaching at all, as the desire among teachers to further their education or to leave their 
profession was high (Akyeampong and Stephens, 2002). 
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era in Ghana, has been called into question. It touches all levels and types of training and even 
extends to formal schooling” (p.107).176 
 
Thirdly, an apparently unforeseen consequence of reducing the years of pre-tertiary education 
from 17 to 12 years was to trigger “the arrival of thousands of young entrants into the labour 
market at a much younger age” (Honny, 1999: 192).  
 
Fourthly, the expectation that temporary teachers and local craftsmen would be employed to fill in 
the shortfall in qualified teachers proved unrealistic. Indeed the MoE was fast to change the initial 
intention of paying these teachers and craftsmen as schools began to present budgets for the cost 
of hiring teachers to them – budgets which had not been factored into the national budget 
(Akyeampong, 2002). Moreover the vocationalised JSS concept lost favour among many parents 
as the “use of local artisans in teaching only reinforced public suspicion that JSS pupils were 
being trained to become local artisans and carpenters” (ibid.). Additionally the local artisans 
lacked the required pedagogical skills which served to reduce the quality of the training (ibid.). 
 
In 1983 Ghana launched the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in reaction to the economic 
meltdown of the early 1980s with the support of the IMF/World Bank SAPs. The ERP led to 
improvements in the macro-economic environment, with GDP – which had shrunk by c.16% 
1971-1983 – showing improvements from 1984: in the period 1984-2005, GDP growth has 
continued to remain positive, averaging 4.9% per year (table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1. GDP growth rates 1984-2005
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Avr.
Real
GDP 8.6 5.1 5.2 4.8 5.6 5.1 3.3 5.3 3.9 5 3.8 4 4.6 4.2 4.7 4.4 3.7 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.8 5.8 4.9
Source: GoG, 2003a: 54; GoG, 2005a: 19; IMF, 2005. 
The 2005 figure is an estimate based on data through to August. 
 
However positive macro-economic performance has not brought about overall or balanced 
economic development. 
 
Firstly, the positive macro-economic performance did not facilitate the structural transformation 
of Ghana’s economy. The over-reliance on primary products (e.g. agriculture, timber, gold) and 
                                                 
176 As noted earlier (chap.4.1.2), the assumed link between education and employment has not just been a 
fad of the post-independence era, but goes back to the mid-nineteenth century. 
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the massive size of the informal economy has changed little since independence. This lack of 
structural transformation “constrained the development of new and better employment 
opportunities and a fuller utilisation of the labour force” (Heintz, 2004: 6). Based on evidence 
from the late 1990s to early 2000s, some argue that “the structure of employment in the Ghanaian 
economy has changed quite significantly, with a shift away from agriculture and toward urban 
activities linked to trade and other services, as well as to manufacturing and construction” 
(Cavalcanti, 2005: 1). Elsewhere in SSA a shift from farm to nonfarm activities has been 
observed (Bryceson, 1996; 1997a; 2002a). 
 
Secondly, structural adjustment meant a loss of formal employment, especially in the public 
sector and the concomitant expansion of the IME sector (Rimmer, 1992). Public sector 
employment peaked in 1985 with 397,000 people employed, but by 1991 had shrunk to 40% of 
the 1985 figure (to 156,000 employees).177 Similarly, private sector formal employment shrank 
from 79,000 in 1987 to less than half that by 1991. Total formal sector employment in 1991 
was 40% of what it was in 1985 (table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2. Trends in formal sector employment, 1960 to 1991 (thousands)   
Year Public sector formal Private Sector formal Total formal sector  
employment employment employment
1960 184 149 333  
1965 278 118 396
1970 288 110 398
1975 318 137 455
1980 291 46 337
1985 397 67 464
1986 347 66 414
1987 315 79 394
1988 252 55 307
1989 177 38 215
1990 189 40 229
1991 156 31 186  
Source: Gockel, 1998, cited in Adu-Amankwah, n.d.  
 
Teal (2001) presents data on the labour force status of Ghana’s population, based on data from 
four rounds of the GLSS between 1987 and 1999 which were divided into five broad categories: 
                                                 
177 These figures are small relative to the number of repatriates from Nigeria: estimated at a million. 
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wage employees, farmers, the non-agricultural self-employed, unpaid family labour and the 
unemployed (table 4.3).178 
 
Table 4.3. Labour force status: percentages of individuals by category
of employment
Ghana Living Standards Survey Rounds
1987/88 1988/89 1991/92 1998/99
Wage Employees 17.3 18.1 15.4 13.2
   Government 8.0 7.9 7.8 5.9
   State Enterprise 1.9 2.3 1.2 0.6
   Private 7.4 7.9 6.4 6.7
Farmer 58.7 54.6 56.7 55.7
Non-Agricultural 19.5 24.2 23.5 27.3
 Self Employment
Unpaid Family 2.2 1.1 1.3 0.3
Unemployed 2.2 1.9 3.2 3.5
Total 100 100 100 100  
Source: Teal, 2001: 17  
 
Table 4.3 provides some information about the extent of labour market opportunities for the 
graduates of the schools and skills programmes over this period. Between 1987/88 and 1998/99 
the percentage of the population engaged in self-employment activities increased from 78.2% 
(58.7% agriculture, 19.5% non-agricultural) to 83% (55.7% agriculture, 27.3% non-agricultural). 
Indeed this period has seen a slight decrease in those engaged in agriculture, while those in non-
agricultural self-employment activities have increased from 19.5% to 27.3%. The percentage of 
individuals in the wage sector has shrunk from 17.3% in 1987/88 to 13.2% a decade later. Formal 
public wage employment (government and parastatal workers) has shrunk from 9.9% in 1987/88 
to 6.5% a decade later. Despite the retrenchments in civil servants following the SAPs the public 
sector remains the largest formal sector employer. It is generally accepted that while employment 
growth in the formal economy appears to be stagnating, employment growth in the informal 
economy is still growing.  
 
As noted, Ghana has a massive informal economy accounting for some 86% of employment 
(including farm and nonfarm activities) (table 4.4). In rural areas, informal employment accounts 
for 92% of all employment, and is predominantly (73%) agricultural and female in composition 
                                                 
178 These categories disguise much of Ghana’s labour market realities (e.g. occupational pluralism) 
(chap.2.3.1). Moreover the issue of categorising anyone in Ghana as ‘unemployed’ is highly problematic 
(chap.2.3). 
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(table 4.4). In urban areas, informal employment is largely (75%) comprised of nonfarm 
activities.  
 
Table 4.4. Employment and unemployment, by gender and rural/urban (1998/99)
Urban Rural Ghana
Male Female All Male Female All Male Female All
Total population aged 15 +
Unemployed - - 11.9 - - 4.3 7.2 6.4 6.7
Employed - - 78.3 - - 84 84 80.7 82.1
Employed population aged 15-64
Total formal employment 42.5 12.5 25.9 13.9 3.2 8.1 22.7 6.2 13.7
(public and private) (a+b)
(a) State-owned company 17.5 6.5 11.4 6.3 1.8 3.9 9.8 3.3 6.2
(b) Private formal 25 6 14.5 7.6 1.4 4.2 13 2.9 7.5
Total informal employment (c+d) 57.5 87.6 74.1 86.1 96.8 91.9 77.3 93.8 86.3
(c) Private informal and non- 35.5 71.4 55.3 15 32.8 24.7 21.4 45.1 34.3
agricultural self-employment
(d) Self-employment 22 16.2 18.8 71.1 64 67.2 55.9 48.7 52
(agricultural)
Sub-category of employed
Unpaid family work - - 8.6 - - 21.2 10.7 22.7 17.2
Sample size 1195 1472 2667 2668 3152 5820 3863 4624 8487  
Source: GSS, 2000  
 
Under the SAPs the sustained growth rates failed to improve the employment opportunities for 
the majority of the working population (Fine and Boateng, 2000). At the same time as formal 
employment opportunities were declining the majority of opportunities in informal employment 
continued to consist of low-end activities in both farm and nonfarm enterprise (Heintz, 2004). 
“Persistent unemployment, underemployment, and growth in precarious forms of employment 
remained central features of the economy” (ibid.: 6). 
 
The SAPs impacted differently on Ghana’s informal MSEs, depending on the enterprise type and 
whether it was a more entrepreneurial or subsistence-orientated informal enterprise (Dawson, 
1993; Osei, Baah-Nuakoh, Tutu and Sowa, 1993; Parker, Riopelle and Steel, 1995; Steel and 
Webster, 1991). For example Parker et al. (1995) find that the SAPs improved the climate for 
MSEs in three areas: access to inputs, relative prices, and the ease of doing business. At the same 
time, however, MSEs faced intensified competition in the post-reform environment. Imports of 
oburuni waawu
179 (second hand clothing) and Chinese textiles have had devastating impacts on 
                                                 
179 Literally ‘the whiteman is dead’. 
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informal (and formal) textile manufacturing. Imports of (highly subsidised) foreign farm produce, 
e.g. rice from the USA, have led to declining farm incomes.180  
 
GoG support to IMEs had been neglectful at best prior to the mid-1980s though a couple of MSE 
agencies existed.181 However since the late 1980s a number of agencies have been established 
which, according to some commentators have “markedly improved [the situation] for the 
informal sector… with a basic institutional infrastructure [established] to support the sector... 
[e.g.] the National Board for Small-Scale Industries (NBSSI)” (Haan and Serrière, 2002: 27). 
However there is strong evidence suggesting that many of these MSE agencies, like the NBSSI, 
have largely failed to provide support to the majority of IMEs in Ghana and have not markedly 
improved the situation (Baah-Nuakoh, 2003; Palmer, 2004a; b; chap.5.2-5.3, this thesis). As well 
as government programmes (since 1970) several donor projects in the mid-1990s have also 
targeted the MSE sector (fig.4.4). 
 
Financial liberalisation policy has not led to wider access to formal financial mechanisms for the 
informal MSEs (Steel, Aryeetey, Hettige and Nissanke, 1997), nor have attempts to provide 
micro-credit been successful in reaching the majority of IMEs (Palmer, 2004a).182  
 
According to the GSS, unemployment in Ghana stood at 6.7% in 2000 though was more acute in 
urban than rural areas (11.9% vs 4.3%) (table 4.4). However ‘unemployment’ figures in Ghana 
should be treated with a high degree of caution. Not only do they vary widely according to how 
‘unemployment’ is measured,183 but the huge number of working poor (ILO, 1972) in low-end 






                                                 
180 Under the SAP agreements Ghana had to remove subsidies on most farm produce which resulted in 
many farmers, like rice farmers in the north, going out of business. Meanwhile heavily subsidised rice from 
the USA was imported into Ghana. 
181 E.g. the Ghanaian Enterprise Development Commission (GEDC) – set up in 1975 as the main credit 
giving body to small-scale entrepreneurs in Ghana. It merged with NBSSI in 1991. 
182 There are many examples of successful micro-credit initiatives in Ghana but these usually cover a 
limited geographical area.   
183 Unemployment in 1997 was estimated to be about 25%, or about 2.2 million out of the total labour force 




Unemployment has remained a major problem in the post-1951 period. During the 1950s-1970s 
the GoG attempted to tackle this with work creation schemes like the Brigades and by setting up 
technical institutes and NVTIs. Since the 1960s there have been repeated attempts to reform the 
education system to make it more orientated towards work. The 1987 attempt to vocationalise the 
junior secondary level has been officially acknowledged as a failure. Policies concerning small 
enterprise have largely not been favourable: Nkrumah’s socialist policies favoured cooperatives, 
and the repeated coups during the 1960s/70s led to an unstable investment climate and an 
economic downturn culminating in the economic nadir of 1983. Rawlings’ period brought 
relative stability and sustained GDP growth but he remained suspicious of private business. 
Moreover, without any significant change in the structure of Ghana’s economy which comprised 
approximately 90% informal activities, and without any significant change in the enabling 
enterprise infrastructure for MSE development, most school and TVET graduates find themselves 
without formal assistance operating in IMEs and training in traditional apprenticeships.  
 
4.4. Concluding remarks on 150 years of skills training, work, enterprise and the 
enabling environment, 1850s-2000 
 
This chapter has covered the main developments related to skills training, work, and enterprise in 
the context of changing environments, 1850s-2000. Over this period it is possible to identify 
themes that have emerged concerning skills, work and MSEs within four types of environment, 
the:  
• political environment; 
• policy and legislative environment for skills development; 
• policy and legislative environment for work; 
• institutional environment for MSEs.184 
 
The political environment (fig.4.1) over the last 150 years has shaped quite considerably the 
whole development of skills and the labour market environment. The formal colonial economy 
                                                 
184 Some of the items in fig.4.1-4.4 have not been previously covered in detail in this chapter. Inevitably, 
the task of covering 150 years of policy and practice vis-à-vis schools, skills and enterprise means that 
some items have to be excluded from discussion. Nonetheless, the author considers it valuable to include 
other dimensions of these four environments in the figures so that the reader can get a fuller picture. 
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(and the development of a monetised colonial informal economy) spread northwards from the 
coast as British political rule spread. Formal job opportunities (other than for missions), limited as 
they were, were largely based around coastal ports and trading posts. Formal job opportunities in 




As British political power spread, traditional political power waned - impacting on the traditional 
labour market and on skills development environments. For example, as the Asante Kingdom 
declined, the quality of Asante gold deteriorated, the demand for regalia reduced and the need for 
cash incomes increased. Artisans shifted from producing for largely subsistence needs or for the 
royal court, to producing goods for cash incomes.  
 
Fig.4.1. The political environment in Ghana (to 2000) 
 
Colonial period 
1806 Ashanti-Fante war broke out. The Fante were abandoning the allegiance to the Ashanti in favour  
of the British. 
1821 British Government took control of the British trading forts on the Gold Coast. 
1820s to 1900 Series of British invasions of Ashanti. 
1844  Fanti chiefs signed an agreement with the British, that became the legal stepping-stone to colonial 
status for the coastal area. 
1874 Gold Coast Colony established on the coast. 
1902 Asante and Northern Territories subsumed under the ‘Gold Coast’. 
1922 Togoland ceded to the Gold Coast (UK). 
Independence 
1957 Independence (March 6th), Convention Peoples’ Party (CPP) in power 
1957-1958 Democracy 
1958-1964 Restricted Democratic Practice 
1964-1966 One Party State (CPP) 
1966 National Liberation Council (NLC) coup (February 24th). 
 1966-1969 Military Regime 
1969 Progress Party (PP) elected. 
 1969-1972 Democracy 
1972 National Redemption Council (NRC) coup (January 13th) 
 1972-1979 Military Regime 
1978 Supreme Military Council coup (July 5th) 
1979 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) coup (June 4th) 
____ People’s National Party (PNP) takes power (September 24th) 
 1979-1981 Democracy 
1981 Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) coup (December 31st) (Rawlings) 
 1981-1992 Military Regime 
1993 National Democratic Congress (NDC) took power (January) (Rawlings) 
 1992-1996 Emerging Democracy 
1996 NDC re-elected (December) (Rawlings) 
 1996-2000 Democracy 
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Since independence, Ghana’s political history has not been encouraging for entrepreneurship in 
general. Between independence and 2000 Ghana has seen almost twenty years of military rule, 
about twelve years of restricted of emerging democratic practice and some ten years of 
democracy. Such a history of coups and military rule – and the effects these have had on the 
macro-economic and labour market environments – have not been conducive to business 
development.185 In the 1970s/1980s military rule drove away many local and foreign 
entrepreneurs and Rawlings’ attitude towards the private sector was “somewhat ambivalent and 
sometimes openly hostile” (Arthur, 2006: 40).  
 
Moreover, as new post-colonial governments came to power, there has been a tendency to 
promote new education reforms as each government’s contribution to development. For political 
reasons new governments ushered in new policies so that it would be seen that something new 
was being done to aid development: in the field of education policy, there were reforms shortly 
after the 1966 and 1972 coups, Rawlings’ second coming and Kufuor taking up office (chap.5). 
What is remarkable, however, is that these education policies repeatedly espoused the need to 
promote TVET. 
 
The policy and legislative environment for skills development was been shaped by: 
i) the ongoing political and policy concern with youth unemployment. Much effort has 
been spent in trying to solve this problem but it has remained persistent for the last 
150 years.  
ii) TVET and education reform being seen as the major solution to this unemployment 
problem. A key thread running through this chapter has been the remarkable 
consistency in the way TVET has been revived over the decades from the early 
colonial period to the present (fig.4.2).186 
 
In spite of the repeated attempts to promote school-based TVET and later VTIs and short-
duration training (like the World Bank’s Vocational Skills and Informal Sector Support Project, 
fig.4.4), no clear skills development policy had emerged by 2000. In 1990 an attempt was made 
“to solve the interdepartmental rivalries and bureaucratic constraints that affected the 
management of training” (King and McGrath, 2002a: 55); the National Coordinating Committee 
                                                 
185 However, the sustained GDP growth during the Rawlings years is impressive (table 4.1). 
186 Yamada (2005) comments on the similarity between TVET policies in the 1920s and those in the 1987 
reform.  
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on Technical and Vocational Education and Training (NACVET) was set up to coordinate a 
national skills development system187 (ibid.; World Bank, 1995). However: 
 
in a decade of existence, NACVET has failed to develop a national policy for skills 
development and continues to suffer from capacity problems and on-going tensions 
between the two parent Ministries. (King and McGrath, 2002a: 55)  
 
                                                 
187 In particular between providers of skills from the MoE and those from the MoESW. 
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The policy and legislative environment for work has largely been formal sector focused 
(fig.4.3) despite the fact that employment and skills acquisition in IME has been the most 
dominant form of work and training for the majority of the population for the last 150 years. 
Where the informal sector has been included (like the Children’s Act) legislation is often ignored 
in practice by IMEs.  
 
Fig.4.2. The policy and legislative environment for skills development in Ghana (to 2000) 
 
Colonial period 
1847 Report by the Education Committee of the Privy Council to the Colonial Office – mention 
of the need to provide practical training in both handicrafts and agriculture to African youth - 
influenced Mission (particularly the Basel) school curricula in the Gold Coast. 
1882  Ordinance for the Promotion and Assistance of Education in the Gold Coast Colony - 
tried to establish a series of industrial schools in which pupils were meant to spend no less than 
10 hours per week in practical classes 
1898 Grants offered by colonial administration to encourage educational establishments to teach 
technical and agricultural subjects  
1908/9 Education Reform Committee (1908) and Education Rules (1909) – planned to introduce 
hand and eye, industrial and agricultural training into the government schools. 
1920s Guggisberg’s ‘Sixteen Principles of Education’ - includes promotion of trade schools. 
Self-government 
1951 Accelerated Development Plan for Education - aimed to expand education in all sub-sectors, 
with a clear emphasis, however, on the expansion of primary and middle schools. 
Independence 
1957 White Paper on a National Workers Brigade 
1960 Education Act (87) - making primary schooling compulsory and free with effect from 
September 1961 - although it does not define until what age the child should attend school. 
Established private institutions (many of which offer TVET). 
1966 Kwapong Educational Review Committee – introduced continuation schools  
1970  The National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) Act (351) - responsible for the 
nationwide coordination of all aspects of vocational training including apprenticeship - in both 
formal and informal sectors. 
1972 Dzobo Educational Reform Committee – experimental pre-vocational courses at the junior 
secondary level. 
1986 Evans Anfom Committee – re-introduced the pre-vocational classes at the junior secondary 
level 
1992  Constitution – introduced Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) 
1990 National Coordinating Committee on Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
(NACVET) was set up to coordinate a national skills development system. 
1995 National development agenda-Vision 2020 - outlines training policy objectives in terms of 
strengthening and expanding training facilities through; i) improving and expanding the 
infrastructure for training; ii) increasing opportunities for technical and vocational level 
training, and iii) strengthening linkages between the training sector and industry.  
1995 FCUBE launched 
1998 Children’s Act (560). Part V, sub-part II on apprenticeship in the informal sector – specifies 
minimum age of traditional apprenticeship should be 15 years or after completion of basic 
education (basic education being officially compulsory) (section 98). Sets out masters’ 
responsibilities towards their apprentices regarding training (section 99), the apprenticeship 
agreement (section 100) duties (section 101) and release (section 102) of apprentice. 
 
Sources: Foster, 1965a; Gold Coast, 1951; GoG, 2004b; 1998; 1995; 1992; 1972, 1970; Guggisberg, 
1922; Hodge, 1964 
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The institutional environment for MSEs has remained weak in practice, despite a number of 
programmes and projects that have intended to improve the MSE environment (fig.4.4). 
Fig.4.3. The policy and legislative environment for work in Ghana (to 2000) 
 
Colonial period 
 Colonial administration favoured big business. Policies in favour of (British) larger firms. 
Independence 
1957 Builder’s Brigade Board Act (37). 
1958 Industrial Relations Act (56) – designed to strengthen the trade unions by giving them legal 
backing for the first time. The Trade Union Congress (TUC) strengthened (given legal 
backing); recognised as the sole representative of trade union movement in Ghana. 
1960 Civil Service Act – trade union membership compulsory for all civil servants. 
1965 Industrial Relations Act (299) (replaced 1958 Act) - every union had to be TUC member. 
1966 National Liberation Council repealed section 24 of the 1960 Civil Service Act, which made 
trade union membership compulsory for civil servants. 
1967  Labour Decree (NLCD 157) – established Public Employment Centers to assist job seekers in 
finding work. It also discusses workers’ contracts and agreements and regulates the 
employment of women, children and young persons. E.g. prohibits employment of children 
under the age of 15, although the law permits undefined “light” work by children. 
1969 Labour Regulations Law (LI 632) provides for the terms and conditions of employment as 
well as the employment of disabled persons. 
1970 Factories, Offices and Shops Act – regulates health, safety and welfare of staff in the 
workplace. 
1971 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act (383) – (replaced Industrial Relations Act, 299) - 
dissolved the TUC (reinstated by the National Redemption Council in 1972). 
1972 Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) established to administer the 
National Social Security Scheme 
1981 National Board for Small-Scale Industries (NBSSI) Act (434) – set up to promote and 
develop the small-scale industrial sector 
1987 Workmen’s Compensation Law (PNDCL 183) deals with an employer's liability for 
compensation for a worker's death or incapacity arising as a result of an accident occurring in 
the course of employment. 
1991 Social Security Law (PNDC Law 247) - Voluntary coverage for the self-employed and hence 
low outreach to the informal sector. 
1992  Constitution - right to work under satisfactory safe and healthy conditions. 
1998 Children’s Act (560). Part V, sub-part I on Child Labour - prohibits employment of children 
under the age of 15. Children aged 13 and over can do light work (defined as “work which is 
not likely to be harmful to the health or development of he child and does not affect the child’s 
attendance at school of capacity of a child to benefit from school work”). Minimum age for the 
engagement of a person in hazardous work is 18 (defined as work that is a danger to the health, 
safety or morals of a person - going to sea; mining and quarrying; portage if heavy loads; 
manufacturing industries where chemicals are produced or used; work in places where 
machines are used; and work in places such as bars, hotels and places of entertainment where a 
person may be exposed to immoral behaviour. Children’s Act specifically includes the 
informal sector. 
 
Sources: Anyemedu, 2000; GoG, 1998; 1992 
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MSEs not recognised as part of the colonial formal economy. Formal banks favoured big 
(foreign) business over small local enterprises.  
Independence 
1950/60s Nkrumah favoured cooperatives over private enterprise, and viewed informal ‘cottage 
industries’ as peripheral to his rapid industrialisation goals. 
1970 Small Business Loans Scheme - to assist small-scale enterprises to start-up or expand. In 
practice it was largely formal enterprise that benefited.  
1975 Ghanaian Enterprise Development Commission (GEDC) – set up as the main credit giving 
body to small-scale entrepreneurs in Ghana. 
1981 National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) – set up by the Government as an apex 
organisation to promote and develop the small-scale industrial sector. However it is poorly 
funded by meager budget allocations. Part of its function was to manage the PAMSCAD. (The 
NBSSI did not really function until 1989). 
1987 Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS) - set up by the 
Government to promote small-scale industrialisation and provide employment opportunities, 
improve incomes and enhance the development of Ghana. GRATIS provides training and 
technical assistance to artisans through ten Intermediate Technology Transfer Units. GRATIS 
experiences a high rate of labour turnover in the project as a result of low remuneration and 
motivation for the workers. There is high level of worker dissatisfaction with poor conditions 
of employment. 
1988  Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) - to assist 
small-scale industries with a revolving fund of 80 million cedis (1989). PAMSCAD is able to 
support only a small number of enterprises; its loan amount of 500,000 cedis per applicant has 
remained constant since 1989 (so that it is worth very little now); repayments are often late 
which delays loans to others. 
1989 Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise Development (FUSMED) – set up by the Bank of 
Ghana as a credit extension programme with funding from the World Bank to finance the 
development of private small and medium enterprises (SME) in the productive sectors of the 
economy. Loans have tended to be ‘captured’ mostly by urban-based medium sized 
enterprises. 
1990 EMPRETEC Ghana Foundation - organises venture forums where entrepreneurs needing 
capital are put in touch with investors, and serves as a financial intermediary between SMEs 
and formal financial institutions. It has a small coverage and excludes informal MSEs.  
1990  Informal sector associations supported by Rawlings’ PNDC. Ostensibly to act as 
intermediaries between member enterprises and the government or other supporting bodies, 
though the establishment of many well-known ISAs had more to do with politics than self-
help. 
1990/91 World Bank project to provide technical assistance and credit facilities to SMEs. However, the 
conditionalities attached to the credit line rendered them inaccessible from informal MSEs. 
1995 Rural Enterprise Project (REP) (IFAD funded 1995-ongoing) - aims to increase rural 
production, employment and income in order to alleviate poverty through the increased output 
of small off-farm enterprises. This is being accomplished by: facilitating access to new 
technology and business advice; promoting easier access to financial services; improving the 
efficiency of existing small rural enterprises, supporting the creation of new enterprises, and 
removing communication constraints through feeder road rehabilitation. See GoG/IFAD 
(2000). 
1995 Vocational Skills and Informal Sector support project (VSP) (World Bank funded, 1995-2001) 
- focused on skills upgrading for 10,000 master-craftsmen and 15,000 traditional apprentices. 
The VSP did have some success in improving the outcomes of graduates, but experienced a 
number of problems and did not lead to any significant impact on the wider informal sector. 




As a concluding word it can be said that government efforts to promote TVET have repeatedly 
been countered by efforts, on the part of civil society, for a more general academic school 
curriculum. School-based TVET, therefore, has largely failed to materialise as it was envisaged, 
and skills training in VTIs has remained an unpopular, or at least second, choice for most youth. 
The preference for academic schooling initially related to the better access it offered to the 
emerging, if limited, occupational opportunities in the colonial exchange economy. After 
independence the preference for a stable wage-income (in the public sector) continued to 
encourage youth to opt for academic schooling. While Gold Coast/Ghana educational policy, 
therefore, has been very much concerned with the development of TVET, public opinion and 
demand has shaped an education system that, in practice, remained largely academic at the start 
of the twenty-first century.   
 
































Chapter 5: Skills Development and Informal Micro-Enterprise in Ghana’s New 
Political Context, 2001-2006 
 
5.0. Introduction: a new chapter in Ghana’s political history? 
 
The election of Kufuor’s NPP in December 2000 ushered in a new political context for Ghana: 
“for the first time a sitting government was ousted from office by means of the ballot box” 
(Nugent, 2001: 405) and nearly 20 years of Rawlings’ rule came to an end. Four years later, in 
December 2004, Kufuor was re-elected and has now been in power in Ghana for over five and a 
half years (November 2006).  
 
When Kufuor took up office in 2001 he was faced by formidable un- and under-employment 
problems particularly among the youth: in fact the NPP had used job creation as a key election 
pledge (chap.7.2). Apart from the lack of opportunities at the post-primary or post-JSS level, 
about 1.2 million children of primary school age were still out of school in 2001 (UNESCO, 
2004). 
 
The last chapter reviewed the policy and practice of skills development in relation to the 
changing economic and labour market, social and political environments from the mid-nineteenth 
century to 2000. This chapter explores skills development and informal micro-enterprise (IME) 
policy and practice within the new political context, 2001-2006. 
 
This chapter will take the following structure: first it examines the vision and the reality of skills 
development policy, 2001-2006; second there follows an equivalent analysis of policy and 
practice concerning IME and youth employment more generally; third it examines a series of 
critical environments that those entering IME currently face. 
 
5.1. Skills development policy, 2001-2006: the vision and the reality  
 
While there is a recognised general absence of skills development in PRSPs (Caillods, 2003; ILO, 
2005, 2003a: 8), the World Bank notes that many governments in SSA have put policies in place 




The GPRS I (2003-2005) has a short section on “Skills and entrepreneurial development for the 
youth” (GoG, 2003a: 104-105). It outlines three groups of young people most in need of support: 
barely literate young people (due to early drop-out or inability to attend school); those who have 
completed (a stage of) formal education but are unemployed due to reasons of quality/relevance 
of education; young people that have acquired some skills but need retraining to enter the labour 
market. The GPRS I intended to: increase the relevance and coverage of vocational and technical 
training; develop and expand the traditional apprenticeship system; and promote entrepreneurship 
among the youth. Similarly the GPRS II (2006-2009) has a section entitled “Training and Skills 
Development” (GoG, 2005a: 44-45) and also points to these same groups of people as most in 
need of skills development, but adds a fourth category; young persons with disabilities. The 
GPRS II calls for the development of skills and entrepreneurial know-how, and sets out a series 
of priority areas: (i) provide skills and entrepreneurial training in a gender responsive and 
equitable manner; (ii) promote dialogue between industry and skills/professional training 
institutions to produce skilled labour required by industry; (iii) strengthen and support human 
resource training institutions; (iv) promote apprenticeship training; (v) promote the adoption of 
the National Youth Policy and enactment of the Disability Bill. 
 
However, in Ghana, skills training has traditionally received little practical government focus, 
despite the rhetoric of the GPRS I and II documents and more than one hundred and fifty years of 
preoccupation with making education more relevant to the world of work.188 It is worth briefly 
outlining the current state of, and trends in, skills development in Ghana, particularly as it relates 
to the informal economy. 
 
The structure of public skills development in Ghana is disjointed, with Government programmes 
spread across no less than nine different ministries (GoG, 2004b: 3).  
 
Formal TVET in Ghana occurs at three levels. Polytechnics, the highest level training institutions 
beneath universities, are located in regional capitals (n=10) and are followed by the Technical 
Training Institutes (n=23),189 both under the MoESS. Public sector VTIs under the MoMYE 
                                                 
188 There were, of course, government efforts to promote school-based pre-technical and pre-vocational 
courses at the JSS level, though these have largely failed. On this and other attempts to promote school-
based TVET see chap.4. 
189 In 2005/6 the total student enrolment in technical institutes was 19,241; of these only 13% of students 
were female (GoG, 2006b). 
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number about 111 (NVTIs (30),190 ICCES (59)191 and other VTIs (22)). Other Ministries have 
vocationally related institutes, for example: the Ministry of Lands, Environment and Forestry has 
15 Regional Technology Transfer Units; and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development has about 22 VTIs (Botchie and Ahadzie, 2004; NVTI, 2002). Nonetheless, the 
MoESS and the MoMYE remain the two dominant providers of TVET in Ghana. The MoMYE is 
more concerned than the MoESS with skills training programmes for the informal economy: e.g. 
ICCES (chap.6) and short-duration programmes like STEP (chap.7.1). 
 
In addition to public skills provision, there is a huge range of private for-profit and non-profit 
provision. There are over 450 private training institutions, many of them church-based VTIs with 
some 10,000 trainees (Botchie and Ahadzie, 2004; GoG, 2004b).192 Some of these, for example 
the Catholic Don Bosco training institutes in Tema/Ashiaman and Sunyani, are probably 
unequalled in quality anywhere in Ghana, and they have a history of training children from poorer 
families. International NGO provision is usually concerned with meeting the training needs of 
poorer children, while much private for-profit provision is beyond the means of poorer parents. 
 
Much of Ghana’s public (and, to a lesser degree, private) formal TVET system is characterised by 
low quality, obsolete equipment, outdated curricula and a lack of relationship with industry and 
employment (GoG, 2004i).193 Moreover, most public and private VTIs are largely out of reach of 
the poorest individuals (Chant and Jones, 2005). The formal TVET sector in Ghana, as in other 
developing countries, is largely orientated towards formal rather than informal employment (cf. 
World Bank, 2004a). 
 
Altogether there are approximately 50,000 students in different formal TVET institutions (public 
and private) nationwide at all these levels.194 Entry requirements for most of the institutes in the 
TVET system is a Basic Education Certificate (BECE) or Middle School Leaving Certificate 
(MSLC), and the training period is usually 3 years. Some, like ICCES, do not have any specific 
entry requirements and cater for both school dropouts and JSS leavers.  
                                                 
190 In 2000 enrolment in NVTIs stood at 3,700 (Botchie and Ahadzie, 2004). 
191 Acting ICCES Director, personal communication 28.07.06. 
192 Of these there are some 213 private TVET providers recognised and registered by the NVTI (GoG, 
2004b: Annex). 
193 Though there are obvious exceptions to this. For example the VOTEC centres (c.20) throughout Ghana 
are comparatively well resourced having received support from the Netherlands 1999-2003.  
194 Botchie and Ahadzie (2004) estimate the total enrolment in Ghana’s TVET system, excluding 
apprenticeships, to be 35,000. However, they under-report the number of students in the technical institutes 
at 4,500. In fact there are nearer 20,000. Correcting for this gives the approximation of 50,000 students. 
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Another type of skills delivery mechanism has been the short-duration modality. In the mid-1990s 
the GoG and the World Bank implemented the Vocational Skills and Informal Sector Support 
Project (VSP) which focused on skills upgrading for master-craftsmen and traditional apprentices 
(World Bank, 1995).195 More recently (2003-2005) a programme, originally termed the Skills 
Training Employment Placement (STEP)196 programme, offered 3-12 months of training to some 
27,000 youth with the intention that the STEP graduates would immediately enter self-
employment (chap.7.1). 
 
The 2005 Preliminary Education Sector Performance Report of the MoES acknowledged that the 
TVET sector has been neglected (GoG, 2005b: 71). This echoes an early comment from the 
President’s Education Reform Committee that skills development sector has been the object of 
“almost total neglect” (GoG, 2002: 230). Despite a 19% increase in public TVET enrolments 
(under MoESS), from 18,001 in 2001-2, to 21,424 in 2004-5 (GoG, 2005b: 72), the numbers that 
formal public TVET reaches are low when compared to the huge numbers of annual JSS 
graduates (c.300,000).197  
 
Government funding for TVET is low: in 2005 MoESS expenditure on TVET was only 1.2% of 
the total resource envelope for education (GoG, 2006b: 108); similarly in 2002 the MoMYE 
allocated 12% of its budget to the TVET sector under that Ministry (GoG, 2002: 12). In 2003, 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) funds were released to finance the STEP programme 
(chap.7.2).198 
 
Similarly, external development partner (DP) funding for TVET has never been extensive. For 
example, DP funding to TVET under the MoESS was only 0.2% in 2003, 2.3% in 2004, 0.9% in 
2005 and 1% in 2006 (GoG, 2004d: 109; GoG, 2005b: 95; GoG, 2006b: 107).199 
 
Nonetheless, there have been a number of DPs engaged in TVET-related programmes including: 
i) the World Bank VSP (1995-01) (World Bank, 1995); ii) the DFID NVTI Centres Support 
                                                 
195 For a summary see Palmer (2005a). 
196 Later renamed the ‘Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Programme’. 
197 The private VTIs only cater for about 10,000 trainees in total (Botchie and Ahadzie, 2004).  
198 Ghana has been a HIPC member since April 2001.  
199 One senior advisor from a bilateral DP in Ghana suspected that these figures for donor support to TVET 
would underestimate the real picture by ignoring the proportion of general budget support which goes into 
TVET (personal communication 23.08.05).  
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Project, 1996-1998, aimed to reorientate the NVTIs to be more self-employment focused (Honny, 
1999); iii) UNICEF support to establishing ICCES, 1987-1992; iv) JICA support in the 
development of a TVET policy framework (since 1997); other small-scale support to ICCES; and 
a new Technical Vocational Education and Training Support (TVETS) Project, planned to 
commence in 2006 (GoG, 2005e); v) German support to technical institutes, e.g. Takoradi 
Technical Institute, 1977-2005; vi) Netherlands support to 20 VOTEC Resource Centres (1999-
2003) and to the Ghana Industrial Skills Development Centre (GISDC) (2006); vii) IFAD’s Rural 
Enterprise Project (1995–ongoing) that aims to support MSEs (GoG/IFAD, 2000); viii) CIDA 
support to GRATIS (2000-2009) and to technical training institutes since the 1960s - to develop a 
secondary focus on providing short skills-upgrading courses for those already working in SMEs 
(King and McGrath, 2002a; Sawyerr, 1997); ix) Soviet Union support to technical institutes 
during the 1960s (Sawyerr, 1997); x) EU support (in 2005) to a small vocational training 
programme in the north; xi) NGO support to ICCES (1986-2006) and other VTIs. 
 
While this support may have improved the quality in individual training institutions it has not had 
an impact on the national TVET system – partly for the reason that support has targeted 
individual beneficiary institutions, that TVET provision is spread across numerous different 
ministries, and that there has been no overall skills development strategy.  
 
Currently DP support to TVET comes largely from JICA, GTZ and various NGOs, but there has 
not been one large scale project/programme underway, apart from JICA’s support to the TVET 
policy framework, since the World Bank gave support to the VSP. The Bank has no immediate 
intention of launching any new skills development projects after the unsuccessful nature of the 
VSP (1995-01).200 Indeed DPs in Ghana have tended to prioritise basic education above other 
sub-sectors, while the GoG has a more holistic view of the education sector (Ayamdoo et al., 
2006; Palmer, 2005c; King and McGrath, 2002a). 
 
Government intervention has been focused on pre-employment skills training and there has been 
very little attention paid to supporting traditional apprenticeships.201 But it is clear that the 
majority of skills training opportunities lie in the informal economy (chap.7.6), with “informal 
apprenticeship remain[ing] the only real option for a lot of young people for quite some time to 
                                                 
200 The VSP was “deemed unsatisfactory at the implementation completion reporting stage in terms of 
achieving its objectives” (World Bank Ghana education specialist, personal communication 18.11.04). 
201 But this is changing: there are plans underway to intervene in traditional apprenticeship training (see 
below). 
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come” (UNDP/ISSER, 2001: 12). However, the scale of the traditional apprenticeship system – 
while acknowledged as being responsible for the bulk of training for those in the informal sector, 
and as the largest private provider of skills – is clear but unknown. The chairman of the 2002 
Education Reform Committee, Anamuah-Mensah, commented that “no one in Ghana knows how 
many apprentices there are” (personal communication 29.07.06). 
 
An education reform, set to commence in 2007, as outlined in the White Paper on the Report of 
the Education Reform Review Committee (GoG, 2004a), proposes some quite radical changes to 
the education and training system in Ghana.202 Concerning skills development, the White Paper 
acknowledges that the vocationalisation of the JSS “has failed to… comprehensively equip[…] 
the youth… with directly employable skills for the world of work” (GoG, 2004a: 4).203 
Henceforth the JSS level will have a more general curriculum. Skills training will be emphasised 
more at the SSS level, which will be extended to four years (from three) and diversified into four 
streams: vocational, technical, agricultural and general education. Lastly, the White Paper notes 
that the government faces an “urgent need to restructure the current officially disengaged attitude 
towards… [those who drop out of primary and JSS and their] subsequent participation in the 
world of work” (GoG, 2004a: 13). Hence, the government intends to partner with the private 
sector to promote more formalised apprenticeship training programmes, with government 
assuming “full responsibility” (GoG, 2004a: 9) for the first year of the programme. The White 
Paper proposes further to support public and private training institutions, like ICCES and 
GRATIS, so that they can increase their enrolment capacity, and to constitute a National 
Apprentice Training Board to regulate and oversee apprenticeship training, including traditional 
apprenticeship.204 
 
The 2004 White Paper (GoG, 2004a), like the previous education reforms (chap.4),  is fueled by 
the assumption that something must have gone wrong with Ghana’s education and training 
system which has resulted in so many unemployed school graduates. Indeed Ghana’s Minister of 
Education and Sports made explicit the connection between the education reforms and 
unemployment. At a recent (21.04.06) meeting he reportedly: 
 
                                                 
202 See Palmer (2005c) on the new White Paper reforms. 
203 For more on vocationalised secondary education, see Lauglo and Maclean (2005). 
204 The other key element of the White Paper reform is the expansion of ‘basic education’ to include two 
years of KG, making the basic education cycle in Ghana 11 years long (2 years KG, 6 years primary and 3 
years JSS). 
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linked youth unemployment problems to lack of proper educational structure hence the 
need for educational reforms. He expressed concern about the lack of attention given to 
technical and vocational training and the number of secondary technical educational 
institutes available as compared to senior secondary schools and said more technical and 
vocational training were [sic] needed to reduce unemployment among the youth. (GNA, 
2006a) 
 
Related to this education reform (GoG, 2004a) is the 2004 TVET Policy (GoG, 2004i)205 which 
complements the White Paper to reform skills training in Ghana.206 Prior to this, there has been 
no comprehensive national TVET policy, and up to now “[a]ctivities and programmes are 
organized in isolation” (GoG, 2004i: 5). 
 
The GoG recognises the neglect of TVET course content and delivery (Preddey, 2005: 13), and 
the new TVET policy and the GPRS II are meant to address this situation. The GPRS II 
emphasises private sector employment creation and skills training as priority areas (GoG, 2005a). 
The new TVET policy in Ghana broadly defines TVET as taking place in both a formal education 
environment and a non-formal training environment:  
 
The formal TVET sub-system consists of institutions that provide classroom and 
workshop-based instruction. They follow written curricula and students take formal 
examinations for which certificates are awarded… Non-formal TVET covers the 
traditional apprenticeship system, on-the-job training and all those skills training 
activities that do not lead to formal certification. (GoG, 2004i: 3-4)  
 
The reformed TVET system will be demand-driven and competency-based in order to help close 
the currently huge gap between skill acquisition and the employment demands of the world of 
work. This is a huge task. Unlike the present curricula which stretch back to the ILO and to the 
Russian advisors, the new intention is that skill competencies and standards shall be “determined 
by industry groups rather than training providers” (GoG, 2004i: 18). It is also clear that this 
competency based approach is meant to extend to the traditional apprenticeship system. 
 
                                                 
205 The TVET Framework Document (August 2004) goes back to April 1997, when the consultation 
process began for reviewing and updating the TVET system of the country. It emerged from the World 
Bank’s VSP. The latest draft of this is August 2004. A slightly earlier version (January 2004) is more 
lengthy and contains more details on the thinking of the authors of the TVET policy framework. Both 
documents will be used in this section and referenced accordingly. 
206 The 2002 Anamuah-Mensah report, from which the 2004 White Paper was developed, agreed to adopt 
the TVET policy document in its 2002 draft form. Hence the White Paper and TVET Policy are 
complementary. 
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The TVET policy framework proposes to dramatically expand the formal TVET sector and to 
include the informal system as part of public provision. However, since budget allocation to the 
TVET sector is small, even doubling support to this level would only provide 2-3% of budget 
allocation to TVET in MoESS.  
 
This renewed focus on skill is being driven by three imperatives (cf. King, Korboe and Palmer, 
2006): the “democratic imperative” requires that education and training opportunities should be 
diversified to serve the needs of all sections of the population; the “poverty reduction imperative” 
suggests that in a country where the majority of the population survive on less than a dollar a day, 
“the challenge to reducing poverty can only be met through a wide-scale and continuous 
provision of relevant productive skills”; but the “economic imperative” makes it necessary in the 
context of globalisation, “to produce a highly skilled workforce to support industrialisation and 
make the country more competitive” (GoG 2004i: v, emphasis in the original). Hitherto, the 
challenge to link skill with poverty reduction has been secured by a series of ad hoc training 
schemes. With the TVET policy framework in place (COTVET, see below) the expectation is that 
a comprehensive demand-driven system can be established and financed. 
 
Specifically the TVET policy framework anticipates that “a massive intervention is necessary to 
modernise and improve productivity of the [informal] sector” (GoG, 2004i: 33). In relation to 
promoting productivity in the informal sector through TVET, the framework outlines the 
objectives that should be the focus of policy interventions (GoG, 2004i: 33): 
 
• Reform and strengthen the traditional apprenticeship system by introducing a 
competency-based training and assessment system; 
• Promote technological proficiency by training for skills to produce competitive items for 
the domestic and international markets; 
• Develop training systems and mechanisms to facilitate the articulation of the informal 
level and standards of skills acquisition with those of the formal TVET system. 
 
Other mechanisms for increasing productivity in the informal sector include: i) encouraging the 
formation of trade associations as a means of delivering training-related assistance to members; 
ii) integrate informal apprenticeship training into the proposed National Qualifications 
Framework (NQF); iii) integrate TVET into poverty alleviation; iv) provide guidelines for NGO 
activities in informal sector training (GoG, 2004i: 33-34). However, these mechanisms for 
increasing informal sector productivity appear to refer more to the informal manufacturing sector 
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and less to the informal retail sector. Indeed the TVET policy framework makes little mention of 
the latter.  
 
The TVET policy framework has a separate section on skills development for agriculture and 
outlines a number of mechanisms by which to improve agricultural productivity through TVET 
(GoG, 2004i 22-24). These include improving access to training,207 extension services208 and 
post-training support,209 especially for out-of-school youth and adult men and women (including 
disabled), and building capacity in agricultural research and technology. Emphasis is on short, 
intensive training programmes organised at the district level. 
 
As just mentioned, the TVET policy framework notes that a Ghanaian NQF is being planned to 
achieve the following objectives: “to bring all post-basic occupation-oriented qualifications into a 
unified qualification framework” (GoG, 2004i: 19); to facilitate access to further education and 
training for individuals in vocational and technical occupations; to promote and facilitate access 
to lifelong learning for all, especially operators in the informal sector; and to improve product and 
service quality by ensuring uniform standards of practice in the trades and professions (ibid.). 
However, it is unclear how the Ghanaian NQF will meet the skills needs of what McGrath calls 
very small and micro-enterprises (VSMEs). In South Africa, the NQF was not designed with the 
needs of VSMEs in mind and has largely failed to understand the skills needs of the sector 
(McGrath, 2005a). 
 
The inclusion of informal apprenticeship in the definition of TVET (GoG, 2004i: 3-4) is a 
positive step forward in acknowledging the importance of informal skills acquisition. However, 
the overall theme of the TVET policy framework - to formalise training in the informal economy 
- strikes right at the heart of the basic dilemma of informal sector policy. The ILO/JASPA studies 
back in the mid-1980s noted that “the [informal] sector is efficient because it is informal, but 
because of its informality it cannot be integrated into development plans” (ILO/JASPA, 1985: 
35).210 The ILO/JASPA report asserted that pro-informal sector policies “taken to [the]… 
extreme… involves the formalization of the informal sector” (ibid.). King further questions the 
formalisation of the informal economy, and comments that  
                                                 
207 Focused on production and post-production needs, as well as entrepreneurship and business 
management skills. 
208 The objective is to improve the agricultural extension officer-farmer ratio from 1:1,500 to 1:500. 
209 The priority areas are: i) facilitating access to land, tools, equipment, credit, and storage and 
preservation facilities; ii) provision of extension services; iii) facilitating access to markets. 
210 This basic dilemma of informal sector policy was noted earlier by Steele (1972). 
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if what is special and positive about the informal sector has been developed despite total 
neglect and even active discouragement by the state, then would it not be valuable for 
government to continue a hands-off approach? (King, 1996: 12) 
 
King (1996) goes on to note that “any attempt to ‘formalize the informal sector’ could well 
undermine its robust independence” (p.12).  
 
Nonetheless, both the President’s Committee Report and the White Paper pledged that 
“Government will assume full responsibility for the first year of all approved apprenticeship 
programmes” (GoG, 2004a: 13). The GoG is referring to the formalisation of the traditional 
apprenticeships system and payments that are expected to be made directly to masters to cover 
the cost of an apprentice’s first year of training. Surprisingly a figure of US$500 per apprentice is 
being discussed - an amount that is many times higher than the cost of the entire three years of the 
present traditional apprenticeship (chap.7.9.1). The director of technical and vocational education 
(GES) commented that: 
 
The amount of US$500 is a budget from the TVET sub-committee of the National 
Education Reform Implementation Committee as the proposed support to be offered to 
master craftsmen/women to meet the cost of training one apprentice per year. This 
proposal has not yet received approval. (personal communication (email) 01.08.06) 
 
It is highly unlikely that this US$500 will be approved; the overall costs would be immense.211 
Nonetheless, while the $500 figure will undoubtedly be reduced, a senior figure connected with 
the 2004 White Paper confirmed that the support of the first year of apprenticeship had the 
President’s blessing (personal communication 29.07.06). 
 
As the World Bank (2004a) notes, the danger of formalising training in the informal economy lies 
in the possibility of undermining the strengths and sustainability of training in this sector.  
 
In addition to these worries about the formalization of the traditional apprenticeship, there remain 
larger questions about how the government intends to fund the TVET elements as outlined in 
both the White Paper and the TVET policy framework. Indeed, it is feared by some DPs that the 
proposals in the new education reforms, especially the changes at the SSS level, combined with 
                                                 
211 If just 1000 apprentices were covered, the cost would be half a million dollars. Masters would 
undoubtedly celebrate this proposal and, what is more, it might lead to a huge surge in the numbers of 
people claiming to be master-craftspeople! 
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unexpected actual expansion of senior secondary and tertiary enrolments (since 2003), will be so 
costly that this will adversely impact on the funding for TVET (Palmer, 2005c). More 
worryingly, the current suggestions on how to fund the new TVET policy were all rejected by 
Ghana’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) with no alternative funding modalities suggested (GoG, 
2004i: Appendix A1).212 According to the local consultants who wrote the TVET policy, the MoF 
“appears to be indifferent and unsupportive… [and contains] pockets of covert resistance that 
would confront the implementation of the policy” (GoG, 2004i: Appendix A2). 
 
Another aspect of the TVET policy framework is the establishment of a Council for TVET 
(COTVET) which will coordinate and oversee all aspects of TVET (GoG, 2004i), across 
ministries and the broad spectrum of formal, informal and non-formal education and training. On 
27th July 2006 the COTVET Bill was passed (GoG, 2006a). Three committees are to be set up 
under COTVET which will undertake the functions of the council:  
 
1. National TVET Qualifications Committee – the main regulatory authority for the 
National Qualifications Framework.  
2. Training Quality Assurance Committee – ensures training providers and qualification 
awarding agencies maintain satisfactory standards in the delivery of training and the 
award of qualifications. 
3. Industry Training Advisory Committee – to develop National Occupational Standards or 
knowledge, skills and work performance standards for the definition and issuance of 
qualifications. 
 
Of relevance to our interest in skills and IME, the COTVET secretariat will include an Informal 
Sector Affairs Division which, among other things, is meant to: develop polices to strengthen the 
informal apprenticeship system; develop and strengthen links between informal sector TVET and 
the formal TVET system; develop training packages for the informal apprenticeship system; and, 
integrate reading, writing and numeracy skills into the informal apprenticeships (GoG, 2006e: 12-
13). 
 
                                                 
212 Proposals for funding TVET in the policy document included: increasing direct government budgetary 
allocation of TVET; allocating 10% of GETFund to TVET; District Assemblies to allocate a minimum of 
5% of total income to support skills training; and, setting up a Skills Development Fund where members 
would contribute 1% of pay roll to the SDF (GoG, 2004b). 
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But there remain some serious challenges to the successful functioning of COTVET. For 
example, as noted in the previous chapter, COTVET’s predecessor (NACVET) failed to develop 
a comprehensive skills policy for Ghana. Apart from the inter-ministerial rivalries that inhibited 
NACVET’s functioning it never had any legislative backing. It is hoped that COTVET, that does 
have legal backing, will be more effective. 
 
However, there remain real dangers related to inter-ministerial cooperation. Initially both the 
MoESS and the MoMYE were involved in COTVET. However, since the judicial process 
requires that only one ministry propose a Bill, the COTVET Bill was proposed to parliament by 
the MOESS. Meanwhile the MoMYE is disputing the idea that MOESS should control 
COTVET.213 The precise reasoning as to why MoESS appears to have gained control of 
COTVET is unknown, but might be to do with accessing funding for TVET from the 
GETFund.214 Under law only institutions under the MoESS can benefit from GETFund - those 
under other ministries (e.g. MoMYE) could not access it. With COTVET under MoESS 
therefore, TVET institutions can access the fund.215 
 
Of course COTVET is designed to be inter-ministerial, with representatives from the MoESS, 
MoMYE, MoTIPP and the Ministry of Environment sitting on the Council, itself chaired by 
someone with “considerable industrial experience” (GoG, 2006a: 4). However, as it was proposed 
to Parliament by the MoESS there is now a feeling that this Ministry might control its 
operations.216  
 
These inter-ministerial wranglings will be worsened by the fact that current TVET provision is 
deeply fragmented. Multiple (often conflicting) agendas and politics within each Ministry have 
the potential of de-railing COTVET, or at least making implementation difficult. Moreover, as 
noted above, the largest skills training modality is found outside of the Ministries altogether, in 
the enormous traditional apprenticeship system.  
 
                                                 
213 Senior NVTI official, personal communication 28.07.06. 
214 The Ghana education trust fund (GETFund) is funded by a 2.5% levy on goods and service tax and 
supplements educational funding in Ghana. 
215 Senior MoESS official, personal communication 28.07.06. 
216 To make matters worse, the technical and vocational education division of GES is mooting the idea of 
moving out of the MoESS building and moving to where the COTVET will be housed (senior MoESS 
official, personal communication 28.07.06). This is dangerous as it will further appear that COTVET is 
being run by the MoESS. 
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Outside the TVET policy proposals and the reach of the ministries a new development in Ghana’s 
skills development system is the GISDC, due to open in Tema in late 2006 (GISDC, 2006a). The 
GISDC, which operates independently of the MoESS and MoMYE, is a public-private initiative 
aimed at supplying demand-driven, industry-responsive training to partner industries in the Tema 
area.217 The first training session is due to start in January 2007 and GISDC will have the capacity 
to take up to 80 trainees at a time on short courses of about a week. Certification will be linked to 
the Scottish Qualification Authority and not to national bodies. The GISDC is firmly oriented to 
the formal sector of the economy, and not to the large number of petty producers in the informal 
sector. Those behind the GISDC initiative have a strong desire to keep the centre autonomous 
from the ministries; their reasoning is that “it is not easy to teach an elephant [the MoESS] a new 
thing” (personal communication 27.07.06). Indeed others see the GISDC as a response to the 
failure of the GoG to deliver TVET reform; one senior DP official commented that the GISDC 
initiative is “a sign of frustration on the side of the private sector that it has taken ten years [for 
the TVET policy] to go nowhere” (personal communication 22.07.06). 
 
5.1.1. Summary  
 
Since 2001 there has been a renewed government focus on skills development and its relationship 
with combating unemployment. This renewed focus has been reflected in both the GPRS I and 
GPRS II documents and has been driven by the democratic, poverty-reduction and economic 
imperatives. TVET, delivered through public and private schools, VTIs and traditional 
apprenticeships, continues to be seen as an important link to work. Between 2003-2005 the GoG 
funded short-duration skills training through STEP – a direct response to government concerns 
regarding unemployment.   
 
The 2004 education White Paper and the TVET Policy Framework have set a challenging agenda 
for skills reform in Ghana. Among other things, this involves developing an NQF, scrapping the 
vocationalisation of the JSS and, instead, diversifying the SSS level and formalising traditional 
apprenticeships. 
 
                                                 
217 While it is a public-private partnership, most of the ‘public’ money is foreign public money. The Dutch 
(through the EU) are contributing 200,000 euros; the British are contributing technical advice; the GoG is 
providing land; and the Ghanaian private sector is supplying funding (22 ‘partner’ industries have 
expressed interest so far and are meant to contribute 10,000 euros each. As of July 2006, 6/22 industries 
had paid this). 
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In 2006 skills development has been a priority concern to national policy-makers. In July the 
Council for TVET (COTVET) Bill, which has been almost 10 years in the making, was passed by 
Parliament. Its function is to coordinate TVET provision across the formal, informal and non-
formal arenas and to harmonize the skills strategies across multiple ministries. This claims it will 
develop a comprehensive demand-driven skills system for Ghana.   
 
Having briefly examined the current state of skills development policy in Ghana, this chapter now 
turns to an examination of policy and practice regarding IME and youth employment, 2001-2006. 
 
5.2. Informal micro-enterprise (IME), youth employment and the enabling 
environment: policy vision and practical realities 
 
Ghana is known for its well-developed informal economy (Haan and Serrière, 2002) and, as noted 
previously, informal employment and agricultural activities account for the majority (c.86-89%) 
of employment in Ghana (GSS, 2000; Heintz, 2004; Xaba et al., 2002). 
 
With approximately one million children of primary school age out of school (UNESCO, 2004), 
and with JSS to SSS transition rates of about 30% (GoG, 2003b), most schooled and un-schooled 
youth enter IME. A crucial issue, therefore, concerns GoG policy and practice vis-à-vis IMEs.  
 
Employment/self-employment creation is a priority for both growth and poverty reduction in 
Ghana (GoG, 2003a; 2005a). However, the government rationale is that before employment/self-
employment can be created, the population need skills and better education. Moreover, since 
budget constraints mean that the government cannot create formal employment for all, their 
primary role is twofold: providing education and skills training, and creating an enabling 
environment for private sector growth.  
 
Both the 2003-2005 GPRS I (GoG, 2003a) and the 2006-2009 GPRS II (GoG, 2005a) see the 
private sector, both formal and informal, as the main “engine of growth” and poverty reduction 
(GoG, 2003a: 30; GoG, 2005a: xxiii). The theme of the 2006 National Budget - Investing in 
People, Investing in Jobs (GoG, 2005c) also underlines the government’s focus on jobs. The 
private sector development strategy 2004-2008 (GoG, 2003c) outlines Ghana’s plans to achieve a 
“golden age of business” (p.4). The strategy underlines the importance of investing in the 
enabling environment for private sector growth and outlines policies concerning the macro-
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economic environment, financial sector reform, infrastructure development, public sector reform, 
contract enforcement/debt recovery and the land system and property rights. This concern with 
developing an enabling business environment cuts across both agricultural and non-agricultural 
business activities and is also emphasised in both the GPRS I and II documents (GoG, 2003a; 
GoG, 2005a). 
 
One of the main objectives of the GPRS II is to “achieve accelerated growth through modernised 
agriculture, led by a vibrant and competitive private sector” (GoG, 2005a: 29).218 It therefore sets 
out priority interventions to create a competitive agricultural private sector (GoG, 2005a: 31-35): 
• reform to land acquisition and property rights; 
• accelerating the provision of irrigation infrastructure; 
• enhancing access to credit and inputs for agriculture; 
• promoting selective crop development; 
• modernising livestock development; 
• improving access to mechanised agriculture; 
• increasing access to extension services; 
• provision of infrastructure for aquaculture; 
• restoration of degraded environment; 
• other policies to support agro-based industrial activities. 
 
These are all components of a dynamic agricultural environment which would better enable youth 
the utilise acquired skills. 
 
In addition, the GPRS II recognises the importance of “strategic support sectors” (GoG, 2005a: 
35-37) that would be developed to facilitate improved productivity in agriculture and agro-
industry including in the transportation, energy and science and technology sectors. 
 
According to the World Bank, Ghana’s business environment for formal private enterprise 
compares favourably to other countries in Africa and even to China (table 5.1), though important 
challenges still remain; Ghana was ranked 94 out of 175 countries. Five states in SSA ranked 
better than Ghana; South Africa (29), Namibia (42), Botswana (48), Swaziland (76) and Kenya 
                                                 
218 The renaming of the ‘GPRS’ acronym from the 2003 Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy, to the 2005 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy is a clear signal that there is a much more explicit focus on growth 
in the latest GPRS. 
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(83). However 32 states in SSA scored worse than Ghana; 14 of the 20 bottom countries were 
from SSA (World Bank, 2006a). 
 
 
While the business environment for formal enterprise is improving, the same is generally not the 
case for informal enterprise. Indeed as Heintz (2004) argues, there “is no guarantee that creating 
an “enabling environment” for the private sector in general will address the specific needs of 
small-scale, informal, or labour-intensive enterprises” (p.23). 
 
In practice, support to private sector growth is largely concentrated in the formal sector with 
informal enterprises receiving little support from government despite the fact that the informal 
economy makes up some 90% of employment activities in Ghana. Policy focus is very much on 
the education and training system as the solution to un-/under-employment and poverty 
Table 5.1. Doing business in Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, China and India 
(economy rankings out of 175 countries, April 2006) 
 
South Kenya Ghana Tanzania China India
Africa
Doing Business 29 83 94 142 93 134
Starting a Business 57 111 145 127 128 88
Dealing with Licenses 45 24 83 172 153 155
Employing Workers 87 68 120 143 78 112
Registering Property 69 115 113 157 21 110
Getting Credit 33 33 117 117 101 65
Protecting Investors 9 60 33 99 83 33
Paying Taxes 74 127 77 113 168 158
Trading Across Borders 67 145 61 67 38 139
Enforcing Contracts 43 67 50 65 63 173
Closing a Business 65 128 94 105 75 133  
Source: World Bank, 2006a 
 
The World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ database provides measures of business regulations and their 
enforcement, comparable across 175 economies. They indicate the regulatory costs of business and can be 
used to analyse specific regulations that enhance or constrain investment, productivity and growth. This data 
is able to provide some measure of what has been termed the ‘economic and labour market environment’, 
albeit only referring to the formal and urban sectors. The data is based on businesses operating in the formal 
sector of a country’s most populous city, especially small and medium sized firms. The data refers to 
businesses with up to 50 employees and a start-up capital of 10 times income per capita at the end of 2005. 
The findings, therefore, does not refer to the bulk of the private sector in many developing countries; those 
operating in micro-enterprises in the informal sector (in both urban and rural areas). See 
www.doingbusiness.org 
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reduction, without the concomitant creation of a supportive pro-poor decent and productive work 
environment, especially for the informal economy. 
 
Both the GPRS I and II documents have failed to deal adequately with IME. Heintz (2004: 9) 
comments that the GPRS I did “not adequately analyse the dynamics of the informal economy or 
present a well-orchestrated approach to poverty reduction for working people in informal 
employment”. The GPRS I discussed the informal economy only in relation to the more dynamic, 
growth-orientated, manufacturing and urban MSEs, and has less to say about the more 
subsistence-orientated, retail and rural MSEs. The latter are most likely to be micro-enterprises 
owned and operated by women. Both the GPRS I and GPRS II documents do, however, discuss 
the importance of agriculture and stress the need to modernise this sector, but have little to say 
about farm-nonfarm linkages, or about rural MSEs (ibid.).219 Furthermore the emphasis on 
growth in the GPRS II is likely to mean that the more subsistence-orientated, retail and rural 
MSEs might continue to receive little support in practice. 
 
Crucially the issue of occupational pluralism (chap.2), a widespread phenomenon in Ghana’s 
rural informal economy, is not recognised in either the GPRS I or GPRS II documents. This, as 
discussed later, has implications for skills training interventions in Ghana’s rural informal 
economy. 
 
Nonetheless, three developments show that the GoG is starting to focus more on the informal 
economy: the President’s Sessional Address to Parliament in February 2005 acknowledging the 
critical importance of the informal sector; the decision to establish a unit under MoTIPP which 
has responsibility for the informal sector; and a nationwide informal sector survey (2006-7). 
 
In February 2005, in his Sessional address to parliament (GoG, 2005d), President Kufuor made 
specific mention of the critical importance of the informal economy to the country’s economic 
development: 
 
The importance of this informal sector is in the fact that it encompasses a host of 
activities including agriculture, commerce, manufacturing, construction, music and 
                                                 
219 The GPRS I and II documents do note the importance of promoting agro-processing activities in rural 
areas. Indeed the development of the agricultural sector and accompanying agro-industries are highlighted 
in the GPRS II. Further, participatory poverty analysis conducted as part of the GPRS I noted that, among 
other things, improved access to education and promoting nonfarm employment were crucial to poverty 
reduction efforts (GoG, 2003a: 29). 
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entertainment. By far the majority of our national population is captured in this sector. It 
will therefore be appreciated that the successful reform of the sector should have a major 
and far reaching impact on the development of our society and economy. Indeed, Mr. 
Speaker, this is level where the turn-around of the economy must be pursued. (GoG, 
2005d: 9) 
 
He went on to stress the need to “to fashion out a plan to discover [sic] and incorporate this part 
of the private sector into the formal economy” (GoG, 2005d: 8). The stated intention of the 
government, therefore, is to formalise the informal sector. 
 
In mid-2005 the MoTIPP was tasked with the responsibility for organising informal sector 
intervention, and in July a Business Development Services Unit (BDSU) was established under 
MoTIPP with “a mandate to develop an action plan for Ghana’s informal sector in collaboration 
with stakeholders already working in the sector” (GoG, 2006d: 1). This would involve facilitating 
access to BDS; training, mentoring and various capacity building programs, as well as access to 
savings and credit (GoG, 2006d). The BDSU has interpreted the President’s wish to formalise the 
informal sector as meaning more than just moving the informal sector into the formal sector, “but 
also to ensure that the informal sector is aware of the opportunities and resources within the 
formal economy… and to ensure that the informal sector is regularized in terms of social 
protection… and the legal framework” (GoG, 2006d: 1). 
 
Furthermore, during 2006/7 the GoG is undertaking a nationwide informal sector survey to 
understand the characteristics, type, and needs of IME (by region). The objectives are to: 
 
• assess the nature and scale of the informal economy by identifying/estimating the size, 
causes, constraints and performance; 
• feed into the development of a national informal sector policy; 
• identify various informal sector groupings as well as individual business operators in 
each region, and prioritise business support services interventions including training, 
mentoring and various capacity building programmes as well as access to credit. (GoG, 
2006d: 2) 
 
Interestingly, in the light of our earlier discussion (chap.2.2.2), in the President’s Sessional 
address, above, he includes agriculture as part of the informal sector. However, the  terms of 
reference for the informal sector survey that will inform the drafting of the strategy reverts to the 
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more traditional view of the informal sector, noting that “all those self-employed outside 
agriculture will be covered, including retail (petty) trade” (GoG, 2006d, emphasis added). 
 
DP support to informal MSE has not been significant since 2001, but a new Word Bank project, 
the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Project (2006-2011) (US$45million) has the 
objective of enhancing the competitive and employment levels of Ghanaian MSMEs (World 
Bank, 2005c). It comprises three mutually reinforcing components: 
• Access to Finance – it aims to significantly improve MSME access to finance; 
• Access to Markets, Trade Facilitation and Entrepreneurship Development – it aims to 
reduce operational, technical and regulatory barriers to markets; 
• Business Environment – support to the GoG Private Sector Development Strategy. 
 
As noted above, with regard to the promotion of private sector development, the GoG has been 
very concerned with the development of an enabling environment and with providing skills and 
education, particularly to the youth. And, while acknowledging that it cannot create employment 
for all, a new employment programme, the National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP), is 
being implemented by the government in 2006 which is expected to ease the general 
unemployment situation in the country by creating over 150,000 jobs in the first year (GNA, 
2006c; GoG, 2006c: 10). 
 
The Ghana Youth Job Corps Programme, otherwise known as the NYEP, is located in the 
MoMYE and arose out of concerns with security, poverty and economic under-development.220 
Its origins are to be found in the registration of one million unemployed persons in 2001, the 
STEP programme (2003-2005), and the declaration on employment and poverty alleviation in 
Africa (African Union, 2004) made by African Union heads of state concerning measures to stem 
unemployment, especially among the youth. 
 
The NYEP, which was officially launched in October 2006, was initiated on a Presidential 
directive and has a budget of some 1.1 trillion cedis (US$105 million).221 The President’s 
foreword to the Youth Employment Implementation Guidelines (GoG, 2006c) notes that while the 
“introduction of the Technical, Vocation [sic] and Education Testing [sic] Policy (TVET) will 
help to sharpen the technical and vocational skills of our young men and women and make them 
                                                 
220 NYEP Director, personal communication 01.08.06. 
221 See footnote 220. 
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more competitive… we also desire that they be placed in employment opportunities that are 
productive and rewarding” (GoG, 2006c: iii). While this is an incorrect reference to the TVET 
policy framework (chap.5.1), the President is at least indicating the need to link skills training 
with job creation. 
 
The NYEP is made up of ten-modules covering plans for youth job creation across a wide 
spectrum of economic activities – from Youth-In-Trades and Vocations, to Youth-In-Agri-
Business and Youth-In-ICT.222 The strategy is to set up national, regional and district-level 
employment task forces to implement the NYEP. The district employment task forces are charged 
with identifying potential employment promotion areas and then implementing one or more of the 
NYEP modules. 
 
The NYEP plans to pay the beneficiaries of all these modules a weekly stipend, averaging 
¢50,000 (US$5.5). Those engaging in self-employment activities will be given assistance to 
purchase inputs, the amount dependent on the trade area.223 The National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) premiums of beneficiaries would also be paid by the NYEP. However, all of 
these payments to beneficiaries are expected to be paid back to the NYEP once the beneficiaries 
are settled into employment (GoG, 2006c: 17-22). 
 
The NYEP is intended to be phase one of a two-phase approach to tackling unemployment issues 
in Ghana; it is initially meant to last about three years and then be phased into a National 
Employment Policy, Strategy and Action Plan which is meant to “create a sustainable 
environment for employment generation in the long term” (ibid.: 49).  
 
It is admitted in the introduction of the Youth Employment Implementation Guidelines by the then 
Minister for the MoMYE that many well-intentioned initiatives in Ghana have not prospered due 
to implementation difficulties, and lack of “very clear and user-friendly guidelines” (GoG, 2006c: 
v). It is also admitted that it would have been preferable to have had a national stakeholders’ 
summit from which an employment policy and strategy could have emerged, but the sheer 
urgency of the youth unemployment situation suggested that some immediate action was required 
                                                 
222 Other modules include: Community protection system; waste and sanitation management corps; rural 
education teachers assistants; auxiliary health care workers assistants; paid internships and industrial 
attachments; vacation jobs; and volunteer services (GoG, 2006c).  
223 The Youth Employment Implementation Guidelines also contains a series of specimen forms on which 
credit applications and disbursements could be filled in by groups of young people. 
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(GoG, 2006c: 2). It is also likely that the government, mindful of the 2008 elections, did not want 
to postpone such a programme given that (youth) unemployment is such a politicised topic and 
that the current NPP government came to power in 2001 with pledges of job creation. 
 
Indeed the NYEP, like the STEP (chap.7.1), appears to be a highly politicised programme. Not 
only was it initiated on a Presidential directive, but the District Chief Executives (DCEs) have 
been made directly responsible for the successful implementation of the NYEP. The NYEP 
guidelines state that the DCEs’ “effectiveness as agents of the Presidency at the district level… 
would be measured by their ability to generate the required number of jobs and self-employment 
opportunities for the youth” (GoG, 2006c: 6-7). The NYEP director went as far as to comment 
that the “DCEs [will] be held accountable if [the] NYEP fails” (personal communication 
01.08.06).  
 
The Senior Minister, Mr Mensah, was reported by the Daily Graphic as saying that the NYEP 
carried the risk of maladministration, welfare dependency and eventual unsustainability. 
Furthermore that the country’s economic advisors never liked the initiative, especially its donor 
partners, but that “the consequences of the alternative of inaction on youth unemployment are 




The creation of an enabling environment for private sector development (PSD) has been flagged-
up in the GPRS I and II documents and the government’s 2004-2008 PSD strategy. Since 2001 
improvements have been made in the formal business environment and, compared to other 
countries in SSA, Ghana has come off well in the World Bank’s Doing Business survey (though 
is still halfway down the overall league table). However, there has not been a similar change in 
the enabling environment for informal enterprise and neither the GPRS I or II dealt adequately 
with this issue. This being said, in 2005 President Kufuor highlighted the critical importance of 
the informal sector and, since then, the MoTIPP has been tasked with the responsibility of 
organising an informal sector policy.    
 
2006 has been an important year for informal sector and employment issues more generally: the 
country’s first nationwide informal sector survey is currently being undertaken, and the National 
Youth Employment Programme (NYEP) has been launched. The NYEP has added a third 
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dimension to the government’s job creation strategy. While the provision of skills and education 
alongside the development of an enabling environment for PSD are still foremost among policy 
objectives, the GoG is also intending to create formal and informal jobs for 150,000 over the next 
year. Like the STEP before it, the NYEP also appears to be highly politicized.    
 
Having examined the policy and practice related to skills and employment up to 2006, the next 
section examines the current state of the transformative context that enables or disables skills 
acquired being put to use. 
 
5.3. From skills acquisition to skills utilisation: enabling and disabling contexts in 
Ghana’s informal labour market 
 
Chapter 3 outlined a number of components that make up the enabling environment for MSEs. 
This section will examine these components in the Ghanaian context. 
 
Working might be the clearest pathway out of poverty for the poor, but the type of work that 
people have is critical (cf. Fluitman, 2005). Most of those working in Ghana’s IME economy do 
not work under ‘decent’ conditions and many are struggling to move from subsistence to growth. 
In the context of this thesis, it is crucial to examine the context into which skills training 
programmes are graduating their trainees. To what extent is the enterprise infrastructure around 
the informal economy enabling or disabling to development outcomes materialising from skills 
training? This section will briefly examine a series of critical environments that those entering the 
IME economy face. It will be recalled that we looked briefly at all of these in Chapter three for 
their relevance across the whole of SSA. These include the: 
• economic environment; 
• infrastructural environment; 
• legal and regulatory environment; 
• policy and institutional environment;  
• social environment (networks and associations); 





5.3.1. The economic environment  
 
Approximately 90% of all employment is in the IME economy (including farm and nonfarm 
enterprises), while formal employment is stagnating (Teal, 2001). Between 1992 and 1999, the 
percentage of Ghana’s population classified as poor reduced from 52% to 40% (GoG, 2003a: 15). 
However, poverty is still pervasive and these averages mask regional and occupational disparities. 
Poverty is largely a rural phenomenon, with rural poverty running three times as high as urban 
poverty (Canagarajah and Pörtner, 2003: 61). This rural nature of poverty suggests that poverty is 
concentrated in the informal economy (which includes agriculture) (GoG, 2003a: 28). Among 
occupational groups, non-export food-crop farmers and the nonfarm self-employed are still most 
at risk (GoG, 2003a). The slow growth of formal employment opportunities (resulting in a slow 
growth in the number of people with reliable salaries), combined with the rural nature of poverty, 
mean that the IME economy, especially in rural areas, operates as an income-constrained market, 
and people’s buying power is weak overall. This has the double effect of restricting overall 
demand for products and services and reducing the demand for training (chap.3.2.1). 
 
The importation of cheap foreign manufactures into Ghana, mainly from China, is suppressing 
demand for certain traditional trades and appears to be leading to problems for some IMEs (e.g. 
kente-weaving, dressmaking, sandal/shoe-makers).   
 
Price increases for petroleum products have been dramatic.224 For example, gasoline (per gallon) 
tripled in price 2001-2006 from ¢10,500/US$1.5 (February 2001) to ¢20,000/US$2.5 (January 
2003) to ¢36,000/US$4 (September, 2006). This has impacted both directly on IMEs through 
increased transportation costs and hence increased input costs, and indirectly through higher 
living costs (e.g. everything moved by road has increased in price).  
 
5.3.2. The infrastructural environment  
 
Informal economic activities are constrained by the inadequate infrastructural environment: low 
access to piped water and sewage systems; unreliable/unavailable mains electricity; low quality 
hospitals/clinics; restricted access to markets, extension and financial services and education and 
training facilities; unmaintained transport infrastructure and unreliable telecommunications 
                                                 
224 This has been the result of the GoG removing subsidies on the Tema Oil Refinery.   
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(Arthur, 2006; Heintz, 2004). For example, the lack of electricity in an area means that 
hairdressers cannot use electric dryers and hence will lose those customers who need to have their 
hair dried before travelling back to their village (fieldwork, 2005).     
 
While the rail infrastructure remains in a state of disrepair, a series of feeder-road projects have 
been improving the rural road networks and the main Accra-Bolga highway is being widened and 
re-surfaced (though at a slow pace). On the telecommunications front, while fixed-line services 
have remained unreliable the massive growth in mobile phone use since 2001 has revolutionised 
telecommunications, even in rural areas (and also created job opportunities for space-to-space 
wireless telephone enterprises).225 The growth of internet-cafés has also been rapid since 2001, 
though connectivity remains slow in most places and cafés are limited to larger settlements.226 
 
The GoG has also started to intervene in the health and social security environment that are meant 
to improve conditions for those in the IME economy. In 2003 a National Health Insurance Bill 
(GoG, 2003d) was passed which introduced, among other things, a NHIS open to those in the 
informal sector. The previous system, known locally as cash-and-carry, involved patients being 
charged immediately before or after treatment; for those in informal activities it was particularly 
difficult to find sufficient money for treatment. The new NHIS (GoG, 2004k) allows individuals 
to make annual contributions into a national health fund. Those in formal employment have 2.5% 
of their social security contribution used as their NHIS contribution. Informal sector workers pay 
an annual contribution according to their social grouping.227     
 
In 2005 the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)228 introduced an informal 
sector pilot scheme project which is meant to facilitate access to social insurance for these 
workers. By the end of 2005 the scheme had registered 6,577 people (against a target of 11,536) 
who had contributed ¢1.05 billion (US$100,000) to the scheme.229 However, the number of 
informal workers involved in this scheme remains tiny compared to the total number of those in 
informal employment. 
                                                 
225 See chap.2.2.2. 
226 Information in this paragraph from fieldwork (2001-5). 
227 The NHIS document (GoG, 2004k) identifies six groupings; core poor, very poor, poor, middle income, 
rich and very rich. The core poor (disabled, elderly) receive free treatment; the very poor and poor have to 
pay ¢72,000 (US$8) a year. 
228 The SNNIT aims to provide income replacement schemes to Ghanaian workers and their dependants in 
the event of old age, permanent disability, or death. 
229 www.ssnit.com 
 180 
5.3.3. The legal and regulatory environment  
 
In Ghana, a key constraint to informal economic activity (and the private sector as a whole) 
remains the lack of rights over land and commercial assets (GoG, 2003a: 123; GoG, 2005a). 
While many assets in the informal sector remain dead capital (De Soto, 2001) it is nonetheless 
possible to informally use some assets, such as the practice of mortgaging cocoa farms to other 
community members (see Austin, 2005). The difficulty of using assets as legal collateral means 
that social collateral becomes more important (i.e. the ability to access finance through social 
relations).   
 
Rising levels of income tax among informal MSEs and utility tariffs, which have increased 300% 
since 2001, further disable enterprise activity (Arthur, 2006; fieldwork, 2005).  
 
Constraints arise from the often contradictory nature of District Assembly and central government 
policy, in relation to tax collection, harassment and official procedures concerning MSE 
registration and start-up (Palmer, 2004b). Further, standards (e.g. health and safety issues) and 
social protection230 that exist largely ignore the informal economy, especially in rural areas. 
 
The 1998 Children’s Act (GoG, 1998) outlines the legislative framework for work for those up to 
18 years.231 The 2003 Labour Act (651) outlines the legislative environment for labour in Ghana 
(replacing the 1965 and 1967 Acts).232 The new Labour Act amends, consolidates, and extends 
the laws relating to labour, including the role of employment centres (GoG, 2003e). Enforcing 
these new laws, however, remains a problem. 
 
5.3.4. The policy and institutional environment  
 
While acknowledging the importance of the informal economy, the GPRS I (GoG, 2003a) did not 
fully cover this issue - having no clear coherent informal economy strategy. Nor was there 
sufficient attention in the GPRS I on promoting ‘decent work’ in Ghana’s informal economy. 
Government policy towards the informal economy has been neglectful at best, and disabling at 
                                                 
230 But note above the informal sector pilot scheme of the SSNIT. 
231 Chap.4, figs.4.2, 4.3. 
232 Chap.4, fig.4.3. 
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worst, but it is hoped that a new informal sector survey (GoG, 2006d) will help to overcome the 
lack of focus of policies concerned with MSEs recognised in the GPRS II (GoG, 2005a). 
 
In Ghana, there has traditionally been no one ministry that has overall responsibility for the 
coordination of activities in the informal economy. Instead a number of ministries have 
programmes related to the informal economy but the lack of coordination between them serves to 
inhibit a coherent strategy from emerging.233 Coordination between the two key ministries 
concerned with education, skills development and employment, the MoESS and the MoMYE is 
weak.234 Similarly, there is a lack of coordination between government ministries on the one 
hand, and the private and non-governmental/ civil society sector on the other.  
 
One of the findings of the VSP evaluation (Korboe, 2001a) was the relationship between key 
government and non-government institutions concerned with skills training and employment 
start-up was disjointed. This resulted in trained VSP graduates lacking access to an integrated 
package of services (credit, extension services, post-training support, vulnerability and social 
protection).  
 
Realising employment objectives involves coordination across Ministries, Departments and 
Agencies (MDAs); the evident lack of coordination between these groups can hinder the 
realisation of employment policies (Heintz, 2004: 23). 
 
That the institutional linkages are weak between agencies promoting skills training and those 
promoting employment should be a key concern in the development of an informal sector 
strategy, and it is hoped that Ghana’s current informal sector survey will cover some of these key 
issues. 
 
The quality of skills training programmes meant to support IME activity like ICCES and STEP 
suffer limitations which further disables training outcomes. Moreover, the gender dimension of 
                                                 
233 As noted, in mid 2005 the MoTIPP were tasked with the responsibility for organising informal sector 
support services.  
234 For example, at a policy dialogue discussion in March 2005 on ‘poverty reduction and wealth creation in 
the informal economy’ in Ghana, organised by the ILO and the MoMYE in Accra, there was not one 
representative of the MoESS. At a workshop in Edinburgh, in May 2005, the Chief Director of the MoES 
confirmed that coordination between his ministry and the MoMYE could be improved. As a further 
example, the NYEP Youth employment implementation guidelines (MoMYE), noted earlier in this chapter, 
had never been seen by the Director of technical and vocational education in GES (MoESS) (personal 
communication 28.07.06) until after it was finalized. 
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skills training means that young women are often restricted to certain, usually less profitable, 
trades due to socio-cultural restrictions. 
 
But it is not simply a matter of poor coordination; the effectiveness and capacity of:  
 
many government bodies – including MDAs at the national level and district assemblies 
at the local level falls below what is required to fully implement the policies. Even the 
most well-developed employment strategies will fail if the capacity to implement them 
has not been developed. (Heintz, 2004: 11) 
 
Both the financial and non-financial government programmes for MSEs in Ghana are weak, with 
women disproportionately disadvantaged in this respect. None of the main schemes of the last 10-
15 years (FUSMED, PAMSCAD, NBSSI or EMPRETEC)235 “seem to be of any benefit to rural 
micro-enterprises, and instead tend to be aimed at the upper-tier of the informal economy or 
MSEs in the formal sector” (Palmer, 2004b: 20). For example, part of the function of the NBSSI 
is to serve as a government supported credit intermediation agency and, as such, it manages the 
small credit component of the PAMSCAD (ibid.: 18-19). However, there appear to be three 
fundamental problems with PAMSCAD that makes it of limited use particularly for rural IMES. 
These include: a) limited coverage and urban bias;236 b) small loan amount and required equity 
contribution that excludes the poorest; c) the timing of loan delivery and repayment schedules is 
bad (ibid.). Further, the NBSSI needs reforming so that it functions as a facilitator agency rather 
than as a service provider agency as is the case now.  
 
Part of the reason for weak support systems for the IME sector and poor government planning 
regarding an effective employment strategy is to do with the lack of government information on 





                                                 
235 FUSMED: Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise Development; PAMSCAD: Programme of Action to 
Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment; EMPRETEC is a UNCTAD programme that promotes SME 
development. See Palmer (2004b: sections 2.5-2.6). 
236 For example, in the 2004 GPRS Annual Progress Report it was noted that during the year the NBSSI 
had succeeded in: incorporating 400 businesses into the formal sector, facilitating the establishment of 120 
new businesses, and granting loans totalling ¢210 million to 378 entrepreneurs (GoG, 2004c: 74). These are 
very small numbers compared to the size of the IME sector. 
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5.3.5. The social environment (politics, networks, associations and gender)  
 
The peaceful conduct of the elections in 2000 and 2004 and the smooth transition between the 
NDC and NPP in 2001 were significant developments and helped to maintain a stable enterprise 
environment. 
 
Those in the IME sector suffer from a lack of representation in the policy process and “have no 
presence in the corridors of decision-making and power” (Adu-Amankwah, n.d: 9). Informal 
sector associations (ISAs) are not providing MSEs in Ghana with a sufficient voice in the policy 
process. ISAs in Ghana were set up to act as intermediaries between member enterprises and the 
government/ other supporting bodies, though the establishment of many well-known ISAs had 
more to do with politics than self-help. For example, many of the well-known ISAs (e.g. 
Dressmakers and tailors association, Ghana national association of garages) did not originally 
emerge from within the informal economy; rather the Rawlings military government sponsored 
the formation and registration of over 30 ISAs supposedly to serve the interest of their members 
but in fact with definite political functions in mind (ie. creating groups that would help legitimise 
PNDC actions) (Ninsin, 1999). In spite of this highly politicised past, ISAs can impart certain 
benefits to members, including: welfare; bulk-buying materials to offer members cheaper inputs; 
intermediating in loan applications; regulating traditional apprenticeships (e.g. offering trade 
association certificates/ the opportunity to register for nationally recognised trade tests); 
coordinating skills upgrading through formal training centres; and facilitating the development of 
a new entrepreneur’s enterprise and institutional networks. Nonetheless it is not unusual for 
members to express dissatisfaction with their associations which many see as being primarily a 
vehicle to facilitate the collection of taxes. Indeed many ISAs are not sufficiently capable or 
competent to make the voice of their members heard. Korboe (2001b: 25) in an evaluation study 
for the VSP, argued that “most of the [informal sector] associations identified by the study team 
only exist in name and are not functioning as mobilisers of the local artisan corps.” It is 
important, therefore, to question whether ISAs are able to communicate good practice of existing 
informal providers to government – which would help in the development of an informal sector 
strategy - other than the services they organise. It should be remembered too that many informal 
MSEs are not members of any registered ISA.  
 
Aside from the organised/registered ISAs, communities all across Ghana have their own informal 
associations (e.g. for health, funerals, marriage, savings, self-help) which serve to directly or 
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indirectly support informal MSEs (Palmer, 2004a, b). Familial, community and ethnic support 
and connections can be crucial in entering IME in the Ghanaian context. This might relate to 
obtaining finance (see below) or access to certain trades. For example social barriers to start-up 
may run along ethnic lines: Hart (1973) noted the existence of ethnic group concentrations that 
“act as informal rings inhibiting entry into certain commodity trades” (p.73). In the 1970s the 
whole of the meat (cattle) distribution (from cattle trading to butchering) was dominated by the 
Islamic Hausa community and non-Muslims had problems accessing this economic area (ibid.).237  
 
Women have traditionally been disadvantaged vis-à-vis access to most elements of the 
infrastructural environment (above) (Ahadzie and Apt, 2002).  
 
Moreover among the Akan, matrilineality has traditionally meant that inheritance has passed from 
a husband to his sister’s son – and not directly to a man’s own children or wife. This has, not 
infrequently, resulted in women and children being ejected from their house, farm and other 
enterprise on the death of the husband. While the 1985 Intestate Succession Law (PNDC Law 
111) was meant to give a larger share of the estate to the spouse and children of the deceased, the 
implementation of the provisions of the law continuous to face stiff resistance in some areas. 
Nonetheless, the practice of matrilineal inheritance is weakening and more and more husbands 
are passing the lion’s share of their inheritance to their own wife and children (fieldwork, 2001-
5). 
 
5.3.6. The post-training environment  
 
After receiving skills, either through pre-employment or on-the-job means, youth are frequently 
faced with the absence of post-training support, especially in rural areas. This is obviously 
connected to the disabling institutional environment outlined above.  
 
Access to formal credit, especially in rural areas, is difficult in Ghana – as it is in most of SSA 
(chap.3.2.5). Nonetheless, the introduction of mobile bankers in some rural districts appears to be 
facilitating easier access to formal savings (and formal credit to a lesser extent) (Palmer, 
2004b).238 However, most new start-ups still rely heavily on their own savings. Research in rural 
                                                 
237 See Palmer (2004a: section 3.25). 
238 Mobile bankers offer daily door-to-door financial services and are modelled on the traditional door-to-
door money collectors (Palmer, 2004b).  
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Ghana (2003-2005) showed that between 56-77% of start-up finance came from personal savings 
(Palmer, 2004b; 2005 fieldwork, chap.8.2). The differential cost of basic equipment has 
implications for the ease of access into certain trades. For example, in 2006 the cost of purchasing 
basic equipment needed to start-up in carpentry (carpenter’s bench, marking gage, ratchet brace, 
saws, planes, hammer, chisels, pinch bar) was ¢700,000 (US$70), while in dressmaking (table, 
sewing machine, scissors, machine oil, thread, thimble, needles, button machine, tape measure, 
hangers, material) the cost was higher: ¢900,000 (US$90). In fact the cost of starting a 
dressmaking enterprise is much higher since they also need to acquire a workplace – unlike 
carpenters who can set up their bench under a shady tree. Another difference is that it is much 
easier for a new carpenter to start small and to purchase items along the way than it is for a new 
dressmaker to do the same: the most expensive of these start-up items for a new carpenter is the 
bench (US$25) compared to the dressmaker’s sewing machine (US$50) without which a new 
dressmaker can do very little.239 Similarly, new hairdressers have a similar need for a kiosk to 
work from rather than working from a temporary location. For both hairdressers and dressmakers 
it is harder to get apprentices if they are not working from a kiosk. 
 
In addition to problems associated with formal credit, formal savings and insurance programmes 
are difficult to access by young, often poor, individuals in the rural informal economy.  
 
Provision of non-financial BDS in rural Ghana is weak. Since 2003, however, the NBSSI has 
opened Business Advisory Centres (BACs) in 102 out of the 138 district capitals to provide 
business advice to MSEs. These BACs rely on enterprise owners coming to the office in the 
district capital instead of the advisors visiting the MSEs. This is likely to inhibit their 
effectiveness. Nonetheless there exist innovative possibilities to extend BDS to rural clients. For 
example, the GoG could encourage the development of mobile bankers (noted above) by funding 
training of these mobile bankers who could then deliver door-to-door BDS to IMEs. Having 
mobile bankers/business advisors would greatly increase outreach and is preferable to having 
static advisors in an office, inaccessible to the entrepreneurs that need the advice (Palmer, 2004b).  
 
Especially in rural areas, agricultural education, extension and training services are largely 
ineffective (GoG, 2004b). This contributes to a general lack of access to technology in the rural 
informal economy which further disables education and skills outcomes. 
 
                                                 
239 Interview with carpenter and dressmaker, 16.07.06. 
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The TVET policy framework for Ghana makes it explicit that training for agriculture is not 
sufficient alone to raise productivity. As noted above, following agricultural training other 
interventions are envisaged including facilitating access to land, tools, equipment, credit, 
extension services and markets (GoG, 2005a: 31-35). 
 
But, the TVET framework is not so explicit with regard to the type of post-training needs for 
those trained in more traditional nonfarm trades, saying only that there should be some allowance 
made for “post-training support” (GoG, 2004i: 34) for trainees by integrating TVET with poverty 
alleviation programmes. 
 
5.3.7. Summary  
 
Since 2001 there have been some general improvements in the enabling environment for IMEs, 
notably in transportation and mobile telecommunications infrastructure and in the extension of 
national health and social security insurance to informal sector workers. Politically there appears 
to be more support for PSD than there was during Rawlings’ time. 
 
However, in general the environment remains disabling. Income tax and utility costs have 
increased significantly, and agencies concerned with delivering financial and non-financial BDS 
to IMEs have failed to make significant changes to their operation: access to formal finance, for 
example, remains out of reach for most. 
 
For the many thousands of youth graduating from skills training schemes, formal post-training 
support still remains fragmented and inaccessible. Most entrants into the IME sector, therefore, 
continue to rely on family and other informal networks to assist them in the process of securing 




2006 has been an important year both for skills development (with the establishment of 
COTVET) and for employment issues (with an informal sector strategy under development and 
the launching of the NYEP). 
 
 187 
This chapter has examined the current state of, and trends in, both skills development and IME 
policy and practice in Ghana, 2001-2006. Over this period the tendency for policy makers and 
politicians in Ghana to link TVET reform to combating unemployment, as noted in chapter 4, 
remains very strong. While there have been improvements in the formal enterprise environment, 
similar changes have not been occurring in the IME environment.      
 
The interaction of politics with policy (both formation and implementation) has been all too clear 
between 2001-2006. The political proclamations of the NPP concerning job creation and election 
attempts to reach out to the youth resulted in the highly politicised STEP programme (chap.7.1), 
the education White Paper and more recently the NYEP.  
 
The NPP’s first term of office (2001-2004) did not bring about the kind of visible ‘positive 
change’ that much of the population expected. Now, mid-way through its second term, the NPP 
faces significant pressure to noticeably improve living standards and to follow-through on job 
creation pledges or else risk losing the 2008 elections. The effect such political pressure will have 
on policy formation and implementation is perhaps already being seen: the launching of the 
NYEP – with claims that it will create 150,000 jobs in the first year - may be one such 
manifestation of emerging populist policies.  
 
The following three chapters, drawing on fieldwork between 2004 and 2006, mark a transition 
point from policy history and policy analysis to the realities of skills acquisition in rural areas. 
The focus of these chapters will be on the last ‘T’ of TVET – training.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 examine three types of skills training modality in more depth. Chapter 6 looks at 
skills training at ICCES: this programme, set up in the late 1980s, delivers three-year training 
courses in formal training centres but has the objective of preparing youth for self-employment in 
the informal sector. Chapter 7 then looks at enterprise-based training in traditional 
apprenticeships as well as the STEP, an example of short-duration training for immediate 
employment creation. Both the ICCES and STEP schemes are unusual in SSA - where skills 
training programmes directed at IME “hardly exist” (Haan, 2006: xxvi) – and hold the potential to 
break away from the traditional delivery of skills for wage-sector jobs. These two chapters 
provide more detail on the operationalisation of the skills agenda just discussed. Chapter 8 then 
examines the pathways to IME self-employment through retrospective interviews. 
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Chapter 6: Institution-Based Pre-Employment Skills Training in Ghana at the 
Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills (ICCES): The Training 




Typically, training for self-employment is offered outside formal training systems. (King, 
1997: 9) 
 
There are very few examples of explicit links between the formal education system and 
the informal sector. (McGrath et al., 1995: 73) 
 
As these two quotations above underline, training for self-employment – especially in the 
informal sector - usually does not occur in formal institutions. Moreover, where attempts have 
been made, this reorientation has proved difficult (Grierson and Mackenzie, 1996). It is 
interesting, therefore, to examine a further attempt at this from Ghana – the Integrated 
Community Centres for Employable Skills (ICCES). ICCES is an example of pre-employment 
long-term skills training that has the principal objective of promoting self-employment, and that 
provides training within a formal skills training environment. The analysis and information in this 
chapter has benefited immeasurably from the close contact I have had with the ICCES 
organisation since January 2001.240   
 
ICCES has been mentioned in a number of agency or policy-orientated documents. However, in 
most cases, this is limited to a few lines (e.g. Aryeetey et al., 2005; World Bank, 2005b), a short 
section (e.g. Haan and Serrière, 2002; UNESCO, 2003) or is based on information that dates back 
to the early 1990s (e.g. Boeh-Ocansey, 1995). However, there have been a few field reports 
written by volunteers working for the ICCES programme (e.g. Brownlee, 2000; Logie, 2004; 
Palmer, 2001). To the author’s knowledge, ICCES has not been discussed at all in the academic 
literature (but see Palmer, 2005a). 
 
Unlike the Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Programme (STEP) (chap.7.1), which has been 
high on both the political and policy agenda (2003-2005), ICCES receives little attention within 
the GoG. ICCES is not mentioned in either the GPRS I (GoG, 2003a), the GPRS II (GoG, 
                                                 
240Unless otherwise stated, the information in this chapter draws on the author’s experience with ICCES 
2001-2006 (chap.1.3.3). 
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2005a), the 2006 budget statement (GoG, 2005c) or the NYEP (GoG, 2006c). However, the 2004 
White Paper (GoG, 2004a: 13) does note that there is a need to support TVET institutions such as 
ICCES. As for documents written by the ICCES Directorate, little material exists of any note that 
tries to synthesise the current state of affairs (but see ICCES, 2004, 1996).  
 
In accordance with the theoretical framework laid out earlier (chap.3), this chapter analyses both 
the delivery context of training at ICCES and the transformative context that ICCES graduates 
experience as they find their pathway to work.241 The first section provides background on 
ICCES, including its aims and objectives, how it relates to GoG strategy, and information on 
curriculum, enrolments, fees and dropouts. The second section examines the training delivery 
context. The third section looks at both the further training pursued by ICCES graduates, and at 




ICCES is an agency under the MoMYE with a network of, predominantly rural, VTIs offering 
training in vocational trades and is the offspring of the defunct 1960s Continuation Schools 
Programme (chap.4.3.2). The creation of ICCES was a further manifestation of the government’s 
desire to prepare youth for work. The intention has been to offer vocational training opportunities 
for JSS graduates and dropouts. ICCES is essentially designed as pre-employment training for the 
informal economy and it is expected that trainees will become employed, mostly in self-
employment in enterprises (ICCES, 1996), upon completion of a three year course. ICCES has 
some similarities to, for example, Kenya’s Youth Polytechnics (e.g. see Haan, 2006) or, at one 
point, the Botswana Brigades. The ICCES Strategic Plan (2004-2007) (ICCES, 2004) outlines 
the mission statement and objectives of ICCES: 
                                                 
241 While the different components of this transformative context have already been covered (chap.5.3), this 
chapter provides new data on the employment outcomes of ICCES graduates. 
242 The data collected was from seven centres in Ashanti, and is backed up with a very detailed 




6.1.1. ICCES as part of GoG strategy 
 
ICCES is meant to have a key role to play in the government’s skills drive. According to a former 
Deputy Minister (MoMYE), the intention is to open ICCES centres in all districts nationwide to 
offer vocational, agricultural and entrepreneurial training (GNA, 2003a).243 Since 1986 ICCES 
has expanded from 12 to 59 centres (August 2006) but has been beset with problems that 
seriously hinder quality training provision. 
 
ICCES centres around the country were service providers of STEP, and therefore - at least 
indirectly - became more important to the government. In 2003 and 2004, ICCES trained 1,369 
and 1,500 people respectively under STEP. In 2004 ICCES centres accounted for 43% (49/114) 
(Preddey, 2005: 15) of the government training institutions that delivered STEP training in the 
second phase. ICCES was chosen to deliver STEP due to ICCES’ widespread nature (especially 
in rural areas) compared to other public VTIs under the MoMYE (ICCES has 59 centres 
compared to about 30 NVTIs). Nonetheless, despite the important function ICCES played in 
delivering the, much publicised and highly politicised, STEP, ICCES itself still remains a weak 
institution. 
                                                 
243 In fact the objective of opening up ICCES centres in every district of Ghana was first set in 1996 and 
was thought achievable in one year (ICCES, 1996). 
Mission statement: To fill a major gap in employment generation by developing young 
human resource in line with the poverty alleviation goals of the Ghana Government through 
the establishment of community-based vocational training centres throughout Ghana. 
 
Objectives 
• To improve upon capacity development, skills training and retraining. 
• To promote community involvement in the provision of vocational and viable 
handicraft training for the youth, particularly JSS and SSS leavers and dropouts at 
lower academic levels as well as illiterates. 
• To support communities, especially rural communities, in mobilising resources within 
and outside their communities for the establishment and running of the community-
based ICCES Centres and Production Units. 
• To support Centres to attain high levels of sufficiency and self-employment for their 
trainees through entrepreneurial training and the formation of cooperatives. 
• To liaise with District Assemblies and other stakeholders to support the various 
ICCES centres. 
• To conduct research and develop plans for the sustenance and expansion of the 
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In addition to delivering STEP, some ICCES centres around the country have been designated as 
production units. These are meant to generate income “that will provide funds needed to resource 
the Centres” (ICCES, 2004: 13). 
 
However, despite conducting other activities like the STEP programme and production units, the 
backbone of ICCES activities centres around the provision of long-term pre-employment 
vocational training in community-based VTIs. 
 
6.1.2. Curriculum, enrolments, fees and dropouts 
 
At the time of writing, the current national enrolment for ICCES was not available; the latest 
figures available are for 2002, when some 11,800 trainees were enrolled.244  
 
Nonetheless, figures are available for Ashanti Region, widely regarded as the most successful 
region in terms of ICCES development. For the last three years, enrolment in ICCES centres in 
Ashanti Region has been around 1000 (table 6.1). Enrolment increased significantly in 2002 in 
part, perhaps, due to the GoG starting to pay the salaries of instructors (chap.6.2.2), which in turn 
would have led to higher attendance of instructors and therefore, perhaps, higher enrolment. 
Moreover, STEP might have encouraged enrolment in ICCES. 
 
Table 6.1. Total enrolment figures for ICCES in Ashanti Region, 2001-2006  
Year Male Female Total
2001 267 116 383
2002 452 222 674
2003 466 260 726
2004 690 339 1029
2005 596 316 912
2006 677 269 946  
Source: ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication (email) 30.03.06  
 
The gender balance in ICCES centres appears not to be equal. For example, in Ashanti Region 
only 28.4% (269/946) of all trainees were female (January 2006) (table 6.2). This has remained at 
about the same level since 2001, but appears to be lower in 2006 than at any time over the last 
                                                 
244 This is in spite of numerous attempts by the author to obtain up to date data. It appears that the ICCES 
Directorate cannot quickly say how many trainees are currently enrolled.    
 192 
five years; the percentage of female students has varied from 28% (2006), 35% (2005), 33% 
(2004), 36% (2003), 33% (2002), to 30% (2001) (table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.2. Enrolment in ICCES centres, by sex, Ashanti Region, January 2006  
Male Female Total
Tetrefu 112 18 130
Nerebehi 142 49 191
Dwease-Praso 16 4 20
Baworo 66 35 101
Asiwa 16 6 22
Twedie 44 7 51
Konkoma 14 17 31
Otaakrom 67 35 102
Akutuase 49 24 73
Amoawi 61 28 89
Afoako 30 20 50
Ofoase-Kokoben 55 9 64
Anyinasuso 5 13 18
Kumasi production unit 0 4 4
677 269 946  
Source: ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication (email) 27.03.06  
 
There are obviously variations at the centre level (table 6.2), with some centres even having more 
girls than boys. 
 
ICCES offers trainees a three year vocational course in trades such as carpentry, 
building/construction, dressmaking, catering, hairdressing, electrical installation, mechanics and 
















                                                 
245 All of these trade areas in ICCES can also be learnt on-the-job in traditional apprenticeships (chap.7.6). 
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Table 6.3. Enrolment in ICCES centres, by trade, Ashanti Region, January 2006  
Building/ Carpentry/ Building/ Dress- Catering/ Batik, tie Electrical Total 
construction joinery draftman- making hair- dye installation
ship dressing
Tetrefu 49 15 20 15 5 0 26 130
Nerebehi 66 8 10 8 40 0 59 191
Dwease-Praso 10 6 0 4 0 0 0 20
Baworo 31 21 0 23 12 0 14 101
Asiwa 7 9 0 6 0 0 0 22
Twedie 29 15 0 7 0 0 0 51
Konkoma 2 8 0 18 0 0 3 31
Otaakrom 53 18 0 18 11 0 2 102
Akutuase 25 24 0 24 0 0 0 73
Amoawi 31 6 0 19 0 0 33 89
Afoako 12 18 0 20 0 0 0 50
Ofoase-Kokoben 22 6 0 9 0 0 27 64
Anyinasuso 3 2 0 7 6 0 0 18
Kumasi production unit 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4
Totals 340 156 30 178 74 4 164 946  
Source: ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication (email) 27.03.06  
 
In Ashanti region almost 40% (370/946) of all trainees enrolled are learning building/construction 
or building/draftsmanship. The next most popular trade areas are dressmaking (19%, 178/946), 
electrical installation (17%, 164/946), carpentry (16%, 156/946), then catering/hairdressing (8%, 
74/946) (table 6.3). Each trainee pursues one main trade area which leads to an NVTI trade or 
proficiency certificate. Illiterate/semi-literate trainees have the option of taking a non-written 
proficiency test (involving a practical and oral examination). Other trainees take the full written 
trade test. The curriculum also includes English, Maths, Agriculture, Public education and 
Entrepreneurial Studies.246 Training is conducted in the VTI full time, 247 with an approximate 
split of 30% trade theory, 40% trade practical and 30% other lessons. A small number of centres 
(e.g. 1/13 in Ashanti) also offer the City and Guild (C&G) course, which lasts an additional year 
and requires an NVTI grade one pass in the full trade test.248  
 
Although most trainees are JSS graduates,249 trainees must fulfil no specific entry requirement 
and ICCES is open to both literates and non-literates (ICCES, 2004). However, ICCES is 
definitely not a first choice for most trainees and certainly comes after SSS, technical institutes 
                                                 
246 Entrepreneurial Studies is not taught in all centres, and mostly only in Ashanti. Public education 
involves the teaching of general life skills like HIV/AIDs awareness, health education etc. 
247 Some trades (building/construction, carpentry) might spend some time doing on-the-job practical 
training if the ICCES centre or any of the instructors have contract work to do. 
248 Fees and registration for the C&G are considerably higher: about ¢1,500,000 (US$150) for the year 
(2006). 
249 E.g. in Otaakrom ICCES (Ashanti), 126/130 current students had been to JSS (fieldwork, 2005). 
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and NVTI centres in terms of attractiveness. Most of those that do enter ICCES have very poor 
aggregate scores at the BECE level, making it difficult to enter into other second-cycle 
institutions. For example, the 126 trainees (85 male, 41 female) in Otaakrom ICCES (Ashanti) 
had an average aggregate of 30 (same for male and females).250  
 
There is no uniform country-wide training fee set. Instead, centre managers usually set their own 
fees in accordance with the ability of local people to pay. In the absence of any fee guidelines 
from the ICCES Directorate, a few ICCES centres (though not in Ashanti) have been set up as 
free-schools in the past (Palmer, 2001). Training fees, therefore, are fairly low. As of July 2006, 
training fees at ICCES centres in Ashanti ranged from ¢10,000-100,000/term (US$1-10.5). In 
addition, most centres charge for school uniforms, PTA, practicals, sports and other items (table 
6.4). These costs, while low in comparison to other VTIs, are still too high for many poorer 
families (chap.6.2.11). 
 
Table 6.4. Costs of ICCES training in Ashanti Region, July 2006  
One off costs (on entry) Termly costs (3 terms/year)
Centre name Admission Admission House School Tuition Hostel/ PTA Practical Sports
Forms Fees Wear Uniform Fees boarding
Nerebehi 20,000 30,000 50,000 … 92,000 5,000 10,000 5,000 10,000
Tetrefu 20,000 100,000 45,000 … 100,000 20,000 10,000 15,000 5,000
Otaakrom 20,000 40,000 … … 65,000 15,000 20,000 … 5,000
Baworo 10,000 50,000 … 50,000 girls 80,000 10,000 10,000 … 5,000
100,000 boys
Dwease-Praso 10,000 20,000 … … 60,000 … 10,000 … 10,000
Twedie 10,000 … 40,000 … 50,000 … … … 10,000
Konkoma 5000 … … … 35,000 Free 5,000 …
Akutuase 10,000 … … … 50,000 … … … 5,000
Amoawi 20,000 … … … 10,000 Free 25,000 10,000 5,000
Ofoase-Kokoben 20,000 20,000 … 115,000 50,000 10,000 10,000 … 10,000
Afoako 10,000 120,000 … … 50,000 … 8,000 … 5,000
Asiwa 5,000 … … … … … 5,000 … …
Anyinasuso … … … … … … … … …  
Source: ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication (email) 15.07.06.
Legend: … - missing data; n/a - not applicable  
The average total cost of a three-year course (excluding uniform and hostel fees) at a rural ICCES 
in Ashanti was ¢790,000 (US$88) in 2006 (calculated from table 6.4). This compares to US$38-
                                                 
250 The BECE aggregate is the aggregate of the best six marks achieved in the BECE. Each subject is 
graded 1 to 10: grade 5 or below is a pass, making the pass range for the aggregate of the six subjects 6 to 
30. A good SSS in Kumasi (e.g. Yaa Asantewaa, Prempeh II) requires entrants to have an aggregate of 6-
10. Otaakrom’s local SSS at Nyinahin, not in the same league as Prempeh II or Yaa Asantewaa, requires an 
aggregate of between 15-30 for entry. About 50% of all ICCES trainees in Otaakrom achieved less than 30 
aggregate and so were theoretically able to access the SSS at Nyinahin (fieldwork, 2005). 
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42 total for a three-year traditional apprenticeship (in carpentry or dressmaking) in rural Ashanti 
(2005) (chap.7.9.1). By contrast, the total cost for three-years training (in carpentry, 
building/construction or dressmaking) for an NVTI certificate in a good quality private VTI in 
Kumasi (e.g. Ramseyer) can cost as much as ¢6,000,000 (US$664) in 2006. 
 
Unlike for JSS, dropout rates in ICCES are not routinely calculated. However, data collected 
from four ICCES centres in Ashanti shows that during 2003-2004, dropout rates were around 
20% for the twelve month period (January to December), improving in 2005 to an average of 
12% (table 6.5). From the four centres where data was available, dropouts appeared highest 
among building/construction trainees (three yearly average of 21.4%); followed by carpentry 
trainees (three yearly average of 19.5%); dressmaking trainees (three yearly average of 14.7%) 
(calculated from table 6.5). Out of all those that dropped out over the three year period (n=111), 
41% (46/111) were building/construction trainees, 32% (35/111) were dressmaking trainees, and 
20% (22/111) were carpentry trainees (calculated from table 6.5). 
 
Table 6.5. Dropout rates for Otaakrom, Konkoma, Amoawi and Akutuase
ICCES centres, 2003-2005  
2003 2004 2005
Enrolments no. of % dropout Enrolments no. of % dropout Enrolments no. of % dropout
Jan-03 Dec-03 dropouts in trade Jan-04 Dec-04 dropouts in trade Jan-05 Dec-05 dropouts in trade
B/C 54 37 17 31.5 76 60 16 21.1 111 98 13 11.7
C/J 32 26 6 18.8 34 25 9 26.5 53 46 7 13.2
D/M 59 54 5 8.5 84 65 19 22.6 85 74 11 12.9
E/L - - - - 15 20 0 0 29 25 4 13.8
H/D 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 - - - -
C 7 5 2 28.5 10 9 1 10 12 11 1 8.3
Total 153 123 30 19.6 220 180 45 20.5 290 254 36 12.4  
Source: Calculated by Palmer, based on data from ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator,
 personal communication 27.03.06. B/C: Building/construction; C/J: Carpentry/joinery;
 D/M: Dressmaking; E/L: Electricals; H/D: Hairdressing; C: Catering.  
 
More detailed work done by the author in Otaakrom ICCES suggests that drop out rates for a 
particular cohort (2003/4) may be as high as 60%. More worryingly from a poverty reduction 
perspective over 70% of children classified as poor who started in 2003/4 were no longer there in 
the final year.251  
 
                                                 
251 This was a pilot exercise conducted on 16.07.06 for a DFID-supported research project at Edinburgh 
University (see Palmer, 2006b). 
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No data exists on the reasons why ICCES trainees drop out. However, financial problems, 
followed by pregnancy, are often quoted as the two main factors.252 
 
6.1.3. Summary  
 
Since ICCES began in 1986 its coverage and form have changed. ICCES has expanded from 12 
to 59 centres nationwide and training has become less associated with the labour market and more 
formalised: the three year courses now take place almost entirely in VTIs and not, as initially 
happened, mostly with artisans on-the-job. Meanwhile the principal concept has remained the 
same: to train youth for employment, preferably self-employment in, and around their 
communities. ICCES remains an important plank in Ghana’s TVET system: it is one of the only 
formal VTIs that does not require a BECE pass and its fees are remarkably low in comparison to 
other institutions. Nonetheless, the fact that the majority of ICCES trainees are JSS graduates is a 
signal that ICCES is failing to reach the most vulnerable groups.          
 
6.2. Training delivery context 
 
This section examines the different aspects of the delivery context of ICCES training.  
 
6.2.1. The changing financing environment of ICCES, 1986-2006 
 
First and foremost, the delivery context of training has been shaped by the changes in the 
financing environment over the last 20 years.  
 
In 1986 the non-formal education division of the MoE,253 with significant financial backing from 
UNICEF from 1987-1992 (ICCES Director, personal communication 18.11.04),254 revived the 
defunct continuation school programme, under the new name of ICCES, starting with 12 pilot 
centres around the country. Support was substantial during the UNICEF period, with the agency 
providing support for salaries, equipment, workshops, transport and follow-up support (ibid.; 
ICCES, 1996) and financing the “new programme very considerably” (ICCES, 1996: 1). By the 
                                                 
252 ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication 01.09.05. 
253 Now MoESS. 
254 An earlier ICCES document reports UNICEF funding ending in 1989 (ICCES, 1996). 
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early 1990s there were some 45 centres nationwide (Haan and Serrière, 2002), by 1995 there 
were 67 centres (World Bank, 1995)255 and by 2002, 91 centres throughout the country.256 
 
After the end of the UNICEF period in 1992, the GoG – lacking the financial resources to 
continue the level of support UNICEF had provided – turned over the funding of ICCES to the 
communities, with the Ministry taking on a facilitating role. The ICCES Directorate, nonetheless, 
was meant to provide some start-up capital to communities opening ICCES centres as well as 
ongoing support. It was expected that artisans in the community would assist with training at 
ICCES centres. At this stage, the strategy adopted was to apprentice trainees to a “master 
craftsman of good standing for 2 years in the trainee’s district of residence” (Boeh-Ocansey, 
1995: 23), and follow this by a further year in an ICCES institution learning trade theory. 
Originally no school fees were charged. Instead finance was meant to come from production units 
(staffed by trainees), chiefs, churches, district assemblies, durbars and communities. In passing 
the financing of ICCES over to the communities, the GoG stripped back ICCES from its original 
form: ICCES moved from the provision of training integrated with other support services during 
the UNICEF-period, to the provision of training alone. Moreover, ICCES training changed from a 
combination of on-the-job apprenticeship in years one and two, combined with theory training in 
an ICCES institution during year three, to all three years of training taking place in an ICCES 
institution. In 1995 ICCES was moved from the Ministry of Education (MoE) to the Ministry of 
Employment (MoESW).257 
 
By the mid/late-1990s ICCES was in crisis: community support had dwindled, local artisans - 
recruited as trainers - were not being paid and National Service Personnel (NSP) were brought in 
to fill the gap. In practice the expected financial support from the ICCES Directorate, 
communities and chiefs was not forthcoming and many centres collapsed. Those that survived 
had some form of external financing and operated effectively independently of the ICCES 
Directorate. For example, Nerebehi ICCES (Ashanti), among the 12 pilot centres opened in 1986, 
gained the support of the Ghana Education Service (GES) in the early 1990s who allowed a GES 
paid teacher to function part-time as the centre manager. Tetrefu ICCES (Ashanti) – also one of 
the 12 initial centres – has been able to maintain, and sustain, strong community support for 
                                                 
255 An ICCES document from 1996 noted that in 1994 there were 70 centres active (ICCES, 1996). 
256 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/governing/ministries/social/manpower.php. As of mid-2006, ICCES has 59 
active centres (senior ICCES official, personal communication 28.07.06). However, as noted above, in 
2002 there were reportedly 91 centres. The difference is likely to be due to centres closing down since 2002 
and the higher figure referring to both active and inactive centres. 
257 Now MoMYE. 
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ICCES, partly as a result of the dynamic leadership of competent centre managers. Nima-441 
ICCES – located in a poor, predominantly Muslim area of Accra (Nima) and one of the very few 
urban ICCES centres - was also among the 12 pilot centres opened in 1986, but it collapsed in the 
early 1990s due to lack of financial support. In March 1999 it reopened with support from the 
Nima-441 Welfare Association and an Iranian NGO. 
 
By 1998 about 40 centres had collapsed (ICCES Director, personal communication 18.11.04). 
Between 1999 and 2001, ICCES centres around the country were in a very precarious position 
and, apart from receiving some tools from the directorate (ibid.), very little government support 
was forthcoming. Since January 2002, the GoG has become more involved by starting to pay the 
salaries of about 5 instructors per centre: before 2002 all centres had to pay staff costs 
themselves. Government financing of the salary component of ICCES has helped considerably. 
However, there is still no central support for investment, tools, equipment, infrastructure or 
running costs: centres are still expected to cover running costs from fee collection and production 
units, and infrastructure/equipment costs from the District Assembly (DA) and the community. 
This remains a major problem.  
 
In fact in 2002 the ICCES Directorate reportedly had the choice of either getting the MoMYE to 
pay the salaries of instructors or to purchase tools (senior ICCES official, personal 
communication 23.07.06). The former option was taken as it was considered most urgent, but this 
left ICCES with no central funding for tools (ICCES, 2004). This either/or approach highlights a 
lack of government commitment to skills for poverty reduction.258 
 
Clearly one of the ways to get most assistance for ICCES nationwide would have been to make it 
a priority investment area in key policy documents like the GPRS. But, as noted above, most of 
the main policy documents, with the exception of the 2004 White Paper – which has not yet been 
implemented, do not make mention of ICCES. Perhaps as a result of this apparently long-running 
low level of government attention, ICCES is not currently supported to any significant degree by 
any of the donor agencies operating in Ghana. Indeed, ICCES as an institution is not well known 
about in Ghana. Brownlee (2000) noted that: 
 
                                                 
258 Another senior official within ICCES commented that it was ridiculous to have to choose between 
salaries and equipment since both are needed for training. If he had been in charge he said he would have 
told the Ministry to close down ICCES altogether since “training without tools is not training at all” 
(personal communication 23.07.06). 
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the name of ICCES very rarely makes it into the National newspapers, and when it does it 
is often as a result of the initiative of some other organisation. (p.17) 
 
Despite being called the Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills, ICCES as it 
operates at the moment might be more appropriately called the Independent Community Centres 
for Employable Skills; centres largely have to rely on their own initiative and skills to generate 
finance for running costs (other than salaries), equipment and infrastructure. An evaluation of 
ICCES from a BESO volunteer notes that: 
 
The approach to such funding has been on an “ad hoc” basis, with Centres being 
responsible for finding the source for their particular projects, and then preparing the 
presentation to them. Some may get help from the Regional Office, but generally it is 
done on their own. (Logie, 2004: 27) 
 
Numerous ICCES centres around the country have received ad hoc bilateral support from 
different organisations including; foreign embassy small grant schemes (mainly from Britain and 
Japan),259 supply of expatriate volunteer teachers (e.g. from Britain’s VSO, Japan’s JOCV, SYTO 
and, formerly, the US Peace Corps);260 or other bilateral financing from ad hoc overseas 
trusts/private donations (often linked to the presence of expatriate volunteers), or 
Ghanaian/International NGOs (e.g. World Vision). A few centres have also received support from 
the Ghanaian private sector; those ICCES centres that are located close to large mining or logging 
companies appear to have had most success as these companies frequently have social 
responsibility agreements with the GoG. Individual ICCES centres are also, increasingly, entering 
into bilateral partnerships with their local DA. Indeed, the ICCES Directorate assumes that DAs 
will assist with the provision of infrastructure and equipment through the District Assembly 
Common Fund (DACF). One factor, however, that hinders ICCES’ access to the DACF is that 
there is no legal framework to this effect: individual centre managers have to negotiate directly 
with the DA explaining the need for support, rather than there being in place a legal mechanism 
that states that part of the DACF should be used for ICCES. Consequently in many districts the 
DA argues that it is already too pressed with other commitments and cannot support ICCES 
(senior ICCES official, personal communication 29.06.07).   
 
                                                 
259 Japanese small grants to centres are commonly linked to the presence of a Japanese (JOCV) 
volunteer at the same centre. Those centres that can successfully get a JOCV volunteer, therefore, 
have more chance of accessing further support. 
260 SYTO – Student and Youth Travel Organisation. 
 200 
In some districts, particularly those in Ashanti, DA support has been reasonably good, with 
Assemblies supplying significant support in some cases (Boateng, 2002). Typical support is in the 
form of one-off new buildings, building materials or small one-off grants (up to 
¢10million/US$1,100) from the DACF. However, while very helpful, this support is not 
sufficient, not reliable, and not a long term solution so long as ICCES is not a part of the 
revolving budget allocations of the DA. Moreover, the competing pressures faced by the DACF 
means that allocations to ICCES are in no way sufficient to meet their needs and so ICCES stills 
ends up lacking basic items. In other districts support and cooperation from the DA has not been 
good and poses a threat to the survival of some centres (ICCES, 2004). 
 
These bilateral partnerships between individual centres and respective agencies might help to 
develop individual centres, but do little for the overall development and functioning of ICCES 
nationally. ICCES remains a very weak and chronically under-funded agency (Logie, 2004).  
 
This lack of funding in the system is, in part, due to the lack of capacity of the ICCES 
Directorate, their inability to take the lead in coordinating partnership support for ICCES, and the 
absence of an ICCES governing board that could better vocalise ICCES needs (chap.6.2.14). 
While it is true that the Directorate does make such appeals from time to time, the fact that they 
have been largely unsuccessful in these bids – for many years – reflects their lack of capacity to 
seek external funding.261 
 
As a result of the general lack of guidance, support or training from the ICCES Directorate on 
how to manage relationships with supporting agencies, individual ICCES centres are usually not 
fully aware of how to manage their bilateral partnerships – if they are lucky enough to get them in 
the first instance. In particular, ICCES centres are usually not aware of the reporting requirements 
for grants and this has led to a breakdown in the relationships between ICCES and agencies such 
as the British and Japanese small grants scheme, as well as with volunteer agencies such as VSO, 
JOCV and Peace Corps. The sourcing of partnership support by individual ICCES centres is 
made worse both through the lack of training of centre managers, and the lack of accessible, easy-
to-follow, guidelines from the agencies themselves. Logie’s (2004) evaluation of ICCES 
comments that:     
 
                                                 
261 However, in 2004 the ICCES Directorate secured funding from UNICEF for a training workshop for 
centre mangers (chap.6.2.9).  
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Clearly some Centre Managers will be familiar with what is required [to seek external 
funding], or perhaps have a volunteer who can help. Others will be out of their depth, and 
consequently will miss out on the support that might have been of great value to the 
Centre. (p.27) 
 
The precarious, and often ad hoc, nature of the partnerships between individual ICCES centres 
and various agencies does not go far enough to raise the overall quality of ICCES training 
provision, with many of these partnerships formed for one-off projects which fail to be sustained 
after the project has ended.  
 
6.2.2. Salaries and condition of service 
 
As noted above, since January 2002 the government has been paying the salaries of about 5 
instructors per centre. However, salaries are low (ICCES, 2004). ICCES employees are on the A-
scale, which provides lower remuneration (by about 20%) when compared to identically qualified 
instructors working under the GUSS (Ghana Universal Salary Scale) system of GES (ICCES 
Director, personal communication 18.11.04). It is therefore very difficult to attract and retain 
suitably trained and motivated instructors. Moreover, salaries are often delayed, sometimes by 
many months, leaving instructors less and less motivated and easy to retain (ICCES, 2004) and 
more likely to seek external informal employment. At a meeting of ICCES centre managers in 
Ashanti Region (20.01.06), managers complained that salary was still being delayed (ICCES, 
2006a). In addition, many centres have more than five instructors and are still expected to pay for 
these costs (as well as any auxiliary staff, e.g. watchmen) independently of the government. 
 
As of August 2006 there is still no condition of service outlining the appointment of ICCES staff. 
Among other things this makes it very difficult for staff to know their rights and what they are 
entitled to claim for (e.g. travel allowances, hospital bills etc.).262  
 
In fact the situation regarding salaries and conditions of service has become so bad that the 
Ashanti Region ICCES Staff Association sent a four person delegation to the ICCES directorate 
on 27th July 2006 to push the Director to address these issues. The draft resolution (ICCES, 
2006b) this delegation took to Accra warned that the problems should be addressed “as soon as 
possible or we will advice [sic] ourselves” (p. 2). This was a reference to the staff in Ashanti 
                                                 
262 A document entitled ‘Conditions, scheme of service, code of conduct for staff and trainees’ is currently 
(August 2006) being prepared by the ICCES Directorate but there is no indication of when this might be 
implemented. 
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taking these issues directly to the Minister and making their plight public through the media. At 
the meeting the ICCES Director did not consider this veiled threat appropriate and requested that 
it should be removed from the resolution. Although the Directorate promised to address these 
issues raised, it should be remembered that the Directorate’s track record over the last five years 
on delivering on promises and pledges has been, at best, disheartening. 
 
6.2.3. The rural nature of ICCES 
 
Since most centres are located in rural areas two main problems arise for the running and 
sustainability of centres in the light of limited government support. 
 
Firstly, it is an undesirable work place for instructors, most of who are from larger towns or cities, 
since there is a general absence of amenities, services, entertainment, infrastructure and housing 
for instructors (ICCES, 2004). Furthermore, there are no incentive packages from the MoMYE to 
work in rural settings. 
 
Secondly, many of the trainees at ICCES centres come from poor farming backgrounds and often 
find it hard to pay the fees charged at these centres. In Ashanti, for example, most of the students’ 
families are cocoa farmers who rely on the harvest money as their principal source of income. 
Since the main harvest is around November each year, families find it hard to pay ICCES fees at 
other times.263 This results in cash-flow problems for ICCES centre and contributes to the 
deterioration of the quality of teaching and learning - since the fees raised are supposed to pay for 
all running costs other than salaries. 
 
6.2.4. Community-supported training and kobwo 
 
The design of ICCES has always assumed community support and involvement. Indeed, the 
establishment of centres is supposed to be dependent on a strong level of community commitment 
to the ICCES concept (Logie, 2004). However, as noted above, community support has generally 
not reached the levels required to sustain many centres, leading to the collapse of dozens of 
centres over the years.  
 
                                                 
263 There is, however, a smaller mid-season harvest from June-August. 
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Centres have largely survived in the past, not because of community support, but rather because 
of the hard work and self-sacrifice of a limited number of individuals connected directly with the 
centre – usually the centre manager and staff (Palmer, 2001).264 This said, communities often help 
out with communal labour when a particular centre has a building project, but the GoG’s 
expectation that the communities could pay instructors’ salaries or other running costs has proved 
to be too naïve.265  
 
Logie (2004) comments that the level of financial commitment communities are expected to 
maintain is not understood in the first place, with many communities not realising that it is an 
“on-going commitment” (ibid.: 3) and some communities promising support but ultimately failing 
to deliver it (ibid). Logie (2004: 3-4) suggests three reasons why community support often 
dwindles: 
• The people in the community who established it in the first place move on to new 
activities; 
• Pressure from the school is not sustained; 
• The local community lose faith in the concept. 
 
But it may be that there is an additional, more fundamental, reason why community support to 
ICCES has never been strong: this is that community members are often unwilling to assist a 
centre if they do not currently have one of their children at that centre and, in a given ICCES 
centre, there is usually a low proportion of ICCES trainees who come from the community the 
ICCES centre is located in.  
 
Many centres have very high percentages of outsiders – youth training at an ICCES centre who 
are not from that community. For example, the household survey conducted as part of the 
fieldwork (2005) in Otaakrom community (Ashanti) where an ICCES centre has been running for 
the last five years showed that only 2% (3/147) of youth sampled in the community had received 
training at this centre (Appendix C, table C.6). 95% of current students at Otaakrom ICCES come 
from outside of the community266 despite the fact that many youth in the community finish JSS 
and are unable to go onto further studies at the SSS level and there is no other second-cycle 
                                                 
264 This is, of course, not true for all ICCES centres, some of which have very strong community support. 
265 As mentioned earlier, it is still the case that not all salaries are covered by the GoG – though most have 
been since 2002. 
266 Otaakrom ICCES centre manager, personal communication 10.09.06. 
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institution in the community other than traditional apprenticeships.267 Honny (1999) also notes 
that most students at NVTIs do not train in centres located nearest to their place of origin.  
 
This unwillingness of JSS graduates to attend a second-cycle institution in their home community 
arises from a dislike of what people term kobwo, which signifies a youth’s failure. Kobwo, 
which literally means ‘go, come pound (fufu)’, refers to something a parent might say to their 
child - ‘go to school, then come home and pound fufu.’268 
 
Kobwo refers to students who continue their education or training in the same community after 
completing JSS. The preference, rather, is to pursue training outside of the community “even 
when the facilities at their place is [sic] better”.269 Furthermore, kobwo is seen by some as “one 
of the major problems for low enrolment in rural schools like ICCES” (ibid.).270 
 
Where many, or most, of the trainees in an ICCES centre do not come from the community in 
which the ICCES centre is located, there is understandably a reluctance on the part of community 
members to contribute financially to the ICCES centre in their community.271 
 
6.2.5. Quality of instruction 
 
The quality of instruction at ICCES centres is low for a number of reasons.  
 
The first issue relates to the retention of un- and under-qualified instructors in the ICCES system 
(Logie, 2004). As noted, ICCES instructors were initially comprised of local artisans and prior to 
2002 centres had to fund these instructors’ salaries independently. Since communities cannot 
afford very much and centres have problems generating income through the collection of training 
fees, the remuneration offered to these instructors was typically low. In some centres, especially 
newer centres, this resulted in few qualified instructors working for ICCES. More established 
                                                 
267 The teachers at this community’s JSS estimate that only one in twenty students enter SSS. 
268 It might not literally be pounding fufu (which is usually done by females) but it also refers to general 
household work that children are expected to do (fieldwork, 2005). 
269 ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication by email, 18.01.06. 
270 Though, of course, there are many other factors that might inhibit access to rural education and training 
(e.g. distance to the institution, opportunity costs of learning, poverty etc.). 
271
 Kobwo also contributes to the high demand for hostels at ICCES centres due to the high proportion of 
trainees from outside the community. The difficulty in obtaining finance for infrastructure (chap.6.2.1), 
such as hostels, contributes to the low enrolment rates in some centres. 
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centres generally have more highly qualified staff. And yet while technically qualified, most 
instructors are not trained in pedagogy.  
 
Since 2002, ICCES has been trying to upgrade the quality of instructors in the centres – now that 
the GoG is paying their salaries. There is, however, still some retention of less qualified 
instructors who have been in the ICCES system since before the changes in 2002.  
 
Among the 68 ICCES staff in Ashanti (September 2006), 16 (24%) are under-qualified (having 
either an NVTI 1 certificate or a middle school leaving certificate): of these only 5 are artisans. 
Most instructors (37%, 25/68) are City and Guild (C&G) holders. Among all these instructors 
there are only 3 (4%) who have been trained how to teach – and all of these have been seconded 
from GES to ICCES.272   
 
This lack of adequately qualified instructors and centre managers in some centres has contributed 
to the breakdown of an effective training environment. Logie (2004) notes that “[v]isits to 
Centres revealed extensive indiscipline, with staff missing, students absent, untidiness, poor 
records, and similar deficiencies” (p.11). Nonetheless, while staff are often un- or under-
qualified, and in spite of low/delayed salaries and poor working conditions, most are dedicated to 
their work (Logie, 2004). This being said, salaries are low and the rural nature of ICCES (and 
lack of incentives) results in problems of finding and keeping qualified instructors.273 The low 
and unreliable salaries means that most ICCES instructors have multiple income-generating 
activities (e.g. cocoa farming, part-time private contract work) in addition to their ICCES job 
(fieldwork, 2001-2006). 
 
Secondly, the lack of funding and support from government, combined with the difficulty faced 
by rural communities in raising funding independently, results in an overall lack of tools, 
equipment, books, materials and infrastructure (ICCES, 2004). Logie’s (2004) field report of 
ICCES noted that:  
 
None of the 14 Centres visited had a sufficient number of tools for the number of students 
under instruction. In many cases students had been required to bring their own sewing 
                                                 
272 The secondment has been done at the District Assembly level. Typically, the GES teacher would be 
registered in the community’s JSS, but would work in the community’s ICCES. 
273 This point was reiterated at a 2006 meeting of centre managers (ICCES, 2006a). 
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machines to help make up the number, though this still left a significant shortage. 
Woodwork tools similarly were far too few, and what there were… blunt and weak. (p.5) 
 
This echoed an earlier observation, made in 2001 and based on visits to 9 centres, that “[c]entres 
receive woefully inadequate amounts of tools, many of which are of inferior quality” (Palmer, 
2001: 29). 
 
Indeed a common and ongoing problem at ICCES centres is the general lack of tools. One of the 
unique aspects of ICCES is that it emphasises practical training to a greater extent than other 
institutions. However, this means little when centres have pitifully few tools for practical 
lessons.274 In addition to the lack of tools, those few tools that have been supplied by the 
Directorate are often of inferior quality. Moreover, many pledges made by the ICCES Directorate 
to provide tools to centres have never been honoured (Logie, 2004). Brownlee (2000) noted that, 
most ICCES centres in the Central and Western Regions “lack the basic infrastructure required to 
deliver vocational training effectively” (p.13). 
 
Thirdly, due to shortage of permanent teachers, ICCES has traditionally relied on both National 
Service Personnel (NSP) and expatriate volunteers to supplement the training staff. While they do 
bring much benefit to centres, they cannot be relied upon like permanent instructors as their stay 
is frequently short (typically nine months for NSP, and two-twelve months for expatriate 
volunteers). Problems with the NSP also include the difficulty in persuading them to live and 
work in isolated rural localities (Boateng, 2002). 
 
6.2.6. Pressure for more academic and examination-orientated teaching 
 
ICCES serves a dual function: it is terminal for many, but the NVTI trade certificates that some 
graduates gain can be used to enter further formalised education/training. Pupils place a great 
emphasis on gaining these certificates, and instructors teach aspects of certain trades more with 
examinations - rather than with self-employment – in mind. Indeed, practical training frequently 
suffers and often does not get as much attention as was intended in the design of ICCES, and gets 
passed over for more academic and theoretical subjects useful for the examinations. Hence, the 
                                                 
274 Dressmaking students at ICCES can be particularly disadvantaged. The cost of procuring the standard 
butterfly sewing machine in 2006 is ¢450,000 (US$50) – a figure out of reach for many. Consequently 
many of these students learn dressmaking without having their own machine. Some are able to borrow a 
machine from a friend or family member, others are able to share a fellow-student’s machine, others have 
to rent a machine (at a fee of ¢30,000/month (US$3.30) in 2006). 
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practical vocational training objective of ICCES is often subverted as a result of pressure from 
trainees and their parents for more academic and examination-orientated teaching (cf. Middleton 
et al., 1993).275 
        
6.2.7. Weak centre-level management capacity 
 
It has been observed that many centres have weak or inefficient centre managers and/or board of 
governors. The latter is sometimes made up of friends of the centre manager and often does not 
properly represent a true cross-section of the wider community. Furthermore a few centre 
managers (e.g. Agomeda, Dodowa) are closely associated with specific Chiefs. Thus when there 
is a Chieftaincy dispute the ICCES centre suffers. 
 
6.2.8. Mixing literate and non-literate trainees  
 
ICCES centres admit not just (supposedly) literate JSS graduates,276 but also those who have 
previously dropped out of school and might be illiterate. This creates problems when ICCES 
centres place these two groups of people together – as they do. For example, during classroom 
lessons (e.g. trade theory, entrepreneurial studies, Maths, English), non-literate trainees are 
usually told by the instructors to ‘ko practical’, go and do practicals. In some centres, non-literate 
students are encouraged to participate in these classroom lessons (which are often taught in a 
mixture of the local language, Twi, and English), but are subsequently teased by literate students. 
During the practical sessions, both the literate and non-literate students are able to work together. 
 
6.2.9. General meetings and training of centre managers  
 
In February 1996 the National Council of ICCES Centres (NACICCES) was formed with the aim 
of unifying all the ICCES centres in the country. NACICCES was meant to coordinate and 
support ICCES activities nationwide and comprised of all centre mangers, regional coordinators 
and directorate staff.  
 
                                                 
275 Interestingly, however, the NVTI exam results (table 6.7) show that the actual outcomes are high pass 
rates (90%) in proficiency exams and 50% pass rates in the full trade test, the latter of which is needed to 
continue training. 
276 Many JSS graduates that enter ICCES have performed so badly at JSS that they are effectively illiterate.  
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However, due to lack of funds NACICCES only met 3 or 4 times between 1996-1999.277 In 2002, 
the defunct NACICCES was replaced by regional groups of centre managers. These are meant to 
meet every month to communicate needs directly to the directorate, meet the welfare needs of 
centre managers and organise staff development (ICCES Director, personal communication 
18.11.04).278  
 
Combined with the lack of general meetings, training for centre managers has been weak. 
However, things have started to improve. For example, in 2003 the ICCES Directorate organised 
a 2-day training workshop to introduce centre managers to the STEP programme. 
 
In June 2004 centre managers in the northern sector (Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Northern, Upper 
East, Upper West) had a training meeting in Sunyani funded by UNICEF. This was the second of 
two workshops organized by the ICCES directorate to update the knowledge and skills of the 
participants. The first workshop (January, 2004), sponsored by the MoMDE279 was held at 
Ajumako (Central Region) for participants from the southern sector. Topics treated at the 
workshops included entrepreneurship, writing of management documents and performance 
appraisal. 
 
6.2.10 Poor public perception of vocational training 
 
Along with other VTIs in Ghana, ICCES shares the poor public perception of vocational training. 
ICCES, like other VTIs, is seen by parents and students as the poor relative of more academically 
orientated second-cycle institutions.280 This poor perception and negative attitude towards 
vocational training is acknowledged by the ICCES Directorate (ICCES, 2004). 
 
An apparent paradox, therefore, is why there are so many youth found in traditional 
apprenticeship (and in lesser numbers in the public TVET system) if vocational training has a bad 
reputation. But really most youth tend to enter TVET when there is no chance of accessing more 
                                                 
277 NACICCES ex-president, personal communication 07.09.01. 
278 There is no national information on the frequency of regional centre managers meetings. However, in 
Ashanti, these meetings usually occur every month.  
279 Now MoMYE. 
280 As noted (chap.4), there has been a history of parents and students favouring more academically 
orientated institutions as this has always been regarded as the best way to access formal wage- 
employment. 
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academic institutions - either due to direct or opportunity costs, low aggregate scores or other 
access issues. 
 
This poor public perception of vocational training is exacerbated for ICCES as parents and 
students are aware of the lack of equipment and facilities at most centres. The ICCES Directorate 
recognises this and concludes that this makes ICCES “unattractive to prospective trainees and 
their families” (ICCES, 2004: 12). 
 
6.2.11. The social composition of ICCES trainees and the centre managers’ dilemma 
 
The question of whether the poor are represented among ICCES trainees is interesting given that 
its policy is to admit not only JSS graduates, but also “dropouts at lower academic levels as well 
as illiterates” (ICCES, 2004: 1). It is among these groups that the poor are likely to be most 
concentrated. But, as noted earlier, since most ICCES trainees are JSS graduates, albeit with poor 
aggregates, the very poor are unlikely to be found in ICCES. 
 
Nonetheless, a survey by Palmer (2001) of six ICCES centres in Ashanti Region suggested that 
needy students do get access to training, and comprise of between 12-54% of the total number of 
trainees in a given centre (table 6.6). Being needy was defined as those who had difficulty in 
paying fees (often because these young trainees were responsible for paying their own fees), 
and/or whose families were known by the centre manger/instructors to be poor. This is likely to 
be an underestimate of the percentage of needy students since many needy students will have 
dropped out in year one or two and therefore not be captured by these figures. As noted earlier 











Table 6.6. Percentage of ‘needy’ students in selected ICCES centres in Ashanti
Region, according to the centre manager and staff, 2001   
 
Source: Palmer, 2001  
NB. The exchange rate in 2001 was approximately ¢7,100 to US$1  
 
Despite the policy of admitting youth irrespective of formal educational background (and hence 
being more accessible to more vulnerable or less-literate youth), ICCES training is not free.281 In 
Ashanti Region, for example, the average yearly fees (July 2006) for training alone was ¢150,000 
(US$16).282 And, since there is very little money in the ICCES system, there is no provision for 
sponsorship of poor students. At the district and constituency level there are limited sponsorship 
opportunities for needy students (e.g. from the MP) but these opportunities in no way meet the 
demand.  
 
Centre managers often sack those students that have not paid their fees, and tell them to ko fi, go 
home, to get the money. The experience of centre managers that do this has been that the poorer 
students, once sacked, frequently do not return. Centre managers, especially those in deprived 
communities, are therefore faced with a dilemma: they have usually become centre managers 
through some desire to help their community and the youth, and not through a desire to make 
money;283 they know that if they sack poor students they will not come back, but equally if they 
                                                 
281 Other than in a handful of  free-schools noted earlier. 
282 This ranges from ¢30,000-¢300,000 (US$3-33) a year for training fees only, though many other termly 
charges apply (table 6.4). 
283 Centre managers do not get paid much and, prior to 2002, were often paid nothing or very little. This 
suggests that like the original village polytechnics in Kenya these ICCES do operate a bit like NGOs in 
terms of centre manager commitment. 
Name of ICCES District Total No. No. of needy % of total Fees/ 
Centre of students  students number year/ 
student/¢ 
Tetrefu BAK 103 15 15 240,000
Otaakrom Atwima 85 20 24 150,000
Baworo Ejusu Juaben 24 13 54 150,000
Konkoma BAK 49 15 31 150,000
Nerebehi Atwima 135 16 12 240,000
Dwease-Praaso Asante Akim 52 15 29 150,000
North
TOTALS 448 94 28 -
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do not sack non-paying trainees the centre, and themselves,284 will be in more financial trouble 
through lack of fees paid. If the centre manager sets a policy of not sacking trainees that have 
failed to pay, other trainees – who can afford to pay – start to default on payment and hence the 
centre is able to collect progressively less and less training fees. What is needed are bursaries for 
poor, but talented, trainees that are distributed on a means-tested basis (or community peer-
review). 
 
For example, at Otaakrom ICCES (Ashanti), the centre manager started in 2001 with a policy of 
not sacking any students. Otaakrom ICCES had a history of collapsing prior to 2001 and the 
centre manager was keen to encourage as many of the youth to enrol as possible. The question of 
fees, therefore, was postponed and those students that were not paying were asked to pay when 
they could afford to. However, in 2002, when many trainees had still not paid, the centre manger 
decided to sack trainees until they had paid the fees. Many did not come back. Others were 
persuaded to return by the centre manager who, on seeing that the needy trainees were not 
returning, indicated that payment could be made later. By the end of 2005, the situation had 
reached crisis point with training fees in arrears amounting to some ¢19 million (over US$2,100). 
By this time, the centre manger had told trainees that they could not collect their NVTI 
certificates unless they had paid all the training fees outstanding to the centre. The response of 
many students was not to come for their certificates. The centre manager, in January 2006, has 
since adopted a new policy; trainees are not allowed to progress to the next year or take NVTI 
exams unless they have paid all their training fees.  
 
The progression of the poor through ICCES, therefore, is to some extent dependent on the fee-
policy of the centre manger – which is determined not by the national directorate, but by each 
individual ICCES centre. In the example from Otaakrom ICCES, above, poor trainees have either 
been unable to collect their examination certificates or have been disallowed from taking 
examinations in the first place. In the former situation, the poor did receive training, but are not 
able to get a certificate to confirm this and are hence disabled from entering into some 
employment opportunities.285 In the latter situation, the poor are unable to progress past the first 
or second years and will, usually, drop-out of their training here. 
                                                 
284 It is not uncommon for centre mangers to use their own resources to finance activities. 
285 Employers, even in the informal sector, often prefer trainees to have some kind of certificate that 
indicates their proficiency. However, ICCES graduates are increasingly commenting that some informal 
contractors prefer to hire people without certificates as they can pay them less (fieldwork, 2001-2005). For 
formal employers, having a certificate is usually a prerequisite for employment.  
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In the absence of gaining access to the limited funding opportunities or being able to delay 
payment through some informal agreement between the centre manager and the trainee/the 
trainees’ parents, the poor do not get sustained access to training at ICCES centres. 
 
6.2.12 The gender composition of training  
 
Overall, there are more male trainees in ICCES than females (table 6.1). The gender composition 
of training in ICCES programmes follows the gender composition of training activities through 
Ghana’s TVET system more generally; female trainees are clustered in the traditionally female 
trade areas (e.g. catering, hairdressing, dressmaking); while male trainees are clustered in the 
traditionally male trade areas (e.g. carpentry, building/construction, electrical installation).  
 
6.2.13 Regional coordination issues 
 
The delivery context of ICCES training is hampered by issues at the regional level. 
 
Firstly, regional offices receive very small amounts of money as working expenses from the 
ICCES Directorate. The Ashanti Regional office, for example, receives ¢1 million (US$111) per 
three months (in 2006), or about ¢16,000 (US$1.8) per working day.286 This money is supposed 
to be sufficient to cover transportation to centres, office supplies, maintenance/repair of the 
computer/printer, telephone calls and meetings.287 This does not go far and allows for little 
official activity in the region. Indeed the Ashanti Regional office could not afford to pay for any 
repairs to its computer/printer, which now sits unused, and the phone line has been disconnected 
as the bills were not paid. Regional Coordinators, like the one in Ashanti, are therefore forced to 
rely largely on their own resources to do their work, or else not do the work.288 
 
Secondly, regional coordinators have no form of ICCES owned transport (ICCES, 2004; Logie, 
2004). Consequently their essential job of monitoring, evaluating and coordinating existing 
                                                 
286 ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication 20.11.05. 
287 In November 2006, two computers and two printers are due to be supplied to the regional office through 
an Edinburgh-based organisation.  
288 When the author visited the Upper West Regional coordinator in 2001 it was found that he did not even 
have an office. Instead he came to work each day with his office in his suitcase and looked around the 
government regional office for a spare room in which to work. 
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centres, the launching of awareness campaigns in their districts, and conducting feasibility studies 
for new centres has to be done from a trotro (public transport minibus). Relying on trotros to get 
around obviously slows the work output of the coordinators considerably.289 
 
Thirdly, the ability and commitment of the Regional Coordinators varies massively, and some 
regions even lack a Coordinator (Logie, 2004). 
 
6.2.14. National coordination issues 
 
The delivery context of ICCES training is hampered by numerous issues at the national level. 
Indeed, one senior official within ICCES went as far as to comment that: “I have the feeling that 
lack of support from the Directorate is the major factor for the decline of ICCES” (personal 
communication 15.09.05). 
 
The managerial competency of the ICCES Directorate appears to be weak. National level 
coordination of ICCES remains poor, with very little support coming from the Directorate to the 
centres. The Directorate does not have up-to-date information on the centres in the country, 
sometimes with data being more than a year old.290 This lack of up-to-date information held by 
the Directorate appears to have resulted, among other things, in ‘ghost workers’ being present on 
the ICCES payroll. Logie (2004) comments that: 
 
There is evidence of salary payments being made to people with no connection to the 
Centres, and it is probable that the list of staff attending, and those on the payroll do not 
agree. (p.11) 
 
The Directorate has too many people doing too little work. Money currently allocated to over-
staffing the directorate with secretaries could be more effectively used to cover transport costs of 
the directorate’s programme/technical officers – who currently rarely visit centres outside of 
Greater Accra. Existing ICCES centres are poorly monitored by the directorate, who appear 
keener on opening up new centres rather than supporting existing ones. Logie (2004) comments 
that “pressure to site a Centre in all… Districts works against ensuring that they are properly 
established” (p.3). 
 
                                                 
289 ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication 15.10.05. 
290 Palmer (2001) noted that the official enrolment figures held by the ICCES Directorate often bear little 
relation to the enrolment figures at the centre level.  
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Indeed, as noted earlier, it is the intention of the GoG to open up new centres in all districts 
nationwide. However, when existing centres are so poorly supported, it seems more logical to 
consolidate on these before expansion. Indeed, this was the recommendation of two previous 
reports (Brownlee, 2000; Palmer, 2001). 
 
The ICCES Directorate appears to take little action on any recommendations that have appeared 
in a number of reports written by volunteers working for ICCES. For example, Logie’s report 
(Logie, 2004), submitted in draft in December 2004, never made it to a final report since he 
received no feedback from the Directorate. In 2006 Logie noted that the ICCES Directorate has 
apparently taken no action on his recommendations and that the emails from the ICCES 
directorate have dried up (personal communication (email) 27.01.06). The fact that the ICCES 
Directorate appears to have ignored a report aimed at highlighting issues of concern and possible 
ways to improve matters within ICCES is of no surprise: earlier reports (e.g. Brownlee, 2000; 
Palmer, 2001) have similarly been shelved with no action taken. The findings of all these reports 
written by volunteers have generally been critical of the ICCES Directorate, and have proposed 
consolidation of the existing ICCES network before the opening up of new centres. Hence the 
directorate has not been keen to make these reports known. Moreover, the directorate has been 
under political pressure to open new centres and expand; an objective that runs counter to the 
recommendations of all these evaluation reports. 
 
In 2001, two volunteers who had film training even went to the extent of producing a 
professional, self-financed, documentary about ICCES. This too has never been used by the 
ICCES Directorate to raise awareness or funding. Indeed that fact that these field reports have 
effectively been shelved is surprising given one of the stated objectives of ICCES: “To conduct 
research and develop plans for the sustenance and expansion of the community-based vocational 
training concept in Ghana” (ICCES, 2004: 2). Lack of funding apart, it appears that the current 
ICCES Directorate has neither the capacity nor the will to be able to manage and develop the 
ICCES programme in the country. 
 
Unlike other agencies, ICCES has no Act of Parliament to support it (ICCES Director, personal 
communication 18.11.04) nor does it have a board of directors.291 Instead the ICCES Director 
reports directly to the Chief Director of the MoMYE. This is a recognised problem:  
                                                 
291 When ICCES was supported by UNICEF in the late 1980s there was a board of Directors in place 
(ICCES, 1996).  
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Strategic and tactical planning have thus been left in the hands of the management who 
should have been concerned with the short-term and day-today [sic] running of the 
organization. The result is the over-stretching of management. (ICCES, 2004: 10) 
 
Logie (2004) further notes that this situation is unsatisfactory and has a number of implications, 
including: the Ministry is overburdened with other issues and cannot spend the time necessary on 
ICCES affairs; a board is more likely to induce a stronger sense of purpose than exists at present, 
and will help raise national awareness of ICCES. 
 
Confidence in the Directorate is further undermined by unfulfilled promises and pledges of 
assistance received by centres. Logie (2004) notes that “[t]here is evidence that the Directorate 
has promised tools, but then failed to deliver them, resulting not only in lack of tools, but also 
lack of confidence and trust in the Directorate” (p.5). Indeed it is common for the Directorate to 
attend an opening of a new centre, or a graduation ceremony or commissioning of a building at an 




This section has been concerned with trying to understand the nature of the delivery context 
(chap.3.1.1) for ICCES training. The financing environment of ICCES has had a considerable 
impact on training quality. ICCES has changed being ostensibly being externally financed (1986-
1992) to being community financed (1993-2001) to being part-supported by government (2002-
present). Since the GoG took over salary payment there appear to be more trainees in the system, 
perhaps reflecting increased demand for ICCES and hence signalling an improvement in quality. 
This being said, the quality of training in many instances is highly questionable and the support 
centres receive from the ICCES directorate (advice, training and coordination), and from central 







                                                 
292 Senior ICCES official, personal communication 15.02.05. 
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6.3. After ICCES, what? 
 
Each year substantial numbers of youth graduate from ICCES centres around the country. For 
example, in 2002, 3,022 trainees graduated compared to 2,833 in 2001.293 However, just because 
a trainee graduates it does not follow that they will pass their final NVTI exam nor, if they do, 
that they will receive their certificate anyway. 
 
Table 6.7. NVTI exam results for Nerebehi, Baworo, Ofuase-Kokoben, Akutuase,
Konkoma, Asiwa and Otaakrom ICCES centres, Ashanti Region (May/June 2005)  
GRADE TWO GRADE ONE
Proficiency Trade Test Proficiency Trade Test
Trade No. of Pass Fail No. of Pass Fail No. of Pass Fail No. of Pass Fail
students students students students
Masonry 31 28 3 * 70 30 40 13 12 1 * 12 4 8
Carpentry and Joinery 12 10 2 * 33 15 18 14 7 7 * (i) 4 2 2
Building/draughtsmanship - - - 8 4 4 - - - 1 - 1
General electricals 15 14 1 * 30 5 25 5 5 - - - -
Catering 18 15 3 * 15 5 10 10 10 - - - -
Dressmaking 21 21 - 24 15 9 19 18 1 * 8 6 2
Tailoring 1 1 - - - - - - - - - -
Totals 98 89 9 180 74 106 61 52 9 25 12 13
* absent on day of exam
(i) only one of the 7 that failed carpentry proficiency grade one was absent.  
Source: ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication 28.07.06  
 
The NVTI exam results for seven centres in Ashanti Region (table 6.7) show that pass rates for 
both proficiency grade one and two are reasonably high:294 grade two has a 90% pass rate 
(89/98)295 and grade one a 85% pass rate (52/61). However, when it comes to the full trade test 
the pass rate is low for both grades: grade two has a 41% pass rate (74/180) and grade one a 48% 
pass rate (12/25). The 60% failure rate for the grade two trade test means that many students 
repeat year two to retake the exam, but many others drop out. In the final year grade one trade test 
exams the 50% failure rate means that many students are leaving ICCES with failure results slips 
(or else repeating the final year). The good pass rates in proficiency compared to the low pass 
rates for the trade test underlines the fact that ICCES is more successful in delivering practical 
                                                 
293 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/governing/ministries/social/manpower.php downloaded 25.01.06. 
294 The proficiency exam is the non-written exam involving a practical and oral component. The full trade 
test involves written, oral and practical components. Grade two is taken at the end of the second year and 
grade one at the end of the third, and final, year. 
295 In fact the only trainees that failed grade two proficiency were absent on the day of the exam! 
 217 
skills rather than preparing students for further formal training.296 It also shows that a 
combination of low instructor quality, low educational background of most ICCES entrants, and a 
poor instructional environment result in high failure rates in exams with written components.     
 
For those final year ICCES trainees that do pass their NVTI exams it does not automatically 
follow that they will be given their results slip/certificate; only those students that have no fees 
arrears are allowed to collect their certificates in most ICCES centres. Those that pass the exams 
but are unable to pay these arrears, perhaps due to poverty, cannot collect their certificates.297 
 
What about the post-training outcomes of VTI graduates, and ICCES in particular?   
 
A study of NVTI298 graduates in the late 1990s (Honny, 1999) reveals a little about the post-
training activities of VTI graduates in Ghana. He comments that: 
 
Immediately after their training, graduates generally go to their places of origin for about 
six months to await their examination results. This is usually followed by travel to larger 
towns and cities for a stay of up to three to four months to look for employment. (p.196) 
 
Honny’s survey of graduates from 21 NVTI centres revealed that the most common employers of 
NVTI graduates were public sector organisations dealing with construction, provision and 
maintenance of facilities and utilities, and large private construction firms. About 40% of the 
NVTI graduates went on to find jobs in the formal or semi-formal sectors within one year of 
graduation, while a further 10% went on to further training (Honny, 1999). However “[t]he 
proportion of those who graduated in the last two or three years employed in this way… has 
fallen considerably” (Honny, 1999: 196). 
 
There is, in fact, very little evidence regarding the employment outcomes of ICCES graduates. 
Following the underlying assumption of the Ghanaian skills development agenda, policy makers 
usually take for granted that the employment objectives of ICCES have been achieved. But with 
                                                 
296 In order to progress to higher education and training post-ICCES, graduates need a pass in the full trade 
test.  
297 In some ICCES centres this results in large piles of certificates from former graduates that remain 
locked in cupboards in the centre’s office. Those that fail their final exam and want to retake it also need 
their certificate – which is not released unless fees arrears are paid. This serves as a barrier, inhibiting 
poorer trainees from retaking exams. 
298 NVTI centres are also under the MoMYE, like ICCES, but have received more support in the past from 
government and external agencies (e.g. DFID, NVTI Centres Support Project, 1996-1998). 
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such a catalogue of weaknesses associated with the training delivery context of ICCES, it is 
crucial to know more about trainees’ experiences after ICCES.  
 
One claim posted on the MoMYE website states that “[s]tudies indicate that 62% of ICCES 
graduates are self-employed in the rural areas.”299 What is surprising though is that not one 
official in the MoMYE contacted by the author knows what studies this is referring to.300 Indeed 
it was even suggested by one senior official within ICCES that he was “not surprised about the 
story posted at the MoMYE/ICCES website… everything there are [sic] false.” While this last 
comment is undoubtedly a gross exaggeration, it does at least suggest that there are those in 
senior positions within ICCES that doubt the reliability of the ICCES Directorate’s claims and 
data. Assuming that the claim – about 62% of ICCES graduates being self-employed – is based 
on a study conducted of ICCES graduates, it still does not tell us what type of self-employment 
graduates are engaged in. Are they operating more at the survival end of the MSE spectrum, or 
doing better? Are they working in self-employment activities using their skills acquired at 
ICCES, or are they working in areas not connected with their training? These, surely, are crucial 
questions. 
 
After ICCES training it is known that graduates receive no structured post-training support or 
assisted access to credit facilities – factors deemed necessary to support self-employment creation 
among VTI graduates in Ghana (Honny, 1999) and elsewhere.301 While centre managers, in some 
cases, have tried to offer advice to graduating trainees, there is no formal mechanism in place to 
provide follow-up training, support, advice on getting access to finance or information on (the 
very limited) formal job opportunities.  
 
The difficulty in accessing financing is recognised by the ICCES Directorate, who further 
comments that this also has a negative impact on enrolment rates: 
 
Unwillingness on the part of financial institutions to grant credit to trainees also poses a 
threat to the overall objective of training to make them employable notably, self-
employed [sic]. The inability to access start-up capital also dissuades potential trainees 
from enrolling. (ICCES, 2004: 16) 
 
                                                 
299 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/governing/ministries/social/manpower.php downloaded 25.01.06. 
300 Those contacted included three senior ICCES officials and a former deputy Minister for the MoMYE. 
301 See chap.5.3.6. 
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ICCES graduates essentially have to fall back on their existing support structures, which consist 
largely of their family, their family’s contacts or other social networks they have been able to 
develop during their training. 
 
Since ICCES training generally takes place in training institutions out of the labour market, 
trainees are not exposed to the same opportunities to develop informal social or other business 
contacts, when compared to those that train in the labour market itself (e.g. in apprenticeships). 
 
However, due to lack of equipment/material at some ICCES centres, some practical training 
occurs away from the VTI, on-the-job when trainees assist an instructor with a private contract. 
Other trainees are able to find temporary work during the holidays, and hence have some, albeit 
limited, opportunity to develop enterprise networks.  
 
Male trainees, especially those in building/construction, are more likely than female trainees to 
find trade-related vacation work.302 Female trainees, who cluster in the traditionally female trades 
of dressmaking, hairdressing and catering, generally have less opportunity to undertake trade-
related vacation work, and consequently have less opportunity to develop the kinds of enterprise 
networks that might be useful in helping them enter self-employment.  
 
ICCES training, therefore, offers limited opportunity to trainees to develop enterprise networks 
that are recognised as so helpful to enterprise start-up.  
 
In order to find out about the kinds of post-ICCES activities trainees are engaging in, semi-
structured questionnaires and focus groups were conducted with ICCES graduates during 2005. 
The objective was to find out about the graduates first employment activity or about training 
received after ICCES. 
 
In the first instance information was gathered directly from 60 ICCES graduates (graduating 
1999-2004) from three centres (Tetrefu, Baworo, Nerebehi). Questionnaires were sent to 
graduates of these centres who then completed and returned the forms. Although about 200 forms 
were sent out only 60 (30%) responded.  
 
                                                 
302 For final year building/construction trainees the daily market rate (in 2005) for their work ranges from 
¢25-50 thousand (US$2.8-5.5), depending on their experience (focus group 3, below).  
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In an attempt to compensate for the difficulty of tracking down ICCES graduates who could 
respond in person, a further method of data collection used was to have discussions with the 
centre managers and instructors of selected ICCES centres in Ashanti region, and ask them about 
the current activity of graduates from a specific year.303 This method is based on the knowledge 
that centre managers and/or instructors have very close contact with the communities from which 
ICCES trainees originate, and are therefore in a good position to comment on their current 
activities.304 Centre managers/instructors from seven centres305 were asked about the current 
activity of all trainees (n=157) who graduated in the summer of 2003. Since this questionnaire 
was not directly administered to graduates but to VTI staff, the exploration of occupational 
pluralism was more difficult and respondents were simply asked about the former trainees main 
activity. Of the 157 ICCES trainees who graduated from these centres in 2003, the centre 
managers and instructors were able to provide information on 102 of them (or 65% of the total 
number).  
 
This data – for 102 graduates of 2003 – was combined with the data collected from the 60 ICCES 
graduates mentioned above.306 This provided information about the current activity (further 
training or activity in the labour market) for some 162 ICCES graduates, graduating between 
2000 to 2004. 
 
In addition, two focus groups (n=10 and n=14) were held with ICCES graduates from Tetrefu 
ICCES (Ashanti), though most of those available to participate were male (only 4/24 were 
female) (tables 6.8-6.9). The graduation year of these focus group participants ranged from 1990 
to 2005, providing a whole range of opinion. A further focus group (n=7) (table 6.10) was 
organised with final year ICCES trainees at Tetrefu ICCES. In addition to general discussions in 
the focus group, some members of the focus groups were interviewed individually to enrich the 
data.307 
 
Both the interviews and focus group discussions, however, are in no way representative of all 
ICCES graduates. Since locating graduates of the programme is very difficult (as many are not 
                                                 
303 See Appendix B for the questionnaires. 
304 Despite the fact that most ICCES students come from communities outside the one where the ICCES 
centre is located, most centre managers/instructors still have a close relationship with surrounding 
communities and are able to keep track of what most former graduates get up to. 
305 Baworo, Otaakrom, Nerebehi, Ofoase, Twedie, Dweaso Prase and Tetrefu. 
306 Care was taken not to duplicate any responses when merging the two sets of data. 
307 The three different focus groups are referred to as FG1, FG2 and FG3. 
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residents of the community in which ICCES centres are located, and the mobility of graduates 
appears high) those interviewed comprised those people who were relatively easy to locate (or 
those 30%, above, who were able to respond to the questionnaire). The findings, therefore, should 
be interpreted with caution, and used more as a suggestive illustration of the activities of ICCES 
graduates. It is also important to remember that many ICCES trainees drop-out of the training and 
hence never complete the full three years. More research is needed to find out about the large 
numbers of ICCES-trained youth who never make it to final year graduation. 
Table 6.8. Composition of focus group 1 (FG1), ICCES graduates, Tetrefu ICCES,
09.10.05  
Highest level
Name Sex Age Trade area Year finished of education
before ICCES
Jusif M 28 Building 1996 JSS3
Constance F 26 Dressmaking 2001 JSS3
Edwood M 22 Building 2005 JSS3
Francis M 19 Building 2005 JSS3
Patricia F 20 Dressmaking 2002 JSS3
Seth M 22 Building 2003 JSS3
Isaac M 23 Building 2001 JSS3
Grace F 21 Dressmaking 2003 JSS3
Kusi M 25 Building 1999 JSS3
Yaa F 23 Dressmaking 2001 JSS3  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Table 6.9. Compostion of focus group 2 (FG2), ICCES graduates, Tetrefu ICCES,
09.10.05  
Highest level
Name Sex Age Trade area Year finished of education
before ICCES
Salisu M 22 Building 2005 JSS3
Alexander M 21 Building 2004 JSS3
Soloman M 30 Building 1998 SSS
Frank M 34 Carpentry 1990 MidForm 4
Alex M 33 Carpentry 1990 MidForm 4
James M 34 Building 1992 MidForm 4
Owusu M 33 Building 1992 JSS3
Amankwabo M 27 Building 1996 JSS3
Dennis M 22 Building 2001 JSS3
Patrick M 24 Carpentry 2001 JSS3
Danquah M 25 Building 2001 JSS3
Yeboah M 27 Building 1999 JSS3
Isaac M 32 Building 1996 MidForm 4
Osei M 34 Carpentry 1990 MidForm 4  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
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Table 6.10. Compostion of focus group 3 (FG3), final year ICCES trainees, Tetrefu
ICCES, 09.10.05  
Name Sex Age Trade area
Peter M 20 Building
Afrifa M 20 Draftsmanship
Collins M 20 Electricals
George M 18 Building
Isaac M 22 Electricals
Emmanuel M 20 Building
Attah M 17 Building  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
6.3.1 Further training 
 
McGrath et al. (1995), commenting on the fact that “[s]ubject to their performance [in 
examinations] these [ICCES] trainees may then be admitted into senior secondary school308 
…[note that] [i]t is clear… such training may lead to leakages into higher academic institutions 
rather than bring the advantages of further education to the informal sector” (p.73). 
 
6/7 participants of FG3 (table 6.10) – final year ICCES trainees – mentioned that they planned to 
go onto do further training. Only Collins indicated that he would not do this – but only because 
his parents did not have the money to help him further. This small group of trainees seemed 
generally positive about ICCES, despite listing many problems with their training.309 They 
considered that ICCES would provide them with a skill which can be used to get work: 
 
ICCES is “better than SSS – if you come and don’t pass [exams] you can do your own 
job” (Collins, FG3). 
 
“After ICCES I can do my own job” (Isaac, FG3). 
 
“The moment you complete you can find a job to do… either join someone else or work 
for self” (Emmanuel, FG3) 
 
Despite this acknowledgement that they could use their skills to be self-employed, the general 
preference was for wage-employment. As one member of the group noted, “if [you] have [your] 
own job [you] won’t get many [sic] money” (Peter, FG3). 
                                                 
308 The authors were referring to Boeh-Ocansey’s Ghana paper written for this synthesis. In fact ICCES 
graduates at the time of Boeh-Ocansey’s study (1993) could not use their certificates to enter SSS (Budu-
Smith, 1997). 
309 Including: lack of text books, teachers, tools/materials and games equipment. 
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Moreover, even in this small group there was not agreement about whether ICCES or SSS was 
better. While Collins, above, thought that ICCES was better than SSS, most of the others 
considered that ICCES was a second best option compared to SSS and that the job opportunities 
with ICCES training were worse: 
 
“My parents don’t have money to send [me] to SSS, so decided to come [send me] to 
ICCES. But you get a better job with SSS” (Attah, FG3). 
 
This high desire among ICCES trainees to continue training was also seen in another survey 
conducted at one ICCES centre in Ashanti Region, which revealed that 79% (22/28) of current 
final year ICCES trainees wanted to continue their education/training on completion of the three 
year vocational course (fieldwork, 2004).310 
 
This recognition of the better job opportunities available to those with higher certificates,  
compared to those with only ICCES training, is undoubtedly the main reason why so many 
ICCES trainees intend to pursue further training after ICCES.  
 
While final year ICCES trainees show a clear intention to pursue further training, it is interesting 
to examine how many do this, and what type of training they undertake. As noted above, data was 
collected from 162 ICCES graduates, who graduated between 2000 and 2004 from seven 
different ICCES centres in Ashanti Region. 
 
This survey of 162 graduates suggests that many are indeed pursuing further training after they 
finish ICCES (table 6.11). In fact 42% (68/162) had pursued further training after ICCES – 
though not, largely, at the SSS level as suggested by Boeh-Ocansey (1993, in McGrath et al, 
1995). Of these, 21% (14/68) had undertaken apprenticeship training, 74% (50/68) had 
undertaken C&G or Construction Technician Courses (CTC), and 6% (4/68) had undertaken 
other training.311 This suggests that there is a view among ICCES graduates that ICCES training 
alone is not sufficient. The preferred option for further training is for ICCES graduates to follow a 
more formal education route, e.g. C&G/CTC, which leads to higher formal education certificates 
and the possibility of entering yet further education at polytechnic level. More than one in five 
(21%), however, pursue apprenticeship training.  
                                                 
310 About 35% of trainees indicated that they hoped to become teachers. 
311 Two were in SSS, one was getting training from the police and the other was training outside Ghana. 
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Out of the 42 female graduates in the sample, 15 (36%) had undertaken further training: of these 
the majority pursued apprenticeships and those that did undertake C&G did not continue to CTC 
level. Out of the 120 male graduates in the sample, 53 (44%) had undertaken further training: of 
these the majority had pusued C&G training (and 1/3 of these had gone on the CTC), while far 
fewer opted for apprenticeship. Male and female ICCES graduates, therefore, seem to follow two 



















JSS Junior Secondary School
ICCES Integrated Community Centre for Employable Skills
TAT Traditional Apprenticeship Training
C&G City and Guilds
CTC Craft Technician Certificate  
 
Table 6.11. Further training received by ICCES trainees, from a sample of 2000-
2004 cohorts from Tetrefu, Nerebehi, Bawro, Dweaso Praso, Twedie, Otaakrom and
Ofoase ICCES  
Male Female Total
Freq. % As a % of Freq. % As a % of Freq. % As a % of
Type of those with those with those with 
further training further further further
training training training
Apprenticeship 6 5 11.3 8 19 53.3 14 8.6 20.6
City and Guilds 30 25 56.6 7 16.7 46.7 37 22.8 54.4
CTC 13 10.8 24.5 0 0 0 13 8 19.1
Other training 4 3.3 7.5 0 0 0 4 2.5 5.9
   Those with training subtotal 53 44.2 99.9 15 35.7 100 68 42 100
No further training 67 55.8 - 27 64.3 - 94 58 -
Total 120 99.9 - 42 100 - 162 99.9 -  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
It is usually the male graduates (who have taken courses like building/construction or carpentry) 
that are most likely to continue their training in formal VTIs to achieve higher certificates, with a 
view of gaining formal employment, often in teaching (FG1&2). The preference for getting 












Fig.6.2. Post-ICCES training pathways (female graduates) 
 226 
work is based on qualifications and hence ICCES graduates want to get to the highest level 
possible (FG1&2). In order to continue formal training post-ICCES it is not uncommon for 
graduates to have to work for a number of years to save up for the fees as the following case 
studies illustrate: 
 
After graduating from a building/construction course (1996), Jusif hoped to continue 
studying and eventually go to university. However, since his parents could not afford this 
he ended up working for three years in building projects (per day basis). By 1999 Jusif 
had saved enough money to attend the local secondary technical school (STS). He 
considered that an STS certificate would help him get access to university. Since 
graduating from STS in 2001, he has gone back to working for construction firms on a 
per day basis and is trying to save money for further study. (FG1)  
 
Kusi finished a building/construction course in 1999 and worked on a per-day basis for 
two years to save money for tuition fees for further training. He has since completed CTC 
part 1. (FG1) 
 
Other ICCES graduates, especially female graduates, continue their training by doing a three year 
traditional apprenticeship course. This pathway suggests that the training that has been received 
in ICCES is not of sufficient practical orientation to allow graduates to become self-employed. 
More worryingly, it might suggest that ICCES trainees, as well as customers, recognise the 
inferior quality of ICCES training, and hence graduates feel the need to get more training. One 
youth commented that “people prefer apprentice-trained dressmakers instead of ICCES-trained 
dressmaking graduates as there is poor quality teaching in dressmaking [at ICCES]” (FG1&2).  
 
The fact that more female ICCES graduates enter apprenticeships, instead of entering more 
formalised further training, suggests that female graduates have less opportunity than male 
graduates to continue down this latter path. Individual interviews with three dressmakers from 
FG1 show that ICCES dressmaking graduates appear concerned that the skills they have received 
are not sufficient and want to continue further training – in apprenticeships: 
 
After completing a dressmaking course (2003), Grace decided to do an apprenticeship as 
she considered herself not qualified after finishing the three year course at ICCES. After 
the apprenticeship, she wants to establish her own enterprise. (FG1) 
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Constance graduated from a dressmaking course in 2001 but felt that she had not 
acquired enough skills during the course and so decided to undertake an apprenticeship. 
She is now a master dressmaker, but works from her parent’s house where she lives, as 
she cannot afford her own kiosk yet. (FG1) 
 
Patricia finished a dressmaking course in 2002. However, she saw that people prefer to 
buy things from dressmakers trained through apprenticeship as ICCES trained 
dressmakers are seen as receiving poor quality training. She is currently doing an 
apprenticeship. (FG1) 
 
While these focus group discussions suggest that the labour market appears to favour apprentice-
trained dressmakers over ICCES-trained dressmakers, the opposite is claimed for the male-
dominated trades: “in general, ICCES trained C&J [carpentry and joinery] and BC 
[building/construction] people do better than apprentice trained people in these areas” (FG1&2). 
 
The view of this latter focus group – that ICCES graduates are better than apprentice graduates – 
is reinforced in other ways. The ICCES Directorate comment that “[i]t has been generally 
accepted that ICCES graduates are deft at practicals because of their on the job training 
orientation” (ICCES, 1996: 7). Similarly centres managers in ICCES Ashanti Region also 
consider ICCES graduates to be better trained than apprentices (personal communication 2001-
2006). Moreover, the good pass rate for the proficiency NVTI exams (table 6.7) shows that 
ICCES graduates do perform well practically.312 The decision some make to enter apprenticeship 
after ICCES may have more to do with the need to develop enterprise networks and learn more 
about the functions of doing business – both aspects which are absent in ICCES training – rather 
than about learning further practical skills. 
 
6.3.2 Employment activities of ICCES graduates in the labour market 
 
From the interviews conducted with the 60 ICCES graduates from three centres during the 
summer of 2005, it can be said that 37 were currently in the labour market, while a further 23 
                                                 
312 In fact, contrary to the opinions of the dressmakers noted above regarding the low quality of ICCES 
dressmaking graduates, the NVTI proficiency exam results for dressmaking are particularly high (table 
6.7). 
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were in further training. In addition the data collected from the other 110 ICCES graduates 
revealed that 73 trainees were operating in the labour market, while a further 29 were in further 
training. Combining both data sets together, while excluding those graduates in further training, 
provides a sample size of 110 (37+73).  
 
Out of the 110 graduates in the sample, 85% were reported to be undertaking some form of paid 
work (table 6.12).313 A further 15% (5% of male graduates and as much as 38% of female 
graduates) characterised themselves, or were described by the centre managers/instructors, as not 
working. However, while these individuals might not have been working to earn income, it is 
very likely – especially for the female graduates – that they were indeed working on their family 
farm. Support for this proposition came from focus group discussions (FG1&2). 
 
About 33% (36/110) of all the ICCES graduates were working in informal self-employment, 36% 
(40/110) in informal wage-employment and 14% (16/110) in the formal sector.314  
 
Out of the women interviewed who were currently in the labour market (n=34), nearly 40% were 
characterised as not working and 44% were working in informal self-employment.315  
 
Male graduates seemed more likely to be working in informal wage-employment (in their trade 
area) than female graduates (46% of male and 3% of female graduates worked in this area). Male 
graduates, particularly those in building/construction trades, are more likely to get work on an 
informal contract basis with construction companies (usually working only part of the year) 
(FG1&2). This informal contract work is typically paid on a per-day or per-month basis and 
might last only 2-4 months of the year. Indeed “it is normal that [only] few of them continue to 
work [for companies on monthly salaries] since contractors chose to lay off workers at the end of 
each contract”.316 Most of the construction companies do not register their workers with the 
SSNIT, which saves the employer money since they do not have to pay their employees 
contributions, and makes it easier to lay people off “when the contractor is out of job”, though the 
                                                 
313 Note that some of these 110 graduates will have been through additional training after ICCES before 
entering the labour market. 
314 The majority of those working in formal employment had pursued further formal training after ICCES 
(e.g. C&G/CTC). 
315 However, as noted above, it is likely that many female graduates who were characterised as not working 
were in fact working on the family farm. 
316 ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication (email) 29.03.06. 
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“lucky ones at times get permanent jobs”.317 Often “contractors want cheap labour so choose to 
employ people on a daily basis” (FG1&2). Moreover, depending on the contractor, an NVTI 
certificate may in fact be a disadvantage in the labour market since “contractors sometimes prefer 
less qualified people [without certificates] as they are cheaper” (FG1&2). Construction 
companies are supposed to pay their workers a monthly salary which is based on the GoG salary 
structure and varies according to qualifications held.318 
 
While this informal per-day wage-employment is popular among building/construction ICCES 
graduates, it is recognised that this work usually does not pay well and hence there is mobility in 
and out of this type of work as the following case illustrates: 
 
Seth and Isaac both finished a building/construction course in 2003 and have been doing 
building work on a per-day basis since then. Seth recently left, however, as the pay was 
not good and now wants to apply for wage-employment in a company. Isaac, on the other 
hand, is still doing per-day work but wants to set up his own enterprise as the pay is not 
good, though he does not know where he will find the money. (FG1) 
 
Getting access to start-up capital prevents many graduates from being able to use their skills on 
graduation, which is another reason why some enter informal wage-employment (FG1&2). 
Honny (1999) identifies the difficulty NVTI graduates face in accessing finance and buying start-
up equipment. 
 
While it appears more common for male ICCES graduates to find employment in this informal 
wage sector, there are also opportunities for females in wage-employment. Dressmakers, for 
example, might find work “for the more endowed fashion designers for monthly salaries which 
are negotiable”.319 
 
Not an insignificant percentage of the 110 ICCES graduates surveyed were working in formal 
wage-employment (14.5%).320 Focus group participants identified two main pathways for ICCES 
graduates to get a formal sector job; i) “to whom you know – It is important to know someone to 
push you through”; ii) “cold knocking on companies to see if they have a job” (FG1&2). 
                                                 
317 ICCES Ashanit Regional Coordinator, personal communication (email) 30.03.06. 
318 ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication (email) 30.03.06. 
319 ICCES Ashanti Regional Coordinator, personal communication (email) 30.03.06. 
320 As noted, most of these received further formal training post-ICCES. 
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On average 14.5% of graduates (15.8% of males and 11.8% of females) were not using the skills 
acquired through ICCES in their current employment activity (table 6.12). However, if it is 
assumed that many, if not most, ICCES graduates who were characterised as not working were in 
fact working on a family farm (as focus group discussions would suggest) the total number of 
graduates not using their skills acquired through ICCES increases significantly. In this case 30% 
of all graduates (21% of male graduates and 50% of female graduates) were not using their skills 
in their current employment activity. Many of these ICCES graduates, lacking either the 
connections or the capital to utilise their skills, go back to the farm and continue to assist their 
family as before. Female ICCES graduates seem to have less opportunity to continue 
education/training and less opportunity to start-up their own enterprise. Many female graduates 
are observed to be not working in the trades that they have trained in, and not a small number go 
back to farming with their family (FG1&2). 
 
Table 6.12. Current employment activity of graduates from a sample of 2000-2004
cohorts from Tetrefu, Nerebehi, Bawro, Dweaso Praso, Twedie, Otaakrom and
Ofoase ICCES  
Male Female Total
Current activity Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Informal self-employed in trade area 15 19.7 11 32.4 26 23.6
Informal self-employed not in trade area 6 7.9 4 11.8 10 9.1
Informal wage work in trade area 35 46.1 1 2.9 36 32.7
Informal wage work not in trade area 4 5.3 0 0 4 3.6
Formal wage employment in trade area 10 13.2 5 14.7 15 13.6
Formal wage employment not in trade area 1 1.3 0 0 1 0.9
Farming with family 1 1.3 0 0 1 0.9
Not working 4 5.3 13 38.2 17 15.5
Total 76 100.1 34 100 110 99.9  




Many ICCES trainees do not make it to graduation. Of those that do, the pass rate of 85% for the 
NVTI one proficiency exam is encouraging, though given what has been said in the previous 
section regarding the quality of training provision, one has to question exactly what passing 
NVTI proficiency means vis-à-vis competency levels. For the full trade test only 50% pass the 
NVTI one exam. Many ICCES graduates (as much as one-third) are pursuing further formal 
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training to the C&G and CTC levels, though males are more likely to take this route. Further 
training for females is more likely to be through traditional apprenticeships.      
 
Of those that do enter the labour market, most (85%) appear to find employment in the informal 
sector, either in wage- or self-employment.  
 
The ability of building/construction graduates to access informal wage-employment (compared to 
those in other trade areas) may account for the popularity of the building/construction course in 
Ashanti (as noted earlier, about 40% of all ICCES trainees in this region are in this trade area). 
 
Some ICCES graduates that have managed to acquire C&G or CTC certificates have been able to 
access formal employment. Nonetheless about one-third of all graduates (and as much as half of 
all female graduates) have not been able to utilise the skills they have acquired in ICCES training 




First, this chapter has shown that the delivery context of training is both very complex and 
absolutely crucial: ICCES training suffers from multiple disabling factors which inhibit quality 
training provision. 
 
Secondly, in examining the current situation of ICCES, an obvious question that emerges is; why 
do youth want to go to ICCES at all if the quality is so bad? There are probably at least two 
factors that might explain this: first, most entrants can’t access other second-cycle institutions 
(SSS, NVTIs) due to poor BECE aggregates or higher fees and so ‘come-down’ to ICCES – the 
only public formalised training offering certification that does not have official entry 
requirements (like a specified BECE aggregate) (cf. World Bank, 1991: 58); second, the NVTI 
certificate that ICCES provides might encourage enrolment: it offers the youth both a chance to 
access further training after ICCES, and the possibility of using the certificate to access formal 
employment. This is despite the fact that pass rates for the full trade test (for those that do make it 
to the final year) appear to be around the 50% mark.  
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Thirdly, from the objectives pursued by ICCES, it is possible to identify a number of underlying 
assumptions inherent in the design, implementation and expected outcomes of ICCES. It is 
assumed that: 
 
• Communities will have the managerial and financial capacity, as well as sufficient 
power and social capital, to be able to keep ICCES centres running and resourced. 
However, community support is often not sufficient to sustain centres, causing many to 
close. Most ICCES centres are located in poor areas; to expect, therefore, poor 
communities to sustain centres is unrealistic. Moreover, kobwo contributes to some 
ICCES centres only having a small number of trainees from the community training in 
that centre. This reduces the community’s desire to fund the training centres (and also 
increases the need for investment in student hostels). 
 
• ICCES training helps to empower the most vulnerable groups of society (e.g. youth, 
illiterates, school drop-outs). While it is true that the poor do get access to ICCES 
centres, probably to a higher degree than in other formal VTIs, poor trainees still find it 
hard to pay fees and, depending on the centre manager, might not be allowed take the 
final exam, continue to the next year if fees for the previous year remain in arrears, or 
might not be allowed to collect their certificate. Other centre managers simply sack those 
trainees that have not paid fees and, in so doing, sack the poor from the training centre. 
The fact that the majority of ICCES trainees have completed JSS3 signals, however, that 
ICCES has failed to connect with the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. What is 
particularly unfortunate from a poverty reduction perspective, is that the lowest cost 
public provision of skills for poorer young people in ICCES has been the most neglected 
by the GoG. 
 
• Providing entrepreneurial studies as part of the curriculum will enable trainees to 
become entrepreneurs. While the basics of doing business can be taught, it is likely that 
the most successful entrepreneurs have not been taught such subjects, but have built up 
their skill from their attitude, from their ambition and from the example of others (Logie, 
2004). 
 
• Providing trade-related training will turn out graduate trainees who are not only 
employable, but who are “preferably self-employed within and around their own 
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communities” (ICCES, 1996: 1). The evidence suggests that a high number of ICCES 
trainees, especially the male graduates, aim to undertake further formal training (usually 
C&G) with a view of getting higher certificates and jobs in the formal sector. The most 
able and most resourced trainees, therefore, are frequently not taking the advantages of 
further education into the informal sector (cf. McGrath et al., 1995). Graduates that cannot 
afford further formal training post-ICCES opt to pursue traditional apprenticeship training 
– this is especially the case for females. Many students, therefore, are not using ICCES to 
equip themselves with self-employment skills but, rather, as another pathway to 
certification and hopes of formal employment. Those who undertake apprenticeship 
training after ICCES obviously consider ICCES training as insufficient in some way as a 
precursor for self-employment. Nonetheless, once ICCES graduates move into the labour 
market, it appears most are finding some kind of employment, predominantly in the 
informal sector; most commonly in self- or (temporary) wage-employment. 
 
Lastly, fig.6.3 shows how the employment pathways noted above relate to the theoretical 
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Fig.6.3. Post-ICCES pathways to training, employment and enterprise 
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Chapter 7: Short-Duration Skills Training and Enterprise-Based Training in 




This chapter complements the previous chapter - that focused on an example of pre-employment 
skills training in ICCES - by examining two other types of skills acquisition modalities and 
presenting new evidence on these programmes.  
 
The first section examines an example of a short-duration skills programme: the Skills Training 
and Entrepreneurship Programme (STEP) that trained some 27,500 people.321 This section will 
draw on interviews with STEP training providers and government officials conducted between 
2003-2006, as well as documents on STEP. The evidence presented will include an analysis of the 
training and post-training environments as well as the political origins of the programme.   
 
The second section examines informal enterprise-based training (traditional apprenticeships) and 
draws on fieldwork in rural Ashanti during 2005 which included interviews with 160 apprentices. 
In addition to an analysis of the training environment, this section presents new evidence on the 
characteristics of rural apprenticeship, the backgrounds of apprentices and their expectations 
regarding entry into informal micro-enterprise (IME).322 
 
Like the previous chapter the emphasis will be on looking at skills acquisition in rural areas, 
though the modalities discussed also occur in urban settings. In fact much of the literature on 
traditional apprenticeship training, in particular, has focused on their characteristics and 
functioning in urban areas and hence the evidence presented here will go some way to 
contributing to an understanding of this  skills acquisition modality in rural areas. 
 
Like ICCES (chap.6), with the STEP there is an assumed link between skills provision and 
employment creation; though the intended provision of micro-finance to STEP graduates is 
                                                 
321 STEP initially stood for ‘Skills Training and Employment Placement Programme’ when it started in 
2003 but was later renamed in the GPRS II as a result of GoG concerns about those trained under STEP 
expecting employment after training. 
322 The following chapter (8) complements this section: it analyses the findings of retrospective interviews 
conducted with rural mastercraftspeople - most of whom undertook an apprenticeship prior to entry into 
IME. 
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expected to ease this transition. By contrast, the traditional apprenticeships operate out with the 
remit of government and training is regarded as being more closely related to employment.  
 
7.1. Section one: the short-duration skills training modality  
 
This section will examine an example of short-duration training in Ghana that aimed to link 
TVET to self-employment creation: the Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Programme 
(STEP). Between 2003-2005 STEP was very high on both the GoG’s political and policy agendas 
and has since been phased into the National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP).323 
 
There has been very little written on STEP to date (mostly internal or consultancy reports, e.g. 
Preddey, 2005), and not, to the author’s knowledge for a wider or academic audience.324 And yet 
it provides some useful lessons about providing training only – STEP was meant to be 
complemented by micro-finance but this has only materialized for, at most, 10% of all those 
trained.  
 
This section takes the following structure: first it examines the background and objectives of 
STEP; second it looks at the training delivery context; and, last it examines what evidence there is 
related to the post-training outcomes of STEP graduates and whether or not they are making the 
expected move into the IME sector. 
 
7.2. Background and objectives of STEP 
 
During 2000 when the NPP, led by John Kufuor, was campaigning in the run up to the December 
election a key pledge made by them was job creation. Indeed the NPP manifesto specifically 
mentioned the intention was to “create jobs for all persons able and willing to work and to reward 
each of them appropriately” (NPP, 1996: sect.1.31). Thus the average voter could not be criticised 
for thinking that if they voted for the NPP, they might be in a better off situation as a result of 
more jobs being created. 
 
Having won the December election, in early 2001 the Vice-President “[reportedly] gave an 
assurance that the government will keep faith with its election promises of creating wealth and 
                                                 
323 See chap.5.2. 
324 But see Palmer (2005a). 
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jobs” (GNA, 2001a). Much was expected of the NPP job creation pledges: during the election 
campaign one NPP parliamentary candidate had reportedly said the NPP would create 750,000 
jobs.325 However a few days after the Vice-President’s assurance, the NPP “members in 
Parliament… denied ever making a promise to create 750,000 jobs in the first 100 days of it 
coming into power” (GNA, 2001b). 
 
In fact it soon became clear that the intention was not to create mass wage-employment for the 
people, but for the people to create jobs, or mass self-employment, for themselves in the informal 
economy.326 The government’s role in job creation would be limited to supporting the 
development of an enabling environment and the provision of skills training (GoG, 2003a). 
 
From September-December 2001 the NPP government organised a country-wide 
‘unemployment’ registration exercise “which attracted one million unemployed people”, mostly 
aged 15-24 (GNA, 2002) and educated to the basic level or above (GoG, 2004e).327 The 2000 
Population and Housing Census had estimated unemployment to be 11.2% of the country’s 
population, or some 2 million people (GNA, 2002; GoG, 2004e). The ‘unemployment’ 
registration exercise, therefore, captured about half of those deemed to be ‘unemployed’. 
President Kufuor, in the preface to the Youth Employment Programme brochure, noted that the 
2001 unemployment exercise was undertaken “to give us a good understanding of the nature and 
scope of the unemployment situation among the youth so as to be able to deal with it very 
effectively” (GoG, 2006c: iii). Arguably the exercise was so politicised and hampered by 
methodological difficulties, associated with defining and registering the ‘unemployed’, that it has 
not provided the government with a good understanding at all.328  
 
Those that were registered in the exercise were asked about their aspirations regarding what they 
wanted to do. Data on the registration exercise from the MoMYE show that only 14% reportedly 
                                                 
325 The promise of 750,000 jobs appears to have come from Kofi Wayo when he was the NPP’s 
parliamentary candidate for the Ayawaso East Constituency during the 2000 election campaign (a 
constituency he later failed to win).   
326 King (2005b) notes a similar case in Kenya, where in February 2003, the new government under Kibaki, 
stated it was the government’s intention to create 500,000 jobs per year. This was qualified in June 2003, 
when the government announced that 88% of these 500,000 jobs were to be created in the informal 
economy by the people themselves.  
327 Of the 943,212 people registered, 771,000 (82%) had completed JSS or middle school, a further 77,000 
(8%) had a post-basic education.  
328 There are huge difficulties with ‘unemployment’ figures in most developing countries, including Ghana 
(chap.2.3). 
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requested training (table 7.1). Most respondents, it appears, wanted either assistance in setting up 
an enterprise (34%) or a position (wage-employment) in an ongoing project (40%). 
 
Table 7.1. Responses from the 2001 unemployment registration exercise
(aspirations of respondents)  
Option Freq. Percent
To be trained in a skill/trade area 74,100 7.86
To seek apprenticeship training/attachment 61,000 6.47
To be assisted to set up their own enterprises 321,100 34.04
To be placed in ongoing and impending projects 377,012 39.97
To continue general education 84,000 8.91
To be re-integrated into families 1,000 0.11
Other 25,000 2.65
943,212 100.00  
Source: GoG, 2004e  
 
However, these results were used to support the implementation of skills training programmes for 
the ‘unemployed’. The, then, deputy Minister (MoMDE) reportedly said that this exercise 
“revealed that 60 per cent of the unemployed who registered did not want immediate employment 
but wanted to be equipped with entrepreneurial skills” (GNA, 2002). This 60% figure must have 
come from those that responded they wanted skills training (14%), those that said they wanted to 
be assisted to set up an enterprise (34%) and those that said they wanted to continue general 
education (9%).329 
 
Therefore, in spite of the fact that most respondents were seeking (self- or wage-) employment 
and not skills training, as a result of the country-wide unemployment census the MoMDE was 
mandated to draw up programmes to train the youth to acquire employable skills. This included: 
• Competency training for master craftsmen/women; 
• Apprenticeship training for the unemployed; 
• Opening of ICCES Centres in all 110 districts330 (GoG, 2004l). 
 
                                                 
329 An unpublished document from the MoMYE comments that the planned intervention for those who 
reported that they wanted to be ‘assisted to set up an enterprise’ was entrepreneurial training and access to 
micro-credit (GoG, 2004e). The comment from the Deputy Minister was therefore misleading and referred 
to the MoMYE’s planned interventions and not to the responses of those who said they wanted to be 
‘assisted’. It is very likely that those who responded that they wanted to be ‘assisted’ to set up an enterprise 
did not have in mind training but access to start-up capital. Indeed this is what a World Bank report has 
taken this to mean (cf. World Bank, 2005b). 
330 There are now 138 districts in Ghana (August 2006). 
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Consequently, the two most visible manifestations of this skills policy became an expanded 
ICCES network (chap.6), on the one hand, and STEP on the other. While ICCES had been in 
existence since 1986, STEP was initiated as a direct response to the government promise to tackle 
youth unemployment if it won political power (Daily Graphic, 18.08.03).  
 
STEP intended to reduce poverty by providing employable skills and other assistance (including 
micro-finance) to the ‘unemployed’ enabling them to become productively employed, mainly 
self-employed in the informal economy. STEP training was delivered through existing service 
providers, including the ICCES, GRATIS, NVTI and other public and private VTIs 
nationwide.331 Funding was made available by allocations from the HIPC Fund.332 
 
The objectives of STEP were (GoG, 2004g) to: 
• Offer short, demand-driven competency based vocational/technical training; 
• Make trainees self-employable, instead of relying on central Government to offer those 
jobs; 
• Stem the unbridled drift from the rural to urban areas in search of non existent jobs; 
• Reduce the endemic poverty and create awareness for wealth creation. 
 
STEP is comprised of three principal components: 
• Skills training delivered through vocational training providers: STEP training courses 
ran for three to twelve months in 58 training areas (fig.7.1). In addition to the main trade 
skill being taught, STEP trainees were instructed in entrepreneurial and cooperative 
formation skills. On completion the intention was that they would be able to create 
employment for themselves in cooperatives.  
 
• Skills enhancement for master-craftspeople and skills training delivered through 
apprenticeship placements: Master-craftspeople undertook a few days training with 
GRATIS to make them more effective trainers. Skills training was then delivered by 
attaching up to 10 trainees to a master-craftsperson to undertake a workshop-based 
apprenticeship for up to twelve months. 
 
                                                 
331 ICCES had an important role to play in the delivery of STEP as noted shortly. 
332 ¢11.16 billion (US$1.1 million) was allocated to in 2003 to implement STEP (GoG, 2004c). 
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• Micro-finance component: This component, launched in December 2004, intended to 
provide capital to those trained under STEP to set up their own enterprises. Funding was 
to be made available from HIPC funds to micro-finance institutions (MFIs) for on-
lending to qualified trained STEP graduates. Two MFIs participated: the Women’s World 
Banking Ghana (WWBG) and rural bank network under the Association of Rural Banks 
APEX (ARB APEX). 
 
There were meant to be three training phases to the STEP programme: phase one February–July 
2003; phase two November 2003–2005; but phase three, due to commence in September 2005, 
was discontinued. Indeed in March 2005, when the teams of ministers changed over, the new 
team decided not to continue with the planned phase three of STEP in its current form.333 The 
MoMYE’s Chief Director said in November 2005 that STEP had not been discontinued totally, 
adding that it would be placed under the new NYEP which is to have skills training and 
placement components (GNA, 2005a). The NYEP is supposed to absorb STEP graduates who 
have been trained but not yet placed in jobs or using their skills in self-employment.334 
 
                                                 
333 Deputy Minister MoMYE, 2003-05, personal communication (email) 26.03.06. 
334 NYEP Director, personal communication 01.08.06. 
Fig.7.1. STEP training courses 
 
three month courses in 12 training areas including:  
Bamboo Processing; Batik, Tie and Dye; Beads Making; Bicycle Repairing; Food Processing; Floral 
Works; Hospitality and Tourism (10 Weeks); Printing; Rural Craft; Steel Bending; Textiles and Soap 
Production 
 
six month courses in 42 training areas including:  
Ashanti Cloth Designing; Auto Body Repairs; Auto-Engineering; Auto Electrical; Building and 
Construction; Beautician; Basketry and Beads Making; Cane/Basketry; Carpentry and Joinery; 
Carving; Carpentry/Furniture Making; Cosmetology; Dressmaking/Tailoring; Electrical; Electronics; 
Food Processing; Food Processing Technology; Food Processing Materials Packaging; Hairdressing; 
Jewellery; Information and Communications Technology (ICT); Kente Weaving; Leatherworks; 
Machining; Painting and Decoration; Multimedia Production; Perfumery/Detergents/Hair care; 
Plumbing; Pottery/Ceramics; Radio and Television; Photography and Video Production; Production 
of Concrete; Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning; Tailoring and Apprenticeship Training; Traditional 
Cloth Weaving; Traditional Footwear Making; Textiles and Printing; Weaving; Wood Processing;  
Welding and Fabrication. 
 
twelve month courses in 4 training areas including:  
Apprenticeship Training Scheme; Draughtmanship and Construction; Foundry; Garment 
Construction 
 
Source: Preddey, 2005 
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7.3. The training delivery context of STEP 
 
STEP training occurred in both the formal training environment in public and private VTIs and in 
the informal training environment in apprenticeship placements.  
 
7.3.1. Skills training delivered through vocational training providers: the case of 
ICCES 
 
One modality by which STEP training was delivered was through vocational training providers – 
including both public and private VTIs. And, as noted in chapter 6, ICCES played a significant 
role in the delivery of STEP training in the VTIs. In phase one of STEP 37% (43/117) of all VTIs 
delivering STEP training were ICCES centres. In phase two ICCES centres accounted for 48% 
(49/103) of public VTIs delivering STEP and 34% (1,369/4,052) of trainees in the public VTIs 
(Preddey, 2005).335  
 
The mechanism by which training was delivered through ICCES was as follows.336 Once the 
centres were identified that were to deliver the training, details were placed in the national papers 
to inform those who had previously registered as ‘unemployed’ during the 2001 exercise that they 
could register for the training. Centre managers were told to register a maximum of 25 trainees 
per course per phase, on a first-come first-registered basis, though in many cases substantially 
more than 25 trainees were enrolled. The government then paid about ¢555,000 (US$61) per 
trainee to the ICCES centre that provided the training, but only for a maximum of 25 trainees per 
centre (Logie, 2004).337 This was to cover the training fee thus making STEP training free to 
those enrolled, apart from a nominal commitment fee of ¢5,000 (US$0.55) payable on registration 
(GoG, 2004h).  
 
The ¢555,000 per trainee paid by government was allocated as follows: 20% for ICCES 
administration; 30% for tuition, and 50% for training materials (Logie, 2004). An average ICCES 
centre, therefore, would receive about ¢13 million (US$1,440) for 25 STEP trainees (about 3 
                                                 
335 In all there were some 244 VTIs in phase two of STEP (103 public and 141 private), training 12,664 
people (4,052 in public VTIs and 8,612 in private VTIs). Of all the VTIs providing training in phase two of 
STEP, ICCES centres were responsible for 49/244 (20%) of the service provision. 
336 STEP training in other public/private VTIs followed a similar mechanism. 
337 This amount was for a dressmaking course. The amount of fees paid by the government for each course 
varied slightly; construction courses, for example, were allocated ¢800,000 per trainee (c.US$88). 
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million of which was for administration) meaning that, “[t]o some extent… [this] subsidise[d] the 
rest of the Centre” (Logie, 2004: 19). 
 
The short-duration STEP training delivered through VTIs was meant to be kept separate from the 
regular (three-year) VTI training. In practice, however, in some cases STEP training delivered by 
ICCES centres was given to all their students, regardless of whether they were STEP trainees or 
regular three-year ICCES students. This cross-over had both positive and negative repercussions. 
One the one hand existing ICCES trainees were able to benefit from STEP training being 
conducted; e.g. ICCES dressmaking students benefited from learning batik or soap making 
intended for STEP trainees.338 On the other hand, however, it is likely that the training quality 
was reduced as the centres were only supplied by the government with sufficient materials to 
cover STEP trainees – and not extra bodies. 
 
A consultant’s evaluation of STEP training at ICCES noted that centres liked to deliver STEP 
training since there was “some benefit to the “normal” students, partly from the funding coming 
into the school, and partly from the overlap of training and the mixing with older students” 
(Logie, 2004: 20). 
 
7.3.2. Skills enhancement for master-craftspeople and skills training delivered through 
apprenticeship placements 
 
Apprenticeship training organised by GRATIS either took place in their own facilities - where 
“adequate” (GoG, 2004f) equipment and machinery existed for the training - or in IMEs with 
master-craftspeople identified by GRATIS. 
 
Many master-craftspeople that were given apprentices to train by GRATIS could not provide a 
decent training environment (e.g. protective clothing) and were ill-resourced in tools and 
equipment (GoG, 2004f). Master-craftspeople complained about receiving insufficient funding to 
adequately train apprentices: while the GRATIS foundation was being paid ¢500,000 (c.US$55) 
per apprentice, the master-craftspeople by contrast received ¢300,000 (c.US$33). Both GRATIS 
and the master-craftspeople complained that much of this was spent by them feeding the 
apprentice throughout the training period (ibid). The duration of training was not considered long 
                                                 
338 Senior ICCES/STEP official, personal communication 15.05.04. 
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enough, especially in trades like welding and carpentry, leading to the creation of “half-baked” 
apprentices (ibid.: 3). This was especially the case since most apprentices being trained had no 
prior knowledge of the trades (ibid.). Training was criticised as having a traditional approach to 
production, one that was not competitive and not productive (Preddey, 2005).  
 
7.3.3. Lack of demand for these types of skills 
 
STEP was highly centralized and training providers were required to follow strict rules and 
procedures leaving little room for training delivery to be tailored to the specific needs of an area 
(Preddey, 2005). 
 
Skills needs assessments were conducted at NVTI Headquarters in Accra and the choice of skills 
to deliver appeared arbitrary and decided without the participation of the implementing bodies or 
the communities involved. There was no real attempt to establish demand for skills and product 
types at the local level, and District Assemblies sometimes complained about STEP training 
providers proposing to continue to deliver “useless” courses (ibid.: 22).  
 
A further concern related to the failure of government to conduct any labour market surveys 
before deciding on which courses to offer was the danger of market saturation and excessive 
competition; often regular long-term VTIs had been operating for many years in communities and 
“may have saturated the labour market with their graduates” (ibid.: 24). Moreover, the lack of 
coordination between local demand for specific products and what STEP trainees learnt led to 
problems selling the items produced by trainees (GoG, 2003f) (and to problems for STEP 
graduates later since they were often trained in designs and styles for which there was no local 
market). 
 
This situation can be illustrated by looking at how one ICCES centre in Ashanti ended up 
delivering STEP training. The community, the centre’s staff (and even the regional coordinator) 
were not involved in any of the decisions regarding the choice of skills or the implementation. 
Instead the centre manager was simply told by the ICCES head office to select ‘about 30 people’ 
for training in soap making, batik, tie and dye and pomade production. As a result many of those 
who registered had little idea about what they were doing there and often attended only because 
the training was free and they thought that they ‘may as well take it’. In fact those that were 
enrolled contained a large number of family and friends of the vocational training centre’s staff, 
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including the wife of the centre manager. When the training started all the regular ICCES trainees 
on the three-year course also participated in STEP training (and subsequently continued with their 
three-year course), thereby diluting the quality of the training for the officially registered STEP 
trainees since materials were limited to 25 people. Since there had been no market surveys 
conducted prior to the training some of the products produced could not be sold since there 
existed no local demand. For example the designs and styles of batik, tie and dye that were taught 
were not in demand locally and hence it was very difficult to sell them afterwards (the items that 
STEP trainees produced were supposed to be sold locally to support the income of the centre 
where the training occurred). 
 
7.3.4. Lack of coordination and weak management 
 
STEP suffered from general management problems (Preddey, 2005). In addition those VTIs 
delivering training were visited irregularly by STEP coordinators which led to poorer 
performance in some STEP centres (GoG, 2003f). In that case of ICCES this was undoubtedly a 
direct result of the lack of transport for regional coordinators (chap.6.2.13). 
 
7.4. The next step: after graduation what?  
 
Some of you might be asking yourself this question: What next after this graduation?... 
You will need to start working immediately… but your parents and guardians perhaps do 
not have means to set you up in business. The government is mindful of this situation and 
efforts are being put in place to offer you some assistance. In view of the problems which 
were associated with a similar scheme339 organised a few years ago where the majority of 
people who were given free tools and kits after their training sold  them and pocketed the 
proceeds, only to get back on to the streets. Government is seriously studying the 
situation to come up with a practicable solution. (Keynote address by the Deputy 
Minister, MoMYE, at the graduation ceremony of STEP trainees, 17.03.04 (GoG, 
2004g)) 
 
There were numerous problems with the implementation of STEP, suggesting among other 
things, that the expected self-employment creation would not come about as easily as was hoped. 
Indeed in order to improve implementation of phase two, responsibility for implementing STEP 
was handed directly by the MoMYE (and not by NVTI which had been responsible for phase 
                                                 
339 This is a reference to the World Bank’s VSP. 
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one).340 There have been a number of constraints hindering the outcomes of STEP, one of the 
largest of which concerns micro-finance provision. 
 
7.4.1. Micro-finance provision 
 
Micro-finance represented one of the three main components of STEP: start-up and working 
capital were meant to be provided to enable those trained to enter self-employment activities. The 
government pledged early on to provide start-up capital for STEP graduates. It was announced in 
mid 2003 that: 
 
The government has set aside 10 billion cedis [US$1.1mill.] out of 50 billion cedis 
[US$5.5mill.] of the Youth Fund to support the… STEP. (GNA, 2003b)  
 
Two years later the figure mooted for STEP graduate loans was being reported as ¢5 billion 
(US$555,000) (GNA, 2005e).  
 
As noted above, two MFIs were used to channel micro-finance to STEP graduates; the ARB 
APEX and the WWBG. However both these MFIs have concerns regarding lending to these 
graduates. While ARB APEX view the capacity of STEP graduates to understand the conditions 
of lending as inadequate, WWBG expressed concern that the expectations of STEP graduates 
about their access to micro-finance was unrealistic (Preddey, 2005). 
 
WWBG considered that providing micro-finance to STEP graduates was a social programme and 
was not commercially viable. The standard loans from WWBG attract interest of 37% and can 
only be accessed if the prospective borrower has 50% of the loan amount deposited with WWBG 
as collateral and is willing to pay a 2.5% commitment fee on the loan amount (ibid.). In the case 
of STEP graduates, the government requested WWBG to charge 25% interest (to be shared 
equally with government) and for WWBG to waive the usual requirements of 50% collateral and 
the 2.5% commitment fee (ibid.). 
 
STEP borrowers were seen by WWBG as a higher risk than other borrowers; being new 
customers with low educational attainment (ibid.) and frequently no credit history. Moreover, in 
most instances STEP training failed to include guidance on how to put together a proposal for a 
                                                 
340 Senior STEP official, personal communication 15.06.04. 
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loan. Consequently most graduates “lack[ed] the capability to produce viable proposals that 
would justify loans” (ibid.: 26). 
 
Financial assistance for STEP graduates appears to have been slow in coming in many cases.  
 
An April 2005 consultancy report of STEP noted that representatives of STEP training providers 
were “unaware of whether any loans had been taken up, and most [were] unaware of the nearest 
micro-financing institution (MFI) to their own training centres” (ibid.: 25). 
 
At the end of July 2005 the Director of ICCES commented that the loans to STEP graduates who 
had received their training through ICCES were still delayed (GNA, 2005b). In fact in Ashanti, 
STEP graduates who trained at ICCES from both phase one and two of the project (that finished 
in mid-2003 and mid-2004 respectively) had not received any start-up funds by the end of June 
2006 (ICCES/STEP coordinator, Ashanti Region, personal communication (email) 28.06.06.). 
Only the Kumasi production unit STEP graduates, which is loosely attached to ICCES and “has 
[only] a few trainees has a loan from [sic] rural bank” (ibid.). 
 
In March 2006 it was announced that no start-up funds had been received by phase one and two 
STEP graduates from Bolgatanga Municipality – who graduated in 2003 and 2004 – though 
graduates from the Bawku and the Navrongo districts have reportedly been able to access funds 
(GNA, 2006b). 
 
Indeed anecdotal evidence points towards difficulties in STEP graduates accessing loans. In one 
case in Ashanti an ICCES centre was asked by the local rural bank to act as a guarantor on loans 
made to STEP graduates; obviously it was not in a position to do this and STEP trainees still have 
not had their loans by mid-July 2006 (centre manager, personal communication (email) 11.07.06). 
 
Even when some ¢5 billion has been set aside for STEP graduates, if this were to be equally 
shared out among all the 27,000 graduates each individual would only get about ¢185,000 
(c.US$20) – hardly sufficient to start-up an enterprise. In fact, “[d]espite expectations to the 
contrary, not all STEP graduates qualify for micro-finance” (Preddey, 2005: 26). As of April 
2005 only 178 individuals had their applications approved, with a further 38 individuals waiting 
to have their applications considered by WWBG (Preddey, 2005). 
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By October 2006, at the official launch of the NYEP, President Kufuor announced that over 3,000 
STEP graduates had received loans (GNA, 2006c). This represents about 10% of all those trained 
under STEP. 
 
Where micro-finance has been paid out to STEP graduates, the average amount meant for each 
individual appears to be ¢500,000 (c.US$56). While this will be a help it is questionable exactly 
what ¢500,000 per graduate can achieve since this amount is small when compared to the outlays 
required to start a new enterprise (chap.5.3.6), especially since profits will not come back to the 
enterprise immediately. This is presumably why the government is encouraging people to form 
cooperatives so that they can share the cost of initial items.  
 
This delay in micro-credit has not been the result of an unawareness of the need to support STEP 
graduates financially. Indeed internal reviews of STEP have noted that this delay in micro-credit 
to STEP graduates will “result [in a]… lack of interest in the skill acquired due to [the] long 
absence of practice” (GoG, 2005f: 3). It appears that inadequate budgetary planning has left 
insufficient funds to finance the credit component. Furthermore, the political will needed to drive 
micro-credit provision has been absent and now the political focus has moved away from STEP 
to the forthcoming NYEP (chap.5.2).  
 
Apart from the promise of credit, there seems to be very little else planned with regard to other 
BDS for STEP graduates (e.g. monitoring, advice, tracers). Meanwhile, the institutional 
framework for MSE support in Ghana, and particularly rural Ghana where most STEP training 
occurred, is known to be very poor (chap.5.3). 
 
7.4.2. Employment outcomes unknown  
 
The government, largely for political reasons, has been very keen to portray the major outcome of 
STEP as job-creation. However this assumed link between skills training and self-employment 
creation is largely yet to materialise in reality. It is true that the skills training component of Skills 
Training and Employment Promotion programme has taken place, albeit with many delivery 
challenges, but as yet the employment promotion has not occurred. A World Bank (2005b) study 
on youth employment in Ghana commented that “while [the] STEP program has been successful 
in providing some skill training to some selected youth, the program has not necessarily enhanced 
the employment opportunities of the youth” (p.32). 
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Indeed the original name of STEP - Skills Training and Employment Promotion – implied to 
many that STEP had some capacity to place trainees in (waged-) employment. The government 
saw the political risk this implication held and made efforts to change the public perception of 
STEP (Preddey, 2005). However it was not until 2005, after much of the training had occurred, 
that STEP was changed to Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Programme in the GPRS II. 
 
To date (October 2006) there remains a lack of evidence on the employment outcomes of STEP 
graduates. Indeed, “except for anecdotal evidence, no one really knows what has happened to the 
substantial number of STEP graduates since the programme’s inception” (Preddey, 2005: 23). 
The indications, from those who implemented STEP at village-level, have been that STEP 
graduates feel the programme has helped them to acquire useful skills (fieldwork, 2005). 
However, the ability to use these skills in the labour market appears to be proving difficult. 
Indeed there is concern that many (if not most) STEP graduates are not faring well in the labour 
market (Preddey, 2005) and not using the skills they have acquired. There has, however, not been 
any tracer study of STEP graduates; so concrete evidence is lacking and it was beyond the 
resources and time constraints of this doctoral work to undertake this tracer. 
 
STEP will not lead automatically into employment creation without a supportive transformative 
context in the informal economy. The government has announced plans to release loans to STEP 
graduates but, as noted above, these have been slow in coming. The government wants STEP 
graduates to form into cooperatives of four or five and to seek loans from the rural banks. Loans 
are not automatically given, however, and it will be interesting to see how many STEP graduates 
apply for, and are able to access these loans when they become available. As of October 2006, 
loans appear to have reached only 10% of those trained.      
 
7.5. Concluding comments on STEP: training delivery in a highly politicised 
environment 
 
I think STEP is politicised, there is still [a] problem with settling the past trainees by 
giving them financial assistance to enable them [to] start their own businesses. So on 
paper so many people have been trained but they are back on the streets selling as usual. 
(senior official, MoMYE personal communication (email) 29.03.06) 
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During the 2000 election campaigns the NPP made special efforts to attract the youth due to 
Ghana’s young population and the fact that the youth vote was “always going to be decisive” 
(Nugent, 2001: 419).341  
 
It was noted earlier (chap.5.2) how the NPP’s political rhetoric of job creation for “all persons 
willing to work” in the NPP manifesto (NPP, 1996: sect.1.31) and election pledges was later 
translated into providing skills training and support to the development of an enabling 
environment for the private sector.342 
 
Right from the start, STEP, with its origins in the 2001 unemployment registration exercise has 
been highly politicized. A 2005 evaluation study of STEP commented that “the initial impetus for 
STEP was political: i.e. a publicly-announced intention to reduce poverty… by eliminating 
unemployment in the informal economy through skills training and job placements. This worthy 
intention may have been over-stated” (Preddey, 2005: 27). 
 
It was further noted above that the government has been very keen to present STEP as creating 
employment for the youth. Indeed it seems that the government has been keen to publicise 
STEP’s success in the media. 
 
For example up to mid 2003, 3,500 people had been provided with skills under STEP (GoG, 
2004c). But this was reported in the media as ‘Government offers employment to 3,500 people’ 
(GNA, 2003a).  
 
In 2004 the Deputy Minister (MoMYE) again directly reaffirmed the assumed link between STEP 
and the problem of unemployment. It was reported in the media that 14,611 unemployed youth 
acquired skills in various trade areas since the commencement of STEP (GNA, 2004). The 
Deputy Minister (MoMYE), is reported to have said that:  
 
unemployment had been a major concern to the nation and it was against this background 
that the… NPP government took a bold step to provide a nationwide skills training 
programme for the youth under the STEP. (GNA, 2004) 
 
                                                 
341 40% of the population was under 15 years in 2003 (UNDP, 2005). 
342 The enabling environment for the informal private sector remains very weakly developed (chap.5.3). 
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In May 2005 the Minister (MoMYE) reportedly said that a “total of 27,000 unemployed youth 
had been trained and assisted with micro-credit to operate on their own under [the] STEP 
programme” (GNA, 2005d, emphasis added).343 But just a day later the same minister was 
reported as claiming that not only had 27,000 unemployed youth been trained and assisted with 
micro-credit, but that they were “now self-employed” (GNA, 2005c). Indeed the headline in the 
article reporting this was ‘27,000 Unemployed Gets [sic] Jobs’ (ibid.). 
 
President Kufuor, in his foreword to the NYEP brochure, also puts a very optimistic political spin 
on the outcomes of STEP programme. He claims that the: “success of this programme [STEP] 
can be found in many young men and women who have gone on to start small businesses for 
themselves while others have been employed by various established organizations” (GoG, 2006c: 
iii).  
 
Although it has been claimed that young people trained under STEP have started their own 
businesses or secured employment, it is probably telling that STEP was renamed the Skills 
Training and Entrepreneurship Programme (in 2005), as it had signally failed to connect with job 
opportunities the very large number of young people who registered. 
 
While STEP has received much publicity and has been presented by the government as easing 
unemployment, it should not be forgotten that the total number trained under STEP, about 27,000, 
is relatively small; over the same two years that the first two phases of STEP operated, about 
300,000 JSS graduates finished school, did not enter further formal education or training and 
found themselves in the IMEs or in informal training, including traditional apprenticeships. 
Traditional apprenticeships remain the most widespread skill acquisition modality and, having 
noted earlier the GoG’s intention to formalise this system (chap.5.1) it is important to examine 
this form in depth. 
 
7.6. Section two: the traditional apprenticeship training modality  
 
Traditional apprenticeship training has had a long history in West Africa and it is unsurprising, 
therefore, that today it is so well-developed in this sub-region (Birks et al., 1994; World Bank, 
                                                 
343 From our earlier discussion related to the disbursement of micro-finance to STEP graduates, it was 
clearly an exaggeration for the minister to claim that all graduates had been assisted with micro-credit. 
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2004a).344 The World Bank (2004a) notes that it is less well developed in eastern and southern 
Africa but that it is still a major provider of skills for workers in the informal sector.345 
 
Despite early recognition in Ghana of the potential of traditional apprenticeship training as a 
skills delivery mechanism (Foster, 1965a) few policy makers have been interested until the mid-
1990s. The World Bank now states that for SSA “traditional apprenticeship is the most important 
source of training for workers in the informal sector” (World Bank, 2004a: 127) and, further, that 
“[t]raditional apprenticeship training is responsible for more skills development than the offerings 
of all other training providers combined” (ibid: 129). Others note that more young people acquire 
competence through informal apprenticeship than it would be possible through more formal 
educational schemes (Overwien, 1997 in Liimatainen, 2002). 
 
This section takes the following structure: first it outlines apprenticeship training in Ghana; 
second it presents new evidence on rural apprenticeship drawing on interviews with 160 
apprentices; third it analyses the training environment; and, fourth, examines the link to self-
employment.   
 
7.7. Traditional apprenticeship training in Ghana 
 
In Ghana apprenticeship training originated as a means to reproduce skills within families or 
communities, but over the years has been modified to involve more formalised contracts, 
payments for training and less restrictions regarding access to this training (Silver, 1981; Quartey-
Papafio, 1914). 
 
Apprenticeship training is responsible for some 80-90% of all basic skills training in Ghana, 
compared to 5-10% from public training institutions and 10-15% from NGO for-profit and non-
profit providers (Atchoarena and Delluc, 2001; GoG, 2004b; Haan and Serrière, 2002; Honny, 
1999; World Bank, 2004a).  
 
                                                 
344 For discussions of apprenticeships in Nigeria see Callaway (1963; 1964), Fadahunsi and Rosa (2002); 
Lloyd (1953); and for Ghana see Ahadzie (2003); Foster (1965a), Frazer (2006); Hakam (1978), Hart 
(1973), McLaughlin (1979), Peil (1970), Silver (1981), Quartey-Papafio (1914), Valenchik (1995) and 
Yokozeki (2005). For general overviews of apprenticeship in SSA see Bas (1989), Fluitman (1994), Haan 
(2001, 2006), World Bank (2004a). 
345 For an early account of informal skills acquisition in Kenya see King (1977). 
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In Ghana, where about 30% of JSS graduates are able to enter formal second-cycle institutions 
and where formal employment opportunities are few, the majority of youth end up either working 
or acquiring skills in IMEs. Aryeetey et al. (2005) note that traditional apprenticeship training 
represents the dominant source of skills acquisition for these JSS graduates who cannot access 
further formal opportunities. Bortei-Doku Aryeetey (2001) adds that “for many people 
[apprenticeship]… is the only option available for acquiring employable skills” (p.42). 
 
The general features of the traditional apprenticeship training modality are well known.346 Briefly 
stated, in Ghana an aspiring apprentice becomes attached to a master, usually for three years (but 
this varies by trade/master).347 A joining fee is usually charged for the training but is sometimes 
waived if the youth is known to the master. In some trades a contract is signed between the 
master and apprentice, but in many cases agreements are verbal.348 The apprentice largely learns 
through observation. A new apprentice is initially given simple tasks to perform, often unrelated 
to the trade (e.g. running errands, doing odd-jobs, cleaning, washing, fetching water, farming) 
(Bas, 1989). During this initial period the apprentice is also given basic trade-related tasks to 
perform (e.g. cleaning nuts/bolts or doing simple wood-smoothing work). As the apprenticeship 
progresses he/she is given progressively more complex tasks under the direction of the master-
craftsperson and other senior apprentices. 
 
7.8. Traditional apprenticeship training in rural Ashanti (Ghana) 
 
The GLSS4 (1998/99) generated some macro-data on apprenticeship in both urban and rural areas 
of Ghana. According to this, most apprentices are to be found in the tailoring/dressmaking (37%), 
carpentry (9%) and mechanical (8%) trades (table 7.2). Both male and females are common in 
tailoring/dressmaking, though many trades are dominated by male apprentices. In rural areas the 
most popular apprenticeship areas are tailoring/dressmaking (36%), carpentry (9%), masonry 
(7%) and mechanics (7%). Male apprentices operate in a more diverse array of trades compared 
to women who are found mainly in tailoring/dressmaking (68% of women) (table 7.2). 
 
                                                 
346 See Fluitman (1994), Haan (2001, 2006), World Bank (2004a). 
347 Unlike in the past (see Silver, 1981; Quartey-Papafio, 1914) entry into traditional apprenticeship training 
in Ghana today is not really restricted to those from the same community or kin group as the master, though 
the master is usually known to the parents before being approached to take their child as an apprentice. 
However, some researchers comment that masters more commonly take on apprentices from their own kin 
or rural birthplace (Dijk, 1997). 
348 On apprenticeship contracts, see Valenchik (1995). 
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Table 7.2. Distribution of apprentices by main trade learnt, by sex and locality (%)  
 
Main trade learnt Male Female All Male Female All Male Female All
Carpentry 16 0.4 8.5 15.7 - 9 15.8 0.2 8.8
Masonry 8.5 - 4.4 11.4 - 6.6 10.2 - 5.7
Tailoring 13.2 64.4 37.8 12.5 68.1 36 12.8 66.4 36.8
Blacksmithing 4 - 2.1 3.4 - 2 3.6 - 2
Mechanical 17.2 0.3 9.1 11.2 0.4 6.6 13.6 0.3 7.7
Electronics/Electrica 8.9 - 4.6 5 - 2.9 6.5 - 3.6
Painting/spraying 4.8 1.1 3 3.1 0.7 2.1 3.7 0.9 2.5
Other 27.5 33.7 30.5 37.7 30.8 34.8 33.6 32.1 33




Notes: The GLSS4 report indicates that there were a total of 3,438 trainees in the sample,
but did not break this down by rural and urban areas.  
Source: GSS, 2000: 13  
 
Fieldwork conducted during 2005 intended to find out more about rural apprenticeship training 
(nsanodwuma suafuo) in Ashanti. Two approaches were used. The main data collection tool used 
was to interview 160 apprentices from 114 IMEs in three communities in rural Ashanti. The 114 
enterprises had a total of 347 apprentices making the sample size of 160 almost 50% of the total 
number of apprentices.349 A secondary approach was to use the household survey conducted in 
one rural community (Otaakrom) (Appendix C) to find out about the training background of 
youth in that settlement. 
 
The author’s interviews (table 7.3) showed a similar pattern to the national figures from the 
GLSS4: 36% of apprentices were in the dressmaking/tailoring area (compared to 36% in the 
GLSS4); carpentry enterprises trained 19% of apprentices (9% in the GLSS4); mechanical 
enterprises trained 8% of apprentices (7% in the GLSS4); and masonry enterprises trained 4% of 
apprentices (7% in the GLSS4). However a significant trade area taking on apprentices, 
categorized under ‘other’ trade and so disguised in the GLSS4 figures, was hairdressing: from the 






                                                 
349 See Chap.1.4.4./Appendix A for the methodology. 
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Table 7.3. Distribution of rural apprentices, by trade and sex (Ashanti)  
Male Female All Percent
Dressmaking 6 51 57 35.6
Haridressing 1 31 32 20
Carpentry 30 0 30 18.8
Mechanics 13 0 13 8.1
Masonry 7 0 7 4.4
Electronics 6 0 6 3.8
Shoemaker 3 0 3 1.9
Welder 5 0 5 3.1
Artist 2 0 2 1.3
Vulcanizer 2 0 2 1.3
Bike repairer 1 0 1 0.6
Fridge repairer 2 0 2 1.3
78 82 160 100.2  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
The household survey conducted in Otaakrom (2005) - that captured data on some 147 youth by 
wealth category - revealed that almost 40% of youth had been through an apprenticeship 
(Appendix C, table C.6). More interestingly, perhaps, is that almost half of all the youth who had 
been through an apprenticeship came from poor (42%) or very poor (6%) households.   
 
It also appears that migration to nearby towns in order to acquire apprenticeship training is quite 
a common strategy for youth living in smaller rural settlements. Almost three-quarters (25/34) of 
youth currently undertaking apprenticeship training in Otaakrom were doing so outside of the 
village (Appendix C, table C.7).  
 
The following discussion relates to the author’s findings from the interviews with 160 rural 
apprentices (unless otherwise specified). 
 
7.8.1. Age at start of training 
 
Of the 160 rural apprentices interviewed the average350 age at the start of the apprenticeship was 
19 years (19.7 and 18.6 years for male and females respectively).351 67.5% of all apprentices were 
between the ages of 16-21 at the start of their apprenticeship (table 7.4). This corresponds to the 
average age reported by others (Haan, 2001).  
 
                                                 
350 Arithmetic mean. 
351 The youngest was 11 years and the oldest 42 years. 
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Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
14% of rural apprentices (n=22) were aged 15 or below. Of these eight, or 5% of the total 
number, were aged 14 or below and were therefore training illegally; the 1998 Children’s Act 
states the minimum age a child may commence a traditional apprenticeship is 15 years (GoG, 
1998). It is clear that this legislation is difficult to enforce. 
 
7.8.2. Duration of apprenticeship  
 
Among those interviewed the average duration of training was 3.3 years, but this ranged from 6 
months to 10 years.352  
 
With respect to trade areas, dressmaking and hairdressing - which are predominantly female in 
composition - have an average duration of 3 years. The male dominated trades of carpentry, 
mechanics and masonry have longer, on average, apprenticeship durations of 3.4, 5.5 and 4 years 








                                                 
352 The two individuals interviewed who had been in apprenticeship for 10 years were in the mechanics 
trade. One of these had received training free of charge (hence the extended period of apprenticeship is 
normal as the master keeps him on longer to pay for the training). 
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Table 7.5. Duration of rural apprenticeship training, by trade (Ashanti)  
% female
Mean duration/ in this n
years trade area
Dressmaking 3 89 57
Hairdressing 3 97 32
Carpentry 3.4 0 30
Mechanics 5.5 0 13
Masonry 4 0 7  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
This largely corresponded with the GLSS4 which showed that male apprentices tended to train 
longer than female apprentices (table 7.6).  
 
Table 7.6. Average length of apprenticeship training, by trade, sex and locality
(months) (Ghana)  
Main trade learnt Male Female All Male Female All Male Female All
Carpentry 39.5 29.6 39.2 29.4 - 29.4 33.4 29.6 33.4
Masonry 31.2 - 31.2 30 - 30 30.4 - 30.4
Tailoring 37.1 29.4 30.8 31.4 26 27 33.7 27.5 28.6
Blacksmithing 55.5 - 55.5 39.3 - 39.3 46.3 - 46.3
Mechanical 36.9 19.1 36.5 35.9 29.2 35.8 36.4 22.7 36.2
Electronics/Electrical 36.7 - 36.7 41.7 - 41.7 39 - 39
Painting/spraying 32.6 16.6 29.1 37.1 23.7 35.2 35.4 20.1 32.8
Other 35.3 24.1 28.9 29.7 21.5 26.5 31.5 22.8 27.4




Source: GSS, 2000: 13  
 
7.8.3. Education level of apprentices 
 
With respect to the highest level of education achieved, the majority (59%) of the 160 rural 
apprentices interviewed had completed JSS, few had SSS and 38% had less than a basic 
education (JSS completion) (table 7.7). This makes it very clear that, for most, apprenticeship is 
now taken after 9 years of education.  
 
Female apprentices had, on average, a lower level of formal education than their male 
counterparts: 40% of female apprentices had less than a complete basic education, compared to 
38% of male apprentices; 15% of female apprentices had no education, compared to 5% of male 
apprentices (table 7.7). 
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Table 7.7. Education level of rural apprentices, by sex (Ashanti)  
Male Female All Percent Cumulative
Percent
None 4 12 16 10 10
Primary not completed 4 4 8 5 15
Primary completed 10 9 19 11.9 26.9
JSS not completed 10 7 17 10.6 37.5
JSS completed 45 49 94 58.8 96.3
SSS not completed 1 1 2 1.3 97.6
SSS completed 3 0 3 1.9 99.5
Post JSS vocational school 1 0 1 0.6 100.1
78 82 160 100.1  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
In terms of aggregate levels for the Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) achieved 
for those with complete JSS or higher, the average was 26.5.353  
 
Table 7.8. Education level of rural apprentices, by trade (Ashanti)  
                Apprenticeship Dressmaking Hairdressing Carpentry Mechanics
                              type
Highest                   Male Female Total Male Female Total (all male) (all male)
education level
None 2 12 14 0 0 0 0 1
Primary not completed 1 3 4 0 1 1 3 0
Primary completed 0 7 7 1 2 3 5 2
JSS not completed 0 3 3 0 4 4 4 2
JSS completed 3 26 29 0 23 23 16 7
SSS not completed 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
SSS completed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Post JSS vocational school 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Total 6 51 57 1 31 32 30 13  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Looking at the interview data from my 2005 fieldwork (table 7.8) and data from a 2001 survey of 
Ghanaian apprentices by Ahadzie (2003) (table 7.9), it can be seen that there appears to be some 
connection between the level of education of an apprentice and the type of apprenticeship pursued 
(table 7.10).  
 
                                                 
353 While 100 apprentices had completed JSS or higher, this average aggregate is based on 69 apprentices 
as other data was missing. The BECE aggregate is the aggregate of the best six marks achieved in the 
BECE. Each subject is graded 1 to 10: grade 5 or below is a pass, making the pass range for the aggregate 
of the six subjects 6 to 30. 
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Weaving 35.3(6) 23.5(4) 35.3(6) 5.9(1) 5.2(17)
Leatherwork 60.0(3) 20.0(1) 20.0(1) 1.5(5)
Blacksmithing 38.4(5) 30.8(4) 30.8(4) 4.1(13)
Goldsmithing 33.3(1) 66.7(2) 0.9(3)
Gunsmithing 100.0 (2) 0.6(2)
Welding 6.7(2) 30.0(9) 56.6(17) 6.7(2) 9.4(30)
Auto Mechanic 5.0(2) 30.0(12) 52.5(21) 7.5(3) 5.0(2) 12.5(40)
Electrical Inst. 35.0(14) 60.0(24) 2.5(1) 2.5(1) 12.5(40)
Carpentry 2.5(1) 47.5(19) 45.0(18) 5.0(2) 12.5(40)
Masonry 5.0(1) 55.0(11) 40.0(8) 6.2(20)
Tailoring 10.9(6) 16.4(9) 63.6(35) 5.5(3) 3.6(2) 17.3(55)
Dressmaking 7.3(4) 41.8(23) 47.3(26) 3.6(2) 17.3(55)
Total 9.4(30) 33.4(107) 51.3(164) 2.2(7) 3.1(10) 0.6(2) 100(320)
SSS Other * TotalTrade No School JSS Dropouts JSS
 
Source: Ahadzie, 2003: 154 (survey data from 2001)
Legend:
* Commercial Schools
JSS Junior Secondary School
SSS Senior Secondary School
Tech/Voc Technical Vocational Education
Numbers in parenthesis  
 
Table 7.10. Apprentices with less than a complete basic education (%)  
Trade area % with less than Source
basic education
Hairdressing 25% (8/32) table 7.8
Tailoring 27% (15/55) table 7.9
Auto-mechanics 35% (14/40) table 7.9
Electrical installation 35% (14/40) table 7.9
Welding 36% (11/30) table 7.9
Carpentry 50% (20/40) table 7.9
Carpentry 40% (12/30) table 7.8
Dressmaking 49% (27/55) table 7.9
Dressmaking 49% (28/57) table 7.8
Weaving 59% (10/17) table 7.9  
 
In the female-dominated trades it appears that entry for less-schooled youth into hairdressing 
apprenticeships may be harder compared to entry into dressmaking apprenticeships. 49% of 
dressmaking apprentices had less than a basic education compared to 25% of hairdressing 
apprentices (table 7.10). Among the male-dominated trade areas tailoring, auto-mechanics, 
electrical installation and welding apprenticeships may be harder to enter for less-schooled youth 
compared to carpentry or weaving apprenticeships (table 7.10). These apparent differences in the 
 259 
formal educational background of apprentices in different trades might suggest that some master-
craftspeople in particular trades have a preference for more educated apprentices. Alternatively it 
might suggest that some apprenticeships are now more popular than others and that master-
craftspeople can be more selective about whom they train – and they are choosing more educated 
apprentices. For example, hairdressing apprenticeships in rural Ashanti appear to be more popular 
among the youth compared to dressmaking apprenticeships as the youth perceive there to be more 
demand for the former trade (fieldwork, 2004-2005) (see chap.8.1). 
 
It has been noted that in SSA, as a result of EFA policies and an increased supply of more 
educated youth, that apprentices now tend to have had more schooling than their masters 
(Charmes, 1999; Haan, 2001; Yokozeki, 2005).354 Over time, the effect of better schooled 
apprentices will have an impact on the informal sector with respect to output and productivity 
(Charmes, 1999; Muskin, 1997). However, having apprentices who have received often 
substantially more education than their masters who are training them has implications for the 
effectiveness of the informal training process. Indeed, the consequences of having less- or un-
schooled master-craftspeople training better-schooled apprentices may well have an adverse 
effect on the training. Due to issues of respect for master-craftspeople and senior (less-schooled) 
apprentices, younger (more-schooled) apprentices may feel reluctant to suggest new approaches 
(Muskin, 1997).  
 
The data collected by the author in 2005 with 114 masters355 and 160 of their apprentices in three 
communities in rural Ashanti did not confirm this emerging trend (table 7.11). Instead it was clear 
that among those interviewed the masters had higher levels of education than their apprentices: 
over 10% of masters had post-basic education, compared to 4% of their apprentices; 63% of 
masters had completed JSS/Middle School, compared to 59% of their apprentices; less than 1% 
of masters had less than a primary education, compared to 15% of their apprentices. While the 
trend (of apprentices being more educated than their masters) might be truer in urban areas, where 
access to education is markedly better than in rural areas, the new data suggests that in rural 
Ashanti the trend might still be for masters to have more education than their apprentices.  
 
                                                 
354 However, Yokozeki’s findings were based on interviews with just 16 youth in five workshops - 
dressmaking, hairdressing, carpentry, car mechanic, bicycle repair – and so should be treated with caution 
(personal communication (email) 17.01.06). 
355 For an analysis of the data from the interviews with masters, see chap.8.1. See chap.1.4.4./Appendix A 
on the methodology. 
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Table 7.11. Comparison of highest education level of apprentices and their masters
in rural Ashanti  
Apprentices Masters
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
None 16 10 1 0.9
Primary not completed 8 5 0 0
Primary completed 19 11.9 5 4.4
JSS/MS not completed 17 10.6 23 20.2
JSS/MS completed 94 58.8 72 63.2
SSS not completed 2 1.3 2 1.8
SSS completed 3 1.9 7 6.1
Post JSS vocational school 1 0.6 3 2.6
Other 0 0 1 0.9
160 100.1 114 100.1  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005
Legend: MS – Middle School  
 
The finding is similar to other research from Ghana (Morton, 2004) which shows that employers 
are, on average, likely to be more educated than employees, with most employers having some 
level of secondary education, while the average level of education for employees is only a basic 
education.  
 
7.9. The traditional apprenticeship training environment in Ghana  
 
As a means of skills acquisition, traditional apprenticeship training is well known to have a 
number of general advantages (fig.7.2) and disadvantages (fig.7.3) with respect to the delivery of 
training (Ahadzie, 2003; Akyeampong, 2002; Baah-Nuakoh, 2003; Grierson, 1997; GoG, 2004i; 






































Fig. 7.2. Advantages of the traditional training modality in Ghana 
 
Relevant to the real world of work and more effective than centre-based training  
On-the-job training: 
• Is work-based and practical, and there is a close link between training and production; 
• Allows for a gradual building up of informal enterprise networks (e.g. with suppliers, customers, other 
business owners and apprentice masters), the development of general business-related skills, including 
customer-relation skills and apprentices are able to “learn the mechanics of being self-employed” (Dijk, 
1997: 107); 
• Allows apprentices to develop their institutional networks (e.g. with informal sector associations, credit 
and business support agencies); 
• Is more effective than formal pre-employment training as trainees are usually more mature and motivated; 
• Offers apprentices the possibility of finding employment with their master on graduation. 
Ease of access 
• Entry is relatively easy. Training is not just for literates; 
• Serves important target groups (rural populations and urban poor); 
• Costs are cheaper than formal training. Parents can pay over time (see also 7.9.1);  
• An important source of technical and vocational skills in manufacturing/service trades for those who 
cannot access formal training institutes.  
Functions sustainably with no government intervention 
• Low cost and self-financing. No need for subsidies. Costs borne by apprentices and their family. No cost 
to government or community; 
• No need for a training centre or separate tools/equipment for training; 






Fig.7.3. Disadvantages of the traditional training modality in Ghana 
 
Training environment linked to the state of the enterprise environment  
• Since training occurs on-the-job, the training environment is intimately linked to the state of the work 
environment in the MSEs, and evidence suggests that this is generally of low standard in Ghana (fig.7.4, 
below). According to the 1998 Children’s Act it is the responsibility of the craftsperson to provide a safe 
and healthy environment for the apprentice to train. Legally speaking, therefore, it is clear that most masters 
are contravening this legislation. Enforcing these legal requirements is clearly a huge problem. 
 No formal curriculum; what is taught depends on what is produced 
• Lack of attention to theoretical aspects; 
• Standards vary; there are no common competency-assessment procedures; 
• The breadth of training depends on the division of labour within an enterprise; 
• Training mostly involves passive learning and observation, not experimentation; 
• Traditional technologies are perpetuated (new product designs and production technologies difficult to 
introduce as technology level and understanding of the master is reproduced in the apprentice); 
• Master-craftspeople or enterprise owner frequently lack teaching skills. 
Possible screening out of the poor (see also 7.9.1) 
• As noted above, where up-front payment is required poor applicants might sometimes be screened-out, or 
their training delayed. Nonetheless it is clear that some youth are able to access this training free of charge. 
Full range of skills often not taught/ risk of competition 
• Some masters do not teach the full range of skills for fear of competition from graduated apprentices. 
Indeed graduated apprentices often start a business in competition with master craftsperson for the same 
customers. 
Risk of exploitation 
• Apprentices are sometimes exploited as a form of cheap labour. While some research evidence from Ghana 
points towards the exploitation of apprentices (Ninsin, 1991; Thomi and Yankson, 1985) others suggest that 
apprentice arrangements are largely fair – though remuneration and working hours could be improved 
(Morton, 2004). Moreover the counter argument to the risk of exploitation is that apprentices are gaining a 
skill from the master in return for their (largely free) work. 
Gender biased 
• Apprenticeships are gender biased, with girls learning only traditionally female activities like dressmaking, 
hairdressing and soap making and boys learning traditionally male activities like carpentry and mechanics. 
Economic aspects of business not learnt fully  
• Although on-the-job learning helps to develop an apprentice’s own enterprise networks – though contact 
with suppliers, customers and enterprise-owners - some evidence suggests that apprentices still know 
“virtually nothing... about the economic aspects of the business” (Dijk, 1997: 107) since master-
craftspeople take over this function almost entirely and do not allow apprentices to “deal with customers or 
delve into accounts” (ibid). Indeed the World Bank (2004a) comments that apprentice graduates lack 
marketing skills “and other business acumen… [which] poses a serious risk to their success in self-
employment and entrepreneurship” (p.147). 
No formal follow-up support 
• Graduates from apprenticeships face the same problems as others entering the labour market vis-à-vis 
access to formal credit and non-financial BDS (chap.5.3.6).  
Integrating apprenticeship training into a formal skills system risks undermining its sustainability 
• Until 2006, no one single government ministry had responsibility for it. The COTVET Bill (chap.5) places 
responsibility for traditional apprenticeship training under the MoESS. Yet responsibility for formal sector 
apprenticeship training remains with NVTI (MoMYE). But GoG plans are to formalise the system and pay 
master-craftspeople to train apprentices; 
• Interventions like the World Bank VSP project, which tried to link it with the formal education system, were 
not very successful.  
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Fig.7.4. The work environment in Ghanaian MSEs 
 
An occupational safety and health specialist from the Factory Inspectorate reviewed 50 MSE workplaces on a 
comprehensive list of safety and health related aspects. The results were as follows. 
a) Safety of workplace location: There was no need for action in most of the enterprises. The local restaurants at 
the Accra Timber Market cluster were, however, exposed to the sources of disease vectors such as flies and 
mosquitoes. 
b) Ventilation: This was not satisfactory in some of the enterprises. Vents provided for fresh air were not adequate 
and were also improperly orientated. 
c) Conditions of floors and work surfaces: The conditions of floors in a few enterprises were slippery or uneven, 
which could contribute to accidents. 
d) Housekeeping: Priority action was needed in most of the enterprises to reduce dust, improve storage of materials 
and products, so as to prevent people from walking into objects or tripping and to facilitate the flow of products. 
e) Frayed, exposed and entangled electric wiring: Electrical wiring in the micro enterprises and to a lesser extent 
in the small-scale enterprises was frayed, entangled or had worn out or decayed insulations. This could be a source 
of serious electrical accidents such as electrocution, shock or fire. 
f) Lighting: The standard of lighting in some enterprises was not satisfactory and required priority action. 
g) Exhaust ventilation systems: The issue of exhaust ventilation was a priority problem in the enterprises. The law 
was being broken in that it requires workrooms giving off dust, fumes and gases of an injurious nature to have 
exhaust ventilation to remove such harmful emissions or prevent their accumulation. 
h) Hazardous chemicals: There was a problem in some small enterprises in terms of the absence of protective 
clothing or appliances. 
i) Mechanical handling: There was a problem of manual instead of mechanical handling of heavy loads requiring 
priority attention in the enterprises surveyed. 
j) Height of working surfaces, equipment, seats, etc.: The observations indicated that workers were bending and 
also stretching their bodies and limbs to reach materials, equipment and to transfer objects, or were sitting or 
standing in uncomfortable positions. 
k) Noise and vibrations: Noise was a problem at some of the clusters such as Timber Market, Tema and 
Adenta/Madina. The use of protective equipment such as earmuffs and ear plugs was totally absent. There was 
both continuous noise and impulsive noise from use of presses and hand tools such as hammers and chisels. The 
obsolescent machines in use contribute to the problem. 
l) Machine guarding: A pronounced problem was observed in the micro enterprises. Most of the machines in use 
are obsolete and had changed hands from one enterprise to the other. In the process of transfer, guards had been 
removed, got misplaced or lost, and were never replaced. 
m) Protective clothing and equipment: In most of the enterprises, protective clothing and appliances were either 
not provided or those provided were not being used. Discomfort was cited as one of the reasons for not using them. 
In some cases the protective equipment provided was unsuitable. 
n) Providing clean water: Apart from the Timber Market cluster where water supply was not available, drinking 
water had been provided simultaneously with toilet facilities. 
o) Separate hygienic place for meals: Most workers took their meals at eating places outside their workplaces. The 
standard of hygiene in such eating places was not within the control of their employers. 
p) First aid: First aid boxes were non-existent in most of the micro enterprises. In the small enterprises where they 
had been provided, the boxes had not been adequately stocked. In a few cases the first aid boxes had been kept 
under lock and key, not on the shop floor but in the office of the employer. 
q) Fire extinguishers: In some enterprises, these had not been provided. Where they had been provided, they had 
often been so installed as not to be accessible for use. In some cases, the type of extinguishing agents in the 
cylinders was not suitable for the type of fire hazard prevalent in the premises. 
r) Emergency exit: As a consequence of bad housekeeping and overcrowding, emergency exits had been obstructed 
by working tables and equipment. Access routes to emergency exits had been used as storage areas for raw 
materials and finished products. The doors affording means of escape had in some cases been constructed to open 
inwards. 
 
Source: Morton, 2004: 6-7 
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7.9.1. Access, apprenticeship fees and the poor 
 
To this discussion of the traditional apprentice training environment must be added the issue of 
access to this training modality: are the poor356 able to gain access to this type of training? It is 
clear that training fees (nitrinsa) and other costs determine the access of the poor, though some 
social mechanisms exist that allow at least some poorer youth to access this training modality.   
 
It is usual for a training fee to be charged by a master for the apprenticeship. In Ghana Yokozeki 
(2005) estimates that apprenticeship fees range from US$33-100 in 2004/5, but is sometimes 
waived if the youth is known to the master. Haan and Serrière (2002) estimate that apprentice 
fees in Ghana range from US$20-200 depending on the trade, locality and popularity of the 
master. 
 
Data collected in 2005 from the 160 apprentices in rural Ashanti (table 7.12) reveal that the 
average apprenticeship fee357 was US$42 (US$46 for males, US$38 for females), though this 
ranged from US$13-173.358 78% (125/160) of apprentices had apprenticeship fees ranging from 
US$20-69. 
 
Table 7.12. Cost of training (US$) for rural apprentices (Ashanti)  
Count
18 3 3 24 6 16 5 3 78
4 4 22 21 11 12 5 3 82






Free $10-19 $20-29 $30-39 $40-49 $50-59 $60-69 $70 and over
Cost of TAT/$ range
Total
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
In addition to the training fees, apprentices usually have bring certain items before they can 
commence training. For example, carpentry apprentices usually have to bring some basic tools 
                                                 
356 The poor here are defined here by a multiple set of characteristics (Appendix C.1). 
357 Excluding those in the sample that did not pay for their training (n=22). 
358 The cost of apprenticeship is quoted in US$ since the apprentices in the survey started their training in 
different years and the cedi value cited by apprentices as the fee they paid in that year has changed 
considerably due to changes in exchange rates. In (April) 2005 US$1 = ¢9,025. 
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(hammer, chisel, measuring tape) while dressmaking apprentices need to bring their own 
machine, scissors and tape.359   
 
Yokozeki (2005) estimated that apprenticeship training fees were some twenty times or more 
what it cost to send a child to JSS at the time of her research.360 However, given her very small 
sample size (16 apprentices) this finding should be treated with caution. Moreover, capitation 
grants (introduced September 2005) have abolished all levies that were previously charged at the 
basic education level, effectively making schooling cheaper to attend and more accessible. 
 
While it is widely acknowledged that “[t]raditional apprenticeship training can be the least 
expensive way to get skills training” (World Bank, 2004a: 131), the training fees associated with 
apprenticeship, combined with the other items apprentices have to bring before training can 
commence, can serve to exclude the poor. Indeed the World Bank (2004a) comments that: 
 
[i]t is commonly assumed that traditional apprenticeship is open to everyone, or at least 
to all young men. This is not so. Very poor households typically cannot afford to pay the 
costs of apprenticeship, particularly for trades that require a high fee or tools and 
equipment. (p.145) 
 
Bortei-Doku Aryeetey (2001) notes that the costs of apprenticeship in Ghana exclude young 
people who “cannot find sponsors to register them” (p.42). An earlier study by  McLaughlin 
(1979) notes that the cost of training fees can either serve to delay access to it (while the family 
saves up) or prevent access altogether. He goes on to note that the only option for some poor 
youth is to train under a fostering apprenticeship with a kin/lineage related master-craftsperson. 
 
Indeed, of the 160 rural apprentices interviewed by the author, 14% (n=22) received their training 
free of charge, with most (c.80%) of these being male.361 Reasons for receiving free training 
included: being related to the master (7/22); master not related, but wanted to help (5/22); 
unspecified (8/22); apprentice works for master on contract work to pay for training (1/22); 
master owes parents of apprentice a favour (1/22). 
 
                                                 
359 The standard Butterfly sewing machine, common among dressmaking/tailoring apprentices, costs 
¢450,000 (US$50) (July 2006), representing a sizeable sum of money for a prospective apprentice. 
360 Yokozeki does not say how she reached such an estimate and whether it included all the costs (direct, 
indirect and opportunity costs of training and schooling). 
361 Valenchik (1995) found that about 40% of enterprises did not charge fees (mid-1990s). 
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The average cost of rural apprenticeships varied by trade area in the sample.362 The average 
apprenticeship fee363 was US$38, 40, 42 and 50 in dressmaking, hairdressing, carpentry and 
mechanics respectively (table 7.13).364 As noted earlier, male apprentices in the sample were 
more likely to receive fee free apprenticeships. In the male dominated trades of carpentry and 
mechanics, 23% of apprentices in each trade area received free training. This compares to just 5% 
and 3% in the female-dominated trade areas of dressmaking and hairdressing respectively (table 
7.13). 
 
Table 7.13. Cost of rural apprenticeship, by trade (Ashanti)  
% who mean fee % female
received in sample (i) in this n
free training (US$) trade area
Dressmaking 5 38 89 57
Hairdressing 3 40 97 32
Carpentry 23 42 0 30
Mechanics 23 50 0 13  
(i) average among those that paid for their training
Source: Author's fieldwork, 2005  
 
Often part of the up-front money paid to the master is returned to the apprentice in the form of 
daily allowance for food (chop money) or with some small gift after the apprenticeship is 
completed. Indeed the 1998 Children’s Act stipulates that it is the responsibility of the 
craftsperson to provide food for the apprentice unless otherwise agreed. 
 
From the interviews with 160 rural apprentices, it appears that it is in the male-dominated trades 
that chop money is most commonly received. In dressmaking and hairdressing, 75% and 81% 
respectively of respondents did not receive daily chop money. This compares to 10% and 21% of 
carpentry and mechanic apprentices who did not receive chop money. The amount received as 
chop money appears to be greatest for masonry apprentices, followed by carpentry and mechanic 
apprentices (table 7.14). 
 
 
                                                 
362 It should be recalled that the traditional apprenticeship fees described here refer to rural Ashanti. Fees 
vary across the country and between enterprises of differing quality. For example, for three-years training in 
well-regarded hairdressing enterprises in Accra apprentices can pay up to ¢1.7 million (US$188) in addition 
to several crates of soft drinks and a gift for the master (fieldwork, 2005).  
363 Excluding those in the sample who received free training. 
364 Haan and Serrière (2002) report the average carpentry apprenticeship fees to be US$70-85. 
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Table 7.14. ‘Chop money’ received by rural apprentices, by trade (Ashanti)  
All apprentices Those that receive
chop money
% female % who Mean Mean
Trade n in this received chop money n chop money
trade area no chop (cedis) (cedis)
money
Dressmaking 57 89 75 728 14 2,964
Hairdressing 32 97 81 1,250 6 5,000
Carpentry 30 0 10 3,117 27 3,463
Mechanics 13 0 23 2,692 10 3,500
Masonry 7 0 0 21,429 7 21,429  
The exchange rate at the time of the interviews was US$1 = ¢9,025 (April, 2005)
Source: Author's fieldwork, 2005  
 
From the total sample of 160 rural apprentices, 77 - mostly female - respondents received no chop 
money. Out of the total number of apprentices that received no chop money, 87% (67/77) were 
female (table 7.15). 
 
Of those that did receive chop money (mostly males) during their training 78% (65/83) received 
between ¢2,000-6,000 (US$0.22-0.66) a day. Given that the average apprenticeship was three 
years, this finding suggest that male apprentices – even those on the lower band of ¢2,000 a day – 
are able to recoup the cost of the fees paid out to the master at the start of the apprenticeship.  
 
































US$1 = ¢9,025 (April, 2005)




7.10. Entering into self-employment after apprenticeship 
 
7.10.1. Expected source of start-up capital for apprentices in rural Ashanti 
 
Part of the transition from graduate apprentice to self-employed artisan involves finding sufficient 
start-up capital (chap.5.3.6). When the apprentices were asked how they expected to find the main 
source of start-up capital for their enterprise, 64% indicated that the family would help them, 
while 14% indicated they would self-finance it and 8% that they were planning to work for their 
master on graduation (table 7.16). 
 
Table 7.16. Expected source of start-up capital of rural apprentices by gender
(Ashanti)  
Expected source of Male Female All
start-up capital Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Family 40 51.3 62 75.6 102 63.8
Self-Employment (informal) 13 16.7 9 11.0 22 13.8
Wage-Employment (informal) 13 16.7 0 0.0 13 8.1
Wage-Employment (formal) 3 3.8 0 0.0 3 1.9
Bank Loan 1 1.3 0 0.0 1 0.6
Other 8 10.3 11 13.4 19 11.9
78 100.1 82 100.0 160 100.1  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
However, female apprentices were much more dependent on their family for providing start-up 
capital than male apprentices were. Three-quarters (62/82) of female apprentices indicated that 
the family would provide start-up capital, compared to half (40/78) of males. Table 7.16 suggests 
that, apart from the family, female apprentices might be able to self-finance their enterprise (11% 
of female apprentices indicated this), but this is more likely for dressmakers rather than for 
hairdressers (table 7.17). Male apprentices, however, anticipated greater options with respect to 





Table 7.17. Expected source of start-up capital of rural apprentices, by trade
(Ashanti)
 Count
42 0 10 0 0 1 4 0 57
24 0 1 0 0 2 3 2 32
15 1 5 0 6 0 3 0 30
6 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 13
1 0 3 0 0 1 2 0 7
4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 6
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2



















employment Self-finance Bank loan
Work for
master Other Don't know Missing data
Source of startup
Total
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
It is interesting to compare the expected main source of start-up capital of these rural apprentices 
with the actual main source of start-up capital their masters used (table 7.18).365 Apprentices 
appear to expect their families to assist them in start-up to a greater extent than families are 
actually able to: 64% of apprentices expected their family to help, compared to 41% of families 
actually assisting. Informal MESE (chap.3.3.2) and informal wage-employment366 appeared to be 












                                                 
365 While it would obviously be ideal if these apprentices could be traced longitudinally to see what their 
own actual (main) source of start-up capital was, there were neither the resources nor the time in this 
doctoral fieldwork to do this. Nonetheless, comparing the expected source of start-up of the apprentices 
with the actual source used by their own masters is quite useful. 
366 Informal wage-employment refers to activities where individuals earn a set wage, either on a per day, 
per week or per month basis, from employment either in an informal enterprise or a formal venture (which 
does not officially register the labour, hence making these employees informal). 
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Table 7.18. Expected versus actual sources of start-up capital in rural Ashanti  
Expected source of Actual source of 
start-up capital (a) start-up capital (b)
Male Female Total Percent Male Female Total Percent
Family 40 62 102 63.8 19 28 47 41.2
Self-Employment (informal) 13 9 22 13.8 31 14 45 39.5
Wage Employment (informal) 13 0 13 8.1 15 3 18 15.8
Wage Employment (formal) 3 0 3 1.9 0 0 0 0
Bank Loan 1 0 1 0.6 0 0 0 0
Other 8 11 19 11.9 4 0 4 3.5
78 82 160 100.1 69 45 114 99.8  
Legend:
(a) Data from the 160 interviews with rural apprentices; (b) Data from the 114 interviews with rural 
masters. 97% of all masters interviewed indicated they had been through an apprenticeship prior to
entering self-employment. See chap.8 for a detailed discussion.
Source: Author's fieldwork, 2005  
 
7.10.2. Entry into informal micro-enterprise (IME) 
 
Traditional apprenticeship training is regarded by some as being the “quickest path to self-
employment” (Liimatainen, 2002: 9). A paper by Frazer (2006) provides some data from the 
Ghanaian Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (GMES)367 on the labour market outcomes of 
traditional apprentices in Ghana. The GMES data shows the overall percentages of apprentices 
engaged in different activities (according to their former masters) (table 7.19).  
 
Table 7.19. Activities of apprentices after apprenticeship (% of former
apprentices in different activities)  
 Continued working for the firm 0.375
Worked for another firm in the industry 0.152
Worked for a firm in another industry 0.032
Started their own business 0.285
School 0.011
Unemployed 0.010
Don't know 0.178  
Source: Frazer, 2006: Appendix table 3  
 
                                                 
367 The GMES was one of nine surveys conducted in African countries in the 1990s as part of the World 
Bank’s Regional Program on Enterprise Development surveys. 
 271 
The largest percentage, 38%, of graduate apprentices continued working within the firm they had 
trained in, while 29% were reportedly in self-employment. A further 15% were working for 
another firm.368 According to Frazer’s (2006) analysis and interpretation of the GMES data:   
 
apprentices appear highly motivated to pursue self-employment. Of [those]… who had 
completed apprenticeships, 77% stated that they would prefer to be self-employed rather 
than working in their current job. (p.3-4) 
 
This desire for self-employment (as compared to wage-employment with the same or different 
firm) is explained by Frazer to be a result of the higher returns to self-employment above other 
employment options. These higher returns, he contests, are the result of the type and value of 
training received in apprenticeships. Frazer (2006) interprets apprenticeship as training unique to 
a firm and argues that apprenticeship in Ghana is training in specific human capital – it is more 
valuable used in the firm where the apprenticeship was taken or in self-employment – rather than 
taking the skills learnt to work for a wage in a different firm. Frazer (2006) argues that training 
received in traditional apprenticeships is highly specific to the firm (reflecting a particular firm’s 
technology and business practice) and that while apprentices “are taught by a master how to work 
the master’s craft… the way in which that craft is carried out varies highly from firm to firm” 
(p.3). Because of this, Frazer concludes, “apprenticeship training cannot be applied to work in 
other firms, which have their own technology and business practice. However, once the 
apprenticeship is complete, the former apprentice can use this knowledge to start his own firm 
and pursue self-employment, replicating the apprenticeship firm” (ibid.). The returns to 
apprenticeship training, Frazer continues, are highest when apprenticed workers become self-
employed, and lowest when apprentices go to work for a wage in a firm different from where they 
trained (Frazer, 2006). 
 
However, there are reasons to question some of Frazer’s interpretations. Firstly, his calculations 
for the returns to apprenticeship training do not take into account any of the ‘environment’ 
considerations that have been discussed in this thesis. In other words he does not distinguish 
between apprenticeship training in different training environments, nor does he distinguish 
between the returns to apprenticeship training in different enabling and disabling enterprise 
contexts. In very disabling enterprise context do the risks of being self-employed lead graduate 
                                                 
368 Given that the firm owners did not know about the activities of 18% of the apprentices, these fractions 
should in all cases (except the case of apprentices continuing to work in the firm) be seen as a lower bound 
(Frazer, 2006). 
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apprentices to prefer wage work? If the training quality has been very low might apprentices not 
have the proficiency to start up by themselves initially, and so prefer to work for a wage? 
Moreover, it is not uncommon for graduate apprentices to make a conscious decision to work for 
a wage in a firm different from where they have trained. Apprentices usually explain this as a 
desire to get more work experience and to obtain different skills before starting out in self-
employment (fieldwork, 2004-2005). Moreover, Frazer’s conclusion that “apprenticeship training 
cannot be applied to work in other firms, which have their own technology and business practice” 
(2006: 3) seems somewhat of a generalisation and one which most researchers with field 
experience of Ghana’s informal micro-enterprises would take issue with. 
 
It was noted above that access to apprenticeships might be constrained by the inability of poorer 
families to afford specific items required for the training (particularly dressmakers/tailors due to 
the high cost of procuring a sewing machine relative to basic carpentry or masoner’s tools). For 
those dressmakers/tailors that do manage to get through apprenticeship training without owning 
their own machine, either by borrowing or renting a machine, a major constraint to starting up an 
enterprise is obviously finding capital to acquire their own machine.  
 
The issue of not being able to utilse skills acquired through apprenticeship as a result of an 
inability to finance the costs of basic tools and equipment is not a new problem. Peil (1970) 
comments that entry into tailoring/dressmaking in the late 1960s was restricted due to the cost of 
the sewing machine: 
 
Their chief requirement is a sewing-machine, a substantial capital investment which 
inhibits widespread entrance to the trade. (p.139) 
 
She notes that, after completing their apprenticeship, “[q]uite a few trained tailors must work at 
other jobs for several years until they can save enough money to buy a machine” (ibid.). 
 
Referring to traditional apprenticeship graduates, the World Bank (2004a) comments that “[l]ack 
of access to credit for business start-up and initial operation makes it difficult to use the skills 
acquired” (p. 147, emphasis added). While this is undoubtedly truer for some trades (which have 
higher start-up costs, e.g. welding) compared to others, it is also true (see chap.8.2) that aspiring 
enterprise owners are able to use multiple means to raise the start-up capital required for an 
enterprise – even if this enterprise starts off considerably smaller than may have initially been 
envisaged. 
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7.11. Concluding comments on traditional apprenticeship training in Ghana 
 
Informal skills training serves the informal sector well but is proving too narrowly focused to 
cope with the increasing challenges of technical change, skills enhancement, and wider markets 
(Ziderman, 2003). In general since skills development in the informal economy occurs on-the-job 
then the delivery context for the training is intimately linked to the enabling or disabling 
enterprise environment of the informal economy itself. Fig.7.4 showed that the work environment 
for Ghanaian MSEs is generally inadequate.369 
 
As noted, the traditional environment in which apprenticeship training is delivered leads to a 
perpetuation of existing technology. But it also may have other effects on the degree to which 
schooling is useful in this setting. It might be that, in some trades, the returns to schooling in 
apprenticeship training will be reduced since education is known to be more useful in dynamic 
(changing) environments (where there are other inputs which can be used more effectively as a 
result of some schooling). In static training and working environments, where there is not the 
availability of new technologies or means of production, experience in that setting might be able 
to replace any benefits that schooling might have imparted on a youth. Hence it would be 
interesting for economists to investigate how the returns to schooling vary in different settings, 
and whether or not the returns to schooling for schooled apprentices and for non-schooled but 
experienced apprentices are similar in so-called traditional contexts.  
 
Nonetheless, in spite of the recognised limitations of traditional apprenticeship training the 
general opinion is that it “contributes significantly to upskilling labour force in the [Ghanaian] 
economy” (Aryeetey et al., 2005: 131). Attempts have been made in the past to overcome the 
limitations of apprenticeship training in Ghana, though with mixed success.370  
 
The discussion in this current chapter on apprenticeship will be complemented by the following 
chapter (8) which examines, retrospectively, apprenticeship outcomes. In chapter 3 a number of 
pathways to self-employment were identified. Chapter 8’s data will enable us to map out some 
typical pathways from apprenticeship to self-employment. 
 
 
                                                 
369 See chap.5.3 for a discussion of the enabling environment for IME in Ghana. 
370 E.g. the World Bank’s VSP (1995-2001), IFAD’s Rural Enterprise Project (REP) (1995-ongoing) and 
the STEP. 
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The last two chapters examined case studies of the three main types of skills training in Ghana: 
informal enterprise-based training (traditional apprenticeships), short-term modular training 
(STEP), and long-term skills training delivered in a VTI (ICCES). 
 
This chapter is still concerned with the interaction amongst school, skill and enterprise which has 
been one of the threads of this thesis, but will tackle this issue by analysing data from 
retrospective interviews with MSE owners already operating in the labour market. In order to find 
out how MSE owners become established in enterprises it is necessary to conduct retrospective 
interviews with existing masters to examine how they got to where they are now.371  
 
This chapter will integrate what is currently known about how masters in rural MSEs in Ghana 
enter self-employment with fieldwork: specifically interviews with some 114 rural MSE owners 
(February-March, 2005).372 This will provide further insights into how young people in rural 
areas create pathways to self-employment through the acquisition of skills and by overcoming 
both the economic and social barriers associated with self-employment start-up. This will also 
allow us to reflect on how our various model pathways (chap.3.3.2) appear in practice. 
 
After briefly outlining some of the characteristics of the interviews conducted with rural MSE 
owners, this section will cover three aspects of the pathway to self-employment: 
• becoming skilled and networked - what formal education have masters achieved and 
what other types of skills have they obtained, and where? How have masters been able to 
establish and build up social and enterprise networks that are crucial to start-up?  
• becoming financed – how have masters been able to overcome the financial barriers 
associated with start-up?  
                                                 
371 One obvious problem with this approach is that it will miss those youth that have failed to sustain their 
enterprise activities, and therefore suffers from selection bias. 
372 See Chap.1.4.4./Appendix A for details on the methodology together with some further data on the 
enterprises. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion in this chapter refers to the author’s interviews in 2005. 
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• becoming established – does the age of start-up vary according to gender or trade area? 
What ongoing constraints do MSEs face and what strategies are used to sustain self-
employment activities? 
The conclusion will discuss some of the main findings of this chapter as well as link back to the 
earlier discussion on pathways to enterprise. 
 
The interviews with rural MSE owners covered 114 enterprises, predominantly from two small 
rural towns in Ashanti and Western Regions.373 Since these interviews wanted to find out about 
training enterprises, that offered traditional apprenticeships, the sample was limited to 
manufacturing and service enterprises, and excluded farming and retail activities where 
traditional apprenticeship training does not occur. Nonetheless, within these enterprises the issue 
of occupational pluralism was investigated which does cut across any straightforward exclusion 
of other enterprise types. The majority of these training MSEs are dressmaking/tailoring, 
hairdressing and carpentry activities (table 8.1). There is a clear gender distinction in rural MSEs: 
females are almost exclusively found in dressmaking and hairdressing enterprises, though 10/33 
(30%) of dressmakers/tailors were male. Males dominate all other trade areas of those 
interviewed (table 8.1). 
 
Table 8.1. Types of enterprise among those interviewed  
Sex of MC
Male Female Total Percent
Dressmaking 10 23 33 28.9
Hairdressing 0 21 21 18.4
Carpentry 24 0 24 21.1
Mechanics 6 0 6 5.3
Masonry 4 0 4 3.5
Electronics 5 0 5 4.4
Shoemaker 7 0 7 6.1
Welder 5 0 5 4.4
Artist 1 0 1 0.9
Vulcanizer 2 0 2 1.8
Bike repairer 2 0 2 1.8
Fridge repairer 2 0 2 1.8
Other 1 1 2 1.8
Total 69 45 114 100  
Note: male 'dressmaking' refers to tailoring. Where 'dressmaking' appears in the following tables
without being disaggregated by gender, it refers to both male tailors and female dressmakers.  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
                                                 
373 90% of the sample were from the two small rural towns of Bibiani, Western Region, (42%) and 
Nyinahin, Ashanti Region, (48%), while the remaining 10% came from the village of Otaakrom (Ashanti). 
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The majority of the enterprises interviewed were informal micro-enterprises 
(manufacturing/service).374 81% of the enterprises in the sample comprised of 1-5 people, 
including the master and apprentices: 24% of these consisted of only the master-craftsperson. A 
further 19% of enterprises had a size of 6 people or more. Overall, 93% (106/114) of the 
enterprises interviewed were micro-enterprises (size of 9 or less) (table 8.2).375 The majority of 
enterprises interviewed operated from temporary or simple structures or from the home (table 
8.3).  
 
Table 8.2. Size of enterprises among those interviewed
Size of Freq. Percent Cumulative
enterprise Percent
Owner-operator 27 23.7 23.7
2 17 14.9 38.6
3 22 19.3 57.9
4 18 15.8 73.7
5 8 7 80.7
6 5 4.4 85.1
7 3 2.6 87.7
8 3 2.6 90.4
9 3 2.6 93
10-14 5 4.4 97.4
15-19 1 0.9 98.3
20 and over 2 1.8 100.1
114 100  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 


















‘Temporary’ included, for example, table-top work places that was taken down at the end of each 
working day, and enterprises that had no fixed location (such as masoners/carpenters who operate
 from different on-the-job locations according to what informal contract they are working on).
‘Metal kiosks’ refer to enterprises established in old metal shipping containers.  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
                                                 
374 See chap.1.2.3. 




Nearly 10% (9.6%) of those interviewed were home-based enterprises, a further quarter (23.7%) 
operated from under a shady tree or other temporary workplace, and about half (53.5%) operated 
from wooden kiosks. Only 13% of enterprises interviewed operated from more permanent 
structures such as metal kiosks or concrete structures. While most carpenters worked from 
temporary worksites, most hairdressers, tailors and dressmakers had kiosks (Appendix A, table 
A.2).  
 
8.1. Becoming skilled, becoming networked 
 
The interviews with rural masters revealed that 25% had achieved incomplete JSS/middle-school 
or less (17% of males, 38% of females), while 75% had achieved JSS/middle-school completion 
or higher (83% of males, 62% of females) (table 8.4). More males (16%) had post-basic 
education than females (2%). 
 
Table 8.4. Highest education level of master-craftspeople among those interviewed
Male Female Both
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
None 1 1.5 0 0.0 1 0.9
Primary completed 2 2.9 3 6.7 5 4.4
JSS/middle school not completed 9 13.0 14 31.1 23 20.2
JSS/middle school completed 45 65.2 27 60.0 72 63.2
SSS not completed 2 2.9 0 0.0 2 1.8
SSS completed 6 8.7 1 2.2 7 6.1
Post-basic VTI 3 4.3 0 0.0 3 2.6
Other 1 1.5 0 0.0 1 0.9
Total 69 100.0 45 100.0 114 100  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Table 8.5 provides a summary of the average education levels of masters in the informal sector of 
Ghana. In earlier literature, informal sector operators have been regarded as possessing a low 
skills base and low levels of education (e.g. Hallak and Caillods, 1981). However, it has been 
recognised that large numbers of much more educated people are entering the informal sector in 
SSA (Charmes, 1999; Chigunta et al., 2005; King, 1990b; Palmer, 2004a) which is changing the 
dynamics of becoming a master. That the levels of education among informal sector operators 
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and apprentices is rising is most probably as a result of progress towards EFA.376 For example, in 
Ghana a survey in Accra (1990/91) (cited in Baah-Nuakoh, 2003) revealed that 14.2% of informal 
sector enterprise owners had not been to school (table 8.5). Later (2003) research in Nkawie-
Kuma, a rural town in Ashanti (Palmer, 2004a), recorded a lower figure.377 The fieldwork 
conducted with rural (manufacturing/service) MSEs in 2005 shows that among the masters in 
Nyinahin and Bibiani, very few had never been to school (0.9%). The 2003 survey included petty 
traders which may account for the higher percentage of owners with no schooling. Likewise, the 
1990/91 urban data revealed that 36.1% of operators had completed middle form four, compared 
to 46.8% and 63.2% in the 2003 and 2005 rural studies respectively (averaging 55% for rural 
masters).378 While the data for rural masters suggests that fewer have no formal schooling, the 
numbers of masters with incomplete basic education is high in rural areas: 9.2% and 20.2% of the 
masters in the 2003 and 2005 studies respectively had started middle school/JSS but dropped out 
(averaging 14.7% among rural masters). This suggests that, while it may have been easier for 
rural masters to complete primary education, there still remain barriers inhibiting many from 






                                                 
376 It may also, in part, be due to the entry of more educated workers from the formal sector into the 
informal sector – as a result of large scale retrenchment associated with the structural adjustment policies 
(Chigunta et al., 2005). 
377 It would be better to compare results from urban areas over this time period, instead of having one urban 
and one rural sample. However, since education in rural areas is almost always less widespread than in 
urban areas, what this data does indicate is that levels of education in urban areas for informal sector 
operators are likely to be higher than is suggested by the rural data.  
378 Loosely comparable to JSS3 now. Note that 63% of the most recent sample (Nyinahin/Bibiani) have 
about 9 or 10 years of education. 
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Table 8.5. Highest education level of masters in Ghana: evidence from three studies
                                           Year of survey 1990/91 2003 2005
                                           Location Urban Rural Rural Rural 
Accra (1) Nkawie- Nyinahin/ average
Highest education level completed Kuma (2) Bibiani (3) (2)+(3)
Not been to school 14.2 9.2 0.9 5.1
Has not completed primary 7.7 2.8 0 1.4
Completed primary 7.0 3.7 4.4 4.1
Entered middle school / JSS but not completed 3.3 9.2 20.2 14.7
Completed middle form four / JSS 3 36.1 46.8 63.2 55
Entered secondary but not completed 4.7 3.7 1.8 2.8
Completed secondary 12.1 15.6 6.1 10.9
Tertiary education 10.4 6.4 0 3.2
Other 5.0 1.8 3.5 2.7  
Notes:
(1) data from an Accra survey by Baah-Nuakoh (2003: 119)
(2) data from interviews in the district capital of Nkawie (Ashanti) by Palmer (2004a).
(3) data from the Author’s fieldwork, 2005
Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding of fractions.
The JSS replaced the middle school in Ghana. In the table ‘middle school’ and ‘JSS’ are assumed to be 
identical even though middle school was 4 years, while JSS is 3. Primary school in Ghana is 6 years.  
 
Comparing the education levels of masters from the two rural studies, it can be seen that more of 
those from Nkawie-Kuma had completed secondary or tertiary education than masters from 
Nyinahin/Bibiani, and hence the percentage of those who had completed middle school/JSS, as 
their highest level of education attained, was higher among Nyinahin/Bibiani MSE owners (table 
8.5). This is not surprising: Nkawie-Kuma is a bigger settlement, only 30 minutes drive from 
Kumasi, whereas Nyinahin and Bibiani are smaller towns, some 2-2 ½ hours drive from Kumasi. 
 
The education levels of owners varied according to trade areas, suggesting some kind of selection 
effect. For example 57% (12/21) of hairdressers interviewed had less than a complete basic 
education compared to 18% (6/33) of dressmakers. This suggests that less-educated females tend 
to cluster in hairdressing, rather than dressmaking, activities. However, in chapter 7.8.3 it was 
seen that among the apprentices interviewed (n=160) those in hairdressing had a higher level of 
formal education than those in dressmaking. This seemingly contradictory finding might signal a 
change over time. When the female hairdressing and dressmaking owners were doing their 
apprenticeship those with higher educational backgrounds tended to cluster in the dressmaking 
trade, perhaps because dressmaking was more popular than hairdressing at that time. That current 
hairdressing apprentices have higher levels of education than current dressmaking apprentices 
might be a signal that hairdressing has become a more popular trade since the 1990s (and hence 
masters are selecting apprentices with higher levels of education).  
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Indeed interview data supports this view, and suggests that foreign imports of ready made dresses 
have reduced the demand for locally made wares. Meanwhile hairdressing has increased in 
popularity among the youth:   
 
dressmaking have [sic]… gone down [in popularity] for the past ten years because of 
import of outside ware or goods because most women prefer already made goods and the 
second-hand cloths too are more cheaper [sic]. So if people are not buying more, surely it 
has to drop and it will no more become attractive. 
 
Fashion is more popular, with regards to hairdressing, women look nice. Whenever with 
nice hair style, people call them, chat with and whole lot of things I am not worth to 
mention. In short, it is very very popular. (interview with Otaakrom ICCES centre 
manager, 27.07.05) 
 
Similarly, of the carpentry masters interviewed 21% (5/24) had less than a complete basic 
education. Of the carpentry apprentices data reviewed earlier (chap.7.8.3), 40-50% had less than a 
complete basic education. This might suggest that a carpentry apprenticeship has become less 
popular option for schooled youth since the 1990s.379 It has been suggested that one reason for the 
decline in popularity is, paradoxically, the increasing use of carpentry machines. Since carpentry 
machines are most common in urban areas, and it is unusual to find a rural carpenter with their 
own machine, rural carpenters’ products are generally of lesser quality compared to those with 
machines. This makes doing a carpentry apprenticeship less popular in rural areas.  As one 
informant put it: 
 
[The] old days of carpentry is different from the present day. With machines it makes it 
modern with good finishing. How many of workshops have carpentry machine? So it is 
no more attractive in terms of no machine and to get money to send wood to machine 
shop is a big problem. The machines are in the cities and how does the rural youth go 
there get a place to stay and learn or become apprentice to carpentry in the city. Only the 
few serious ones will stay with somebody, serve the person and get a place to sleep and 
study. (interview with Otaakrom ICCES centre manager, 27.07.05) 
 
The data also suggests that there might be some relationship between the education levels of 
masters and the longevity of their enterprise. For example, out of the masters interviewed who 
had less than a basic education (n=29), the average age of their enterprise was 2.9 years. For those 
masters with a complete basic education or more, the average age of their enterprise was 6.4 
                                                 
379 These figures are, of course, not directly comparable since the samples are from different sites. But it 
does suggest, at least, that carpentry apprenticeships are becoming more common among less schooled 
youth. 
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years. While there are very many examples of highly successful enterprise owners who are totally 
illiterate, this data does suggest that there might be a higher chance of an enterprise surviving 
longer if the enterprise owner has a basic education (or higher).380 Of course this data does not 
prove causation since the relationship between education level and age of enterprise may be 
spurious: in other words, there may be a third or more variables which cause the correlation. For 
example, the socio-economic background of a master’s household can affect whether or not 
he/she completes basic education. It is likely that better off families are more able to support their 
children through basic education and, by being better off, more able to support their child in the 
initial stages of enterprise start-up (possibly putting their enterprise on a more steady footing and 
more likely to survive longer). 
 
With regard to the source of skills training, the majority (92%) of all master-craftspeople 
interviewed (2005) indicated that they had been through traditional apprenticeship only, while a 
further 5% indicated that they had trained in both an apprenticeship and a formal VTI.381 Informal 
enterprise-based training, therefore, seems to be a central ingredient for those who end up self-
employed in rural MSEs: 97% of rural masters interviewed indicated that they had been through a 
traditional apprenticeship (table 8.6). 
 

















Notes: VTI - Vocational training institute. TAT - Traditional apprenticeship training.
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
                                                 
380 The two longest surviving enterprises in the sample (25 and 28 years old) were both run by SSS 
graduates. 
381 When asked what their highest level of education was (table 8.4), only 3 master-craftspeople indicated 
that they had attended a VTI. However, when asked about their training, a total of 8 master-craftspeople 
indicated that they had been to a VTI. This discrepancy is either because the question was not clear enough 
– and master-craftspeople did not consider VTI training as education; or, it might have been that some of 
those interviewed went to a VTI before going onto SSS (or even JSS/middle-school) and hence this is 
masked in table 8.4. 
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The mean duration of apprenticeship training of the master-craftspeople interviewed was 3.2 
years, but this varied by trade area (table 8.7).  
 
Table 8.7. Duration of apprenticeship training of the master-craftspeople
among those interviewed
mean % female
duration of n in this 
training trade
Dressmaking 3.1 33 70
Hairdressing 2.9 21 100
Carpentry 3.2 24 0
Mechanics 4.5 6 0
Shoemaker 2.6 7 0
All 3.2 111 40  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Since 97% of master-craftspeople interviewed had acquired their training on-the-job in traditional 
apprenticeships, most would have been well place to develop networks which are known to be 
important for self-employment. 
 
It was noted earlier (chap.3.2.4) that two distinct types of networks need to be stimulated for self-
employment promotion: i) enterprise networks; and ii) institutional networks (e.g.  financial and 
non-financial BDS institutions) (Grierson, 1997). But given that family and relatives play such a 
strong function in providing start-up capital for so many new enterprises (see below and Palmer, 
2004a), and that ethnic networks are known to be an important in facilitating access to 
employment or support (chap.5.3.5), it is argued that a third type of network is essential for self-
employment promotion: family and ethnic networks.382 
 
If apprentices can establish and maintain contacts with customers, suppliers and enterprise 
owners during their training, these contacts may well be able to assist them in the start-up phase. 
As one respondent put it: “apprentices like to meet those people [customers, suppliers] so they 
can develop connections”.383 One strategy used to obtain start-up capital is getting suppliers or 
customers to provide credit. Similarly this supplier or customer credit is also useful to satisfy 
working capital needs once the enterprise is established (Palmer, 2004a). Hence making 
enterprise contacts early on (during training) puts aspiring owners at an advantage compared to 
                                                 
382 These different networks are, of course, not necessarily mutually exclusive: e.g. a family member or 
relative might also own an enterprise and hence be in both the family and enterprise networks. 
383 Interview with centre manager of Otaakrom ICCES (VTI), 22.09.05. 
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those that don’t have such connections. McLaughlin’s (1979) work on apprenticeship in the late 
1970s also led him to note that during apprenticeship youth learn how to deal with customers and 
build up personal contacts with dealers.    
 
Chant and Jones (2005) comment that “in Ghana… it was identified that employment is 
frequently a matter of ‘know who’ not ‘know how’, with the ‘knowing who’ involving a complex 
array of familial, ethnic and religious contacts” (p. 194). Lyon (2000) also highlights the 




Three-quarters of the 114 master-craftspeople interviewed had achieved JSS/middle-school 
completion or higher, which roughly corresponds with an earlier survey in rural Ghana (Palmer, 
2004a). 16% of male owners had a post-basic education compared to 2% of female owners. 
Compared to other data from Ghana, far fewer owners interviewed had never been to school or 
had dropped out of primary school. While this appears positive, 20% of those interviewed 
reported that they had started JSS/middle-school but dropped out. 
 
The education levels of owners varied according to trade areas, suggesting some kind of selection 
effect. Combined with the earlier data on apprentices (chap.7.8.3) it appears that preference for 
specific trades has been changing since the 1990s.  
 
The majority of owners (97%) interviewed had trained through a traditional apprenticeship after 
school: 5% of these had also been through a formal VTI. The length of apprenticeship training 
varied according to trade area, but averaged 3.2 years. During this apprenticeship, masters would 
have been able to begin to establish valuable networks while gaining experience training on-the-
job.  
 
8.2. Becoming financed: Overcoming the financial barrier to start-up  
  
Past studies of MSEs in Ghana have revealed that banks are unwilling to finance micro-enterprise 
start-up (Anheier and Seibel, 1987; Gockel and Akoena, 2002; Palmer, 2004a; Webster and 
Fidler, 1996) (fig.8.1).  
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Fig. 8.1. Reasons why getting access to formal credit is difficult for rural
micro-enterprises  
1] Lending to MSEs is considered a higher risk vis-à-vis lending to larger ones;
Banks do not have enough information on potential borrowers and fear the 
lack of predictability surrounding the transaction. Lenders are frequently faced 
with information asymmetry (*) when compared to potential borrowers and thus 
“may avoid lending to smaller, less-known clients, or impose strict collateral 
requirements when they do” (Aryeetey et al. 1994: 7);
2] MSEs lack ‘acceptable’ collateral;
3] The small size of loan transaction has a high ratio of transaction cost to 
loan size. “The smaller the SME the more unattractive it is… as financial 
institutions will always want to recover their costs and make a reasonable 
profit, which is not always possible with small lendings” (Odei and Hammond
1996: 80).
4] MSEs often produce poor project reports and/or lack of comprehensive 
project plans;
5] MSEs often do not show managerial competence;
6] The ability of MSEs to repay a loan is not proven;
7] MSEs often lack a clear repayment plan;
8] The weak legal system to enforce repayments or contracts;
9] Suspicion of fungibility of loans disbursed;
10] Physical remoteness of many enterprises, especially in the rural areas;
11] Lack of book keeping is common for MSEs;
12] Mobility of many MSEs;
13] Illiteracy of many MSE owners (**) and the inability to understand 
what the banks ask of them;
14] MSEs are seen as disorganised.  
Notes:
* Asymmetry of information arises when potential borrowers have more information than the lenders
are able to accurately obtain about the ability and willingness of the former to repay any loan.
** This assertion is not supported by the research findings from Palmer (2004a) or the field research
conducted in 2005 that revealed that most MSE owners interviewed had completed JSS or higher (table 8.4).
Source: Palmer, 2004a: 14  
 
With the difficulty of accessing formal credit, MSEs use personal and relatives’ savings as the 
predominant form of financing enterprise start-up (Anheier and Seibel, 1987; Aryeetey et al., 
1994; Baah-Nuakoh, 2003; Buckley, 1997; Kpemlie, 1998; Liedholm, 1991; Meghir, 1991; 
Thomi and Yankson, 1985). This trend is noted in other developing countries: Liedholm (1991) 
notes that evidence from Africa indicates over 95% of initial firm capitalisation is received from 
family, friends or personal savings. Borrowing from other sources is minimal. When resorted to, 
it is usually from non-institutional sources such as professional money lenders rather than formal 
financial institutions (Blunch et al., 2001). Other sources include customer advances and 
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suppliers credit (Aryeetey et al., 1994). Some researchers suggest alternative sources. For 
example, Kpemlie’s (1998) research in Ghana revealed that 13.3% of start-up finance came from 
churches. 
 
A detailed analysis of how existing rural Ghanaian masters were able to find the start-up capital 
for their enterprises, and hence overcome the financial entry-barrier contributes to our 
understanding of how the pathway to self-employment is navigated in rural areas. 
  
Overall, masters interviewed in 2005 mostly obtained their start-up capital for their current MSE 
activity from their family (41.2%) (spouse or parents/relatives), from previous periods of informal 
self-employment (39.5%) (including small-scale cash-crop farming, MESE activities384 or some 
other form of self-finance), and periods of informal wage-employment (15.8%) (including 
working for their previous master or labouring).  
 
The following case illustrates the difficulty of accessing formal finance and the way family 
finance is sometimes sought: 
 
Thomas completed JSS and went into a shoemaking apprenticeship. After he finished he 
found it impossible to get a bank loan: ‘because I was unemployed nobody [the banks] 
wanted to give me a loan to start a business’. He turned to his family for support and his 
grandmother gave him a loan of one million cedis which he is meant to repay with 100% 













                                                 
384 See chap.3.3.2. 
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Table 8.8. Source of start-up capital for enterprise owners (by sex) among
those interviewed
Male Female Both
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Spouse 0 0 9 20 9 7.9
Parents/other relatives 19 27.5 19 42.2 38 33.3
  Family 19 27.5 28 62.2 47 41.2
Farming 10 14.5 1 2.2 11 9.6
Starting small 10 14.5 3 6.7 13 11.4
Other self-finance 11 15.9 10 22.2 21 18.4
  Self Employment (informal) 31 44.9 14 31.1 45 39.5
Working for master 9 13 2 4.4 11 9.6
Labouring 6 8.7 1 2.2 7 6.1
  Wage Employment (informal) 15 21.7 3 6.7 18 15.8
Other 4 5.8 0 0 4 3.5
69 99.9 45 99.9 114 99.8  
Notes:
‘Other self-finance’ included saving chop money (3), hiring a kiosk (1), Galamsey informal sector gold mining (1),
 small scale retail trading (2) and other self-finance unspecified (14).
‘Labouring’ usually referred to ‘farm labouring’, i.e. getting paid a small per-day wage to weed or do the farm
 work of other community members.  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Breaking down the components reveals interesting distinctions according to gender.  
 
A higher proportion of female masters (62%) obtained their start-up capital from their family 
compared to male masters (28%). Where male masters obtained start-up capital from their family 
it primarily came from their parents or other relatives, and not their wife. In contrast, of those 
women who obtained finance from their family, nearly one third obtained finance from their 
husband (table 8.8). The high percentage of women receiving start-up finance from their family 
may be connected with support from maternal uncles (matrilineal system) though, as noted earlier 
(chap.5.3.5), among the younger generation the matrilineal system appears to be weakening in 
Ashanti and giving way to the stronger nuclear family system.    
 
Males were more likely to engage in informal self-employment activities to finance start-up, 
compared to females (45% of men compared to 31% of women). Male masters were more likely 
to engage in farming activities or starting their enterprise in a very small way, than their female 
counterparts (table 8.8).  
 
Similarly, male masters were more likely to use periods of informal wage-employment to finance 
start-up when compared to their female counterparts (22% of men compared to 7% of women). 
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Male masters had more opportunity, it seemed, to do wage work for their former masters than 
female masters were (13% of men compared to 4% of women) (table 8.8). 
 
Table 8.9. Source of start-up capital for enterprise owners according to trade and
gender among those interviewed  
Count
3 4 1 0 2 0 0 10
5 1 1 6 4 5 2 24
3 0 0 0 1 1 1 6
0 2 0 2 0 0 0 4
2 0 1 0 1 1 0 5
2 2 2 0 1 0 0 7
2 0 0 1 1 1 0 5
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
19 10 6 10 11 9 4 69
5 7 1 1 2 7 0 23
3 12 0 0 1 3 2 21
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1



































Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Among female dressmakers, over half (52%, 12/23) obtained finance from their family, 48% 
(11/23) obtained finance from MESE activities and only 4% (1/23) obtained finance through 
informal wage-employment (table 8.9). Among hairdressers, nearly two-thirds (71%, 15/21) 
obtained finance from their family, 19% (4/21) obtained finance from MESE activities and only 
10% (2/21) obtained finance through informal wage-employment (table 8.9). 
 
In contrast, among carpenters, only one fifth (21%, 5/24) obtained finance from their family, 46% 
(11/24) obtained finance from MESE activities and 25% (6/24) obtained finance through informal 
wage-employment (table 8.9). Among male tailors, only 30% (3/10) obtained finance from their 
family, 60% (6/10) obtained finance from MESE activities and 10% (1/10) from informal wage-
employment (table 8.9). 
 






Table 8.10. Main source of start-up capital: A comparison of Ghanaian
findings, urban and rural (figures in columns are percentages)  
URBAN (1) URBAN (2) URBAN (3) URBAN RURAL (4) RURAL (5) RURAL
Aryeetey et al Buckley Anheier and average Palmer Author's average
1994: 83 1997: 1082 Seibel 1987 2004a fieldwork
(n = 76) (n = 150) (n = 209) (n = 435) (n = 101) (n=114) (n=215)
Own savings 71 56 70 66 77 56 67
Gifts / loan from friend or relation 15 33 25 24 19 41 30
Loans from an organisation 14 3 5 7 4 - 2
or someone else
Don't know / can't remember - 8 - 3 - 4 2
100 100 100 100 100 101 101  
 
Notes
The fourth column displays the average of these three urban sites. The author's data is shown in column six.
(1) Aryeetey et al. (1994) study was based on 76 more dynamic micro-enterprises with “good growth potential”
(ibid: 1) in the urban areas of Accra, Tema, Koforidua, Kumasi and Takoradi, Ghana. The table only includes the 76
micro-enterprises out of the 133 in the sample (which was made up of micro-, small- and medium-enterprises).    
(2) Buckley (1997) study was based on 150 micro-enterprises in the urban areas of Accra, Kumasi and Cape Coast,
Ghana. 
(3) Anheier and Seibel (1987) study based on 209 small-scale industries (wood- and metal-processing firms)
(size 15 or less) in Kumasi and Accra, Ghana.
(4) Palmer (2004a) study based on 101 micro-enterprises (including manufacturing, retail, food) in Nkawie-Kuma,
Ashanti Region.
(5) Data from author’s 2005 fieldwork – interviews with 114 rural MSEs (manufacturing) largely from Nyinahin




It is interesting, at this point, to compare previous MSE research findings in Ghana with the 
author’s findings from the interviews with rural MSEs in 2005. Four such studies, three urban and 
one rural based are compared in table 8.10.      
 
Looking at the averages of the three urban studies there appears to be little difference with 
averages of the rural data. ‘Own savings’ are still the most important source with gifts and loans 
from friends and relatives of secondary importance. The data does suggest gifts from 
family/friends are more common in rural areas (30%) than urban (24%). Comparing the results of 
the 2005 rural MSE interviews with the previous rural study (Palmer, 2004a) indicates that, as in 
urban areas, there are different patterns of enterprise start-up. The 2005 rural MSE interviews 
suggested that ‘own savings’ was a less important source of start-up finance than the previous 
rural survey suggested (56% versus 77%). Moreover, receiving gifts/loans from friends/relatives 
was more important in the 2005 interviews than in the 2003 survey (41% versus 19%). This, 
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perhaps is not surprising, and might be a reflection of the different socio-economic contexts of the 
2003 and 2005 rural surveys. While the 2003 rural survey was conducted in a well-established 
rural district capital (Nkawie-Kuma, Ashanti), the 2005 survey was conducted in a very newly-
established rural district capital (Nyinahin, Ashanti) and a smaller district capital (Bibiani, 
Western Region). As have noted elsewhere (Palmer, 2004a; 2004b), social and kin obligations are 
more pronounced in more smaller rural settlements compared to larger, more established, rural 
towns (or urban areas).385 It is therefore perhaps expected that gifts/loans from friends and 
relatives are more common for rural enterprise start-up. Similarly, it might be argued that, in 
smaller rural areas there is less opportunity for the young to engage in informal wage- or self-
employment in order to accrue personal savings. 
 
Loans from external organisations are also more common in urban areas (7%) than rural areas 
(2%). Only in the Aryeetey et al. (1994) survey was the percentage of those enterprises getting 
start-up finance from external organisations of significance (at 14%).386 However, the Aryeetey et 
al. study is not truly representative of MSEs throughout urban Ghana as these authors 
concentrated on more dynamic, higher-end MSEs (see Palmer, 2004a). Nonetheless, the author’s 
interview data from Nyinahin/Bibiani does seem to agree in the most part with previous findings.     
 
Palmer (2004a), like others (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Buckley, 1997; Kpemlie, 1998), found that 
enterprises frequently utilise multiple sources of finance to start-up their enterprise. This is 
logical, especially in rural areas: 
 
Since informal financing is the predominant source of start-up capital and one of the main 
problems associated with informal financing is its inability to mobilise a great deal of 
money, to use multiple sources is logical. (Palmer, 2004a: 33) 
 
One rural survey in Ghana found that 37% of masters indicated that they had used multiple 
sources of start-up capital (Palmer, 2004a). 
 
In light of the data discussed above, it is possible to outline a number of strategies that are used in 
rural areas in order to obtain start-up capital and hence overcome the financial start-up barrier 
(fig.8.2). 
 
                                                 
385 See also the ‘traders dilemma’ in Evers and Schrader (1994). 
386 This was made up of money from pensions (5%), bank loan (1%); PAMSCAD (3%); GEDC (1%) and 
other 4%. 
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Fig.8.2. Strategies adopted to finance enterprise start-up costs in rural Ghana  
Accrue personal savings
1. Informal self-employment (on an ad hoc and very small-scale basis) 
a) Working on a part-time basis on a very small scale periodic basis 
for yourself at the same time as continuing to farm to make a living. 
Customer or supplier credit is frequently used to avoid the need for capital.
(more common for males, especially in carpentry).
b) Savings from small-scale cash-crop farming (more common for males).
2. Informal wage-employment
a) Working for their previous master (more common for males, especially in carpentry).
b) Labouring for others on a per-day wage basis (more common for males)
3. Other methods
a) Apprentices saving ‘chop money’ given to them by their masters 
to buy basic tools (more common for males since females get 'chop money' less frequently)
b) Newly graduated master-craftsmen taking apprentices on and
using the apprentice fees charged to purchase items to start own enterprise. 
c) Using profits from existing enterprise activities to invest in another enterprise.
Family (more common for females, especially in dressmaking/hairdressing)
a) Borrow money from a member of the (extended) family either with 
or without interest charged.
b) Be given a gift of money by a family member to initiate a business.
Other
a) Getting a loan from the formal financial sector or government credit 
programme (not common).  
 




Financing for the start-up of their self-employment venture mostly came from family (41%), 
previous periods of informal self-employment (40%), and periods of informal wage-employment 
(16%). Women were more likely to obtain start-up capital from their family compared to males. 
Males were more likely to engage in informal wage- or self-employment activities to finance 
start-up, compared to females. According to trade areas, the majority of those entering into 
hairdressing enterprises got finance from their family. Dressmakers used two main strategies: 
family and starting in MESE activities. Nearly half of carpenters obtained their start-up finance 
from MESE activities, a further quarter from informal wage-employment, and only 20% from 
family. Start-up finance for rural enterprise usually comes from multiple sources and a number of 
strategies are pursued to access these sources. 
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Entry into self-employment in Ghana is constrained by various factors. While Chant and Jones 
(2005) comment that start-up capital and personal contacts are equally crucial factors, others like 
Frazer (2006) suggest that youth are “constrained only by capital from becoming apprenticed 
entrepreneurs” (p. 44). But Frazer appears to be overemphasizing the importance of capital alone, 
and the author’s fieldwork (2004-2005) agrees with Chant and Jones that social networks are 
absolutely critical for entry into self-employment. However, as noted above, the two are related: 
access to start-up capital for the majority comes from personal or family contacts and ties. Hence 
access to financial capital is tied up with access to social capital. 
 
8.3. Becoming established: strategies for sustaining self-employment activities and 
ongoing constraints faced by owners 
 
The MSE owners interviewed were asked at what age they started their enterprise. This can be 
difficult to determine. For example, where owners have engaged in MESE activities as a means to 
raise start-up finance, the time at which an enterprise was started (and hence the age of the owner) 
is muddied: there might not be a distinct start-up time. Furthermore, where MESE activities are in 
different areas from subsequent enterprise activities (i.e. trade MESE leading to carpentry 
enterprise) the age at which the owner started their enterprise might not correspond with the age 
at which they started self-employment ventures per se.    
 
With this cautionary note in mind, the average age given was 23 years, 2 months, though this 
ranged from 13-38. The average age of women enterprise owners at start-up was slightly higher 
than it was for men in the sample: 23 years, 7 months, compared to 22 years, 11 months. 
 
Only 9% of enterprise owners interviewed (11.6% of men, 4.4% of women) started their business 
when they were aged 18 or less. Of those that did, most where men (8/10). 23% (26/114) started 
their business between the ages of 19-20 (20.3% of men, 26.7% of women); 20% (23/114) started 
their business between the ages of 21-22 (21.7% of men, 17.8% of women); 18% (21/114) started 
their business between the ages of 23-24 (21.7% of men, 13.3% of women) (table 8.11). By the 
































Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Of the 72 masters interviewed that had completed JSS/middle school and went no higher, the 
average start up age was 22 years, 10 months. Assuming that the average master completed 
JSS/middle school at the usual age of 16/17, and went on to do an apprenticeship averaging 3 
years, 2 months (see above), there is a gap of between 3 years, 8 months and 4 years 8 months 
between completion of formal schooling and apprenticeship training and starting in their self-
employment activity. This period of time seems to be when the young prospective self-employed 
artisans made their transition from training to self-employment and had to utilise one or more of 
the strategies outlined above (fig.8.2) to finance the start-up of their enterprise.387 
 
There also appears to be some distinction between the start-up ages according to trade area. For 
example, in the carpentry trade, 88% (21/24) of masters interviewed had started their business by 
age 24. By contrast, 61% (20/33) of dressmakers/tailors had started their business by the age of 
24. Similarly, 67% (14/21) of hairdressers had started their business by the age of 24. Carpenters, 
therefore seemed to be able to enter self-employment at an earlier age (average 21.8 years), 
followed by hairdressers (22.2 years average) and then dressmakers/tailors (24.5 years average) 
(fieldwork, 2005).388 This might reflect, in part, the difference in required start-up capital for 
different trades (chap.5.3.6). 
 
                                                 
387 Honny (1999) estimates a similar time – 5 years after graduation – for trainees of NVTI centres in 
Ghana to establish themselves in self-employment. 
388 There was little difference between male tailors and female dressmakers. 
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Most newly graduated apprentices want to take on apprentices as soon as possible. This not only 
adds prestige to their establishment and allows them to undertake more work, but also, usually, 
provides the master with a source on income from apprenticeship fees (fieldwork, 2001-2005; see 
also Valenchik, 1995). Small informal operators may be tempted to use apprenticeship fees as a 
substitute for capital since they find it so hard to gain access to loans from commercial banks 
(McLaughlin, 1979). Apprenticeship fees can also be a useful source of working capital for rural 
enterprises (Palmer, 2004a).389 However, taking on apprentices appears to be easier in some 
trades than others. In dressmaking/tailoring and hairdressing, both female dominated trades, most 
newly graduated apprentices indicate that they can’t take on apprentices until they have a kiosk or 
other structure to work from – other than the home or from a table-top (fieldwork, 2001-2005). 
Most newly trained dressmakers/tailors, therefore, work alone from their parents/family house 
until they can acquire the capital to get their own kiosk and take on apprentices. In contrast, it 
appears relatively easy for newly trained carpenters to take on apprentices – since most carpenters 
work under a shady tree or other temporary structure that requires minimal capital outlay. 
Likewise, newly graduated masonry apprentices can more easily take on apprentices since their 
worksite is frequently in different on-the-job locations according to the informal contract they 
might have at the time.  
 
Among those master-craftspeople interviewed, the average number of apprentices per enterprise 
was three, though this ranged from no apprentices at all to 22 apprentices.390 Nearly three-
quarters of the owners interviewed had 0-3 apprentices (table 8.12): 24% had no apprentices 
(27/114), 50% (57/114) had 1-3 apprentices. Male enterprise owners (n=69) had on average 2.4 
apprentices, while female enterprise owners (n=45) had on average 4 apprentices. 
 
                                                 
389 In the late 1970s Hakam (1978) and McLaughlin (1979) noted that it was common for master-
craftspeople just starting out to use apprenticeship fees to assist the start-up of their enterprise. A new 
master’s ability to attract a sufficient number of paying apprentices may determine whether he/she is able 
to purchase particular tools, raw materials and so on. McLaughlin (1979) found that capital from 
apprentices was likely to be more important for new start-up enterprises than it is for more established 
enterprises – although he noted that it can still be important for them if they need capital for an investment. 
390 The four largest enterprises (with 12, 17, 20 and 22 apprentices) were all hairdressing ventures. When 
there are such large numbers of apprentices it might be that the enterprise gets a large proportion of income 
from being a training provider. 
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Table 8.12. Average number of apprentices by sex of enterprise owner among

























Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
The female dominated trade areas of dressmaking and hairdressing had the greatest number of 
apprentices. 15% (5/33) of dressmaking enterprises and 33% (7/21) of hairdressing enterprises 
had 6 or more apprentices (table 8.13). 
 
Dressmaking/tailoring enterprises had an average of 2.5 (84/33) apprentices. Male-headed 
tailoring enterprises had an average of 1.7 apprentices (17/10) compared to an average of 2.9 
apprentices (67/23) for female-headed dressmaking enterprises. Hairdressing enterprises had an 




Table 8.13. Average number of apprentices per enterprise by type of enterprise
among those interviewed
Count
6 7 8 6 1 0 5 33
5 5 1 1 1 1 7 21
4 1 8 7 3 1 0 24
0 0 0 1 0 3 2 6
2 0 0 0 1 0 1 4
2 0 1 1 0 0 1 5
4 1 1 1 0 0 0 7
1 2 1 0 1 0 0 5
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2





















Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Respondents were asked what the most important ongoing constraint was for their enterprise. 
Overall, about 20% indicated that their enterprise did not have any significant ongoing problems. 
However, nearly 60% indicated financial problems to be the most pressing ongoing constraint, 
and this was similar for both male and female owners. This concurs with other small enterprise 
literature that shows masters indicate financial problems to be their biggest problem (for Ghana 
see Aryeetey et al., 1994; Aryeetey, 1996).391 Male owners appeared to have more of a problem 
with ongoing working capital than female owners: 45% of men compared to 31% of women 
indicated that working capital was their biggest problem. Women were more likely to indicate 
that there was a lack of demand for their type of service/products in the market: 13% of women 




                                                 
391 See chap.3.2.5. 
 296 
Table 8.14. Ongoing problems faced by rural MSEs
Male Female Both
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
No problem 13 18.8 9 20 22 19.3
Lack of working capital 6 8.7 2 4.4 8 7
Problems with clients paying 10 14.5 8 17.8 18 15.8
Lack of fixed capital 10 14.5 11 24.4 21 18.4
Lack of fixed and working capital 15 21.7 4 8.9 19 16.7
   All working capital problems 31 44.9 14 31.1 45 39.5
   All fixed capital problems 25 36.2 15 33.3 40 35.1
   All financial problems 41 59.4 25 55.6 66 57.9
Lack of customers/market 5 7.2 6 13.3 11 9.6
Availabilty of parts/ material 5 7.2 0 0 5 4.4
Other problem 5 7.2 5 11.1 10 8.8
69 99.8 45 99.9 114 100  
Notes:
According to the respondents; ‘problems with clients paying’ included: ‘clients don’t pay for good workmanship’; ‘the
client don’t [sic] pay regularly’; ‘clients don’t come for their item on time’; ‘people refuse to pay money after work is
done’; ‘inability of customers to pay for charges’. ‘Other problems’ included: ‘luck at getting job and problems with so
many taxes’; ‘apprentices are undisciplined’; ‘too many bills’; ‘electricity bill and income tax’; ‘want to help poor to
acquire a trade, but limited to help them’; ‘problem with writing’; ‘do not have electricity’; ‘land to establish my shop’;
and, ‘Family pressure’.  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Another survey conducted with MSE owners in rural Ghana in 2003 (Palmer, 2004a) also showed 
financial problems as ranking high among the concerns of owners (table 8.15). In this survey, 
respondents were asked to rank different factors on a 5-point scale from ‘no problem to ‘major 
problem’, and were not just asked about the main problem they faced.  
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Table 8.15. Factors considered as ‘major ongoing problems’ by rural MSE
owners in Ghana (multiple responses)
%
Profits too small to reinvest 34
Lack credit to buy large item 32
Too much competition 30
Problems with equipment 21
Cost of credit 13
Lack of working capital 25
Access to raw materials 19
Low purchasing power  15
Lack of demand 10
Other markting problems 15
Community obligations 13
Family obligations 11
Getting title to land 18
Poor Infrastructure 15
Other government regulations 16
Lack of electricity/water 13
Uncertain about future 11
Managerial ability of owner 3
Lack of training for owners 5
Availability of skilled labour 8  
Source: Palmer, 2004a: 58  
 
The difficulty of accessing finance has repercussions for the scale of business that can be 
achieved. For example, two hairdressers interviewed (fieldwork, 2005) commented that their 
inability to afford a hair-dryer was a big problem as, without it, they find it hard to attract 
customers who want their hair dried the same day and they are forced to reduce their charges to 
attract customers 
 
Looking again at the results of the 2005 rural MSE interviews, it is clear that among the three 
trades of dressmaking, hairdressing and carpentry, carpenters appear least likely to have no 
problem: 24% of dressmakers, 14% of hairdressers and 8% of carpenters indicated they were not 
constrained by ongoing problems. For carpenters, working capital constraints were by far the 
most pressing issue and appeared to be more so than in the other two trade areas: 54% of 
carpenters, compared to 33% and 30% of hairdressers and dressmakers respectively mentioned 
working capital problems. Lack of demand was felt most by hairdressers (19%) and carpenters 
(17%) (table 8.16). 
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Table 8.16. Ongoing problems faced by rural MSEs (by selected trade area)
Dressmaking Hairdressing Carpentry
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
No problem 8 24.2 3 14.3 2 8.3
Lack of working capital 1 3 1 4.8 2 8.3
Problems with clients paying 7 21.2 3 14.3 3 12.5
Lack of fixed capital 8 24.2 5 23.8 3 12.5
Lack of fixed and working capital 2 6.1 3 14.3 8 33.3
   All working capital problems 10 30.3 7 33.3 13 54.2
   All fixed capital problems 10 30.3 8 38.1 11 45.8
   All financial problems 18 54.5 12 57.1 16 66.7
Lack of customers/market 2 6.1 4 19 4 16.7
Availabilty of parts/ material 0 0 0 0 2 8.3
Other problem 5 15.2 2 9.5 0 0
33 100 21 100 24 99.9  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Given that working and fixed capital problems represent the most pressing constraints to rural 
MSEs - according to the owners - what strategies are adopted to help ease this situation?  
 
Evidence from rural Ghana suggests that MSE owners use multiple strategies to compensate for 
the lack of working capital in their enterprises (fig.8.3). One survey indicated that: nearly a 
quarter of owners obtain financial advances from customers in order to complete an order; 11% 
acquire working capital from suppliers; 10% acquire working capital from apprenticeship fees; 
12% from labouring work; 8% from farming work; and 15% from Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs) (Palmer, 2004a).392 
 
Fig. 8.3. Strategies adopted to finance working capital costs  
a) Retained profits from previous sales (might be saved 
in ROSCAs or rural bank for example).
b) Total advance payment from customer 
– either in cash and/or materials.
c) Partial advance payment from customer
 – either in cash and/or materials.
d) Loan from friends / relatives.
e) Cross-financing from other owned enterprises, pawning
of labour or farming work.
f) Credit from suppliers.   
g) Use of apprentice fees.   
 
Source: Palmer, 2004a: 44  
 
                                                 
392 ROSCAs are a widely used, effective and cheap savings mechanism in Africa (Ardener and Burman, 
1996). 
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8.3.1. Occupational pluralism among rural masters 
 
Undertaking other informal self- or wage-employment in order to complement a main enterprise 
activity therefore appears a logical option in rural Ghana. Indeed, as noted earlier, occupational 
pluralism – owners operating multiple enterprises - in rural Ghana is widespread and growing in 
importance (chap.2.3). Research from rural Ghana suggests that nonfarm enterprises are more 
likely to be used to finance the start-up of a new enterprise rather than contribute to the working 
capital needs of existing nonfarm enterprises (Palmer, 2004a). Buckley (1996) suggests that one 
reason that owners might have for shifting money from one enterprise to another is to ‘conceal’ 
their wealth from family and community members who might otherwise act as a drain on the 
business (cf. Palmer, 2004a). However, with respect to cash-crop farming, the evidence from 
rural Ghana suggests that a two-way cross-financing does occur between farming enterprises and 
the working capital needs of nonfarm enterprises (Palmer, 2004a). Undertaking cash-crop 
farming at the same time as a main nonfarm enterprise, therefore, appears to be important for the 
survival of some rural enterprises.  
 
Table 8.17 shows that 40% (46/114) of all masters interviewed indicated that they worked in an 
additional income-generating enterprise activity: 25% small-scale farming,393 9% retail activity 
and 6% other.394 
 
Table 8.17. Primary additional income-generating enterprise activity of master-
craftspeople  
Count
34 25 4 6 69
34 4 6 1 45










Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Male masters were more likely to have additional income-generating enterprise activities than 
women. 50% of all men (35/69), compared to 24% of all women (11/45), reported an additional 
                                                 
393 ‘Farming’ here refers to small-scale cash crop farming, not subsistence agriculture or ‘chop crops’ as 
they are known. 
394 Other included: driving; renting out sewing machines; composing songs; vehicle body repair; painting; 
renting a room. 
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(farm or nonfarm) enterprise activity. This figure is likely to be an underestimate of additional 
activities done by the masters, particularly the female masters. Respondents were asked to report 
on additional income-generating enterprise activities that they undertook in addition to their trade 
activity. Women, in particular, engage in numerous forms of subsistence or non-paid work or 
activities that contribute directly to the overall wellbeing of their households, even though no 
income is generated per se. 
 
Table 8.18. Primary additional income-generating enterprise activity, by trade and
sex, among those interviewed  
Count
5 5 0 0 10
12 8 1 3 24
3 1 1 1 6
1 2 0 1 4
4 1 0 0 5
2 3 2 0 7
4 0 0 1 5
0 1 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 2
1 1 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 2
0 1 0 0 1
34 25 4 6 69
21 0 2 0 23
13 4 3 1 21
0 0 1 0 1





























Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Table 8.18 suggests that the need for additional income-generating activities is higher in some 
trade areas than others. In carpentry and tailoring, 50% (12/24 and 5/10 respectively) of 
respondents have second income enterprises, compared to 38% (8/21) of hairdressers and just 9% 
(2/23) of (female) dressmakers. The small number of masters in other trade areas makes any 
generalisations difficult, but the data suggests that artists, vulcanizers, shoemakers and builders 
(masonry), as well as carpenters and tailors rely on secondary income activities to a greater 
degree than do dressmakers, hairdressers, welders or electronics repair enterprises. Among 
carpenters in the survey, 33% (8/24) were engaging in small-scale cash-crop farming in addition 
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to their carpentry enterprise. Given the working capital problems faced by carpenters (table 8.16) 
and the evidence that farming activities are often used to support nonfarm activities in rural areas 
(Palmer, 2004a), it is likely that many of these farmers in the survey are using their farming in 
this manner too – to financially support their carpentry activities. 
 
The interviews with MSE owners (2005) appears to suggest that the way an enterprise was 
financed in the start-up phase has an effect on whether the owner engages in other income-
generating activities later on (table 8.19). 
 
Table 8.19. Source of start-up capital and later incidence of occupational pluralism
(%’s refer to % of those with a particular source of start-up capital)  
              Occupational pluralism No other income Other income activity
Freq. % Freq. % Total
Source of start-up
Spouse 7 - 2 - 9
Parents/other relatives 26 - 12 - 38
   Family 33 70.2 14 29.8 47
Farming 2 - 9 - 11
Starting small 8 - 5 - 13
Other self-finance 16 - 5 - 21
   Self-Employment (informal) 26 57.7 19 42.2 45
Working for master 4 - 7 - 11
Labouring 3 - 4 - 7
   Wage Employment (informal) 7 38.9 11 61.1 18
Other 2 - 2 - 4
68 - 46 - 114  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005  
 
Table 8.19 suggests that masters whose start-up finance came from their family were less likely to 
be undertaking other income generating activities. Conversely, masters that financed their 
enterprise start-up through informal self- or wage-employment were more likely to be 
undertaking other income generating activities after start-up.395 Of those masters that obtained 
their start-up capital from their family (47/114), only 30% were pursuing some other form of 
income generating activity at the time of interview. In contrast, of those masters that obtained 
start-up capital through informal self- or wage-employment, 42% and 61% respectively were 
pursuing some other form of income generating activity at the time of interview. 
 
                                                 
395 This relationship does not necessarily imply causation. 
 302 
The interview data with the MSE owners suggests that - if one measure of a successful enterprise 
is its longevity - more successful enterprises commonly practice occupational pluralism: only 
29% (23/80) of those enterprises aged five years or less reported undertaking additional income 
generating activities, compared to 68% (23/34) of those enterprises aged above five years (table 
8.20).  
 
Table 8.20. Pluri-activity (occupational pluralism) of owners by age of their enterprise
Count
5 0 0 0 5
16 5 2 0 23
6 3 0 0 9
12 3 2 0 17
8 1 3 2 14
10 2 0 0 12
0 3 0 0 3
2 0 1 1 4
1 3 0 0 4
1 2 0 1 4
3 1 0 0 4
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
3 1 0 1 5
0 1 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 2
































Over 60% of owners interviewed started their self-employment activities between the ages of 19-
24. Only a few (9%) started self-employment at age 18 or less. Carpenters seemed to enter self-
employment at an earlier age than other trade areas (nearly 90% had started by age 24), implying 
that entry is easier into this trade area, probably related to the differential costs of start-up for 
different trade areas. 
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Once self-employment commenced, masters did their best to attract apprentices to their 
enterprise. Taking on apprentices, however, appears to be easier for carpenters and masons than it 
is for dressmakers and hairdressers. Owners interviewed revealed that financial problems were 
their biggest problems. Multiple strategies are adopted to overcome working capital needs. One 
strategy involves entering into other forms of self-employment – engaging in occupational 
pluralism. In the interviews, 40% of owners indicated that they undertook another income 
generating activity. Those that had been financed by the family, mainly women and hairdressers, 
were least likely to have additional income generating activities. In contrast, those that had to find 
start-up capital principally from their own resources were more likely to be engaging in multiple 
activities. For example, 50% of carpenters interviewed indicated that they had other income 
generating activities.  
 
8.4. Conclusion: typical pathways to self-employment in rural Ghana 
 
The pathways to self-employment identified through the interviews are related to the typical 
pathways noted earlier (chap.3.3.2) but are, usually, much more complex. It is not the intention to 
list all the possible pathways identified but, rather, to show some of the more common routes. 
 
The first pathway relates to Model B: enterprise-based training followed by wage-employment, 
followed by self-employment (fig.8.4). This is illustrated in the following two cases: 
 
Akua did not complete middle school. She trained in a hairdressing apprenticeship for 
two years under her sister’s guidance who had her own enterprise. After her 
apprenticeship, Akua went to work for a different hairdresser for one year to ‘test if [she] 
can be self-employed’. The money she saved during this year was used to start up her 
own hairdressing store in Otaakrom. (interview, 29.01.05) 
 
After JSS, Victor trained in an electronic repair apprenticeship for 2½ years. After the 






The second pathway (fig.8.5 & 8.6) combines Models B + C, but also highlights the common 
practice of engaging in informal wage-employment (usually labouring or weeding) in order to 
save money to do an apprenticeship or pay for schooling. Among the apprentices interviewed 
(chap.7.6), while the average education level was a complete basic education (ending at age 
16/17), the average age of starting an apprenticeship was 19 years: part of this 2-year gap 
between completion of JSS and starting apprenticeship may be filled with earning money to 
finance an apprenticeship, as well as waiting for the BECE results and, perhaps, trying to gain 
admission into formal second-cycle institutions, including SSS. After the apprenticeship both 
(in)formal wage-employment and MESE activities are used to raise start-up capital. This is 
illustrated by the following two cases: 
 
After finishing JSS in 1991, David did day labouring for two years to earn money for a 
tailoring apprenticeship. After his apprenticeship he did more day labouring as well as 


















Anthony, an old rural tailor, describes his pathway to self-employment:  
 
When I was five I saw some children going to school so I followed them, but I could not 
get help [to afford school], so I went to some cassava farmers and asked them if I could 
weed for them to get money. I did this until I was about nine years. In 1965 I finished 
middle school, and stayed idling until about 1969 before I know that they [parents] 
cannot help me so I should help myself. So I went to a certain tailor to learn from him. 
Before that he realized I am learning it was about three months. I used to make notes how 
to sew. The first day I was there I opened his measurement book and learnt something – 
the measurement he was using to cut one shirt or one trouser. So I write. After three 
months I know that I am qualified, so I went to Kumasi Ministry and asked a certain man 
to give me appointment letter to go and teach. I was a supply teacher. So through 
teaching I got some money, and went to a certain man to buy this [sewing] machine. It 
was from these Lagos people [Nigerians] who they were driving from Ghana [with the 
Alien Compliance Order]. I taught for about one year four months. When I worked [on 


























The third pathway (fig.8.7) is similar to Model C: informal enterprise-based training followed by 
MESE activities to finance start-up costs. This is illustrated below: 
 
Isaac finished JSS and then undertook a three year carpentry apprenticeship, during 
which he saved his ‘chop money’396 so that he could purchase tools. ‘After I had the 
tools, people brought the jobs [with an advance] and I could do the work’. Six months 
after he finished his own apprenticeship he took on apprentices to train and used the fees 
that they paid to buy more materials. (interview, 11.01.05) 
 
 
                                                 




























The fourth pathway, anticipated in Model H involves acquiring skills from multiple sources prior 
to self-employment. The first case (fig.8.8) involves combining VTI-based training with informal 
enterprise-based training and also highlights the importance of family support in the post 
apprenticeship period. This is illustrated below: 
 
After completing JSS, Alima went to the village ICCES centre to learn hairdressing, but 
dropped-out after one year as the hairdressing instructor left and was not replaced. She 
did a hairdressing apprenticeship for 8 months. She did not get any certificates from her 
training and continued to work with her former mistress for just over a year until her 
mistress left the village in 2004. Alima then started out on her own, with support from her 
mother, and took over the ‘pitch’ and customers of her mistress, but gradually lost most 
of them as she no longer had access to a hair-dryer (her mistress took it with her when 
she left, and Alima can’t afford to buy her own). (interview, 03.03.05) 
 
After JSS Issah started to learn dressmaking in the village ICCES centre, but dropped-out 
after about 2 years of the course as she did not think the practicals were very extensive 
and the ICCES lacked instructors. After leaving ICCES she did labouring for three 
months to earn enough money to do a dressmaking apprenticeship in a nearby town. On 
completion she started her own dressmaking enterprise from her family’s house using her 




 Chop money 
saved 
Apprentices 














The second case (fig.8.9) involves acquiring skills through multiple informal enterprise-based 
training:  
 
Doris did not complete middle school. She trained as a hairdresser for five years in three 
different places so as to acquire a wider understanding of hairdressing from different 
sources. After her apprenticeship, she worked for an established hairdresser for four years 
and was able to save money so she could start her own business. Her main problem at the 
moment is how to acquire her own store from which to conduct business from. At the 
moment she works from the house. She says that it is difficult to get apprentices without 
























These illustrations (figs.8.4-8.9) highlight three important points concerning the pathway to self-
employment for these masters. First, for the vast majority of all masters interviewed the 
acquisition of skills through formal training was either minimal or absent: most had acquired their 
skill in traditional apprenticeship training. Second, it is quite common for youth to self-finance 
this apprenticeship training through a period of prior informal wage-employment. Third, the issue 
of time appears crucial, particularly post-training: for most youth the pathway to self-employment 
is drawn out. Multiple strategies are used to find the required start-up funds, including working 
for periods in informal wage-employment, MESE activities or sourcing start-up support from the 
family.  
 
Based on the discussions from this chapter and chapter 7 it is also possible to map out some 
typical pathways to self-employment for specific trade areas in rural Ashanti: hairdressing and 



























A typical route to hairdressing in rural Ashanti involves a female completing basic education (9 
years of schooling) by age 16/17. After about 2 years, during which time the girl waits for her 
BECE results (about 6 months) and then either tries to seek admission to other second-cycle 
institutions and/or tries to earn some money to pay for an apprenticeship, a three-year 
apprenticeship commences.  
 
After finishing the apprenticeship there is a gap of about 3 years during which the graduate 
apprentice seeks support to start the enterprise. Most (70%) get support from their family, while 
others get support from MESE activities (20%) or informal wage-employment.397  
 
About 70% will be able to start-up by age 24 and gradually take on apprentices to a maximum of 
about 5. After a couple of years of business about one-third of new enterprises start other 
enterprises to supplement their income.   
 
                                                 
397 These categories are not mutually exclusive. Multiple sources of start-up are common. This applies also 
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A typical route to dressmaking in rural Ashanti involves a female not completing basic education. 
At the age of about 17, perhaps after having earned money to pay for the fees, a three-year 
apprenticeship commences.  
 
After finishing the apprenticeship there is a gap of about 4-5 years during which the graduate 
apprentice seeks support to start the enterprise. Half get support from their family, while the other 
half save money through MESE activities.  
 
About 60% will be able to start-up by age 24 and gradually take on apprentices to a maximum of 
about 3. After a couple of years of business about one-tenth of new enterprises start other 

















by age 24 
Takes on 3 
apprentices 





TAT – traditional apprenticeship training  
MESE – micro-entrepreneurial self-employment 
a) Usually starts out working from home 
50% 
50% 





A typical route to tailoring in rural Ashanti involves a male completing basic education by age 
16/17. After about 2 years, a three-year apprenticeship commences.  
 
After finishing the apprenticeship there is a gap of about 2-3 years during which the graduate 
apprentice seeks support to start the enterprise. Most (60%) get support from MESE activities, 
while about 30% get support from their family.  
 
About 70% will be able to start-up by age 24 and gradually take on apprentices to a maximum of 
about 2. After a couple of years of business about one-half of new enterprises start other 
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A typical route to carpentry in rural Ashanti involves a male not completing basic education. At 
the age of about 17, perhaps after having earned money to pay for the fees, a three-year 
apprenticeship commences.  
 
After finishing the apprenticeship there is a gap of about 4 years during which the graduate 
apprentice seeks support to start the enterprise. Half save money through MESE activities, while 
a quarter do so through informal wage-employment. One-fifth get support from their family and a 
further 5% from elsewhere.  
 
About 90% will be able to start-up by age 24 and gradually take on apprentices to a maximum of 
about 2. After a couple of years of business about one-half of new enterprises start other 
enterprises to supplement their income.   
 
These four diagrams above (figs.8.10-8.13) highlight a number of aspects of the school-skill-
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Fig.8.13. Typical pathway to self-employment in a rural carpentry enterprise 
(males) 
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apprenticeship training, but especially after completing apprenticeship. Females are more likely 
to receive support from their families, especially if they are also able to see these girls through a 
complete basic education, when compared to males. While males are more reliant on their own 
initiative vis-à-vis finding start-up capital, they are also more likely to start enterprises earlier 
than females. Females in dressmaking and hairdressing take on more apprentices but engage less 










































Chapter 9: Skills Development, Enabling Environments and Informal Micro-
Enterprise in Ghana 
 
9.0. The study’s contribution to knowledge 
 
This study has been concerned with rethinking education, skills training and the informal sector 
in relation to their enabling environments. It has examined the history of the interaction amongst 
school, skill and enterprise (chap.3) as well as the history of the concept of the informal sector, 
and of pluri-activity (chap.2). It has sought to make a contribution to the understanding of the 
transition from training to self-employment and is the first treatment of the world of skills that 
takes seriously the perspective of the enabling/disabling environment; in both its delivery and 
transformative contexts (Palmer et al., 2007) (chap.3). It has examined the repeated and assumed 
link between TVET and unemployment (chap. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9.2.1).  
 
This present study also contributes to our understanding of rural development in three ways.398 
Firstly, by emphasising occupational pluralism and highlighting the blurred nature of the 
farm/nonfarm divide – which still remains in much of the policy and (some) academic literature 
(chap.2).399 Secondly, it marries the livelihoods and enterprise diversification literatures with the 
literature on the relationship between schooling and farm outcomes and schooling and nonfarm 
outcomes (chap.3). Thirdly, it contributes to our understanding of how individuals are accessing 
these nonfarm enterprises (through skills training and other means) in rural areas (chap.3, 6, 7 and 
8). 
 
Finally, it has sought to contextualise all these issues, for example by contributing to the 
understanding of the rural informal sector and the policy history of school, skill and enterprise in 
Ghana (chap. 4 and 5), and by examining the three main types of skills training modality in the 
country (chap.6 and 7). 
 
                                                 
398 For many ‘rural’ and ‘agriculture’ are synonymous. This traditional notion of ‘rural’ sees agriculture as 
the main sector for employment creation in rural areas. But it is increasingly being acknowledged that there 
has been, and still is, a transformation of rural labour markets marked by a rise in the importance of 
nonfarm rural employment. 
399 Though the livelihoods and enterprise diversification literatures, noted in the second point, do recognise 
occupational pluralism, much of the economics of education literature still discusses farm and nonfarm 
separately.  
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This conclusion will cover three major issues: first, it examines the limitations of the study and 
issues of generalisability; second it re-examines the assumptions of the Ghanaian skills 
development agenda (chap. 4 and 5) and positions this both in relation to access and equity issues, 
but also to the larger macro-economic dynamics; third, it comments on the skills development 
programmes and pathways to rural informal micro-enterprise identified in chapters 6, 7 and 8; 
lastly, it outlines some theoretical concerns arising from the study (particularly in relation to chap. 
2 and 3). Throughout the conclusion references will be made to supporting evidence in the main 
body of the thesis. 
 
9.1. Limitations of the study and generalisability  
 
How generalisable are the findings of this study to other developing countries and SSA in 
particular?  
 
In developing countries, like Ghana, where formal job growth is limited, demand for technical 
and vocational education (TVE) remains weak and yet there is still frequently the false 
assumption that the provision of skills (without concomitant improvements in the MSE 
environment or in the formal labour market) will reduce unemployment. But in countries like 
South Korea, China and Mozambique, where job growth has been sustained in recent years, 
demand for TVE has been strong (Adams, 2006); hence the link between skills and employment 
would be stronger and the assumption more true.  
 
All of the three types of training modality examined in this study (pre-employment long term, 
short term and on-the-job apprenticeships) are to be found in similar forms in other countries in 
SSA and developing countries in general. However, while traditional apprenticeship training is 
common in West and Central Africa, it is less prevalent – though still important – in Eastern and 
Southern Africa (Haan, 2006, King, 1996). In these countries, and others like India, the pathway 
to IME appears less likely to be dominated by this type of skills acquisition strategy. Nonetheless 
learning on-the-job, often through casual work, does still appear to be the key method of skills 
acquisition in many of these countries, though this is not as formalised as it is in Ghana’s 
traditional apprenticeships. More research that examines the transition from training to self-
employment in other countries, particularly those that do not have a history of traditional 
apprenticeship like Ghana, is needed. 
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How generalisable are the findings within Ghana? 
 
The bulk of the information collected during the fieldwork for this study was undertaken in one 
district of Ashanti (the district capital of Nyinahin and a smaller settlement, Otaakrom). Data 
from another district capital, Bibiani, was also used. Although Bibiani is technically in the 
Western Region, it is located right on the boundary of Ashanti and Western Regions, a few 
kilometres from Nyinahin and Otaakrom. Data was also collected from a total of 7 ICCES 
centres, all in Ashanti Region. What limitations are placed on the findings of this study, therefore, 
and how generalisable are the findings to other parts of Ghana?  
 
Ashanti Region is the largest in terms of population in Ghana and, while there are pockets of 
poverty throughout the region (particularly amongst non-export food crop farmers and others in 
nonfarm informal employment), it is better off with regards to average poverty levels when 
compared to all the other regions apart from Greater Accra and Western Region (GoG, 2003a). 
The rural forest-belt areas of Ashanti had a lower incidence of poverty (21%) compared to the 
rural coastal (28%) or rural savannah areas (59%) in 1999 (GoG, 2003a). In much of Ashanti cash 
cropping of cocoa is widespread (unlike in other regions) which offers households increased 
livelihood opportunities.  
 
Had the data been collected in a district in one of the three northern regions (Upper East, Upper 
West, Northern Region) – the three poorest regions in Ghana - there might have been differences 
in the pathways to self-employment. Firstly, when compared to Ashanti, more youth never attend 
school or drop out early in the three northern regions. It would be less common, therefore, for a 
pathway to self-employment to include a period of complete basic (or even primary) education. 
Secondly, there might be differences in the way youth were able to acquire start-up capital for 
ventures. Outside the cocoa belt of Ashanti there might be less opportunity for youth to earn a 
wage (informally) doing farm work in the cash-crop sector. Moreover, higher poverty levels 
might mean that families would be less able to support their children financially vis-à-vis a 
proposed enterprise venture. With less opportunity to acquire support from their family or from 
informal wage employment, other avenues to raising capital (e.g. starting small in micro-
entrepreneurial self-employment) might be more important and there may well be a longer period 
of time required to save sufficient capital than is seen in Ashanti. Furthermore, the higher 
incidence of poverty would suggest that markets are more constrained in the three northern 
regions compared to Ashanti. 
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What about the specificity of ICCES in Ashanti Region? Where ICCES is concerned, Ashanti 
Region is widely regarded as the most successful region in terms of organisation and number of 
(comparatively) developed centres. Indeed, apart from a few notable exceptions from other 
regions (e.g. Agomeda ICCES in Greater Accra has almost 200 trainees) many other centres in 
other regions remain under-developed and under-populated. Reports (Brownlee, 2000; Palmer, 
2001; Palmer, 2006b) suggest that ICCES in regions other than Ashanti experience similar or 
worse disabling training conditions when compared to centres in Ashanti. For example, visits by 
the author to three ICCES centres in the Upper West Region in 2001 revealed a slightly worse 
state of affairs than was seen in Ashanti at the same time. Centres were desperately short of 
equipment and infrastructure and the regional coordinator at the time did not even have a 
permanent office to work from. Detailed fieldwork by the author in Agomeda and Nima 441 
ICCES, both in Greater Accra Region, in July 2006 revealed a general lack of equipment and 
government support (Palmer, 2006b).  
 
Indeed, how comparable is ICCES to other VTIs in Ghana? In many regards ICCES is quite 
similar to other public (e.g. NVTIs) and private VTIs; many VTIs in Ghana, particularly the 
public ones, suffer from a lack of equipment and materials (Palmer, 2006b). But there are some 
noticeable differences. Firstly, ICCES differs from other VTIs in not having a minimum formal 
education qualification required for entry (though in practice most entrants to ICCES are JSS 
leavers) (chap.6.1.2). Secondly, the fees charged at ICCES are substantially less than those 
charged in other types of VTI (chap. 6.1.2; Palmer, 2006b). Thirdly, the organisational structure 
of ICCES as a whole appears to be significantly weaker than other training agencies like NVTI. 
For example, there is no board to oversee the affairs of the Directorate, and the Directorate itself 
appears to lack managerial capacity. The lower cost and different entry requirements, therefore, 
make ICCES the most likely destination for poorer trainees seeking formal training. In this 
regard, it is particularly disturbing that ICCES appears to have been so neglected by the 
government. A total reform of the leadership of ICCES is required.   
 
What of the generalisability of the findings regarding traditional apprenticeship in rural Ashanti? 
While the general features and characteristics of traditional apprenticeship are similar to other 
regions of Ghana (and, indeed, elsewhere), differences are likely to be evident vis-à-vis 
apprenticeship types and fees. Apprenticeship studies in the north, for example, might pick up 
different kinds of trades not so common in Ashanti (e.g. while the weaving of Kente cloth is 
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common in Ashanti, the weaving of smocks is common in the north). Training fees in rural 
Ashanti are likely to be slightly lower then those charged in urban Ashanti (e.g. Kumasi) or other 
urban (particularly southern) areas of Ghana. As noted earlier, some apprenticeships in Accra can 
cost significantly more than the US$42 average seen in rural Ashanti (chap.7.9.1): e.g. three-years 
training in well-regarded hairdressing enterprises in Accra cost up to ¢1.7 million (US$188) in 
addition to several crates of soft drinks and a gift for the master. Though these costs are still 
significantly lower than the US$500 subsidy the GoG is proposing to give to masters (chap.5.1).   
 
9.2. The Ghanaian skills development agenda 
 
9.2.1. Underlying assumptions of the Ghanaian skills development agenda 
 
In Ghana there has been a long history of attempts to vocationalise education and to provide skills 
for employability (chap.4 and 5). The underlying assumption of the Ghanaian skills development 
agenda – that skills provision will lead to a reduction in unemployment - has taken a central role 
in repeated government attempts to promote technical, vocational and agricultural education and 
training in the country. Over the last century and a half the GoG, and the Gold Coast 
administration and missionaries before that, have repeatedly tried to make education more 
relevant to the world of work. During the nineteenth century the underlying assumptions referred 
to school-based technical and vocational education (TVE) (the ‘TVE’ of TVET). The colonial 
period saw the advent of the ‘T’ (training) in formal TVET with training delivered through public 
works departments, government trade schools and technical institutes. It was not until the 
1960s/70s with the Workers Brigades, expansion of Technical Institutes and (N)VTIs, that the ‘T’ 
of formal TVET became more widespread in Ghana. This being said, the largest provider of 
training has always been in the informal apprenticeships.  
 
What is clear is that the argument that vocational education is superior to general education as a 
preparation for work has received considerable support in Ghana. 
 
Indeed, internationally, the beneficial results of skills development - improved productivity, 
higher income, service/product diversity - perpetuate the assumption that skills training leads to 
economic growth and poverty reduction (cf. WGICSD, 2002: 16). But the empirical basis for 
linking skills development to these kinds of outcomes is limited (King and Palmer, 2006b). 
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Similarly, while this assumption is popular in Ghana it is backed up with little evidence. For 
example, Akyeampong (2005) comments that he:  
 
did not find empirical studies conducted in Ghana that support the economic benefit 
argument of vocationalization of the secondary school curriculum – for preparing 
students for paid and self-employment.  Many simply assume this to be the case – an 
assumption which is firmly imbedded in the discourse of TVE in Ghana at both school 
and policy level. (Akyeampong, 2005: 9, emphasis added) 
 
The research, monitoring and evaluation evidence from Ghana for the impact of skills 
development on informal micro-enterprise is weak. King and McGrath (2002a: 55) note that 
“[e]vidence of where students go for employment [after training] is typically weak, save where 
there is a dominant local employer, such as the Volta River Authority”. Those programmes that 
have been evaluated were externally funded - like the World Bank VSP (World Bank, 1995) and 
the IFAD/GoG Rural Enterprise Project (GoG/IFAD, 2000). In contrast to these donor-evaluated 
projects, GoG skills development programmes that target the informal sector - like ICCES 
(chap.6) and STEP (chap.7) - have been little evaluated. The MoMYE does not really know what 
happens to ICCES or STEP graduates; it is simply assumed that objectives are reached and that 
these programmes have a positive impact on their target clients, the unemployed poor or rural 
youth. Indeed, their very names suggest some kind of semi-automatic link between skills and 
employment: the Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills (ICCES) and the Skills 
Training and Employment Placement Programme (STEP).400 
 
The over-riding assumption of the Ghanaian skills development agenda, therefore, is that 
unemployment among the bulk of the population could be solved through the provision of TVET. 
But it is possible to break down this assumption into three components: 
1. That the provision of pre-vocational subjects in the curriculum, or the creation of VTIs 
would generate a demand for such an education; 
2. That the expectations of parents and students regarding the potential functions of school-
based TVET and VTIs were congruent with those of the policy makers and politicians; 
3. That technical, vocational and agricultural education was the key to economic 
development as it is more orientated towards the world of work. 
 
                                                 
400 It was noted earlier (chap.7) that STEP was renamed in 2005. 
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However, as has been suggested throughout this thesis, each one of these three assumptions – and 
hence the over-riding assumption – is misleading.  
 
Firstly, simply expanding school or VTI-based TVET will not generate a demand for this kind of 
education. Only when parents and, more crucially, the youth see sufficient (formal) labour market 
demand for these skills, and a wage structure that has similar remuneration levels comparable to 
those that have an academic education, will demand for TVET increase.  
 
The second assumption is related to the first. An issue concerning much vocationalisation policy 
in Ghana is that policy makers have expected such institutions (e.g. the continuation schools in 
the 1960s and the vocationalised JSS and ICCES in the late 1980s) to have dual functions; on the 
one hand they are meant to prepare the youth for (self-)employment by equipping them with 
skills and, on the other hand, to prepare youth for further study. However, parents and students 
often use VTIs, not as ways to obtain skills training for work, but, rather as a means to obtain 
certificates for further education (and hoped for access to better paid jobs in the formal sector). 
Hence the expected outcomes of TVET promotion from the government’s side – the provision of 
employable skills to the youth so they can enter self-employment – are, to a large degree, 
subverted by those that enroll in TVET courses. While there will be those with a genuine interest 
in TVET, many youth enroll in TVET institutions not so they can learn technical and vocational 
skills per se, but rather because they could not get access to SSS, and TVET institutions provide 
an alternative pathway to formal employment. That youth and parents are using TVET 
institutions in this manner not only subverts the original objectives of policy makers, but also 
gradually transforms schools with a TVET focus into more academic schools, and encourages 
VTIs to focus more on theory for examinations, rather than practical classes. Hamilton and 
Asiedu (1987) comment that: 
 
subtle political pressure… tend[s] to transform these [technical] schools progressively 
into academic institutions, and… in most cases, students did not regard their courses as 
terminal, leading to artisan work; rather, they saw them as “stepping stones” to enable 
them to enter professional courses. (p.353) 
 
Akyeampong (2002) also argues that it is nearly impossible to achieve a dual purpose: “TVE 
subjects come under the strong influence of general education goals that might lead to a 
corruption of the goals of vocationalization” (ibid.: 45). This is of course particularly a challenge 
with the weak version (chap.1.2.1) of vocationalisation. 
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Lastly, the third assumption about TVET being more orientated to the world of work fails to 
acknowledge that: i) from the youth’s perspective an academic education is often a better 
preparation for the world of (formal) work and is, in this sense, more vocational than vocational 
education; and, ii) training itself does not create jobs and the acquisition of skills (in schools, 
VTIs on on-the-job) in an environment largely unsupportive of enterprise development will not 
encourage the utilisataion of these skills and hence impede economic growth.   
 
9.2.2. The Ghanaian skills development agenda: access and equity  
 
Ghana’s formal education system is generally not pro-poor (Palmer, 2005c). For example, 
research by Addae-Mensah (2000) shows that over 60% of entrants into the five publicly funded 
universities are from just 18 SSSs – considered to be elite public boarding schools. Meanwhile, 
the Ghanaian elite tend to send their children to good quality private primary and JSSs so that 
their children are better able to access the publicly funded elite senior secondary boarding schools 
(Palmer, 2005c). Furthermore, while the methodological problems of these studies should be 
acknowledged, economics of education research from Ghana is increasingly showing that the 
returns to education are lowest at the primary level and that it is at the post-basic level that returns 
are now highest (Palmer, 2006a); hence access to the highest paying formal wage jobs 
increasingly requires SSS education or higher.  
 
With the removal of subsidies at the SSS and tertiary levels in the 1987 reform, combined with an 
inadequate bursary system and increased competition for places, the poor appear much less likely 
to get to, for example, the University of Legon than they did at the time Foster was writing his 
monograph in the mid-1960s. Given that access to the highest levels of Ghana’s education system 
appears to be getting increasingly more difficult, and the better-off segments of society are more 
able to compete for these places, it is interesting to ask to whom do the underlying assumptions of 
Ghana’s skills development agenda (chap.9.1.1) relate? 
 
It appears that the assumptions of the skills development agenda - concerned with VTI-based, 
modular and informal on-the-job training - do not appear to be particularly relevant to the elite; 
this minority is very much focused on formal academic education (to the highest possible level) 
and generally not found acquiring skills training (other than through the current supposedly 
vocationalised JSS or at higher levels in polytechnics and universities).     
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The Government’s proposed skills agenda is wide and includes increasing the global 
competitiveness of Ghana’s human resources, but it is also concerned with the relationship 
between skill and poverty. Hence, while the assumptions of the skills development agenda appear 
to relate less to the better-off segments of society, there are questions concerning who is getting 
access to this training; are the poor and marginalised excluded, or rather do they rapidly drop out, 
as some anecdotal evidence suggests? 
 
In the formal TVET system the fee structure means that the poor find it hard to access this 
training. Even ICCES, which has the lowest fees among the public VTIs still find it hard to reach 
the very poor, and large numbers of poor students (as much as 70% of a cohort) appear to drop-
out from some centres (chap.6). While some of the private non-profit VTIs (e.g. Don Bosco) do 
appear to be successfully targeting and retaining the poor (Palmer, 2006b), other for-profit VTIs 
appear to offer far fewer opportunities for them.  
 
Hence, while it is probably true to say that the poor are significantly more represented in the 
formal post-basic TVET system than they are in the formal post-basic academic system, many of 
the poor (and larger numbers of the very poor) are still not getting access to institution-based 
skills training. Since large numbers of the poor are not to be found in formal VTI-based training, 
the assumptions of the skills development agenda relating to the formal TVET system do not 
apply. 
 
It is the largest private provider of skills training in Ghana – the traditional apprenticeships – that 
appears able to serve the poor most effectively (though not all and probably not the poorest) 
(chap.7.9.1). And it is this area that the government is increasingly becoming interested in 
formalising (see below and chap.5.1).    
 
9.2.3. The skills development agenda in relation to larger macro-economic dynamics 
 
During Nkrumah’s time, Ghana was very much a “developmental state” (Mkandawire, 1999); it 
was believed that economic development would come about through a large and active state-
sector (chap.4). During the later 1960s and the 1970s, “there was a lot more continuity than 
diminution in the role of the state” (Killick, 2004: 4) as subsequent governments were unsure 
about whether to oust the Nkrumah model (ibid.). To some extent there was a break from this 
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state-led model with the introduction of the SAPs in the early 1980s, and subsequent privatization 
programmes and reductions in the size of the public sector. In spite of this, however, the state is 
still responsible for some 50% of all formal sector jobs (chap.4, table 4.3), and Killick (2004) 
suggests that this large public sector reflects “faith in a development process led by the state” 
(p.5).  
 
With the advent of Ghana’s new political context following the election of the NPP in 2000 
(chap.5), the government has put in place strategies to promote private sector development (PSD) 
- in trade, industry and the agricultural sectors - as the engine of growth (e.g. GoG, 2005a, 
2003c). In parallel to this renewed focus on promoting PSD, the government is in the process of 
implementing other strategies aimed at stimulating growth and development, for example in: 
infrastructure (energy, water, roads, communications), ICT, science and technology and health 
(GoG, 2005a), and reforms in education and TVET (chap.5). Indeed, these kind of parallel 
strategies for PSD, education, health, infrastructure etc. appear to be in line with much of the 
international literature regarding the need for large multi-sectoral investments to kick-start 
sustainable development (Commission for Africa, 2005; UN Millennium Project, 2005; see also 
chap.3.1.2, this thesis). The realization of these inter-connected strategies is crucial if the 
acquisition of skills in school, VTIs or on-the-job are to be translated into utilization of these 
skills in productive employment on the farm, in a trade or in a salaried job. 
 
It is precisely the degree to which these policies can be successfully implemented that will dictate 
the extent to which assumptions about skills provision leading to employment can be realized (i.e. 
the link between skills acquisition and skills utilization). With regard to the implementation of the 
PSD strategy, while the government has made some progress in creating an enabling environment 
for the formal business sector (chap.5.2), challenges remain (Killick, 2004). More worryingly, the 
enabling environment or transformative context for the IME sector has changed little and remains 
disabling; for example, prohibitively high interest rates and a scarcity of capital are very practical 
constraints faced by entrepreneurs. But it is hoped that the 2006/07 informal sector survey will 
contribute to the development of a better strategy (chap.5.2).  
 
Indeed, Killick (2004) argues that, “thus far there seems to have been a marked gap between 
[GoG]… desire to improve the business environment and its actual achievements” (p.6). It also 
appears that the government is starting to move beyond just developing an enabling environment 
for PSD and into creating the jobs directly. For example, the national youth employment 
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programme (NYEP), launched in October 2006 (chap.5.2), will allegedly create new employment 
opportunities but will also add more people to the public sector payroll at a time when public 
sector reform is attempting to streamline this area. What will be interesting to track, however, will 
be the extent to which this job creation pledge refers to formal jobs or the government assisting in 
the creation of jobs in IMEs; which would take the government back to its role in developing an 
enabling environment for informal PSD. 
 
Moreover, there appear to be government moves to promote the formalization of part of the 
informal sector; for example the government intention to assume responsibility for the first year 
of traditional apprenticeships (chap.5.1). The process of formalising the traditional apprenticeship 
would be beset with problems. Some of these came to the fore when the GoG paid some master-
craftspeople to train youth under the STEP (chap.7.3.2), while other issues might be expected 
based on experience elsewhere (e.g. the Nigerian Open Apprenticeship System, see Adam, 1993 
and King, 1990c).  
 
9.3. Skills development and pathways to informal micro-enterprise (IME) in rural 
Ghana 
 
A 2006 review of IME in SSA (Haan, 2006) noted that the transition from training to self-
employment “remains unclear” (p.3). As noted, this study has contributed to the understanding of 
this transition to manufacturing IME in rural Ghana.  
 
Skills development provision for Ghana’s IME sector, as it does elsewhere in SSA, generally 
takes two forms:  
i) skills development for IME - this includes both longer-duration IME-targeted pre-
employment training in VTIs, such as ICCES (chap.6), and short-duration training for immediate 
self-employment in IME, such as STEP (chap.7.1). 
ii) skills development in IME – this enterprise-based training includes traditional 
apprenticeships (chap.7.6), trade- and farm-related training (Palmer, 2005a). 
 
Pathways to IME in rural Ghana do not commonly include training in formal VTIs, including 
ICCES. Furthermore, the STEP programme trained comparatively few (27,000) when compared 
to the large numbers of JSS graduates (and dropouts from earlier stages of schooling) entering the 
labour market every year.    
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This study confirms the importance of traditional apprenticeship training as a component of many 
rural entrepreneurs’ pathways to manufacturing IME (chap.8) (cf. Haan, 2006). It has also 
stressed the complexity of these pathways including: combining formal schooling with (in)formal 
skills training, acquiring skills from multiple sources, and the movement to and within the IME 
sector and beyond (chap.6, 7 and 8) (summarised in fig.9.1). The incidence of multiple skills 
pathways to the labour market (fig.9.1) represents one area in need of further investigation in 
Africa’s IMEs. 
 
Movement into different activities in the labour market is strongly affected by the transformative 
context in which youth find themselves post-school or post-training (chap.5.3). More research is 
required – at a country level – into determining the most critical elements of such a 
transformative context for Ghana’s IMEs (see also 9.3.3 below).  
 
While most rural youth graduate into what can only be described as a “constrained environment” 
(Kodithuwakku and Rosa, 2002: 431), some appear more entrepreneurial than others with regard 
to furthering their education and training, or accessing resources required for start-up. For 
example, it appears that many youth (e.g. JSS, ICCES graduates) are using periods of informal 
wage- or self-employment to finance further education and training (chap.6.3). This highlights the 
determination of many youth to acquire further training, particularly that which leads to formal 
certification. Once youth enter the labour market multiple strategies are adopted to find the 
required start-up funds, including working for periods in informal wage-employment, MESE 
activities or sourcing start-up support from the family (chap.8.2). 
 
For the most part, the types of transitions that have been presented in this study (chap.6, 7 and 8) 
appear to be the kinds of pathways likely to be pursued by the poor. While it has been noted that 
many of the poor don’t get access to, or drop out of, ICCES (chap.6.1.2) and apprenticeship 
training (chap.7.9.1), these skills acquisition modalities do appear open for at least some of the 
poor. It would be interesting for further research to map out the transitions to urban IMEs (or in 
different rural areas like the north) in Ghana, as well as examining the types of transitions 
experienced by Ghana’s elite. In the case of the latter, it has been suggested above that one such 
transition is from private basic education to (good quality) public SSS to university. But there are, 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9.4. Theoretical concerns arising from the study 
 
The fieldwork strategy was driven by several theoretical concerns with the conceptualisation of 
informal economy and of the interaction amongst school, skill and work which have gone 
relatively unchallenged for almost 35 years. 
 
The impact of education, and particularly primary education, on poverty reduction (increased 
productivity etc.) has held sway in the economics of education literature for the last twenty-five 
years (cf. Palmer et al., 2007). But the way that many of these quantitative studies link school to 
employment outcomes oversimplifies the complex reality of many people in developing 
countries.    
 
This thesis has shown that the complexity of the school-skill-enterprise interaction has been 
oversimplified in both academic and policy discourse as a result of misunderstanding four 
important aspects of this relationship. Firstly, as noted above, the link between skill acquisition 
and skill utilisation in enterprise is to some degree seen as almost semi-automatic (chap. 4, 5, 6, 7 
and 9.2.1). Secondly, the standard years of schooling variable does not account for the 
complementarities between schooling and skills training, nor does it account for the variable 
quality and complexity of the delivery context (see chap.3). Thirdly, the dichotomous 
occupational classification (e.g. farm/nonfarm, self-/wage-employment, formal/informal) 
commonly used fails to represent the occupational pluralism of increasing numbers of SSA’s 
population (chap.2). Fourthly, too little emphasis has been given to examining the school-skill-
enterprise relationship in different enabling and disabling contexts (chap.3).   
 
9.4.1. The years of schooling variable 
 
The quantitative measurement of the impact of schooling on developmental outcomes usually 
focuses on the formal schooling of owners as measured by a years of schooling variable. This 
variable says nothing about the kind of school (e.g. academic, vocationalised) that these years of 
schooling have been in. But this thesis has also shown that there are implications - vis-à-vis using 
this variable - arising from: i) combining schooling and vocational skills acquisition, and ii) the 
concept of the enabling environment.  
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This study has shown that many IME owners and youth in rural Ghana are combining (a period 
of) formal schooling with informal apprenticeship training (and/or, less commonly, with formal 
VTI training) (chap.6, 7, 8). But the years of schooling variable says nothing about the 
complementarities and interaction between formal education and informal/formal skill 
acquisition. Indeed there appears to be a lack of research that examines the synergies between 
skills development, particularly informal skills training, and education that youth receive prior to 
the training. 
 
There are also new methodological challenges related to the concept of the enabling environment. 
The years of schooling variable fails to account for the type of delivery context (or quality) of the 
schooling or training delivered. Indeed acknowledgement of this is leading some economists to 
use different education variables, like test scores (cf. Jolliffe, 1998), to measure human capital. 
But this still only goes part of the way to capturing all the elements of the education and training 
delivery context (chap.3.1.1) or the specific delivery challenges for vocational training in VTIs 
(e.g. chap.6.2), modular training (e.g. chap.7.3) or in traditional apprenticeship training 
(chap.7.9).  
 
9.4.2. Occupational classifications: interrogating the farm-nonfarm and formal-
informal dichotomies  
 
There has been a bias in both the academic and policy literatures since the early 1970s towards 
the urban informal sector (chap.2), and when the term informal sector was finally used to refer to 
rural areas, there was a strong tendency for it to refer only to nonfarm activities. Only since the 
early 2000s have small farms also been considered small firms in SSA’s informal sector. 
Nonetheless, both sets of literatures still hold on to the farm-nonfarm divide which oversimplifies 
the multiple occupational realities, or occupational pluralism, of many of those in SSA (chap.2.3). 
Increasing numbers of people in SSA are operating multiple IMEs (multiple farm, multiple 
nonfarm or multiple farm and nonfarm!): this blurs the neat farm-nonfarm divide. Moreover, the 
large number of links and shared characteristics between formal/informal economies (Palmer, 
2004b) also blurs the relationship between the formal and informal. For example: where formal 
sector employees (e.g. teachers) have informal sector sidelines (straddling); where there is 
movement from the formal to informal areas of the economy and hence movement of formal 
backgrounds, up-to-date information and access to formal support mechanisms for enterprise; or 
where informal activities are used to finance a period of formal sector training. 
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While acknowledging the blurred nature of these categories, it is not suggested that the farm-
nonfarm and formal-informal categories are done away with altogether. It is, for example, useful 
for policy makers to know about the relative importance of farm and nonfarm activities within the 
IME sector. But it is crucial that the growing incidence of multiple employment be captured in 
employment statistics, instead of classifying a worker as simply self- or wage-employed, and 
assuming that one person has one ‘job’. Indeed, a number of countries are already starting to 
collect data on secondary activities (Charmes, 2005).    
 
Therefore, researchers examining quantitatively the impact of schooling on farm and nonfarm 
enterprises need to take occupational pluralism more into account. Rate of return studies have 
been criticized for largely focusing on wage-employment (Bennell, 1996a) and not being of 
relevance for the majority of developing countries with large informal sectors characterized by 
self-employment in IMEs and occupational pluralism. Other quantitative studies are normally 
based on distinct occupational catergorisations (e.g. public/private wage job, non-agricultural 
self-employment, farmer – see Teal, 2001), or distinct job types (carpenter, mechanic, food-crop 
farmer, export farmer etc.). Many studies simply examine either farm or nonfarm activities and do 
not account for multiple farm or multiple nonfarm enterprise behaviour. One exception to this is 
Jolliffe (1996, 1998, 2004) who “argues that the estimated returns to education need to 
incorporate the effect that human capital has on all sources of income” (1996: iii). Jolliffe’s 
examination of the impacts of schooling on farm, nonfarm and total income would have been 
better, however, if he had been able to disaggregate the farm and nonfarm categories further. 
Since there is a whole spectrum of farm and nonfarm work, much of which is very subsistence 
orientated, it would have been useful to know more about the type of activity.  
 
9.4.3. The transformative context 
 
Most quantitative studies of this sort also fail to account for the transformative context, or the 
different types of environment into which school, VTI or apprenticeship graduates emerge. 
Usually, the generic returns for different levels of education or different types of occupation are 
simply stated. But research (e.g. Lockheed et al., 1980) and commonsense would suggest that the 
returns to education and skill acquisition are markedly higher where there are other supportive 
measures in place (chap.3.1.2). For example, in an econometric study of the returns to 
apprenticeship in Ghana (Frazer, 2006), no attempt was made to make a distinction between more 
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and less dynamic enterprises or more and less dynamic enterprise environments. It was noted 
earlier that one such early attempt by Lockheed et al. (1980) to distinguish between different 
types of environment – they used modernizing and traditional (chap.3.1.2) – showed that 
schooling has an impact on agricultural productivity only in a modern environment (where 
complementary inputs – e.g. fertilizers - are present). It is likely that the same is true for Frazer’s 
apprentices: that the returns would be higher for those in more dynamic, more urban enterprises 
who have better access to (formal and informal) resources (social, financial and physical), 
compared to those in tiny, more-subsistence orientated, more rural enterprises whose access to 
any type of resource is poor. This type of evidence would be far more useful and have far more 
significant implications for policy than simply saying that apprentices in Ghana have returns of x, 
or that farmers have average returns of y – with no indication of the type of environment for which 
these returns hold true. Research, therefore, is needed that examines the differential impact of 
schooling and skills in disabling and enabling contexts. Given what has been said above, it would 
be interesting to investigate the degree to which the wider environment, particularly the labour 
market environment, impacts on education and training outcomes. 
 
Related to this point above is the methodological challenge of how such an environment might be 
measured. Indeed, given the complexity of the transformative context for IMEs (chap.3.2 and 
5.3), this is not an easy task – and was beyond the scope of this current study. But it would be 
interesting for research to examine what a list of indicators might look like that could be used to 
measure the transformative context for informal micro-enterprise. Undoubtedly much can be 
learnt from how the formal enterprise environment is measured in developing countries, for 
example in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ surveys,401 its Regional Programme on Enterprise 
Development (RPED) data on investment climates,402 or its enterprise surveys.403 This being said, 
the formal enterprise environment is very different from the kinds of informal micro-enterprise 
contexts discussed in this study.  
 
In 2005 DFID commissioned a number of new five-year programmes of education research and 
three consortia of researchers are examining issues of educational access, quality and 





outcomes.404 By chance all three consortia are working in Ghana and the author is involved with 
the Centre of African Studies (Edinburgh) in this process. It is hoped that this project will be a 








































                                                 
404 Further information on each of the three consortia on educational access, quality and outcomes can be 
found at the following websites: ACCESS (CREATE) http://www.create-rpc.org/; QUALITY (EDQUAL)  
http://www.edqual.org/; OUTCOMES (RECOUP) http://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/RECOUP/index.html 
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Between February and March 2005 in-depth interviews were conducted by the author in 114 rural 
MSEs in three rural communities of Ghana; Otaakrom and Nyinahin in Ashanti Region and 
Bibiani in the Western Region (chap1, fig.1.2). The objectives were to: i) conduct retrospective 
interviews with the owners to find out how they were able to establish themselves (and in 
particular about their education and training backgrounds) and; ii) to interview rural apprentices 
in their workshops to get a better sense of this form of skills acquisition in rural areas. 
 
Since the theme of the thesis is an examination of skills development, it was decided to conduct 
interviews only in MSEs that were seen to, or thought to, deliver training to traditional 
apprentices. Skills acquisition through traditional apprenticeship is known to be the most 
widespread modality of skills acquisition available to Ghana’s youth, the poor in particular.405 
 
A.1. Background data on enterprises 
 
Most enterprises were to be found in the larger rural settlements of Bibiani and Nyinahin, both 
rural district capitals (table A.1).  
 











Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005 
 
In the three localities, enterprises were mapped with the assistance of local VTI instructors. These 
local actors were able to point out the majority of store, street and home-based enterprises. Since 
there was neither sufficient time nor resources to systematically map all the MSEs in these three 
communities and then randomly sample from among these, the interviews were conducted on a 
                                                 
405 Though as we noted earlier (chap.7.9.1), the poor are often excluded from traditional apprenticeship 
training - due to direct or opportunity costs.  
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non-random basis. Nonetheless, each of the communities were roughly divided into four zones 
and MSE owners were interviewed in each of these areas so an attempt to capture a representative 
population of masters was made. The in-depth qualitative interviews with masters used, as a 
starting-off point, a short semi-structured questionnaire (see section A.2, below) which was 
followed by the more qualitative work. The interviewing exercise was conducted with a research 
assistant who acted as translator in most cases. But since this research assistant was also from one 
of the three communities, he knew many of the masters personally which facilitated the interview 
process. He was also able to identify ‘hidden’ enterprises (e.g. in households) that would not have 
otherwise been included among those interviewed. Interviews with the masters took 
approximately thirty minutes.  
 
Most of the rural MSE owners interviewed were dressmakers/tailors (29%), carpenters (21%), 
hairdressers (18%), shoemakers (6%), mechanics (6%), electronics repairers (4%) and welders 
(4%). Of those masters interviewed 61% (n=69) were male and 39% female (n=45). Female 
owners were clustered in the dressmaking and hairdressing enterprises (chap.8., table 8.1). 
 
One third (38/114) of enterprise-owners interviewed were operating from non-permanent 
enterprises.406 10% of those interviewed operated ‘hidden’ enterprises within households. Most of 
those interviewed (54%) were operating from a wooden kiosk and a sizeable minority (13%) had 













                                                 
406 This included temporary enterprises set up in a collapsible table, enterprises set up under a shady tree 
and those operating from inside households or compound areas. 
 335 
Table A.2. Structure of enterprises, by type of enterprise and sex of master 
Count
1 0 5 0 3 1 10
5 8 9 1 1 0 24
0 0 4 2 0 0 6
4 0 0 0 0 0 4
0 0 4 0 0 1 5
2 0 3 0 0 2 7
2 0 3 0 0 0 5
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 2
0 0 2 0 0 0 2
0 0 2 0 0 0 2
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
14 8 35 3 5 4 69
4 15 1 1 2 23
1 11 2 2 5 21
0 0 1 0 0 1































Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005 
 
Looking at the structure of enterprises by type of enterprise and sex of the owner reveals some 
interesting patterns (table A.2). 
 
Most carpenters (all male) worked from basic non-permanent workshops; one third (8/24) simply 
worked under a shady tree, while a further 21% used temporary structures (5/24). More 
established carpenters were operating from wooden kiosks (38%) or from metal (4%) or concrete 
structures (4%).  
 
Most dressmakers/tailors (61%, 20/33) worked from wooden kiosks, 15% (5/33) from temporary 
structures, 12% (4/33) from concrete structures and 9% (3/33) from their household.  
 
Over 70% of hairdressers (15/21) operated from kiosks, compared to about a quarter (5/21) 
working from the home.  
 
For both dressmaking/tailoring and hairdressing there appears to be less of a possibility of 
working from a temporary enterprise structure, suggesting that entry into these trades might be 
more difficult than entry into carpentry where new owners can simply set up a bench under a tree.  
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Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005 
 
The majority (70%, 80/114) of those enterprise owners interviewed had been in business for five 
years or less, though some had been operating for nearly 30 years (fig.A.1).407 This suggests that 
many enterprise ventures are short-lived and that turnover is high in the informal micro-enterprise 
sector (cf. Liedholm and Mead, 1999). Only 13% (6/45) of female owned enterprises were older 
than five years, compared to 41% (28/69) of male owned ventures (author’s fieldwork); 
suggesting either that women owners find it harder to survive in the labour market and/or that 
women are more likely to enter into short term business ventures than men – perhaps to smooth 
over a lean time in the household income. 
 
A.1.1. Occupational pluralism 
 
Overall 40% (46/114) of owners reported to be undertaking additional income generating 
activities, mostly in farming enterprises (chap.8., table 8.17). 
 
                                                 
407 Only five enterprises had opened up in 2005, compared to 23 in 2004 but this is not surprising as the 
interviews were conducted during February and March 2005. 
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A.1.2. The apprentices 
 
Of the 114 masters interviewed, 87 had apprentices they were training at the time of the 
interview. Of these 87, 17 had only one apprentice; and all 17 were interviewed. Of the remaining 
70 enterprises visited two apprentices from each enterprise were interviewed making a total of 
160 apprentices interviewed.408  
 
The 114 enterprises had a total of 347 apprentices making the sample of 160 almost 50% of the 
total number of apprentices. 
 
Again a semi-structured questionnaire was used to start the more in-depth interview process (see 
section A.3 below). This allowed for additional questions and for probing to occur. Each 



























                                                 
408 In a few enterprises there were very many apprentices (over 20), and in these cases more than two 
apprentices were interviewed, making the total of 160 apprentices. 
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A.2. SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MASTERS (starting point for more 
in-depth interview – see A.1 above) 
 
Date and time of interview:_____________________  Location of Enterprise: 
________________________ 
  
1. Name of Master ______________________   2. Sex (please circle) M / F 
 
3. Age _____________  4. Type of Work _______________ 
 
5. Size of Enterprise (master, apprentice, other) _____________ 
 
6. What year was you enterprise started?  _______________ 
 
7. What is the highest level of education you completed? (INCLUDE AGGREGATE FOR JSS) 
No schooling     Primary not completed    
Primary completed    JSS / Middle school not completed  
JSS / Middle school completed   SSS /STS not completed   
SSS / STS completed    Other ________________________  
 
8. a] What type of training did you do to learn your trade? _______________ 
 
8. b] If apprenticeship, what was the length of this training? _____________ months 
 
8. c] Why did you choose this type of training?  
 
9. What was the main source of start-up capital for your enterprise?  
 
10. Do you have any other source of income generation? If so, what is it?  
 
11. What is the structure of the enterprise? (please tick)   
Temporary structure    Work under tree   
Wooden kiosk     Metal kiosk   
Other (please describe)   ____________________________ 
 
12. Do you have a bank account? (please circle)   YES / NO   
 
12. b] IF YES, when was the last time you made a deposit? _______________ months 
 
13. Do you keep financial records for you enterprise? (please circle)  YES / NO   
 











A.3. SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR APPRENTICES: (starting point for 
more in-depth interview) 
 
Date and time of interview:____________ Location of Enterprise: ________________________ 
 
1. Name of Apprentice ______________________    
 
2. Sex (please circle) M / F 
 
3. Age _____________   
 
4. Type of Apprenticeship _______________ 
 
5. What is the highest level of education you completed? (INCLUDE AGGREGATE FOR 
JSS) 
No schooling     Primary not completed     
Primary completed    JSS / Middle school not completed  
JSS / Middle school completed   SSS /STS not completed   
SSS / STS completed    Other ________________________  
 
6. Why did you choose to do an apprenticeship?  
 
7. What is the duration of your apprenticeship?  _____________________ 
(years, months) 
 
8. What is the cost of your apprenticeship when you started? _____________________ cedis 
 
9. What year did you start your apprenticeship? _____________________ 
 
10. Do you receive daily chop money from your master? IF YES, how much do you 




11. What do you think will be the most important source of start-up capital for you to start 















APPENDIX B: ICCES questionnaires 
 
B.1. ICCES TRACER QUESTIONNAIRE (06.01.05) – filled in by graduates themselves 
 
Please check the below details and amend any error where necessary. 
 
A. Year passed out __________________ B. Centre  __________________ 
 
C. Name   __________________ D. Sex   __________________ 
 
E. Years of Study __________________ F. Course followed __________________ 
 
G. Certificates obtained ________________________________________ 
 
 
1. What is your current address ___________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Mobile / contact telephone number if available ____________________________________________ 
 
EDUCATION RECEIVED BEFORE ICCES 
 
3. What is the highest level of education you completed BEFORE ICCES? (please tick)   
No schooling      Primary not completed     
Primary completed     JSS / Middle school not completed  
JSS / Middle school completed    SSS /STS not completed   
SSS / STS completed     Other ________________________  
 
ABOUT YOUR TRAINING AT ICCES 
 
4. What grade did you obtain in the final examination? ________________________ 
 
5. What was the quality of teaching like? (please tick) 
 
Excellent  Good    Average   Poor   Very poor
  
    
6. What was the availability of tools/equipment? (please tick) 
 
Excellent  Good    Average   Poor   Very poor
  
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7. What was the availability of teaching and learning materials for your theory lessons (eg text books)? (please 
tick) 
 




8. What was the availability of teaching and learning materials for your practical lessons (eg. Timber, blocks, 
brown papers etc)? (please tick) 
 
Excellent  Good    Average   Poor   Very poor
  
 
9. What was the availability of buildings like (eg classrooms, workshops)? (please tick) 
 
Excellent  Good    Average   Poor   Very poor
  
 
10. Were you taught Entrepreneurial Studies?  Yes  / No  
 
11. Were you able to pay all your fees during the course duration?   
Yes  GO TO QUESTION 12] 
No   GO TO QUESTION 11. b] 
 
11. b] If No, why not? 
 
Parents can’t pay  Other reason (please state)  ______________________________________ 
 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING AFTER ICCES 
 
12. Did you continue your education and/or training AFTER FINISHING at ICCES? (please tick all that 
apply) 
Apprenticeship training    CTC 1     None    
City and Guild Intermediate   CTC 2    
City and Guild Advanced    Other course (specify)  
 
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITY 
 
13. Are you working now? Yes  / No  
 
14. What type of work are you doing? ______________________________________________________ 
 
15. Please tick the box below that best describes your current work situation 
  
Salary worker  – GO TO QUESTION 16 
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Self-employed      – GO TO QUESTION 17 
Both self-employed and a salary worker  – PLEASE ANSWER BOTH QUE 16 AND 17  
 
 
QUESTION 16. FOR THE SALARY WORKER 
 
16. Please describe as best you can the type of work you do (e.g. where it is, if it is full-time or part-time, salary) 
QUESTION 17. FOR THE SELF-EMPLOYED 
 
17. a] Are you now working in your hometown?   Yes  / No  
 






FOR BOTH SALARY WORKERS AND THE SELF-EMPLOYED  
 




19. In addition to either being self-employed or a salary worker, do you have any other  
source of income generation?  (eg. Farming) (please tick all that apply) 
 
No other source of income   
Small scale Farming for chop   
Small scale Farming for cash-crops  
Large scale Farming for cash-crops  
Trading      
Other (please state)    _________________________________ 
 
20. Please use this space to tell us anything else you want to about your experience DURING ICCES OR 
































B.2. ICCES questionnaire for centre managers and instructors regarding the 
current activity of 2003 graduates 
 
Subject: Current Activity of ICCES trainees who graduated in 2003 
 
Please look at the form below. We would like you to look at your list of students who graduated 
in 2003 and to write down the current activity of these graduates – according to the following 
options:   
• Further training apprenticeship – they are currently doing an apprenticeship; 
• Further training City and Guild – they are currently doing a city and guild course; 
• Further training CTC – they are currently doing a CTC course; 
• Other further training – they are currently doing some other type of training or education, 
like SSS; 
• Self-employed in trade area – they are currently self-employed in the trade area that they 
learnt. E.g a carpentry graduate is self-employed as a carpenter; 
• Self-employed not in trade area – they are currently self-employed NOT in the trade area 
that they learnt. E.g a carpentry graduate is self-employed as a tailor or trader; 
• Per-day wage employment in trade area – they are currently employed on a ‘per day’ 
basis in the trade area they learnt in – e.g. a masonry graduate is working on a per day 
basis doing building/construction work; 
• Per-day wage employment not in trade area – they are currently employed on a ‘per day’ 
basis NOT in the trade area they learnt in – e.g. a masonry graduate is working on a per 
day basis doing trading work; 
• Formal wage employment in trade area – they are currently employed on a continuous 
basis in a waged job; e.g a carpentry graduate is employed as a carpentry teacher or 
instructor; 
• Formal wage employment not in trade area – they are currently employed on a 
continuous basis in a waged job; e.g a carpentry graduate is employed as a masonry 
teacher/ instructor, or as a soldier, policeman etc; 
• Farming with their family – they are currently working in farming helping their family; 
• Not working at all – they are currently doing nothing at all.  
 
 344 
If you do not know the current activity of a trainee, record it as ‘don't know’. If they are doing 
something which is not in the list above, record it as ‘other activity’ and write down the activity 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Objectives of the survey: 
• To get information on youth in Otaakrom (aged 14-25) regarding their education and 
skills background and their current activities; 
• To get information on occupational pluralism of households in Otaakrom; 
• To be able to categorise the households into different poverty/wealth categories in order 
to look for trends.  
 
This survey in Otaakrom village in Ashanti Region was conducted between October 2005 to 
January 2006 (for further details about Otaakrom see chap.1.3.2). 
 
A multi-stage approach was used to select the youth in the sample. It was decided to map all the 
households in the community and then to select at random a number of households in the 
community to interview in order to obtain information on the youth and occupational pluralism 
issues. 
 
C.1. Poverty classification and the wealth ranking exercise 
 
Before the household mapping exercise could occur, however, I needed a way of categorising 
households into different wealth/poverty groupings.  
 
Within international development literature and policy there appear to be two major trends with 
regard to defining and measuring the concept of poverty. On the one hand there is a reasonable 
consensus (at least among policy-makers and development agencies) on the importance of a 
multidimensional understanding of poverty that recognises the complex inter-relations between 
social and physiological aspects (see Shaffer, 1998; Thin, 1999; World Bank, 2000). Elaborate 
systems have been established which seek to capture these multiple dimensions, such as the 
Human Development Index and the Human Poverty Index (UNDP 2005). On the other hand, in 
policy and practice there is a tendency to categorise poverty simplistically in terms of the 
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minimum income required to satisfy basic needs (food, accommodation, services), i.e. income 
poverty. This is often reduced to measuring the population living on less than $1 or $2 a day. 
While this measurement may indirectly take into account various aspects of poverty, it can 
become a simplistic label which obscures interesting nuances in how poverty is perceived in 
different countries.409  
 
The literature on poverty and poverty classification in Ghana is fairly extensive (e.g.  Ashong and 
Smith, 2001; Canagarajah and Pörtner, 2003; Coulombe, 2004; GoG, 2003a: section 3.3; GoG, 
2000; Kunfaa, 1999; Kunfaa and Dogbe, 2002; Norton, Bortei-Doku Aryeetey, Korboe and 
Dogbe, 1995) and is generally in line with the international literature in identifying the multi-
dimensional nature of poverty. Much of this literature recognizes the inadequacy of income 
poverty measures (and the difficulty in measuring income anyway) and discusses participatory 
poverty classification, including wealth ranking, as a means to access local knowledge about 
poverty. These “local, or self-definitions of poverty provide a vital insight into physical, 
economic, human and social conditions of the poor” (Ashong and Smith, 2001: 5). 
 
Broader interpretations of poverty present a more accurate picture of who the poor are (e.g. 
defined in terms of income/ consumption, low achievements in education and health, 
vulnerability, exposure to risk and voicelessness / powerlessness, material/ non material assets, 
gender and ethnic equality, and freedom/security) and question the precision of poverty lines 
defined only in terms of income or expenditure (Ashong and Smith, 2001; World Bank, 2000). 
 
However, in practice, the Ghana Government uses an economic index to measure poverty. The 
Ghana Living Standards Surveys (GLSS), which are used by the government to collect economic 
and social indicators, characterizes the poor as those subsisting on a per capita income of less than 
two-thirds of the national average. The 'hard core' poverty line is defined as income below one 
third of the mean. In monetary terms these two poverty lines translated as ¢700,000 per adult per 
year (approximately US$100) and ¢900,000 (approximately US$129) in 1998/99.  
 
In order to obtain a more multi-dimensional understanding of poverty, therefore, it was decided 
that a simple wealth ranking exercise was needed in order to be clear about possible 
poverty/wealth categories that would be used in the household mapping exercise. 
 
                                                 
409 This paragraph draws on Palmer et al., 2007. 
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Moreover, getting accurate data on incomes is difficult, not least due to occupational pluralism 
and the fact that most households keep no financial records.  
 
The concept of wealth ranking is based on using local knowledge about people’s levels of wealth. 
Local people who live and work in the same village and who can observe others over a long time 
period are normally a better judge of levels of wealth than an outsider. In a wealth ranking 
exercise, key informants from the local communities rank their fellow villagers into wealth 
categories. The informants decide on their own definitions of wealth and wealth categories. The 
wealth ranking exercise therefore helps to bring out the complexities and realities of wealth and 
poverty, rather than using definitions predetermined by the researchers (Jeffries, Warburton, 
Oppong-Nkrumah and Fredua Antoh, 2001: 3-4). 
 
Firstly I had lengthy discussions with two well-known community members who were to assist 
me with the mapping exercise.410 I had explained to them what I wanted to do – to think about 
possible poverty/wealth categories before conducting a household mapping exercise. What made 
this exercise easier was that one of the community members assisting me had just finished 
conducting an assessment of ‘social groupings’ for the local district assembly to determine how 
much each household had to pay under the new national health insurance scheme (NHIS). Under 
the NHIS, households were classified as either core poor, very poor, poor, middle-income or rich 
(Table C.1). While a start, the NHIS classifications were not totally satisfactory since the 
descriptions of each category was still very employment- and income-centric. Moreover, the 
terms ‘unemployed’ and ‘employed’ are problematic in the Ghanaian context, particularly in rural 
areas (chap.2.3.1). Hence in order to find out what such classifications mean it was necessary to 
conduct a qualitative exercise to establish what factors should be included when thinking about a 






                                                 
410 One used to be the local assembly person (lowest official in district assembly hierarchy), has lived in the 
community all his life (he is aged about 50 years) and I have known him since January 2001. Having 
known this person for almost five years meant that we had a strong rapport and I was able to freely access 
information about the village in the knowledge that he would not give me a guarded response. The other 
was a teacher in the local ICCES centre who had been in the village for the last two years.  
411 This was intended to capture the multi-dimensional nature of poverty.  
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Table C.1. Social groupings in the informal sector according to the National Health 
Insurance Scheme 
 
Core poor Adults who are unemployed and do not receive any
identifiable and constant support from elsewhere for
survival
Very poor Adults who are unemployed but receive identifiable 
and consistent financial support from sources of 
low income
Poor Adults who are employed but receive low returns for
their efforts and are unable to meet their basic needs
Middle income Adults who are employed and able to meet their
basic needs
Rich Adults wo are able to meet their basic needs and 
some of their wants
Very rich Adults who are able to meet their basic needs and 
most of their wants  
Source: GoG, 2004k 
 
The following list emerged through discussions:  
 
The source of a household’s income (degree to which family members are employed, 
unemployed or underemployed, what types of income-generating activities they pursue 
and how successful these activities are); clothing/shoes; food eaten (including number of 
meals a day); type of housing (materials used, type of toilet, water and fuel source); 
whether the children were at school; the type of medical care the household usually has; 
whether the household owns any farmland or livestock; what kinds of ‘luxury’ items a 
household owns (e.g. TV, radio, fridge, bicycle, car); the extent to which a household 
contributes/participates in to social and community obligations/associations (e.g. funeral 
or church/mosque donations, and membership of informal health and savings groups); 
household misfortune (including disease, death in the family and funeral obligations etc); 
household vulnerability (how easily could they fall into poverty?); education and training 
background of household members and ability of household to educate their children; 
family structure (including divorced or widowed women, old people with no family 
support). 
 
We decided that we would categorise households into five types: very poor, poor, average 
(middle-income), well off, very well off bearing the above proxy indicators of poverty/wealth in 
mind. Discussions with the community member who had previously been involved in the NHIS 
revealed that virtually no-one in the community had been classified as core-poor. Hence we 
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decided to merge ‘core-poor’ and ‘very poor’ together as simply ‘very poor’. At the other end of 
the scale we decided to expand ‘rich’ into two categories to distinguish between those seen as 
asikafoo (rich people) or meyeyie / meya ayeyie (on the way to becoming rich) and those seen as 
sikawur (‘owner of money’) (see below). To get a better idea of what constitutes a household in 
each of these categories we made visits to 21 households in Otaakrom community over a five day 
period; talking informally to the household members and making an assessment of the household, 
their assets and their capabilities. The following descriptions represent the typical households in 
each of the five categories. 
 
Very poor – ohiabubroo (miserably poor); ohia ye edam bo (poverty is madness); oteneho (‘I live 
on my own’) 
• Poor house structure (mud as principal building material); 
• Usually has about 3 rooms in their house; 
• Uses a communal toilet; 
• Cooks with firewood; 
• Might not own a radio; 
• Does not own a TV; 
• Can’t meet normal requirements, e.g.: 
o Does not eat three meals a day; 
o Clothing is old and very poor quality; 
o Children often do not attend school; 
o Prefers not to go to hospital due to costs and can’t afford the national health 
insurance scheme (NHIS); 
o Is not a member of community associations and either makes little or no 
contribution at church/mosque; 
o Often does not attend funerals as can’t afford to make a donation; 
o Has very little influence over community affairs/decisions. 
Poor – ohiafoo / ohiani (the poor) 
• Poor house structure (mud as principal building material); 
• Usually has no more than 4-5 rooms in their house; 
• Uses a communal toilet; 
• Usually owns a radio; 
• Usually can’t meet normal requirements, e.g.: 
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o Finds it tough to get three meals a day; 
o Clothing is old and poor quality; 
o Finds it hard to send children to school (e.g. due to cost of school uniform); 
o Prefers not to go to hospital due to costs and can’t afford the NHIS; 
o Usually a member of community associations but often is late paying 
contributions; 
o Makes small contributions at funerals; 
o Has little influence over community affairs/decisions. 
Average - adantemo 
• Adequate shelter: usually mud block house often with concrete plastering; 
• Usually has no more than 9 rooms in their house; 
• Might have access to a private or shared KVIP toilet;412 
• Owns a radio and might own a TV; 
• Is a member of community associations and makes contributions on time; 
• Has some influence over community affairs/decisions; 
• Able to afford adequate clothing and food for family; 
• Able to send children to school, but has difficulty sending them to post-basic education 
(e.g. sending a child to SSS is a big problem, but not impossible). 
Well off – asikafoo (rich people); meyeyie / meya ayeyie (on the way to becoming rich) 
• Good shelter: strong house structure (concrete clock, plastering, burglar bars); 
• Often many rooms; 
• Has a private KVIP toilet; 
• Might cook with gas; 
• Owns a radio and TV; 
• Probably owns a mobile; 
• Is a member of a number of community associations and makes contributions on time; 
• Has quite a lot of influence over community affairs/decisions; 
• Able to afford good clothing and food for family; 
• Able to send children to school, including to post-basic institutions. 
Very well off – sikawur (‘owner of money’), odefuo 
• Lives in a well-built large house; 
• Cooks with gas, has own toilet; 
                                                 
412 KVIP – ‘Kumasi ventilation improved’ toilet: a single pit latrine with a ventilation tube. 
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• Can meet and surpass all requirements regarding clothing and food; 
• Owns a TV, radio, mobile, fridge/freezer, cooker and often a car/vehicle; 
• No problem sending children to the best schools at any level; 
• Very influential in the community. 
 
These categories above could then be used in the household mapping exercise. 
 
C.2. Household mapping exercise 
 
Next the household mapping exercise was conducted over a seven day period, during which a 
map of all households in Otaakrom was drawn up with the assistance of the two community 
members mentioned above. 
 
This consisted of two main activities: 
 
Identification of different households 
The two community members were able to identify different economic family units; in some 
instances more than one family lived in the same household, or some families had more than one 
household. The definition of a ‘household’ for the purpose of this survey was taken to be the 
household economic unit; people were considered to be in the same household if they contributed 
to the economic welfare of that unit and/or ate from the same (re)source. This was decided by the 
two community members who were guiding the household mapping process.  
 
Categorisation of household according to poverty/wealth indicators 
The two community members were asked to consider the multiple proxy indicators of 
wealth/poverty – which we had determined previously - for each household. I asked them to 
consider not only the situation the households found themselves at the time we saw them, but how 
representative the households current situation was in relation to how the household normally is 
over the space of the last year.413 
 
 
                                                 
413 The household mapping exercise was conducted about the same time as households were starting to 
receive income from cocoa (November/December harvest). Hence households tend to have more 
disposable income at this time of year. 
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C.3. Random sampling and questionnaires  
 
After the household and wealth mapping exercise was complete, a random sample of 81 
households was taken from the list of all households in Otaakrom (n = 235), representing a 35% 
sample of all households in the village. Resources were not available to increase the sample size, 
but the author considers it to be fairly representative of all households in the community. 
 
Each household was then visited and a simple questionnaire was administered to the household 
head, asking principally about the youth aged 14-25 in the household (see C.5, below, for the 
questionnaire). However, while the principal focus was on collecting data on youth, I considered 
that it would be interesting to ask a question about the income generating activities of the 
households at the same time; to get a sense of the degree of occupational pluralism at the 
household level. 
 
Each questionnaire took approximately 30 minutes with the household head being the principal 
respondent. In many instances other family members were present at the interviews and were able 
to contribute and clarify aspects of the household head’s response. The household head, along 
with the family members present at the time of the interview were relied upon to provide 
information about their children. Since it was known that many of the youth raised in Otaakrom 
are not currently present in Otaakrom it was considered more effective and less time consuming 
not to interview the youth directly. Hence information of the youth was obtained from the 
household head and other family members present at the time the questionnaire was administered. 
Using this approach meant that some information was missing as parents or other family 
members could not tell exactly what some of their families’ youth were currently doing outside of 
the village, but it also meant that data on a significant proportion of non-resident household 
members was able to be collected. 
 
In the household interviews I was assisted by a teacher from the village vocational centre who 
acted as a translator, but who later took over the data collection exercise acting as a research 
assistant. Approximately half the questionnaires were undertaken with both myself and the 
teacher. Later on, however, as my time in Ghana was coming to a close, the teacher took over the 
data collection exercise and posted the remaining questionnaires to me in the UK. Since we had 
done approximately 40 household interviews together, I considered that he had sufficient 
experience to continue alone.   
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C.4. Analysis: some background data on the survey 
 
Once all the 81 questionnaires were completed, the data was inputted into SPSS and then 
analysed. Below is some background data on the household heads and youth in the sample. The 
three principal data tables from this exercise can be found in chapter 2 (table 2.1 on occupational 
pluralism) and in this appendix (tables C.6 and C.7 on skills training). 
 
C.4.1. Household heads in the survey 
 
Questionnaires were administered in 81 households (45 households were headed by men and 36 
by women). The age of the household head ranged between 28 and 78 years, with the average age 
of household heads at 50 years.  
 
A third of all household heads had no formal schooling. A further 10% had primary or less. 31% 
had completed middle school/JSS (table C.2). 
 



























Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005 
Legend: JSS – Junior Secondary School; SSS – Senior Secondary School; MS – Middle 
School; PB – Post-basic 
 
C.4.2. Youth in the survey 
 
The survey consisted of 205 youth (101 males, 104 females) aged 14-25 from the village of 
Otaakrom in Ashanti Region (table C.3). At the time of the survey (October 2005 –January 2006) 
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53% of the youth were resident in Otaakrom, while a further 47% were living elsewhere, mostly 
in Kumasi (table C.4). 
 































Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005 
 
























Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005 
 
From the sample of 205 youth, 55 were still in school, 3 gave no response and 147 had already 
left school. The highest educational level of those youth who had left school is shown in table 
C.5; while the majority of youth (52%) had completed JSS, over 25% of youth had less than a 
complete primary education (including 10% with no schooling at all). 
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Primary not completed 22 15.1
Primary completed 2 1.4
JSS not completed 27 18.5
JSS completed 76 52.1
SSS completed 4 2.7
146 100.1  
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2005414 
 
C.4.3. Youth training  
 
Of the 205 youth aged 14-25 in the Otaakrom sample, 55 were still in school and 3 gave no 
response. Out of the remaining 147 youth, 37% (55/147) had engaged in apprenticeship training, 
61% (89/147) had received no further training and only 2% (3/147) had been to a vocational 
institute. The fact that only 2% of the youth in the survey had been to a vocational institute is 
remarkable given that there has been a vocational training centre (an ICCES) in the village since 
2001. This underlines the fact that youth do not like to pursue further institution-based training in 
the same village as they went to JSS. This compares to nearly 40% of Otaakrom youth who have 
gone through apprenticeship training. 
 
Furthermore, table C.6 shows that the ‘poor’ are able to participate in apprenticeship training; 
nearly half of all Otaakrom’s youth who had been through an apprenticeship were from ‘poor’ or 
‘very poor’ households (26/55).  
 
Table C.6. Percentage of youth in Otaakrom engaged in post school skills training  
Apprenticeship Vocational school No further training Total
n % n % n % n
Very poor 3 5.5 0 0 6 6.7 9
Poor 23 41.8 1 33.3 26 29.2 50
Average 29 52.7 2 66.6 56 62.9 87
Above avr. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Well-off 0 0 0 0 1 1.1 1
Total 55 100 3 99.9 89 99.9 147  
Source: Author’s fieldwork 
 
 
                                                 
414 Total of youth completing formal education was 147, but missing data means that the total in this table 
is 146. 
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C.4.4. Schooling, training and migration 
 
Poor households in the sample were more likely to send their children outside of Otaakrom 
village for apprenticeship training; 15/17 youth from poor households currently doing 
apprenticeships were not currently resident in the village. On the other hand, youth from slightly 
better off households doing apprenticeships, while still showing a great deal of mobility to receive 
training, appeared more likely to reside in the village during the training period (table C.7). 
Kumasi was the most popular destination to undertake an apprenticeship with 56% (19/34) of 
youth travelling here. 9% (3/34) travelled to Accra, while 26% (9/34) stayed in Otaakrom village 
to do their apprenticeship (author’s fieldwork).415 The situation became reversed, however, with 
regards to those youth still in school; those from poor households were more likely to be currently 
residing in Otaakrom (16/23), compared to those from average households (9/23). Again Kumasi 
proved the most popular destination for youth to attend school outside of Otaakrom; While 59% 
(36/61) of sampled youth were still at school in Otaakrom, 20% (12/61) were in Kumasi and 7% 
(4/61) in Accra (author’s fieldwork). 
                                                 
415 However, just because an apprentice lived in Otaakrom village during his/her apprenticeship it might 
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C.5. HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE: OTAAKROM 
 
Date:    Poverty code:    Location code: 
 
Q.1. Name of Household head ________________________ 
 
Q.2. Sex (please circle)    MALE / FEMALE 
 
Q.3. Age _____________________ 
 
Q.4. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (circle)   
 
No School     SSS not completed 
Primary not completed   SSS completed 
Primary completed    Other (please state below)    
JSS not completed     
JSS completed     ------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Q. 5. Please tell us about any income generating occupational activity (eg farming, trading 
etc) that your HOUSEOLD engages in at any time in the year. 
 
i) ________________________________ ii) _________________________________ 
 
iii) ________________________________ iv) _________________________________ 
 
vi) ________________________________ vii) ________________________________ 
 
 
Q.6. How many children do you have aged: 
 
a] UNDER five (5) years old? ________________  
 
b] five (5) years old to thirteen (13) years old? ______________ 
 
 
ABOUT YOUR CHILDREN AGED 14-25 
 
The next series of questions are about all your children aged 14 to 25 inclusive. We want to 
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APPENDIX D: Methodological choices, approach and considerations 
 
D.0. Introduction: the research design 
 
Chapter 1 outlined the methodological approach used and the research sites chosen in this study. 
It is useful, however, to examine further the choices, approach and considerations that shaped this 
research.   
 
Since the mid-1990s, academic research into MSEs has been characterised by its 
transdisciplinarity, where research is driven not by the traditions of a particular discipline, but by 
the research problem (Gibbons, Nowotny, Limoges, Trow, Schwartzman and Scott, 1994). The 
examination of the relationship between school, skill and enterprise in this thesis required that 
two main sets of literature were drawn together. On the one hand the education and skills 
development literature (including the literature on traditional apprenticeships), and on the other 
hand the literature concerned with the informal sector, rural livelihoods and MSE development 
(including the literature examining pathways to enterprise and the literature that discusses the 
challenges faced by enterprises). This research therefore took this multi-disciplinary approach as 
a starting point from which to construct a research design.    
 
The research design provided the “framework for the collection and analysis of [the] data” 
(Bryman, 2001: 29) and was important since it maximised the chance of producing research 
results that would be seen as credible by particular audiences. In this way the author is able to gain 
a greater awareness and understanding about the information collected (cf. Blaike, 2000). This can 
also feed back positively into future designs (cf. Kvale, 1996).416 From the outset I was 
intentionally very reflexive about my design and allowed it to constantly change as both my ideas 
and thoughts evolved and as certain unforeseen constraints arose. Indeed, it is to be expected in 
any piece of research spanning a number of years that research questions, theoretical approaches 




                                                 
416 Although Kvale in his article was actually referring to the need for reflexivity with respect to interviews 
(and not research designs), in the sense that by critiquing the strengths and weaknesses of particular 
questions or interview methods this would feed back positively into future interviews. The same principle 
is suggested here for ‘research designs’.       
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D.1. Choices made: why Ghana, why this research and why this approach? 
 
D.1.1. Why investigate skills development and MSEs in Ghana’s informal economy? 
 
Chapter 1 explained the case and rationale for investigating skills development and MSEs in 
Ghana’s informal economy. This will not be repeated here. Instead I will briefly re-state the 
reasons for choosing the three types of skill modality examined in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Chapter 6 examined the Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills (ICCES). This was 
chosen for a number of reasons. First, my prior knowledge of, and contact with this programme 
(since 2001) made access very easy. Second, it is a useful example of formal training, delivered 
in a VTI over three years, which has the specific intention of training youth for self-employment 
in the informal sector. Third, it has not been examined previously in the literature.  
 
Chapter 7 (section 1) examined the Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Programme (STEP). 
This was a useful example of short-duration modular training that had the intention of promoting 
self-employment through the provision of skills and micro-credit. STEP has been very high on 
the policy and political agenda recently (2003-2005) which further made it an interesting choice. 
Other short duration skills programmes, like the World Bank funded Vocational Skills and 
Informal Sector Support Project (VSP) (1995-2001) (Korboe, 2001a, b; World Bank, 1995) or the 
IFAD Rural Enterprise Project (REP) (1995-ongoing) (GoG/IFAD, 2000) have already been 
extensively evaluated and discussed in the literature.  
 
Chapter 7 (section 2) examined traditional apprenticeship training. As the largest provider of 
skills training for the informal micro-enterprise sector, this had to be examined. However, the 
rural focus of my research should complement other research done on apprenticeship in Ghana 
that usually examines urban settings. 
 
D.1.2. Why look at the rural informal economy? 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the urban bias associated with the informal sector literature. This study 
intended to contribute to the wider understanding of Ghana’s informal sector by examining it in 
rural areas.  
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D.1.3. What is rural? 
 
It is not always clear exactly what a ‘rural settlement’ is defined as, and thus the term itself needs 
clarifying. Some define it numerically, as being less than 2000 people (Mead, 1999: 62), less than 
5000 people417 or less than 15,000 people (Aryeetey, 1994: 14). However as Livingstone (1991: 
652) rightly notes, to denote a place as ‘rural’ by how big it is, is to a great extent arbitrary. The 
Ghana Statistical Service defines rural areas as having the following characteristics:418 the 
majority of the population are engaged in primary economic activities (farming, fishing, hunting); 
an area where the per capita income is significantly lower than the national average; an area with 
a general lack of basic social amenities. For this research rural is defined more by characteristic 
than size and is taken as meaning an area where the predominant activities are or concerned with 
agricultural activities.    
 
D.1.4. Where in rural Ghana? 
 
During the research design phase, I initially intended to have three rural research sites in different 
parts of Ghana: one in Ashanti and two in Upper Volta Region. I had visited all these sites before 
as Schatzman and Strauss (1973, in Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 37-38) advise:  
 
[The researcher should] case possible research sites with a view to assessing their 
suitability, the feasibility of carrying out research there, and how access might best be 
accomplished.  
 
However, as my research design developed I made the decision to focus on a smaller area, with 
three sites closer together: Otaakrom and Nyinahin in Atwima Mponua District (Ashanti Region) 
and Bibiani in Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai District (Western Region). This was because, prior to 
commencing the PhD fieldwork, I had some 16 months experience working in this area: 14 
months working in a VTI and living at village-level, and 2 months doing MSc research on rural 
MSE financing. I decided that it would be better to take advantage of the prior knowledge and 




                                                 
417 Ghana Statistical Services, 1995, in Kpemlie, 1998: 7. 
418 Ghana Statistical Services, 1995, in Kpemlie, 1998: 7. 
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D.2. Methodological approach 
 
As noted in chapter 1, six main approaches were used to collect data: i) retrospective interviews 
with 114 masters in rural manufacturing enterprises; ii) interviews with 160 traditional 
apprentices; iii) questionnaires, interviews and focus groups with 162 graduates from 7 
vocational training centres; iv) a basic household survey (81 households) in one rural community 
(involving a wealth-ranking and mapping exercise) that captured data on 165 youth; v) interviews 
with other key informants (e.g. village, district and national officials, as well as development 
partner officials); and, vi) informal (participant) observation of education, skills and enterprises 
in rural communities. Having covered the first four approaches earlier (chap.1.4 and Appendices 
A, B and C), it would be useful to say a few words on the last two approaches.  
 
D.2.1. Interviews with other key informants  
 
The names of key informants are not included in this thesis deliberately to protect their identity. 
 
During the fieldwork, interviews were undertaken at the three main ministries related to the 
theme of this thesis: education (MoESS), manpower (MoMYE) and private sector development 
(MoTIPP). In each of these ministries there were different agencies whose head offices in Accra 
were also approached for information, for example ICCES, STEP, Ghana Education Service 
(GES), National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI), National Board for Small-Scale Industries 
(NBSSI), National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP).  
 
Key individuals in the development partner (DP) community in Accra were also approached (e.g. 
education/TVET advisors, economists, rural livelihood specialists, private sector development 
advisors), for example in the ILO, World Bank, DFID, USAID, JICA. In a number of instances I 
was able to interview senior agency individuals who were visiting Ghana for research (e.g. in the 
case of the ILO). In addition, while doing interviews in the World Bank (Washington) and UNDP 
(New York) as part of DFID-funded work (see Palmer et al., 2007) I was also able ‘piggy-back’ 
questions specifically related to my PhD. In this way I was able to access very senior individuals 
within these agencies.   
 
The academic and research consultancy community in Accra was also approached to find out 
about current research being conducted and/or to have discussion related to my thesis. For 
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example, visits were made to the University of Ghana (Centre for Social Policy Studies, Institute 
of Statistical, Social and Economic Research) (Legon), the Private Enterprise Foundation 
(Legon) and Associates for Change (Accra).  
 
At the regional level, I was able to follow-up on national level interviews with agencies like 
ICCES, STEP, NBSSI. At the district level, interviews were conducted with assembly officials.   
 
Some of the most valuable information, however, arose from countless informal discussions I had 
with those involved in education and skill delivery at the village level. Many of these individuals 
I have known for five years and count as friends. Our discussions led to the very detailed 
understanding of ICCES and STEP in particular, but also to TVET and rural MSE development 
more widely.   
 
D.2.2. Informal (participant) observation of education, skills and enterprises in rural 
communities 
 
While doing the doctoral fieldwork I was able to continue to do some work for ICCES (teaching, 
administration, planning etc.) which updated my first hand experience previously gained in 2001-
2002. A further strategy adopted was to observe master-craftspeople, who I knew from the 
village, in their enterprises.  
 
D.2.3. The case study approach and issues of triangulation 
 
In effect there are multiple levels of case studies involved in this research. First, and foremost, 
Ghana is used a case study to illustrate the interaction amongst school, skill and enterprise. 
Second, the three main locations chosen (Otaakrom, Nyinhin and Bibiani) represent case studies 
of particular localities. Third, the three types of skills training programmes chosen (ICCES, STEP 
and apprenticeship) are all case studies of particular types of training modality (long-duration pre-
employment, short-duration modular and on-the-job respectively). Fourth, those interviewed in 
more detail (e.g. master-craftspeople and ICCES graduates/trainees) are themselves micro-level 
case studies.     
 
The case study approach has a number of advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand: a) the 
emphasis on an intensive examination of a contextualised single case reveals the complexity and 
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unique nature of the phenomenon (Yin, 1994); b) the use of a variety of data collection 
techniques allowing multiple triangulation should provide a rich depth of data (Bryman, 2001; 
Hakin, 2000; Stake, 1998); c) the use of multiple case studies allow for comparison and 
contrasting to occur (Hakin, 2000); d) the confidence in the general significance and robustness 
of research findings will increase with more case studies (Sudman, 1976 cited in Hakin, 2000). 
 
However, the principle weakness is that the results can be strongly shaped by the interests, 
perspective and ‘brought-self’ of the researcher (Hakin, 2000; Reinharz, 1997).  Moreover this 
method has been criticised for its lack of rigour and generalisability (Bryman, 2001). 
 
Inherent in the case study approach is the use of multiple tools (in this case questionnaires, semi-
structured interviews, interviews with key informants and impromptu discussions) that serve as a 
cross check. In addition, since different information arises from different tools a more holistic 
view is obtained overall.  
 
Triangulation itself has a number of strengths and weaknesses that should be noted. On the one 
hand, triangulation can help to mitigate personal bias associated with a single methodological 
approach since the use of a collection of methods is thought to reduce the effect of the peculiar 
biases of each one (Webb et al., 1966 in Blaikie, 2001). On the other hand, however: a) practical 
constraints relating to time and money will mean that any triangulation that does occur will be 
limited in time, depth, space and professionalism (of researcher multi-tasking); b) Mathison 
(1988: 14 in Blaikie, 2001: 267) points to ontological considerations, noting that different 
methods may tap different ways of knowing different realities; c) since triangulation rarely (if 
ever) leads to convergence the researcher still has to subjectively interpret the results. However, 
Blaike (2001) notes that provided the methods used follow a common research strategy, 
ontological problems are not an issue since all methods are interpreted within a consistent 
ontology. 
 
D.3. Considerations  
 
D.3.1. Epistemological considerations 
 
In terms of the epistemological considerations that underpin the theory, the aim of the research - 
to understand the situation from the perspective of the informants, not to ‘discover’ knowledge, 
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but to see how informants socially construct it - is consistent with a constructionist epistemology 
(Crotty, 1998). The interpretivist theoretical perspective followed sees meaning as ‘situated’ in 
specific contexts (LeCompte and Schensul, 1999: 49). It is thus clear that the proposed methods 
of semi-structured interviews, the use of case studies, non-directive questioning use of impromptu 
discussions are consistent with these theoretical and epistemological underpinnings. Indeed Stake 
(1998) notes that researchers using case studies can “assist readers in the construction of 
knowledge” (p.95).  
 
D.3.2. Pragmatic considerations 
 
The initial design accepted that pragmatic considerations such as travel costs, contacts and access 
to information would be very important in the choice of location (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
1995), but noted that these considerations would also directly affect the choice of research 
questions, methodology and theoretical approach. Main considerations include the issues of time, 
money and the comparative advantages the author has for conducting this type of research.  
 
Firstly, it was necessary to adopt a feasible approach given the time-frame. Probably the most 
effective way of analyzing the school-skill-enterprise relationship would have been to organize 
longitudinal tracer studies with different groups of youth (e.g. those that had never been to school, 
those that had completed primary but not entered JSS, those that had completed JSS, those that 
had completed an apprenticeship or a VTI course). This would have required at least 5 years to do 
since it would be necessary to trace individuals into the labour market (or into skills training) for 
some time. Within the constraints of doctoral fieldwork this was not possible. Instead, I tried to 
do the next best thing: to get information from VTI graduates on their first destination (training or 
in the labour market) and, perhaps more usefully, to conduct retrospective tracers with those 
already working in the labour market.     
 
Secondly, financial constraints directly affected the methods. While I was able to hire a full-time 
local research assistant to help with the interviews and questionnaires, it was not possible to have 
full-time assistance for the duration of the fieldwork.  
 
Practical considerations arose from the author’s various strengths and weaknesses related to 
personality and personal skills. The fact that I have spent sixteen months in rural Ghana before 
was a great help as it meant I already had a firm grasp of the culture and could more or less ‘hit 
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the ground running’, not wasting (valuable) time settling in or being misled or confused because 
of cultural misunderstandings.  
 
I was also able to judge much better what was and what was not feasible in the given time frame. 
Moreover, the many existing contacts in Ghana the author has from village to Ministry level were 
utilised. The research was also greatly assisted by the fact that I could demonstrate previous 
insider status as this allowed me to gain greater access to individuals (trust, rapport), situations, 
events, places or documents (cf. Agar, 1996). My dual position of being able to demonstrate 
previous insider status, while at the same time remaining an outsider, was advantageous since 
culture members are “often not conscious of the fundamental presuppositions that shape their 
vision” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 9). Although I cannot speak fluent Twi (the local 
language) I speak enough to be able to break down initial barriers and get informants laughing at 
my attempts. Obviously it would have been better if I could conduct all the interviews in Twi 
myself, since some information may be lost or mixed up in translation. Further, reliance on a 
translator can mislead the researcher since the translator can steer the research in the wrong 
direction or can lead the researcher to get either a good or bad impression of an informant 
depending on how they translate and what the personal interaction is like between them and the 
informant they are talking to. The Ghanaian proverb, Obrofotefo na oma obruni ye aye (It is the 
one who hears English [the interpreter] who directs the white man whom to praise), neatly sums 
this up.   
 
D.3.3. Ethical and power considerations 
 
The power relations between the researcher and the researched created a number of ethical 
problems concerning the knowledge generated. For many micro-enterprise owners, apprentices 
and VTI teachers, oburunis (lit. ‘white men’) in Ghana are associated with money and power 
(among other things), meaning that for me it was hard to escape a ‘powerful’ big-man image 
when interviewing these type of people. Some of those interviewed initially thought that I 
represented a bank, an NGO or development agency. However, for the interviews conducted with 
owners and apprentices I was accompanied by residents of that community – who were also my 
friends – and hence these local actors were able to legitimize my position and dispel rumors that I 
was able to provide financial support to these people. My working connection with ICCES at 
village level since 2001 also helped to legitimize my position and often an interview started with 
a discussion of the local ICCES.    




This power asymmetry also relates to the fact that the researcher defines the topic, situation and 
course of the interview (Kvale, 1996: 126), although I attempted to mitigate this in the in-depth 
interviews by encouraging respondents to talk of issues concerning them (while loosely keeping 
within my research parameters).  
 
Another ethical issue connected to power relations I was aware of was that of the foreign 
researcher going into a developing country and extracting information for use abroad, so-called 
‘academic colonialism’. In order to counter this, the intention is for me to rewrite and substantially 
shorten some of the chapters in this thesis in collaboration with some individuals in Ghana – like 
the one on ICCES – so that the information can be used by these individuals to raise awareness of 
their situation.  
 
These problems created by the perceived and actual power imbalance could only be minimized to 
an extent since certain derived characteristics of the researcher cannot be changed. 
 
D.4. PhD timetable 
 
1. October 2003 – September 2004:  Literature reviews and research design constructed 
(methodology outlined, questionnaire designed, research questions formulated, choices made).  
 
2. October 2004 – November 2005: Ghana fieldwork, 
 
























Photo 2: Papa Anthony, 
who described himself as 
‘the colonial man’ (due to 
his age), a tailor, farmer 
and all round 
entrepreneur, Nkawie-
Kuma, Ashanti Region 
(July, 2003). 
 
‘For me, I don’t like loan. 
At first I was just making 
poultry, so I borrowed 
money from somebody, 
later the money went 
away, the cocks died and I 
went myself into debt, so 
I don’t like this loan 
business…at all koraa!’ 









Photo 3: Welders working 
outside in Nyinahin. Note 
the lack of proper eye 
protectors and the use of 
sun-glasses as a substitute 






























Photo 4: The master 
shows them how it is 
done in this carpentry 
enterprise. Note the 
outside location, the basic 
hand tools used and the 
lack of a wood clamp (so 
the master has to sit on 














Photo 5: Carpentry 
practical class at 
Otaakrom ICCES (2001). 
Note the similarities with 
the apprentices above: no 
uniform, lack of tools 





















Photo 6: Hairdressing at 
Otaakrom ICCES (2003). 
Note that there is only one 
practice doll so while one 
girl learns hands-on, the 
other apprentices learn 
through observation – 






















Photo 7: Under the sun: 
lack of classroom space in 
many ICCES centres 
means that classes often 




















Photo 8 (left): Learning 
on the job: ICCES 
trainees getting some 
hands-on practice in the 
construction of a new 
building for that centre. 
 
 
Photo 9 (below): No hurry 
in life at a small tailor’s 
shop in Dambai, Northern 
Volta Region. Most youth 
end up working in 
informal micro-enterprises 
of this type.  
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